G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001 LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners, vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.

G.R. No. 143340       August 15, 2001

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners, 
vs.
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.

FACTS

            Lamberto Chua alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane LPG.  For business convenience, Lamberto and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER, under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship.  Both Lamberto and Jacinto contributed P100,000.00 to the partnership, with the intention that the profits would be equally divided between them.

            The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy, sister-in-law of Lamberto.  Upon Jacinto’s death in the later part of 1989, his daughter, Lilibeth took over the operations of Shellite without Lamberto’s consent.  Despite Lamberto’s repeated demands for accounting, she failed to comply.

            On June 22m 1992, Lamberto filed a complaint against Lilibeth with the RTC.  RTC decided in favor of Lamberto.

            Lilibeth questions the correctness of the finding that a partnership existed between Lamberto and Jacinto.  In the absence of any written document to show such partnership between Lamberto and Jacinto, Lilibeth argues that these courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of Lamberto and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three (3) years after Jacinto’s death.

            To support the argument, Lilibeth invokes the “DEAD MAN’S STATUTE OR SURVIVORSHIP RULE” under Sec. 23, Rule 130.  Lilibeth thus implores this Court to rule that the testimonies of Lamberto and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto).

ISSUE

            Whether or not the “DEAD MAN’S STATUTE” applies to this case so as to render inadmissible Lamberto’s testimony and that if his witness, Josephine.

HELD

            No. The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own contradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.

Lilibeth filed a compulsory counterclaim against Lamberto in their answer before the RTC, and with the filing of their counterclaim, Lilibeth herself effectively removed this case from the ambit of the “Dead Man’s Statute”.  Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, Lamberto, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.  Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, Lamberto is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been bought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.

The testimony of Josephine is not covered by the “Dead Man’s Statute” for the simple reason that she is not “a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted”.  Lamberto offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between Lamberto and Jacinto.  Lilibeth’s insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of Lamberto does not make her an assignor because of the term “assignor” of a party means “assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen”.  Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of Lamberto, latter being the plaintiff.

Lilibeth’s reliance alone on the “Dead Man’s Statue” to defeat Lamberto’s claim cannot prevail over the factual findings that a partnership was established between Lamberto and Jacinto.  Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, they considered the evidence for Lamberto as sufficient to prove the formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one.

FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A. MONTINOLA, EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR., petitioners-appellants, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the Late Juan Bon Fing Sy, respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. 127745            April 22, 2003

FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A. MONTINOLA, EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR., petitioners-appellants, 
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the Late Juan Bon Fing Sy, respondents-appellees.

Facts:

On February 7, 1990, herein petitioner-appellant Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as creditor, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 4497, for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy (the deceased) who died on January 10, 1990. Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount of P603,000.00 and to his sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of P360,000.00.¹

Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Angeles) later filed separate claims against the estate, alleging that the deceased owed them P50,000.00 and P150,000.00, respectively.By Order of February 12, 1991, Branch 28 of the Iloilo RTC to which the petition was raffled, appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the deceased, as administratrix of his estate, following which she was issued letters of administration.³

During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade Montinola, wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified on the transactions that gave rise thereto, over the objection of the administratrix who invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court otherwise known as the Dead Man’s Statute.

Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she had a transaction with the deceased which is evidenced by six checks issued by him before his death and Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she knew that the deceased issued five checks to Sanson in settlement of a debt; and after the death of the deceased, Sanson presented the checks to the bank for payment but were returned due to the closure of his account.

Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and mother-in-law Angeles, testified that on separate occasions, the deceased borrowed P50,000 and P150,000 from her husband and mother-in-law, respectively, as shown by three checks issued by the deceased,⁹ two to Angeles and the other¹⁰ to Eduardo Montinola, Jr.

The administratrix objected to the admission of the checks and check return slips-exhibits offered in evidence by the claimants upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are disqualified under the Dead Man’s Statute. Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade, the administratrix asserted that they are inadmissible because Jade is the daughter-in-law of claimant Angeles and wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., hence, she is covered by the above-said rule on disqualification.

Finding that the Dead Man’s Statute does not apply to the witnesses who testified in support of the subject claims against the estate, the trial court issued an Order directing Administratrix Melecia T. Sy to pay, in due course of administration, creditors-claimants Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00; Celedonia S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00;¹⁸ Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00 and Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00, from the assets and/or properties of the above-entitled intestate estate. The case was elevated to the CA, and the latter set aside the trial court’s decision and dismissed the claims.

Issues:

            1. Whether Jade Montinola is not a qualified witness and barred by the Dead Man’s Statute by reason of relationship.

            2. Whether the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each other’s claims are not covered by the Dead Man’s Statute.

Ruling:

            1. No. The administratrix’s counter-argument does not lie. Relationship to a party has never been recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the credibility of the witness or—subject only to well recognized exceptions none of which is here present—the admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of relationship to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution in the assessment of a witness’ testimony but is not necessarily a negative element which should be taken as diminishing the credit otherwise accorded to it.

As for the administratrix’s invocation of the Dead Man’s Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.

x x x

The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein.

Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence—the checks.

2. No. Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court otherwise known as the Dead Man’s Statute reads:

SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.—Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.

 Sanson’s and Celedonia’s claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonia’s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sanson’s claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other’s transaction.

In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony.²⁹ Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks, besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them.

MA. IMELDA “IMEE” R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND “BONGBONG” R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO, Respondents.

CASE DIGEST

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

versus

MA. IMELDA “IMEE” R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND “BONGBONG” R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO,

Respondents.

G. R. No. 171701

February 8, 2012

FACTS:

After the People Power Revolution in 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) that was primarily tasked to investigate and recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and associates.

On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.  

Four amended Complaints were thereafter filed imputingactive participation and collaboration of another persons, viz. Nemesio G. Co and Yeungs (Kam, Ho and Fan) of Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing Corporation Phils.; and, Imelda Cojuangco for the estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Prime Holdings, in the alleged illegal activities and undertakings of the Marcoses in relation to the ₱200 Billion Pesos ill-gotten wealth allegation.

Petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents. However, the latter objected on the ground that the documents were unauthenticated and mere photocopies.

On 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a RESOLUTION ADMITTING all the documentary exhibits formally offered by the prosecution; however, their evidentiary value was left to the determination of the Court.

Subsequently, Imelda R. Marcos, Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III;Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the PEA-PTGWO filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.

On 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, granting all the demurrers to evidence except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos. The sequestration orders on the properties in the name of Gregorio Maria AranetaIII are accordingly lifted.

With regard to Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta III, the court noted that their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was never established; neither did the documentary evidence pinpoint their involvement therein. The court held that all presented evidence are hearsay, for being merely photocopies and that the originals were not presented in court, nor were they authenticated by the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that petitioner failed to provide any valid reason why it did not present the originals in court. These exhibits were supposed to show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotoc in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three of which she had allegedly acquired illegally, her alleged participation in dollar salting through De Soleil Apparel and to prove how the Marcoses used the Potencianos as dummies in acquiring and operating the bus company PANTRANCO.

Meanwhile, as far as the YEUNGS were concerned, the court found the allegations against them baseless. Petitioner failed to demonstrate howGlorious Sunwas used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show that they were dummies of the Marcoses. Again, the court held that the documentary evidence relevant to this allegation was INADMISSIBLE for being mere photocopies, and that the affiants had not been presented as witnesses.

ISSUE:

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEMURRERS TO EVIDENCE FILED BY RESPONDENTS MA. IMELDA (IMEE) R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND (BONGBONG) R. MARCOS, JR.; RESPONDENT-SPOUSES GREGORIO ARANETA III AND IRENE MARCOS ARANETA AND RESPONDENTS YEUNG CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUN FAN, AND YEUNG CHUN HO

RULING:

It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations; the operative act on how and in what manner must be clearly shown through preponderance of evidence.

The petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents themselves. It is imperative; therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove petitioner’s allegations. Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation of best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself. Furthermore, petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the court such documents as secondary evidence absent the affiant’s testimony.

The presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not validly excepted under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 3 (d), when ‘the original document is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,’ the original thereof need not be presented. However, all except one of the exhibits are not necessarily public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG may be a public document but what the plaintiff presented was a mere photocopy of the purported TSN which was not a certified copy and was not even signed by the stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings. The Rules provide that when the original document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office; a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof may prove its contents.

In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original. None of the abovementioned requirements were complied by the plaintiff.Exhibits ‘P’, ‘Q’, ‘R’, ‘S’, and ‘T’ were all photocopies. ‘P’, ‘R’, and ‘T’ were affidavits of persons who did not testify before the Court. Exhibit ‘S’ is a letter, which is clearly a private document. It is emphasized, even if originals of these affidavits were presented, they would still be considered hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and identify them.

Petitioner having failed to observe the best evidence rule rendered the offered documentary evidence futile and worthless in alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned.Hence, Sandiganbayan is correct in granting the respondents respective Demurers to evidence.

Rico Rommel Atienza vs. Board of Medicine and Editha Sioson

Rico Rommel Atienza

vs.

Board of Medicine and Editha Sioson

G.R. No. 177407

February 9. 2011

Facts:

Private respondent went to Rizal Medical Center to submit for a check up due to her lumbar pains. Her diagnostic laboratory test results revealed that her right kidney was normal while her left kidney was non-functioning and non-visualizing. Hence, she underwent kidney operation under the care of the four physicians namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio and petitioner Dr. Rico Rommel Atienza.

The said physicians removed her fully functioning right kidney instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney. Due to their gross negligence and incompetence, private respondent filed a complaint against the four doctors before the Board of Medicine.  Private respondent therein offered four certified photocopies as her documentary evidence to prove that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time that she was operated.

The Board of Medicine admitted the formal offer despite the objection of herein petitioner. Petitioner contends that the documentary evidence offered were inadmissible as it were incompetent. Further, he alleged that the same documents were not properly identified and authenticated, violate the best evidence rule and his substantive rights, and are completely hearsay.

Issues:

1.       Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that it violates the best evidence rule.

2.       Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that they have not been properly identified and authenticated.

3.       Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that it is completely hearsay.

4.       Whether the admission of the documents violated the substantive rights of the petitioner.

Ruling:

1.       No. The subject of the inquiry in this case is whether the doctors are liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. The proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.

In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence is allowed. Section 3, Rule 130 provides that when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when  the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the offeror. Since the original documents cannot be produced based on the testimony of Dr. Aquino BOM properly admitted Editha’s formal offer of evidence, and thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.

2.       No, the documentary evidence were properly identified and authenticated. The records show that the exhibits offered by private respondent were the same evidence attached in Doctor Lantin's counter-affidavit filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor in answer to the criminal complaint of the respondent.  To lay the predicate for her case, private respondent offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time of her operation.

3.       No, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence. The anatomical positions whether left or right, of Editha’s kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.

4.       No, petitioner’s substantive rights were not violated when the documentary evidence were admitted. The fact sought to be proved by the exhibits that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on is presumed under Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provides that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

The fact sought to be established by the admission of the respondent’s exhibit need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. Laws of nature involving the physical science, specifically biology include the structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings in which the court may take judicial notice.