PEOPLE VS PALMONES

PEOPLE VS  PALMONES

G.R. No. 136303.  July 18, 2000

FACTS

The case evolved from a shooting incident that happened in Kidapawan, Sultan Kudaratthat involved a police officer AsimMamansal as the victim who was killed later and the brothers  AnthonyMelchor and Anthony BaltazarPalmones as the accused-assailants.

That one night in April 27, 1997, the victim was shot in a dark place, together with his paramour, while riding home by an unidentified person who later were known through the prosecution’s witness testimony as the Palmones brothers.

The identity of the two accused was raised based on the testimony of Sony Boy Redovan, the witness of the prosecution who was also a nephew of the victim, who testified that before the death of his uncle, the later was able to declare that the accused-assailant were the Palmones brothers. That the witness Redovan was able to talk with his uncle nearly an hour before it dies, and that the same declared who shot him.

 The same testimony was also testified by Inspector Tagum who said that he was able to ask the victim while in the emergency room, about the identity of his perpetrator, and that were Juany and Tony Palmones.

The two accused were convicted for a crime of murder in the RTC based largely on the alleged dying declaration of the victim through the testimonies of the witnesses Sonny Boy Redovan and Inspector Tagum and the apparent weakness of their defense.

Hence, this appeal by the accused-appellants to the Supreme Court.

Issues:                                                                                                                                                

            1. Whether the court a quo erred in considering the alleged dying declaration of AsimMamansal as an exception to the hearsay rule.

            2. Whether the court a quo erred in considering the alleged dying declaration of AsimMamansal as part of the Res Gestae Rule.

Ruling:

1. Yes. There was an error in considering the alleged dying declaration of AsimMamansal for it lacks some of the requirements to be an exceptions to the rule of inadmissibility of hearsay evidence for it to be admissible as evidence to the court.

Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 31.  Dying declaration. – The declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be received in a criminal case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death

As such, the requirements for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement are: (a) it must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for murder, homicide or parricide wherein which the decedent was the victim.

In cases where an alleged dying declaration is sought to be admitted, it must be proven that that the declaration was made “under a consciousness of impending death” which means simply that the declarant is fully aware that he is dying or going to die from his wounds or injuries soon or imminently, or shall have a complete conviction that death is at hand, or there must be “a settled hopeless expectation.”

In this case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of the declarant concerning the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death were made under the consciousness of impending death.  No proof to this effect was ever presented by the prosecution.  It was not shown whether Sonny Boy Redovan or Inspector Alexander Tagum ever asked the victim whether he believed that he was going to die out of his injuries or any other similar question.  Sonny Boy Redovan claimed that he was able to talk with the victim for around an hour but the only thing he revealed of their conversation was the alleged identification of the victim of his two assailants. For his part, Inspector Tagum admitted that the only question he asked of the victim was if the victim knew who had shot him.From these points, there was no proved that the victim was ever aware of the seriousness of his condition.

2.         Yes. The alleged statements attributed to the victim cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae because it lacks the requisites of spontaneity in order for it to be admitted as part of the res gestae and be admissible as evidence to the court.                                                                                                                                                 

Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.

In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical.  The following factors have generally been considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously:  (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.

                                               

Premises considered, the judgment by the RTC Kidapawan, Cotabato is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants are ACQUITED AND RELEASED from confinement.

ESPERANZA BORILLO VS. COURT OF APPEALS,

ESPERANZA BORILLO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 55691, May 21, 1992

FACTS:
Elpidio Borillo owns four parcels of unregistered land, namely, A, B, C and D. When Elpidio died, his wife, Esperanza (petitioner), continued to possess and cultivate the same. Years later, the siblings of Elpidio, namely: Catalina (private respondent) and Marcos Borillo, forcibly and unlawfully dispossessed Esperanza of the property. The latter then filed a complaint for recovery of property.

Catalina testified that parcels A, C and D were sold to her by her late brother Elpidio as evidenced by:

Exhibit “3”- an acknowledgement receipt of a loan of P40.00 dated May 12, 1946 (no mention of any property sold; not acknowledged before a notary public); and

Exhibit “4”- an undated and unsigned document (no witnesses, not acknowledged before a notary public, and has a mere cross over the written name of Elpidio)

ISSUES:
1. Whether Exhibits “3” and “4” are admissible in evidence
2. Whether the testimony of Catalina aiding in the description of Exhibit “3” violates the parole evidence rule

RULING:
1. NO. Both Exhibits "3" and "4" are private documents. Hence, before they may be received in evidence, their due execution and authenticity must first be proven either: (a) By anyone who saw the writing executed; (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or (c) By a subscribing witness.
Private respondent did not present anyone who actually saw the execution of Exhibits "3" and "4", witnessed Elpidio affix his signature on Exhibit "3" or make the cross over his written name in Exhibit "4". There are no subscribing witnesses. The due execution then of Exhibits "3" and "4", as the alleged deeds of sale transferring title over said parcels of land to private respondent, was not satisfactorily proven; thus, the same can not be received in evidence.

2. YES. Exhibit “3” suffers from a patent and not just an intrinsic ambiguity. There was no mention of any property sold. Hence, it hardly qualifies as a deed of sale. Before parol evidence may be admitted in order to identify, explain or define the subject matter of a writing, there must be a description that will serve as a foundation for such evidence. Parol evidence is not admissible to identify the property where the description thereof is so vague as to amount to no description at all. In other words, parol evidence is not permitted to supply a description, but only to apply it. The uncertainty cannot be explained by parol evidence.

PEOPLE vs. CIRILO OPOSCULO Jr.

PEOPLE vs. CIRILO OPOSCULO Jr. (case digest)

G.R. No. 124572.  November 20, 2000

By: Elro Mar L. Tabiliran

FACTS: At around 5:00 p.m. of October 13, 1990, Glorito Aquino and his nephew Henry Cuevas arrived at a birthday party at Alos, Alaminos, Pangasinan. Two hours later, or at around 7:00 p.m., they decided to leave and walked their way towards the house of Glorito which was more than a kilometer away.

As they were nearing the church, two persons, one of them is the accused Cirilo, came out of the church gate and talked to Glorito, who invited the two to walk with them.  However, these two persons refused their invitation and went back to the gate.

Moments later, Glorito and Henry stopped at a store owned by one of the accused Ernesto Fernandez, Sr. to buy cigarettes.  Five persons were drinking in front of the store.  The two persons whom they met at the church gate then arrived.  Glorito asked them why they did not walk with him and his nephew earlier.  Accused Cirilo answered that they did not recognize him.  As Glorito and Cirilo kept discussing on that issue, accused Ernesto went out of his store and held the hands of Glorito behind the latter’s back.  Accused Cirilo then went in front of Glorito and pulled out something from his waist.  The five persons drinking stood up and mauled Glorito.  Then accused Cirilo lunged a bladed weapon at Glorito who shouted at his nephew Henry to run because he (Glorito) was hit.

Henry scampered for safety but after running about thirty (30) to forty (40) meters from the store, he looked back and saw Glorito running away and falling to the ground soon thereafter.  Henry approached Glorito and attempted to bring him to the hospital, but Glorito was dead.  So Henry rushed to Glorito’s house to inform the latter’s wife, Milagros Bulseco, of her husband’s death.

PNP SPO4 Victor Abarra, a cousin and neighbor of the victim Glorito, heard Glorito’s wife and Henry Cuevas crying inside her house.  He went to her house where he learned from Henry that accused Cirilo Oposculo stabbed Glorito. Victor Abarra then proceeded to the store of accused Ernesto and found the dead body of Glorito fifty (50) meters away from the store.  He noticed bloodstains on the bamboo slots of the store.

Later in the evening, policemen arrived at the scene to investigate the incident.  Senior Police Inspector Abarra called accused Ernesto from the latter’s house and asked who the attackers of Glorito were.  Accused Ernesto, pale and holding both his hands, replied that Glorito’s assailants were accused Cirilo, Wilfredo Baracas and Jaime Baril.

During trial, Henry only testified only against Cirilo’s direct participation in stabbing Glorito. Abarra testified upon the participation of Wilfredo and Jaime of the crime based upon the statement of Ernesto during his interrogation.

On Appleal, Wilfredo and Jaime contended that their implication on the crime is based upon hearsay evidence and thus inadmissible. However the prosecutor argued that it is an exception to the rule, being part of the res gestae.  

ISSUE: Whether Senior Police Inspector Abarra’s testimony that accused Ernesto told him about Wilfredo Baracas and Jaime Baril’s participation of the crime admissible as evidence which forms part of the res gestae?

RULING: No. Only Cirilo should be convicted as only he is pointed by Henry to have participated in the killing. Accused-appellants Wilfredo and Jaime were implicated in the crime on the basis of the testimony of SPO4 Abarra who, in turn, got his information as to their participation from accused Ernesto.  Senior Police Officer Abarra’s testimony is clearly hearsay evidence, as he had no personal knowledge of how Glorito’s killing took place.  The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else had told him, whether orally or in writing.

The trial court erred in admitting Senior Police Officer Abarra’s testimony by applying the rule on res gestae.  The rule of res gestae applies when the declarant himself did not testify provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.

There are two (2) reasons why the rule of res gestae can not apply in this case.  First, ccused Ernesto, the declarant, testified in court and stated that he saw accused-appellants Wilfredo and Jaime with accused-appellant Cirilo at his store on that fateful night of October 13, 1990.  But accused Ernesto did not say that accused-appellants Wilfredo and Jaime participated in Glorito’s killing.  And second, an appreciable amount of time had elapsed from the time of the killing and the arrival of Senior Police Officer Abarra at his store to whom he gave his statement identifying accused-appellants Wilfredo and Jaime as companions of accused Cirilo.  Accused Ernesto could have contrived his story implicating accused-appellants Wilfredo and Jaime in the crime during the interregnum.

G.R. No. 168387 August 25, 2010 SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ, Respondents.

G.R. No. 168387               August 25, 2010

SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ, Respondents.

Facts:

Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of the two agricultural lands of Lantap Property located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and the Murong Property located at Brgy. Murong of the same town which were subsequently foreclosed and sold to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) due to their failure to pay the loans in the said bank. But a Deed of Sale was made on Feb. 26, 1985covering "TCT No. T-62096" (corresponds to Murong property) without description as to the location of the subject property whether it is in Brgy. Murong or Brgy.Lantap.

TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong Property and TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap Property in favor of RBBI. However, both TCTsdid not specifically state its location whether it is in Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.

RBBI executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of Marquez and DelaCruz covered by TCT No.  T-62836 (corresponds to Lantap Property) but described being located in Brgy. Murong.DAR issued Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to Marquez and Dela Cruz upon payment of the purchase price to RBBI.

Nemi Fernandez, husband of ElenitaEspejo, was the tenant of Lantap Property while Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz were the tenants of the Murong Property. No evidence that Espejos took possession of Murong Property nor demanded lease rentals from petioners, Marquez and Dela Cruz.

Espejos filed Complaint on Feb. 10, 1997 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya based on the Deed of Sale indicating that TCT No. T-62096 (referring to Murong Property) was the subject of theirbuy-back transaction.RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed of Sale and VLTs but was reversed by Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

In appeal, the CA annulled and set aside DARAB’s decision because in using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land which was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 – the Murong property – then that is the property that the respondents repurchased. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is located in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere typographical error.

On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 163320 with the Supreme Court but was denied. CA’s decision becomes final and executory. A petition for review on Certiorari was filed in the SC by Marquez and Dela Cruz.

Issues:

1.      Whether or not the said petition is proper when it raises factual issues.

2.      Whether or not the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the contracts.

3.      Whether or not Parol Evidence Rule can be applied in this case.

Ruling:

1.      The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the CA’s rejection of their evidence (as to the contractual intent) as inadmissible under the Best Evidence Rule. The question involving the admissibility of evidence is a legal question that is within the Court’s authority to review.Besides, even if it were a factual question,we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the general rule because the appellate court misappreciated the facts of the case through its erroneous application of the Best Evidence Rule.

2.      The appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.

There is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule in this case because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents for it is admitted by the parties that the Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners’ VLTs referred to TCT No.T-62836 as its subject.The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties.

There’s an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.

3.      The CA refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of the contracting partiesin which itwould appear that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.It excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument.

But even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar.First,respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as "between the parties and their successors-in-interest." The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.

Second, the instant casefalls under theexceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule because there were issues on the intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; and the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9.

It was squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties which necessitates an examination of the parties’ respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties.

It is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to the petitioners.

Although the CA’s decision had already become final and executory as against RBBI with the dismissal of RBBI’s petition in G.R. No. 163320, our ruling herein in favor of petitioners is a supervening cause which renders the execution of the CA decision against RBBI unjust and inequitable.

The SC granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari and declared thatthe Deed of Sale between respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the VLTs and CLOAs of the petitioners covered the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary corrections to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this decision.