Monday, April 13, 2020

FINAL EXAMINATION IN EVIDENCE


INSTRUCTION: Please answer the 20 questions below.Submit your answers in my email ad: emma_bastasa2000@yahoo.com

1.In a case for annulment of marriage filed by the husband on the ground that the wife was suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia, plaintiff sought to present the psychiatrist from the National Mental Hospital to testify as an expert witness. Defendant objected on the ground that the testimony sought to be presented is privileged since the psychiatrist examined the patient in a professional capacity. The trial court allowed her to testify as an expert witness and she was asked hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated defendant for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the medicine she had prescribed.
Issue:
In the testimony barred by Sec. 24(c) , Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidences?

2.Atty. Sansaet was counsel for Paredes in a complaint undergoing preliminary investigation before the Tanodbayan for violation of RA No. 3019. The complaint was, however, dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy based on their claim that Paredes was previously charged of the same offense which was dismissed after arraignment. It turned out, however, that this claim of double jeopardy was based on falsified documents, so that both Paredes and Sansaet were charged of falsification. As his defense, Atty. Sansaet claimed that it was Paredes who falsified the documents in his house and instigated and induced him to file the motion using the falsified documents. Atty. Sansaet offered to become state witness against Paredes.
Issue:
Would the proposed testimony of Atty. Sansaet violate the attorney-client privilege?

3. Sometime in 1959 a number of residents of Guiguinto, Bulacan, sent a letter-complaint to the Highway District Engineer of that province asking that the Sapang Cabay, a public navigable stream, which had been blocked by means of dikes and dams and converted into fishponds, be ordered reopened and restored to its original condition. The letter was referred to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, who caused an investigation to be conducted pursuant to Republic Act No. 2056. Acting on the report which the investigator submitted to him, the Secretary rendered his decision on August 10, 1959, finding that the Sapang Cabay was a public navigable stream and ordering Cenon Mateo, the herein petitioner-appellant, who had in the meantime acquired the property inside which the said creek is situated, to remove the dikes and dams therein constructed within thirty days from notice; otherwise they would be removed at his expense. Mateo moved to reconsider but was turned down, whereupon he filed the basic petition to restrain the respondent Secretary from enforcing his decision. The petition, as already stated, was dismissed by the Court a quo.

They pose the argument that when the question at issue is whether or not a certain body of water is private property or constitutes a navigable stream or river of the public domain, the same is essentially judicial and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to inquire into and decide; and that insofar as Republic Act No. 2056 purports to confer that power upon him it does so in violation of the Constitution.
In the memorandum filed by the petitioner-appellant after Lovina vs. Moreno was decided, he submits that all but one of the issues he raised have been settled by that decision, and that the only issue which remains is the applicability of Republic Act No. 2056 in the instant case. He concedes the authority of the Secretary to decide, after hearing, whether or not a river or creek is navigable and therefore belongs to the public domain; whether or not the dikes and dams complained against encroach upon or obstruct such navigable river or creek, or communal fishing grounds; and whether or not the dikes and dams constitute public nuisance or prohibited constructions. The plea, however, is that in the light of the facts established at the investigation ordered by the respondent Secretary his conclusion that Sapang Cabay is a public navigable creek constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not substantial evidence rule applies.

4. Accused-petitioner was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, which school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. His duties included the collection of tuition fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance of collections exceeding P500.00 to the National Treasury.

An information charging petitioner with having violated Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, was filed with the then Court of First Instance ("CFI") of Surigao del Norte (docketed Criminal Case No. 299)
Which the accused-petitioner failed to audit in the amount of SIXTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS and SIXTY-TWO CENTAVOS (P16,483.62) and and failed as well to restitute despite demands by the office of the Provincial Auditor, to the damage and prejudice of the Government equal to the amount misappropriated.
A warrant of arrest was issued, but accused-petitioner could not be found. On 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the RTC, he pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was then docketed with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond.

Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. However this was denied and trial ensued and he was found guilty.


Issue:
Whether or not the accused-petitioner is guilty of malversation.


5. On the 26th day of July, 1985, while Robert Te was maneuvering the cargo truck to get the truck from the mud he was shot by Fortunato Pamon and the later died instantly. Thereafter, the truck was burned by another man, and then gunman escaped and boarded the last truck which was the one owned by Gerson Dulang. Pamon was arrested was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest for a murder charge against him in the RTC of Tangub City and was detained at the PC stockade at Camp Hamac, Sicayab, Zamboanga del Norte. The accused-appellant, in the presence of Atty. Rubencio Ligorio of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), executed before Pfc. Roland Salatandre of the CIS a Confession marked as Exhibit "A". He admitted that he shot and killed Robert Te. Furthermore, he implicated John Doe, alias "Dodo", Gerson Dulang, and Inocencio Feras. This extrajudicial confession was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Vicente Aseniero and reaffirmed his confession during the preliminary investigation of the case.
An information was filed for murder was filed against Fortunato Pamon, as principal by direct participation, Inocencio Feras and Gerson Dulang as principals by inducemet, and John Doe, alias "Dodo" as accomplice. When Inocencio Feras died during the course of the trial, the information was amended by dropping Feras' name and substituting the name of Gerson Dulang. The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Gerson Dulang who professed ignorance of the crime; of Raul Curativo, a neighbor of Fortunato Pamon, who described the killer as "short, dark in complexion, with curly hair and was bearded",  and who said that Fortunato Pamon was not the killer; of Jaime Gilbero, who said that at the time of the killing, Fortunato Pamon was plowing his field; and of Fortunato Pamon himself who denied the killing and retracted his extrajudicial confession. His affidavit of retraction, dated April 23, 1987, is attached as Annex "B" of Appellant's Brief. He alleged therein that the confession was involuntary on his part as it resulted from torture and coercion. This affidavit was, however, not offered in the trial court as an exhibit. Fortunato Pamon and Gerson Dulang made separate assignments of errors. Fortunato Pamon avers that the trial court erred in upholding the validity of his arrest and the voluntariness and admissibility of his extrajudicial Confession, and in not considering the testimony of a witness, Raul Curativo, that Fortunato Pamon was not the killer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made by the accused-appellant is admissible as evidence against him and co-accused Gerson Dulang.

6. Accused-appellant Henry Ponseca y Soriano appeals from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, convicting him and his four co-accused namely:  Alex de Guzman y Magat, Agustin Ladao y Loreto, Henry Ponseca y Soriano, Antonio Panganiban y Aquino and Victorio Eugenio y Roque, of the crime of robbery with homicide conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence employed upon the person of ALFONSO DELA CRUZ Y QUIAMBAO, that is, by tying the latter’s both hands and feet and subsequently dumping his body at the estero in Tanigue St., Dagat-Dagatan, this city, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away undetermined amount, belonging to the said complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in undetermined amount; and as a result of aforesaid force and violence employed to said victim, the latter drowned at the estero which incident directly caused his death.
In the ensuing investigation conducted by Police Inspector Antonio Paras and Ricardo Concepcion, accused-appellant and his co-accused executed, with the assistance of Atty. Juanito R. Crisostomo of the Public Attorney’s Office, Caloocan City, their extra-judicial confession admitting authorship of the crime of robbery with homicide.
For his defense, accused-appellant testified that on February 9, 1990, while he was in an eatery in Caloocan, he was arrested by armed Caloocan policemen. Prior to his arrest, accused-appellant declared that he did not know his four co-accused.  He denied participation in the commission of the crime and claimed that he was tortured and forced to sign an extra-judicial confession. Accused-appellant insisted that he does not know Atty. Juanito Crisostomo and that he was never assisted by him during the custodial investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not extra-judicial confession made is admissible in evidence.

7. Accused Nicomedes Fabro, Francisco Dimalanta, Amado Alcala, William Hoge, and “John Doe” were charged for murdering one Dionisio Joaquin with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and reward. Fabro was the gunman and Dimalanta and Alcala who participated in the killing were his co-conspirators.
During interrogation, CIS investigator Santiago requested Fabro to sign a document, which turned out to be his extra-judicial confession/admission (Exh. “F”).  Accused Fabro  (claims that he) was not allowed to read the document, neither were its contents read to him.   A certain Atty. Isagani Jungco was however present when he signed the document.
The confession of Dimalanta coincided in all material points with the confession of Fabro.  Dimalanta narrated how he was promised the amount P10,000 by a certain Bill Hoge and how he was paid of P5,000.00 as initial payment and the balance to be paid after the killing is accomplished.  The P5,000.00 initial payment was shared by the three accused.” From the foregoing, the trial court established the existence of conspiracy among the three accused.  The trial court further found the testimony of Beck unbiased, truthful and credible.
Issues:
1.            Whether or not the confession made by the appellant is admissible

2.            Whether or not Positive identification has more probative value than the defense of Alibi in this case at bar.

8. On July 1947, Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to private respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong Yee, who died in January 1983. The said sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English. Subsequently, the document was registered with the RD of Manila, which issued a TCT dated September 2, 1947 in the name of private respondent Parian.
According to private respondent, she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to the brother of her husband, petitioner Ong Ching Po when the spouses settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded that the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, petitioners refused to vacate the said premises.
On March 19, 1984, Parian filed a case for unlawful detainer against petitioner Ong Ching Po before the MTC of Manila. The inferior court dismissed her case, and so did the RTC, Manila and the CA, the CA decision final and executory.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong Ching Po bought the said parcel of land from Joi Jong. The sale was evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale written in Chinese. An English translation of said document read as follows:
Deed of Sale
I, Ong Joi Jong, a party to this Deed of Sale hereby sell in absolutely (sic) manner a lot located on No. 4 Fundidor Street, San Nicolas an (sic) area consisting 213 square meters including a one-story house erected thereon unto Mr. Ong Ching Po for the sum of P6,000.00 the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by me and consequently I have executed and signed the government registered title (sic) the said lot inclusive of the house erected thereon, now belong (sic) to Mr. Ong Ching Po unequivocally. And the purpose of this document is to precisely serve as proof of the sale.
Addendum: I have acceded to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po into signing another document in favor of Soledad Parian (She is the Filipino wife of Ong Yee, brother of Ong Ching Po) for the purpose of facilitating the issuance of the new title by the City Register of Deeds and for the reason that he is not yet a Filipino. I certify to the truthfulness of this fact.
Lot Seller: Ong Joi Jong
On Dec. 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to his children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong, the same property sold by Joi Jong to private respondent Parian  in 1947.
On Dec. 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy and David filed an action for reconveyance and damages against private respondent in the RTC, Manila.
On July 26, 1986, private respondent Parian  filed an action for quieting of title against petitioners Ong Ching Po and his wife, petitioner Yu Siok Lian, in the RTC, Manila. Upon her motion, the case was consolidated with the earlier civil case. (petitioner Ong Ching Po died in October 1986.)
On May 30 1990, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent.
On appeal by petitioners to the CA, the said court affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
 According to petitioners, the CA erred:
(1) When it gave full faith and credit to the Deed of Sale (Exh. A) in favor of private respondent, instead of the Deed of Sale (Exh, B) in favor of petitioner Ong Ching Po.
(2) When it concluded that the acts of petitioners were not acts of ownership; and
(3) When it ruled that no express nor implied trust existed between petitioners and private respondent (as stated in Exh. B)


9. In this case the accused-appellant RizalinoFundano seeks to reverse the 1996 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape. Rizalino was charged with this crime that he had committed towards Melody Fundano, his 15-year old daughter with his common-law wife Maria Fundano.

            It was alleged in the complaints filed by Melody and her mother that she was first raped by Rizalino on the night of September 10, 1993. Melody was again raped by Rizalino on the next two succeeding nights. However, Melody was only able to reveal about her ordeal on October 26, 1993 because she was afraid and ashamed of what had happened.On November 11, 1993, Melody, accompanied by her mother Maria and her sister-in-law Lucita, went to the NBI and accomplished a complaint sheet, executed a sworn statement, and submitted herself to a medical examination.

            Dr. Rolando Victoria, who examined Melody, found no extra-genital physical injuries norhymenal lacerations, and while her hymen was intact, it admitted a 2.8-centimeter diameter tube without producing any injury. Dr. Victoria thus concluded that MELODY's hymenal orifice could admit an adult male organ in full erection without suffering injury, and that it was possible she engaged in sexual engaged in sexual intercourse.

            The trial court found Rizalinoquilty of rape. It gave full faith & credit to Melody's testimony who declared in court, "in a straight forward and categorical manner," and exhibited no ulterior motive which "could have removed the sense of modesty and shame in a 15-year old girl and impelled her to concoct a story that would certainly bring ignominy, dishonor and humiliation to her and her family." Also, the trial court found unworthy the credence of Rizalino’sdefense of alibi, which was belied by the witnesses for the prosecution.


ISSUES:
1.            Whether or not the victim Melody is a credible witness given that the accused alleged that she has an ill motive in blaming her father for the crime.

2.            Whether or not the defendant Rizalino may question the expertise and credibility of Dr. Rolando Victorio as an expert witness in the case.

3.            Whether or not the Trial Court erred in disregarding the surrebuttal testimony of the defense.

10. The petitioner prays for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to admit Exhibits A, B, C, and D (attached to the petition), as evidence for the prosecution in criminal cases Nos. 4501 and 4502 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Andres Guevarra. The informations alleged that the defendant, with malicious intent, published on page 9 of the weekly paper IngMagumasidin its issue of July 13, 1930, a squib in verse, of which a translation into Spanish was included therein, intended to impeach the honesty, integrity, and reputation of Clemente Dayrit (information in criminal cause No. 4501) and of Mariano Nepomuceno (information in criminal cause No. 4502).

The defendant demurred on the ground of duplicity of informations, he having published only one libelous article in the IngMagumasidfor July 13, 1930. The court overruled the demurrer.
A joint trial was held of criminal cases Nos. 4501 and 4502. The fiscal attempted to present as evidence for the prosecution, the aforementioned Exhibits A, B, C, and D, which are copies of the IngMagumasidcontaining the libelous article with the innuendo, another article in the vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish. Counsel for the defendant objected to this evidence, which objection was sustained by the court.

The respondents answered the petition for mandamus, praying for its dismissal with costs against the petitioner.

At the hearing of this case, both parties appeared and moved that they be allowed to present memoranda in lieu of an oral argument, which memoranda are in the record.
The petitioner contends that the exhibits in question are the best evidence of the libel, the subject matter of the information, and should therefore be admitted; while the respondents maintain that, inasmuch as the libelous articles were not quoted in the information, said evidence cannot be admitted without amending the information. The prosecution asked for an amendment to the information, but the court denied the petition on the ground that it would impair the rights of the defendant, holding that the omission of the libelous article in the original was fatal to the prosecution.




ISSUE:

Whether or not The aforementioned exhibits are admissible as evidence.

11. Gomer Climaco was caught during the buy-bust operation. During the buy-bust, two plastic sachets were turned over to SPO4 Teofilo Royena, one was the product of the buy bust marked TR-B, which means Teofilo Royena and the letter "B" means "Bust." While the other one recovered from Gomer Climaco by SPO3 Samson was marked TR-R, which means Teofilo Royena and the letter "R" means "Recovered". Climaco was charged with illegal possession and illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. During trial, PO1 Ignacio testified against Climaco and the following documentary exhibits were offered for the prosecution: (1) Exhibit "A" – Letter dated 7 September 2004; (2) Exhibit "B" – Chemistry Report No. D-1102-04; (3) Exhibit "C" – One-half white envelope; (4) Exhibit "C-1" – Plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with markings "GSC-1"; (5) Exhibit "C-2" – Plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with markings "GSC-2"; and (6) Exhibit "D" – Pinanumpaang Salaysay of PO1 Ignacio. The RTC declared Climaco guilty of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issues:
1. Whether the chain of custody of evidence was broken.
2. Whether the guilt of Climaco for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug, was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
3. What is “chain of custody” and its importance in the prosecution for illegal possession of prohibited drugs?


12.         Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City went to the police station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.

ISSUES:
       1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
  2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of the accused.


13. On February 2, 1993, Andrea, who was then three years old, came home crying, with bruises on her right thigh. She told her guardian, Iluminada Beltran, that her uncle, herein petitioner, touched her private part. In her own words, she said, "Inaano ako ng uncle ko," while doing a pumping motion with the lower part of her body to demonstrate what had been done to her. She also said that petitioner showed his penis to her.
The matter was reported to Barangay Councilor Carlos Lumaban who, with the child, the latter’s guardian, and three barangay tanods, went to the house of petitioner to confront him. As petitioner’s father refused to surrender his son to Lumaban and his party, Lumaban sought assistance from the nearby Western Police District (WPD) Station No. 7. It appears; however, that petitioner took advantage of the situation and ran away.
On February 8, 1993, Lumaban was informed that petitioner was in the nearby barangay. Together with some barangay tanods, Lumaban went to the place where petitioner was reported to be, but petitioner’s employer refused to surrender the latter to the authorities. Later, however, with the aid of two policemen from the WPD Police Station No. 1, Lumaban and his party were able to take petitioner to Precinct 1 and later to Precinct 7.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape, whereupon trial ensued. In her testimony in court, Andrea said that petitioner fondled her organ and showed her his penis. She said that when petitioner did a pumping motion, she had no panties on and that she was lying down. Petitioner was also lying down, according to her. The medical report on Andrea prepared by Dr. Maximo Reyes, who examined the child on February 3, 1993, showed that hymen of the victim is still intact.
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the accusation against him. He said that Andrea was coached by her guardian. He likewise denied that he escaped from Lumaban and his men on February 2, 1993, and said that he only went away to avoid any trouble that time. The trial court found petitioner guilty of acts of lasciviousness hence this appeal.
ISSUES
Whether Andrea is a competent witness.

14. Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila. A year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter. Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that  at the time of their marriage, Joselita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon his time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
Still petitioner was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of ultimate facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person does not call for information on evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of particulars filed in amplification of the petition is sufficient.


15. Dano brothers had a previous misunderstanding over the purchase of a horse from his cousin on installment basis. Emeterio wanted to buy the horse, but appellant bought it ahead of him, which caused the former to resent him.
On March 16, 1994, at 6:30 in the evening, Wilfredo Tapian (Prosecutir’s witness) saw the victim pacing back and forth in appellant’s front yard and armed with a scythe, shouting at appellant, who was looking out of his window to come down so they could fight to the death. (“Kanaog diri kay magkamatay ta.”) Wilfredo tried to pacify the victim who kept repeating his challenge while striking his scythe on the ground but he was ignored. Appellant also advised his younger brother to go home, but the latter refused to listen. Suddenly, Emeterio leaped at appellant who was standing with his head out of the window and slashed appellant with his scythe but missed.
Demosthenes Peralta, the barangay captain of Tiguian, was informed by Wilfredo and a certain Fernando Teves that the Dano brothers were quarreling. Demosthenes went to appellant’s home to investigate. On his way, he met appellant. The latter told Peralta he had killed Emeterio and voluntarily surrendered to him. Demosthenes left appellant in Wilfredo’s house and proceeded to appellant’s residence where he saw the bloody corpse of the victim sprawled in the yard, near the stairs. He noticed that the body bore several hacking and slashing wounds. Demosthenes fetched appellant from Wilfredo’s house and took him to the police station.
The necropsy report established that the cause of death was acute blood loss, secondary to multiple hacking wounds.
When interrogated by the police, appellant, without assistance of counsel, admitted he killed his brother. The pertinent portion of his statement, contained in the police blotter, and read into the records without objection by the defense, reads:
“Subject admitted of  killing his younger brother as the latter was drunk and provoked him for a scythe duel right downstairs of his house that prompted him to get his scythe and come down from his house and allegedly boxed first his brother and subsequently hacked several times as he was already commanded by his evil thoughts.”
Upon arraignment with the assistance of counsel the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, but the RTC of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 29 rendered its decision convicting Alberto Dano herein accused-appelant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, for the death of his brother Emeterio Dano, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua with qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.


Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND IN ADMITTING “EXHIBIT E” AS BASIS OF CONVICTION OF THE CRIME CHARGED


16. An appeal of the decision of the RTC of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62, convicting appellant of the crime of rape with homicide, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P30,000.00 as actual and moral damages.
Appellant was 28 years old, married, cousin of the victim. The victim was an eight (8) year-old girl, Dyesebel "Gigi" de la Cruz, who was reported missing and the following day found raped and strangled to death near the riverbank of the Tayuman river in Quezon province.
On April 14, 1991, at around nine o’clock in the morning, Myra Pines, a twelve-year old girl, was passing by the ricefield near the road located at Barangay Ilayang Tayuman in the Municipality of San Francisco, Quezon Province she heard a voice coming from the direction of the forested area of the place and it seemed to her that someone was being strangled. Listening closely, she recognized the voice as belonging to her friend and playmate, Dyesebel de la Cruz. Frightened at the thought that Dyesebel was being strangled, Myra scampered and proceeded to the crossing where she was originally headed for.
Later that day, at around four o’clock in the afternoon, Barangay Captain Aristeo Allarey of Barangay Ilayang Tayuman was visited in his house by Mila de la Cruz, Dyesebel’s mother, who reported that her daughter was missing. Allarey sought the assistance of his constituents and organized a search party.
Barangay Captain Allarey learned from Gonzalo de la Cruz that, earlier, Dyesebel was in the company of accused-appellant Vicente Valla, and that both of them were tasked to watch the ricefield. They went to the ricefield but appellant was not there. Allarey learned from a barangay tanod that appellant was drinking liquor in the house of a friend within the same barangay. He summoned appellant but the latter failed to immediately report to him.
On the following day, at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, they finally found Dyesebel. Her body was found near the river with her neck blackened and her vagina bloodied. She was still wearing her dress but her panty had been pulled down to her mid-thigh.
Allarey and his companions immediately confronted appellant who, out of remorse, admitted that he raped and killed Dyesebel. Thereafter, he addressed Dyesebel’s father, in the presence of Allarey and company, offering his own daughter in payment of Dyesebel’s life which he took and begged for forgiveness. De la Cruz told appellant that he cannot accept appellant’s daughter.
Dyesebel’s body was brought to the Bondoc Peninsula District Hospital in Catanauan, Quezon, where an autopsy was performed. Dyesebel’s skull bore a depression on the left temporal area which resulted from being struck with a hard object. Her pubic area bore blisters brought about by a contact with a lighted cigarette. Her hymen bore several lacerations indicative of repeated rape before and possibly, after she was killed.
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Myra Pines, the victim’s 12 year-old playmate, who heard the victim’s cries as she was being strangled, but became afraid and went home instead; (2) Aristeo Allarey, the Barangay Captain of Ilayang, Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, who organized a search party upon report of the mother that her daughter was missing, and before whom, appellant admitted that he raped and killed the victim, and even offered his (appellant’s) daughter in return; (3) Gonzalo de la Cruz, father of the victim, who took part in the search party, and who witnessed appellant’s confession to the commission of the crime; (4) Reynaldo Merle, Barangay Tanod of Barangay Ilayang, Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, another member of the search party; (5) Bayani Samadan, Kagawad of the Barangay, also a member of the search party; (6) Rodolfo Rosales, police investigator of San Francisco, Quezon, Philippine National Police; (7) Dr. Araceli R. Madatu, Senior Resident Physician of Bondoc Peninsula District Hospital, Catanauan, Quezon, who testified that when the cadaver was brought for examination, it was in cadaveric rigidity, the legs were spread like a woman about to give birth ("parang nanganganak"), the tongue sticking out ("nakalawit), the skull crushed ("basag"), and the pubic area had blisters resulting from cigarette burns, ("pinagpapaso ng sigarilyo"), and the vagina had a laceration up to the anus, evidencing that the child was raped.
In addition to the oral evidence, the prosecution offered as documentary evidence the sworn statements of Barangay Captain Aristeo Allarey and Gonzalo de la Cruz, the Criminal Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Francisco, San Andres, Quezon, and the Medico-legal Certificate signed by Dr. Madatu.
On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses (1) appellant himself who bluntly denied any participation in the rape/killing of the victim, or that he made any confessions to the barangay captain; he interposed the defense of alibi that at the time of the alleged rape/killing, he was at his house in Barangay Ilayang Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon together with his wife, their child and his brother, caring for his sick child, and (2) his father Emilio Valla, who corroborated his story. The defense offered no documentary evidence.
On March 29, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty of the crime of "rape with homicide,” sentencing him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Appellant claims that the testimony of prosecution witness Allarey was inconsistent since on direct examination, Allarey narrated that when he summoned appellant, the latter did not immediately appear, but on cross-examination, he said that appellant immediately reported to him. Appellant also contends that Merle’s testimony that appellant was "tulala" at the time he confessed to the commission of the crime was inconsistent with appellant’s alleged begging for forgiveness for the crime.
ISSUE”
WHETHER OR NOT THE INCONSISTENCY OF TESTIMONIES AFFECTS THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES.


17. This is an appeal from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI, Quezon City, through Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz, finding Danilo Mesias y Sebastian guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide committed against Vivencio Cruz y Ramos. The dispositive part reads:
At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of September 26, 1980, while Mrs. Olympia Cruz was setting the table for dinner, five (5) armed men, four of them wearing masks, barged into their house situated at No. 41 Kasunduan St., Barangay Commonwealth, Quezon City. Her husband, Vivencio Cruz, was in the living room while their son, Marlon, then six (6) years old, was in the bedroom watching television. Three (3) men poked their guns at Vivencio.. Then, she heard the armed men ransacking their house.
Marlon was allowed by the malefactors to return to the bedroom to watch television. Then through the open door, Marlon saw the robber without a mask stab Vivencio three times, twice on the chest and once on the left neck, with what appeared to be an icepick. Upon seeing his father wounded, Marlon ran to his mother and exclaimed "Nanay, naku si Tatay!" Olympia removed her blindfold and saw Vivencio apparently lifeless and bathed in his own blood.
Of the alleged five offenders, only Mesias was charged. At his arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the crime of robbery with homicide. Trial followed. On January 26, 1982, the lower court rendered the assailed judgment of conviction.
In this appeal, accused Mesias insists on his innocence. His principal defense is alibi. He alleges that on the night of September 26, 1980, he slept early in his sister's house located at the IBP site, Constitution Hills, Quezon City, about a half (1/2) kilometer away from the crime scene. This was corroborated by his sister, Leni Claudio, who testified that Mesias was in her house between 6:00 in the evening of September 26, 1980 and 6:00 in the morning of September 27, 1989. 6
To further support his claim of innocence, Mesias alleges that the victim's widow and young son, mistook him for another person because there is another man who looks just like him, which he calls his "double", and who happens to live in the same area.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Defense of Alibi of Mesias is tenable given the facts of the case.


18. Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaint of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of the stone in her gall bladder. Because of discomfort which interfered her normal ways, she was advised to undergo an operation. However, on her scheduled gall bladder operation in the Delos Santos Medical Center, she sustained brain damage from wrongful intubation by her anesthesiologist Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Petitioners filed an action for damages and presented the testimony of Herminda Cruz, her sister in law, Dean of the College of Nursing in the same institution, who was in the operating room right beside her when the tragic event occurred. It was rebutted that Cruz is not competent to testify since she is not an anesthesiologist, therefore she had no expertise in the matter at hand.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY IS NECESSARY IN DETERMINING NEGLIGENCE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICES WHEN THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR IS APPLICABLE

19. Two informations, one for murder of Ferdinand Rabadon and the other for violation of Presidential Decree 1866 were filed at the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan against Noel Navarro. The trial court declared the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and that the illegal possession of firearm is considered merely as an aggravating circumstances considering that the alleged firearm used was not recovered by the authorities and never presented in court. According to the prosecution, Jose Rabago saw the incident and reported the killing to a policeman Virgilio Rabadon. A day after, when investigated by policemen Rolando Rabadon he said he did not see anything, and explained that he did not divulge the identities of the assailant for fear of his life for some policemen in Alaminos Pangasinan were members of the Aguila gang allegedly led by Ramon Navarro. Lately, Rabago changed his testimony and swore that it was not the appellant who had shot Rabadon , but a “short and stout man”. Noel Navarro denied any participation in the killing of Rabadon and reiterated that he was arrested without any warrant of arrest by the NBI and Prossecutor Rabina charged him of murder without conducting a preliminary investigation. Appellant also contends that the testimony of Prosecution witness Jose Rabago was filled with serious and material inconsistencies, allegedly because he gave three versions of the incident.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the evidence of prosecution is credible and sufficient.
                  2. Whether or not the statements of Rabago given to both Virgilio Rabadon and Rolando Rabadon were part of res gestae.

20. Tantuco Enterprises, Inc. is engaged in the coconut milling and refinery industry. It owns two oil mills both located at its factory compound. The two oil mills were separately covered by fire insurance policies issued by American Home Assurance Company. Both policies are paid for the full amount of premium covering for the period of March 1, 1991 to 1992. On September 30, 1991, a fire broke out, gutted and consumed the new oil mill. Insurer was immediately notified of the incident and thereafter sent appraisers who inspected the burned premises and the properties destroyed. However, insurer rejected the claim for the insurance proceeds on the ground that no policy was ever issued by it covering the burned oil mill citing the erroneous boundaries described in its policy. Further, insurer argues that Tantuco Enterprises is barred by parol evidence rule from presenting evidence of its self-serving intention that it intended really to insure the burned oil mill.

ISSUES:

I.              What is Parol Evidence Rule?

II.            WON Tantuco Enterprises is barred by Parol Evidence Rule in presenting evidence aliunde?


End of the Final Examination

Saturday, March 14, 2020

Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the child's competency as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195244               June 22, 2015
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the child's competency as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge.
Under review is the decision promulgated on July 23, 2010,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the conviction of the appellant for the composite crime of robbery with homicide handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 211, in Mandaluyong City through its judgment rendered on January 27, 2006.2
Antecedents
The information charged the appellant with robbery with homicide, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of force and violence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to ₱13,000.00 belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter; that by reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon said JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries which directly caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The CA adopted the RTC’s summation of the evidence of the Prosecution, to wit:
Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her to the hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he related that the assailant took money from his father’s pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetra tor because there was no light (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp. 3, 11-23, 28, 30-32).
Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his mother was stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor, which illumined the ground floor through the stairway (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp. 33-34).
Insp. Marquez, who autopsied the body, related that the cause of the victim’s death was hemorrhagic shock due to stab wound. The wound was located at the epigastric region, measuring 2.8 x 0.5 cm, 4 cm from left of the anterior midline, 13 cm deep, directed posterior and upward, piercing the right ventricle of the hear t, thoracic aorta and lower lobe of the left lung (TSN, April 21, 2004, pp. 1, 6; Exh. "I," Records, p. 103).
Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the victim. He narrated that he and the victim were married for nine years before the incident and that they have four children: Monica, 11 years old; Mary Joy, 9 years old; Carl, 5 years old; and Cherry Ann, 7 months old. At about 9 p.m. on October 21, 2003, he and his wife were sleeping downstairs in their sala, with their baby, while their other children slept upstairs. Their sala measures 3 by 3 meters. At around 2 a.m., his son Carl woke up crying and went downstairs to sleep with them. Fifteen to thirty minutes later, he heard someone shout "magnanakaw!" [H]e turned on the light and saw that their door was open. He got their bolo and ran outside. When he did not see anybody, he returned and heard his wife moaning. He embraced and carried her and saw blood on her back. He shouted for help and his brother-in law helped him bring the victim to the hospital where she eventually died. He spent ₱23,000.00 for the funeral and ₱44,500.00 for the wake and burial. On cross-examination, he admitted that he has no personal knowledge as to who stabbed his wife since he did not actually see the perpetrator and that it was his son who saw the appellant (TSN, August 25, 2004, pp. 3 12; October 6, 2004, pp. 5-6; November 17, 2004, pp. 3-4).
Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that she and her husband were sleeping upstairs when they were roused from their sleep at around 2 a.m. of October 22, 2003 by Dennis’ cry for help. She saw that there was blood on the victim’s chest. After the victim was brought to the hospital, she noticed that the victim’s children were trembling in fear and were crying. They got outside and went to the billiard hall in front of their house. She took Carl and had him sit on her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone but she did not see who it was since there were many people passing by. Later, the police asked Carl whether he saw somebody enter their house and he answered yes and demonstrated how his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that the person who stabbed his mother was present in the vicinity. He then pointed to appellant and said " siya po yung pumaso k sa bahay namin." As a resident there, appellant often goes to the billiard hall and sometimes watches the television at the house of the victim (TSN, February 9, 2005, pp. 3-14).
PO1 Fabela also testified that after it was reported to him that there was a stabbing incident, he went to the hospital then to the crime scene and interviewed the persons thereat. Later, Carl pinpointed and positively identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his mother and robbed them of their money. Appellant was arrested and brought to the police station (TSN, March 16, 2005, pp. 2, 5-6).
PO2 Sazon meanwhile testified that while he was questioning people in the area, Carl pointed to them the suspect who was one of the bystanders. They were asking Carl questions when he suddenly blurted out that it was appellant who entered their house and stabbed his mother. They invited the appellant to the police station but the latter denied having committed the crime. On cross-examination, the witness admitted that their basis in arresting appellant was the information relayed by Carl (TSN, April 27, 2005, pp. 2, 12-17; June 15, 2005, p. 5).4
In turn, the appellant denied the accusation. According to him, he had frequented the victim’s billiard hall, which was situated only four houses away from where he lived, and, on the evening in question, he had been the last to leave the billiard hall at 11 o’ clock p.m. and had then gone home. He recalled that he had been roused from slumber by screams for help around two o’clock a.m., prompting him to ask his mother for the key to the door; that he had then gone outside where he learned of the killing of the victim; that police officers had later on approached him to inquire what he knew about the killing because they told him that Carl, the young son of the victim, had pointed to him as the perpetrator, making him the primary suspect; that he had replied that he had had nothing to do with the crime; and that he had assured the police officers that he had never been involved in any wrongdoing in his years of living in the neighborhood.
The appellant’s mother corroborated his version.5
Judgment of the RTC
As mentioned, the RTC pronounced the appellant guilty of the crime charged under its judgment rendered on January 27, 2006,6 disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA @ "NONOY" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE under Article 293 and punished under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the court hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA as follows:
1) ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity;
2) ₱57,500.00 as actual damages;
3) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.7
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony of Carl, a 5-year old witness whose recollections could only be the product of his imagination.8
On July 23, 2010, however, the CA, giving credence to the child witness, and opining that his inconsistencies did not discredit his testimony, affirmed the conviction of the appellant,9 ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 27, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 211 of Mandaluyong City in Crim. Case No. MC03-7597, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that the award of ₱57,500.00 as actual damages should be DELETED and in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 should be AWARDED the heirs of Josephine Castro y Barrera.
SO ORDERED.10
Issues
In this appeal, the appellant posits that the adverse testimony of the 5-year old Carl, being filled with inconsistencies, was not credible, but doubtful; that unlike him, his sisters, who were then at the second floor of the house, were not roused from sleep; that contrary to Carl’s recollection, the place was not even dark when the stabbing attack on the victim occurred because his father said that he had turned the light on upon hearing somebody shouting " Magnanakaw!;" and that his father had then gotten his bolo, and gone outside the house.11
Moreover, the appellant maintains that the Prosecution did not prove that violence or intimidation was employed in the course of the robbery. He argues that he could not be held liable for robbery by using force upon things considering that the culprit had neither broken any wall, roof, floor, door or window to gain entry in the house nor entered the house through an opening not intended for entrance. If at all, he could be liable only for the separate crimes of theft and homicide, not of the composite crime of robbery with homicide.12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the evidence showed that the appellant’s principal intent had been to rob the victim’s house, with the homicide being perpetrated as a mere incident of the robbery; and that Carl positively identified the appellant as the person who had stabbed the victim, his identification bearing "all the earmarks of credibility especially when he has no motive for lying about the identity of the accused."13
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The most important task of the St ate in the successful prosecution of the accused is his credible and competent identification as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, this appeal turns on whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide was credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-year old lad, whose sole testimony positively pointed to and incriminated the appellant as the person who had entered their home, robbed the family, and killed his mother.
The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwis e provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (l8 a)
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a)
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social stat us are not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for disqualification.14
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.15
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court.16 All questions bearing on the credibility of witnesses are best addressed by the trial court by virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial and often incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment while testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court because of the nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique advantage of actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, the trial judge’s assessment of the witnesses’ testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings. The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred with the trial court.17
The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of perceiving events and of communicating his perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a competent witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct examination of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-examination. All that the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to communicate his perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.
The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That is apparently not disputed. However, it seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his testimony did not concern the principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime charged but related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did not negate the positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Also, that Carl did not shout to seek help upon witnessing how the appellant had stabbed his mother to death did not destroy his credibility. For sure, he could not be expected to act and to react to what happened like an adult. Although children have different levels of intelligence and different degrees of perception, the determination of their capacity to perceive and of their ability to communicate their perception to the courts still pertained to the trial court, because it concerned a factual issue and should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong showing of mistake or misappreciation on the part of the trial court.18
It is true that an appeal in a criminal case like this one opens the record of the trial bare and open. Even so, the finding of facts by the trial court are still entitled to great respect especially when affirmed on appeal by the CA.19This great respect for such findings rests mainly on the trial court’s direct and personal access to the witnesses while they testify in its presence, giving them the unique opportunity to observe their manner and decorum during intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused, and to see if the witnesses were fidgeting and prevaricating, or sincere and trustworthy. With both the RTC and the CA sharing the conviction on Carl’s credibility, his capacity to perceive and his ability to communicate his perception, we cannot depart from their common conclusion. Moreover, according credence to Carl’s testimony despite his tender age would not be unprecedented. In People v. Mendiola,20 the Court considered a 6-y ear-old victim competent, and regarded her testimony against the accused credible. In Dulla v. Court of Appeals,21 the testimony of the three-year-old victim was deemed acceptable. As such, Carl’s testimony was entitled to full probative weight.
Carl positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the investigation and during the trial. Worthy to note is that the child could not have been mistaken about his identification of him in view of his obvious familiarity with the appellant as a daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the child’s family. Verily, the evidence on record overwhelmingly showed that the appellant, and no other, had robbed and stabbed the victim.
The appellant contends that robbery was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the robbery itself must be proven as conclusively as the other essential element of the crime; and that it was not established that the taking of personal property was achieved by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force upon things.
The contention lacks persuasion.
To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the Prosecution must prove the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.22 A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.23
The CA has indicated that the appellant carried a long-bladed weapon. The fact that the appellant was armed with the long-bladed weapon, which was undoubtedly a deadly weapon, competently proved the presence of violence or intimidation against persons that qualified the offense as robbery instead of theft. For sure, too, the patent intent of the appellant was originally to commit robbery, with the homicide being committed only in the course or on the occasion of the perpetration of the robbery. As the records show, Dennis was awakened by someone shouting " Magnanakaw!" The shout was most probably made by the victim, whom the appellant then stabbed in order to facilitate his escape. Considering that the original criminal design to rob had been consummated with the taking of the money amounting to ₱13,000.00, the killing of the victim under the circumstances rendered the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime, also known as a special complex crime. It is composed of two or more crimes but is treated by law as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of one criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and is to be distinguished from a compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.24 A composite crime is truly distinct and different from a complex or compound crime. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law, but in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other. In a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific, but in a complex or compound crime the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be made the subject of a separate information, but a light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed.
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime are not appreciated to raise the penalty to be imposed because the information did not specifically allege them. But they should be appreciated in order to justify the grant of exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim in the amount of ₱30,000.00 in accordance with relevant jurisprudence.25 Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be granted if at least one aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstance for this purpose need not be specifically alleged in the information, and can be either a qualifying or attendant circumstance. As expounded in People v. Catubig:26
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense.1âwphi1 The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.27
In line with current jurisprudence,28 we increase the civil indemnity to
₱75,000.00, and the moral damages to ₱75,000.00.
In addition to the damages awarded by the CA, the appellant should be liable to pay the heirs of the victim interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the monetary awards for damages from the date of the finality of this decision until the awards are fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 23, 2010 subject to the MODIFICATIONS that then accused-appellant ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA shall pay to the heirs of the late Josephine Castro y Barrera civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00; moral damages of ₱75,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00; temperate damages of ₱25,000.00; and interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all monetary awards for damages reckoned from the date of the finality of this decision until the awards are fully paid, plus the costs of suit.
The accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 2-20: penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamar (retired), and Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson (retired).
2 CA rollo, pp. 23-39.
3 Id. at 9.
4 Rollo, pp. 3-6.
5 Id. at 6-7.
6 Supra note 2.
7 CA rollo, p. 39.
8 Rollo, p. 8.
9 Supra note 1.
10 Id. at 20.
11 Id. at 7-8.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 9.
14 Cavili v. Judge Florendo , No. L-68680, October 9, 1987, 154 SCRA 610, 615.
15 People v. Hermosa, G.R. No. 131805, September 07, 2001, 364 SCRA 648, 660.
16 People v. Abaigar, G.R. No. 199442, April 7, 2014; People v. Bisda, G.R. No. 140895, July 17, 2003, 406 SCRA 454.
17 People v. Barcela, G.R. No. 208760, April 23, 2014.
18 Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101680, December 7, 1992, 216 SCRA 224, 232.
19 Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106472, August 7, 1996, 260 SCRA 374, 381.
20 G.R. No. 134846, August 8, 2000, 337 SCRA 418.
21 G.R. No. 123164, February 18, 2000, 326 SCRA 32.
22 People v. Algarme, G.R. No. 175978, February 12, 2009, 578 SCRA 602, 621.
23 People v. Daniela, G.R. No. 139230, April 24, 2003, 401 SCRA 519, 534.
24 Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes . – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
25 People v. Barra, G.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013, 701 SCRA 99.
26 G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621.
27 Id. at 635.
28 People v. Arbalate, G.R. No. 183457, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 239, 255.