Second. The parole evidence rule is applicable. While the application thereof presupposes the existence of a valid agreement, the innominate contract between the parties has been directly put in issue by the respondents. Verily, the failure of the deed of sale to express the true intent and agreement of the parties supports the application of the paroleevidence rule.^[22]

Contrary to petitioners' contention, the absence of Bernabe's signature in the 1978 deed of sale is not necessarily conclusive of his dissent or opposition to the effected arrangement. As previously adverted to, the agreement had multiple causes or consideration, apart from the P15,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. To repeat, the agreement between the parties had both an onerous and a remunerative cause. Also worthy of note is the moral consideration for the agreement given the relationship between the parties.

Third. We agree with both the lower and the appellate courts that the Statute of Frauds is not applicable to the instant case.

The general rule is that contracts are valid in whatever form they may be.^[23] One exception thereto is the Statute of Frauds which requires a written instrument for the enforceability of a contract.^[24] However, jurisprudence dictates that the Statute of Frauds only applies to executory, not to completed, executed, or partially consummated, contracts.^[25]

In the case at bench, we find that all requisites for a valid contract are present, specifically: (1) consent of the parties; (2) object or subject matter, comprised of the parties' respective shares in the subject lot; and (3) the consideration, over and above the P15,000.00 stipulated price. We note that the agreement between the parties had long been consummated and completed. In fact, the agreement clearly contemplated immediate execution by the parties. More importantly, the parties, including petitioner Fe, ratified the agreement by the acceptance of benefits thereunder.^[26]

We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,^[12] which cited State Prosecutors:

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.

From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of "common knowledge" or notoriously known.

We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.

However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalie's appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court - What need not be proved.

Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro^[10] is instructive:

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.^[11]

While Tolentino’s testimony may be considered as independently relevant statement and may be admitted as to the fact that Pineda made utterances to him about the request for electricity, it is still inadequate to support the claim that AMC reneged on its obligation to provide electrical facilities. Admissibility of testimony should not be equated with its weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.^[47] Here, the Court finds no reason to doubt and overturn the CA’s evaluation of Tolentino’s testimony.

The defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration when the prosecution has strong, clear and convincing evidence identifying appellant as the perpetrator. Appellant failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the time and the place of commission of the crime.^[44] Thus, this Court has ruled that "alibi is one of the weakest defenses an accused can invoke and courts have always looked upon it with caution, if not suspicion, not only because it is inherently unreliable but likewise because it is rather easy to fabricate."^[45]

On this basis, the trial court correctly refused to admit Jesus Cortez's Affidavit, which respondent had offered as evidence.^[52]  Well-settled is the rule that, unless the affiant is presented as a witness, an affidavit is considered hearsay.^[53]

An exception to the foregoing rule is that on "independently relevant statements."  A report made by a person is admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the statements.^[54]  Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement given in the report, the fact that it has been made is relevant.  Here, the hearsay rule does not apply.^[55]

In the instant case, the challenged Survey Report prepared by Cortez was admitted only as part of the testimonies of respondent's witnesses.  The referral to Cortez's Report was in relation to Manlapig's final Adjustment Report.  Evidently, it was the existence of the Survey Report that was testified to.  The admissibility of that Report as part of the testimonies of the witnesses was correctly ruled upon by the trial court.

In this case, Evangelista's testimony may be considered as an independently relevant statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant.^[19] When Evangelista said that Rubia told her that it was petitioner who requested that the check be exchanged for cash, Evangelista was only testifying that Rubia told her of such request. It does not establish the truth or veracity of Rubia's statement since it is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not presented in court to attest to such utterance. On this score, evidence regarding the making of such independently relevant statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may (a) constitute a fact in issue or (2) be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.^[20] Indeed, independent of its truth or falsehood, Evangelista's statement is relevant to the issues of petitioner's falsehood, his authorship of the check in question and consequently, his culpability of the offense charged.