G.R.
No. 111692 February 9, 1996, FIRST DIVISION
ALEJANDRO
FUENTES, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
Still
professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of mistaken identity,
petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder.
Petitioner
stabbed Julieto Malaspina, the victim, in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Before
the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that
Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.
Petitioner
claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias
"Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that "Jonie" admitted
spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match before the
latter untied his gloves and punched him.
Petitioner
would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a
declaration against penal interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay
rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo
Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of the
accused-petitioner is admissible as a declaration against interest and
therefore an exception to the hearsay rule.
Ruling:
No. One of the recognized exceptions
to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest.
Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration
made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made
so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true,
may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and
against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration
is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.
There
are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration
against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the
declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the
circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
The
far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be
accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to
testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally
incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates.
His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto
unavailable under this rule. the records show that the defense did not exert
any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the
Court is always for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent
declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as
when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the
probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to
lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is
unable to testify.
G.R. No.
152364 April 15, 2010, THIRD DIVISION
ALEJANDRA
S. LAZARO, assisted by her husband, ISAURO M. LAZARO; LEONCIO D. SANTOS; ADOLFO
SANTOS; NENITA S. LACAR; ANGELINA S. SAGLES, assisted by her husband, ALBERTO
SANTOS, JR.; REGINA SANTOS and FABIAN SANTOS,
Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTA AGUSTIN, FILEMON AGUSTIN, VENANCIA AGUSTIN, MARCELINA AGUSTIN, PAUL A. DALALO, NOEL A. DALALO, GREGORIO AGUSTIN and BIENVENIDO AGUSTIN, Respondents.
vs.
MODESTA AGUSTIN, FILEMON AGUSTIN, VENANCIA AGUSTIN, MARCELINA AGUSTIN, PAUL A. DALALO, NOEL A. DALALO, GREGORIO AGUSTIN and BIENVENIDO AGUSTIN, Respondents.
Facts:
The petitioners (plaintiff) file
a complaint against the respondent (defendant) for claiming as one of the
co-owners of a parcel of land Lot No. 10676. Alleging
the following:
a.
that Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, all surnamed Santos, who are the
children of Simeon Santos, consented that the parcel of land of this complaint
be titled in the name of Basilisa, the latter being the eldest and so Original
Certificate of Title No. 20742 in the name of Basilisa Santos was obtained
although it was agreed among them that it did not and does not necessarily mean
that Basilisa Santos is the sole and exclusive owner of this parcel of land,
and as embodied in the Title obtained in the name of Basilisa Santos;
b. that without the knowledge and
consent of the plaintiffs, the title of the lot with Original Certificate of
Title No. 20742 was transferred into another title which is now Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-20695 in the names of Modesta Agustin, Filemon
Agustin, Venancia Agustin, Marcelina Agustin, Monica Agustin, Gregorio Agustin
and Bienvenido Agustin who are the children of the late Basilisa Santos-Agustin
who
c. that during the lifetime of
Basilisa Santos-Agustin, plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro informed the former,
who are sisters, that the transfer of the title in the name of Basilisa Santos
into the names of her children would erroneously imply that the lot is solely
and exclusively owned by Basilisa Santos-Agustin's children, but Basilisa
Santos-Agustin replied [to] plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro not to worry
because an affidavit was already executed by her recognizing and specifying
that her brothers Alberto Santos and Leoncio Santos, and her sister Alejandra
Santos-Lazaro would each get one fourth (¼) share of the lot;
The
MTCC ruled, among others, that no evidentiary value could be given to the affidavit
allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein she purportedly acknowledged her
co-ownership of the subject property with her siblings Alberto, Leoncio and
Alejandra, because the affiant was not presented on the witness stand, such
that all the statements made in her affidavit were hearsay. The RTC affirmed
the decision with modification. The CA affirmed also the decision of MTCC with
modification.
Issue:
Whether or not the sworn statement
of Basilisa S. Agustin is a declaration against interest which establishes the
co-ownership of lot no. 10676 by and among the petitioners and respondents.
Ruling:
No.
At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong for petitioners to argue
that Basilisa's alleged sworn statement is a declaration against interest. It
is not a declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission against
interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation
or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and
are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declarations against interest are those
made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the
suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule.
They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. In the
present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and is,
thus, in privity with the latter's legal interest, the former's sworn
statement, if proven genuine and duly executed, should be considered as an
admission against interest.
Settled is the rule that
generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon
it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a
notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. However, this presumption is not
absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Not all notarized documents are
exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not
automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial
jurat. The presumptions that attach to notarized documents
can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was
regular.
Petitioners rely heavily on the
presumption of regularity accorded by law to notarized documents. While indeed,
a notarized document enjoys this presumption, the fact that a deed is notarized
is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The presumption cannot be
made to apply to the present case because the regularity in the execution of
the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima
facie validity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances
under which it was supposedly executed, as well as the testimonies of witnesses
who testified on the improbability of execution of the sworn statement, as well
as on the physical condition of the signatory, at the time the questioned
document was supposedly executed.
A notary public should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein. In the instant case, the notary
public should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity
of the person executing the said sworn statement. However, the notary public
did not comply with this requirement
G.R.
No. 74306 March 16, 1992, THIRD DIVISION
ENRIQUE
RAZON, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.
G.R.
No. 74315 March 16, 1992
VICENTE
B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC., respondents.
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC., respondents.
Facts:
In G.R. No. 74306 the Regional
Trial Court of Manila declared that the owner of the 1,500 shares of stock in
E. Razon, Inc. covered by Stock Certificate No. 003 is owned by the petitioner,
but which was reversed by the Court of Appeals and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian,
the deceased father of petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315 is the
owner of the said shares of stock.
Stock Certificates No. 003 for
1,500 shares of stock of defendant corporation was issued and registered in the name of Juan T. Chuidian
in the books of the corporation. Later on said certificate of stock was
personally delivered by Chuidian to the Corporate Secretary, since then Enrique
Razon was in possession of said stock certificate even during the lifetime of
the late Chuidian, from the time the late Chuidian delivered the said stock
certificate to defendant Razon. By agreement of the parties such certificates
were delivered for deposit with the bank under the joint custody of the parties.
The certificates were delivered
by the late Chuidian to Enrique because it was the latter who paid for all the
subscription on the shares of stock in the defendant corporation and the
understanding was that he (defendant Razon) was the owner of the said shares of
stock and was to have possession thereof.
In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner
Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged
misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule
is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as
plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral
agreement between him and the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the ownership of
the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased
opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross
examination regarding such testimony.
The petitioner maintains that
his aforesaid oral testimony as regards the true nature of his agreement with
the late Juan Chuidian on the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. is
sufficient to prove his ownership over the said 1,500 shares of stock.
In G.R. No. 74315, petitioner
Vicente B. Chuidian insists that the appellate court's decision declaring his
deceased father Juan T. Chuidian as owner of the 1,500 shares of stock of E.
Razon, Inc. should have included all cash and stock dividends and all the
pre-emptive rights accruing to the said 1,500 shares of stock.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not the petitioner's testimony is admissible.
2.
The main issue is whether or not the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.
covered by Stock Certificate No. 003 are owned by Juan T. Chuidian.
3.
Whether or not all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights
accrues to the said 1,500 shares of stock.
Rulings:
1.
Yes, it is admissible. Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23
of the Revised Rules on Evidence) States:
Sec.
20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The
following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested
directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated.
(a)
Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon
a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against
such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact accruing
before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind." The purpose of
the law is to "guard against the temptation to give false testimony in
regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party."
The rule, however, delimits the
prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against
the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against
the estate of the deceased person.
The case was filed by the administrator
of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E.
Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear,
therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition
of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the
estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore,
the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of
the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late
elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination by
the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's
testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.
2.
Yes, it is owned by Juan T. Chuidian. The records show that during his lifetime
Chuidian was ellected member of the Board of Directors of the corporation which
clearly shows that he was a stockholder of the corporation. From the point of
view of the corporation, therefore, Chuidian was the owner of the 1,500 shares
of stock. the petitioner who claims ownership over the questioned shares of
stock must show that the same were transferred to him by proving that all the
requirements for the effective transfer of shares of stock in accordance with
the corporation's by laws, if any, were followed or in accordance with the
provisions of law.
The law is clear that in order
for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the certificate must be
properly indorsed and that title to such certificate of stock is vested
in the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of
stock. To reiterate, indorsement of the certificate of stock is a mandatory
requirement of law for an effective transfer of a certificate of stock.
3.
The cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights are all incidents
of stock ownership, hence, it accrued and attached to the 1,500 shares in E.
Razon, Inc., since 1966 are declared to belong to the estate of Juan T.
Chuidian.
