G.R. No. 89762 August 7, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
-versus-
ANTONIO LAZARTE y MOGALLON accused-appellant.
ANTONIO LAZARTE y MOGALLON accused-appellant.
At around 11:45 o'clock P.M., on October 8, 1986, Lorenzo Lara was sleeping in his residence at Zone 5 Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila. A knock at the door, awakened him. He opened the door, but he saw nobody. Then, to his surprise, someone entered the house through the window. It was Nonito Jambunganan y Hundana, the owner of the house which he was occupying for free, as a caretaker. He held Nonito, and felt blood in the latter's clothes and sensed that he had wounds in his body. When he asked Nonito what happened, the latter replied, "Tol, sinaksak ako sa labas." "Who stabbed you?" Lara asked. "Tony, Suay Ric and Junior," he answered. Nonito also "shouted" twice, "Help me!" Frantically, Lara called out to his neighbors for help. Neighbors came running. When Nonito was about to be placed on board a jeep, he collapsed. He was declared "DOA," dead on arrival, at the Nichols Airbase Hospital. Nonito sustained three stab wounds at the back and died of hemorrhage, severe, secondary to stab wounds.
Of the four mentioned assailants, Only Antonio Lazarte y Mogallon and Ricardo Ignacio were apprehended, as the other two, "Rodolfo Mundido" and "Eliseo Henares," were never arrested, and remain at large. Ricardo Ignacio on the other hand was acquitted on a demurrer to evidence pursuant to the Resolution of the trial court dated February 9, 1989.
The defense of Antonio Lazarte, the appellant in the case at bar, consists of denial and alibi, and points to two others -persons-Milo Veloso and a certain Miguel-as the assailants.
Several witnesses were presented by the defense in the trial but the testimonies of these witnesses did not convince the trial court of the innocence of the accused-appellant, and, in a decision dated June 28, 1989 rendered a verdict of conviction, sentencing Antonio Lazarte to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of victim Nonito Jambunganan y Hundana in the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Hence the appeal and the decision of the trial court was reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court is correct in its judgment based solely on the dying declaration of the victim?
Whether the trial court is correct in bringing up conspiracy to convict the accused-appellant?
HELD:
No, From the records of the case, it is clear that the conviction of the appellant had been based largely on the alleged dying declaration of the victim. It behooves therefore to determine not only the admissibility, but also appreciate the weight of the oral dying declaration of the deceased Nonito Jambunganan testified on by the principal witness for the prosecution, Lorenzo Lara. As a rule a dying declaration is hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence. In order that a dying declaration may be admissible as evidence, four requisites must concur, namely: that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; that the declarant is competent as a witness; and that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. A close scrutiny of the witness testimony cannot support, in the finding of the trial court that the "victim was conscious of his imminent death when he relayed the statement to Lorenzo Lara. This finding is gratuitous and has no clear basis in the records. Nonetheless the ante mortem statements of Nonito may be considered as part of the res gestae. In any event, even if they constitute part of the res gestae or they constitute indeed a dying declaration and accepted by the trial court and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule, this admissibility notwithstanding does not suffice to satisfy the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt against any of the four accused, much less against the accused-appellant. In criminal law, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. And to warrant conviction in criminal cases based upon circumstantial evidence the circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken chain of events so as to lead to a conviction that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The Trial Court erred in bringing up conspiracy to convict the accused - appellant since there is no eyewitness to the crime was presented by the prosecution. Nobody testified that he or she saw accused - appellant within the vicinity of the crime before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Nor did anyone attest to seeing the accused - appellant in possession of a deadly weapon or of his being the hatchetman. Except the supposed dying declaration there is no evidence whatsoever in the records of the case on the stabbing of the deceased Nonito, much less is there any testimony that the four accused ganged up on the deceased victim. Specifically, no evidence has been adduced by the prosecution to establishing the participation of accused - appellant in the alleged conspiracy. As a matter of fact, the appellant's co-accused, Ricardo Ignacio, the one identified as the "Ric" in the ante mortem statements of Nonito, was discharged and acquitted by a mere demurrer to evidence. This grant in favor of the appellant's co-accused, Ricardo, exposes the weakness of the evidentiary weight of the ante mortem statements of Nonito. The prosecution failed to prove that accused - appellat killed the victim or acted in conspiracy with the one(s) who killed him. No person can be convicted on mere assumptions and conclusions.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and appellant Antonio Lazarte y Mogallon is hereby ACQUITTED.
G.R. No. 129556 November 11, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REY GADO, accused-appellant.
vs.
REY GADO, accused-appellant.
Facts:
On the evening of January 30, 1992, the victim and some of his friends were having a drinking session at the house of Juanito Vicente. Shortly thereafter, the victim decided to leave and accused-appellant Rey Gado and Juanito Vicente decided to bring him home. With them were a certain Emma and her brother whose name the victim failed to mention. On their way, and while they were along Fleur De Liz Street, the victim was held by his companions and he was stabbed in the abdomen by Rey Gado. As the victim freed himself from his assailants, the latter fled. He immediately grabbed a stone and hurled it at them.
On the evening of January 30, 1992, the victim and some of his friends were having a drinking session at the house of Juanito Vicente. Shortly thereafter, the victim decided to leave and accused-appellant Rey Gado and Juanito Vicente decided to bring him home. With them were a certain Emma and her brother whose name the victim failed to mention. On their way, and while they were along Fleur De Liz Street, the victim was held by his companions and he was stabbed in the abdomen by Rey Gado. As the victim freed himself from his assailants, the latter fled. He immediately grabbed a stone and hurled it at them.
While he was proceeding home, he was
chanced upon by barangay tanod Fernando Reyes who offered to help him home. At
about 9 o'clock that evening, he reached their house. He immediately slumped on
the floor and asked his father to bring him to the hospital. Upon his father's
query, the victim identified Rey Gado as his assailant.
While aboard a jeep on their way to
Perpetual Help Hospital at Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the victim once more
related what happened to him, identifying the other companions of Rey Gado. He
was given medical attention at Perpetual Help Hospital but about four hours
thereafter, at around 2 o'clock early morning of January 31, 1992, he succumbed.
The Court finds Rey Gado guilty of Murder and was sentenced by reclusion perpetua and awarded civil indemnity to the amount of P50,000.
The Court finds Rey Gado guilty of Murder and was sentenced by reclusion perpetua and awarded civil indemnity to the amount of P50,000.
Issue:
Ø Whether the
statements, uttered by the victim before he died partake of the nature of a
dying declaration or not.
Ø Whether the civil
indemnity amounting to P50,000 is correct?.
Ruling:
Yes, the Court finds it in the affirmative. The statements uttered by the victim before he died partake of the nature of a dying declaration. As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence. In order that a dying declaration may be admissible as evidence, four requisites must concur, namely: that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; that the declarant is competent as a witness; and that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. The trial court correctly considered the declaration of the victim a dying declaration and, therefore, admissible. The declarant was conscious of his impending death. This may be gleaned not only from the victim's insistence right after he reached their house that he should immediately be brought to the hospital and that he was becoming weaker by the moment, but also from the serious nature of his wounds and the fact that the said victim died shortly afterwards. The trial court likewise correctly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. However, they do not see how the award of actual damages in the same amount may be justified in the light of the evidence tending to show that only the total amount of P23,217.65 was actually spent. It is elementary that actual and compensatory damages, unlike moral and exemplary damages, cannot be left to the sole discretion of the court. A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We must emphasize that these damages cannot be presumed, and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. The award of actual and compensatory damages in the case at bar must, therefore, be reduced to the amount duly proved at the trial which is to P23,217.65.
Yes, the Court finds it in the affirmative. The statements uttered by the victim before he died partake of the nature of a dying declaration. As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence. In order that a dying declaration may be admissible as evidence, four requisites must concur, namely: that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; that the declarant is competent as a witness; and that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. The trial court correctly considered the declaration of the victim a dying declaration and, therefore, admissible. The declarant was conscious of his impending death. This may be gleaned not only from the victim's insistence right after he reached their house that he should immediately be brought to the hospital and that he was becoming weaker by the moment, but also from the serious nature of his wounds and the fact that the said victim died shortly afterwards. The trial court likewise correctly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. However, they do not see how the award of actual damages in the same amount may be justified in the light of the evidence tending to show that only the total amount of P23,217.65 was actually spent. It is elementary that actual and compensatory damages, unlike moral and exemplary damages, cannot be left to the sole discretion of the court. A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We must emphasize that these damages cannot be presumed, and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. The award of actual and compensatory damages in the case at bar must, therefore, be reduced to the amount duly proved at the trial which is to P23,217.65.
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G.R. No. 175466 December 23, 2009
BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS as successor-in-interest of
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,Petitioner,
vs.
SMP, INC., Respondent.
vs.
SMP, INC., Respondent.
FACTS:
Sometime in January 1995, Maria Teresa Michaela Ong, as
Sales Executive of SMP, Inc. undertook the acceptance and servicing of a
purchase order of CLOTHESPAK MANUFACTURING PHILS. (Clothespak) for 4,000 bags
or sacks of General purpose (GPS) polystyrene products. The ordered products
were delivered, for which delivery receipts were issued. The total selling
price of the products amounted to U.S. $118,500.00. As payment, Clothespak
issued postdated checks in favor of plaintiff SMP and delivered the same to Maria
Teresa Michaela Ong. When the same were deposited by SMP Inc. on their maturity
dates, the drawee bank dishonored and returned said checks for the reason
"Account Closed."
In the meantime, a case was filed by herein defendant Far
East Bank and Trust Company against Clothespak for a recovery of sum of money
with prayer for issuance of preliminary attachment. The Pasig Court granted and
issued the writ dated March 14, 1995 in favor of the plaintiff bank. Real and
personal properties of the defendants were levied and attached.
Thereafter, on March 28, 1995, SMP, Inc. filed an
Affidavit of Third Party Claim in that Civil Case No. 65006, claiming ownership
of the 4,000 bags of General Purpose (GPS) polystyrene products taken at
Clothespak factory worth P3,096,405.00.
With the filing by Far East Bank of the indemnity bond, the goods claimed were
not released and the Pasig Court directed SMP, Inc. to ventilate its claim of
ownership in a vindicatory action under Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Meanwhile, Far East Bank obtained a favorable judgment against
Clothespak. It has become final and executory which led to the implementation
and enforcement of said decision against Clothespak’s properties inclusive of
the goods earlier attached. Hence, the instant case is filed by SMP, Inc. to
recover from the attaching bank the value of the goods it claims ownership and
for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether at the time of the
attachment, plaintiff still owned the goods levied upon, or ownership thereof
had already passed to Clothespak Manufacturing.
RULING:
Yes, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
defendant Far East Bank and Trust Company (now Bank of the Philippine Islands),
ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty
Three Thousand Forty One Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P2,963,041.53)
as actual damages, plus costs of suit. The case was appealed in the Court of
Appeals and affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. A distinction between a
contract to sell and a contract of sale is helpful in order to determine the true
intention of the parties. In a contract of sale, the title to the property
passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; while in a contract
to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved for the vendor and is not to pass
to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.9 In a contract of sale,
non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition. In a contract to
sell, full payment is a positive suspensive condition. In a contract of sale,
the vendor loses and cannot recover ownership of the thing sold until and
unless the contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside. In a contract to
sell, the title remains with the vendor if the vendee does not comply with the
condition precedent of making payment at the time specified in the contract. In a contract to sell, the payment of
the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is
not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation which prevents the obligation
of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.
ISS
