The document speaks for itself. The foregoing document was acknowledged before Notary Public Iluminado Golez and recorded in his notarial book as "Reg. Not. No. 41; Pag. 100; Lib. II, Serie de 1937." Documents acknowledged before notaries public are public documents which are admissible in evidence without necessity of preliminary proof as to their authenticity and due execution. They enjoy the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. To overcome the presumption, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld.1

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 148635            April 1, 2003

MARILLA MAYANG CAVILE, DON C. DELA CRUZ, JOSE C. DELA CRUZ, JR., SOLON C. DELA CRUZ, JAMELA CAVILE BACOLINAO, HENRIETTA GELLEGANI CAVILE, BERNARDO CAVILE, LAWRENCE CAVILE, FRANCIS CAVILE REEVES, ROY CAVILE, PRIMITIVO CAVILE, JR., NATIVIDAD CAVILE MINGOY, AGUSTIN CAVILE, DIANA ROSE CAVILE DELA ROSA, THOMAS GEORGE CAVILE, SR., HENRY CAVILE, MANUEL AARON CAVILE, ALEXANDER CAVILE, WILFREDO CAVILE, FE CAVILE DAGUIO, and HOPE CAVILE ARCHER, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF CLARITA CAVILE, ULPIANO CAVILE, PLACIDA CAVILE, GREGORIO CAVILE, FORTUNATA CAVILE, AMILITA CAVILE, APAD CAVILE, AQUILINA CAVILE, CRESENCIO CAVILE, ALMA CAVILE, JESUS CAVILE, ROMAN BANTILAN, GREGORIO BANTILAN, FELOMINA PAREJA, ESPERANZA PAREJA, DIONESA PAREJA, TEODULO TACANG, RAMONA TACANG, FABIAN TACANG, COSME TACANG, CRESENCIO TACANG, CONSOLACION TACANG, TERESITA TACANG, PRIMITIVO TACANG, LEODEGARIO TACANG, BRENDA MAPUTI, LORNA MAPUTI, ADELINA MAPUTI, SUSAN MAPUTI, LOURDES MAPUTI, FRANKLIN MAPUTI, SALLY MAPUTI, JESUS MAPUTI, FRANCISCO MAPUTI, VICTORIO SUNLIT, BARTOLOME SUNLIT, TEOFILO SUNLIT, TIBURCIO SUNLIT, TITO SUNLIT, ASUNCION SUNLIT, CATALINA SUNLIT, RAYMONDA SUNLIT, ISIDRO SUNLIT, ROSAL GALAN, FRANCISCO GALAN, ROMUALDO QUIANZO, JUSTO QUIANZO, LEONIDAD QUIANZO, JULITA QUIANZO, SOCORRO QUIANZO, MARGARITO QUIANZO, CASTOR QUIANZO, JUSTINA LITANIA, GENOVEVA LITANIA, FELICIDAD LITANIA, BIENVENIDO CAVILE, REPELITO GALON, FELOMENA NAVARRA, IRENE NAVARRA, RAYMUNDO NAVARRA, PEDRO NAVARRA, ESTELA NAVARRA, CLEMENCIA NAVARRA, FORTUNATA NAVARRA, LOURDES NAVARRA, VICTORIANO NAVARRA, EUSTAQUIO LUYAS, and FORTUNATA LUYAS, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 21, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV. No. 36617 entitled "Heirs of Clarita Cavili,* et al. vs. Heirs of Perfecta Cavili, et al." reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 36 in Civil Case No. 6880 for Partition, Accounting and Damages, and its Resolution dated June 28, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.

This case has its roots in the complaint filed by the respondents against the petitioners for partition of the properties left by their common ascendant, Bernardo Cavili.

It appears that Bernardo Cavili contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Ines Dumat-ol with whom he had one child, Simplicia. The second was with Orfia Colalho with whom he had two children: Fortunato and Vevencia. And the third was with Tranquilina Galon with whom he had three children: Castor, Susana and Benedicta. Throughout his lifetime, Bernardo Cavili acquired six parcels of land which became the subject of the instant case.

In October 1977, the descendants of Bernardo’s first and second marriage (herein respondents) filed a complaint for partition against the descendants of his third marriage (herein petitioners). The complaint alleged, among others, that respondents and petitioners were co-owners of the properties in question, having inherited the same from Bernardo Cavili. Upon the death of Bernardo, his son by his third marriage, Castor Cavili, took possession of the properties as administrator for and in behalf of his co-owners. However, when Castor died, his children took possession of the parcels of land but no longer as administrators. They claimed the properties as well as their fruits as their own and repeatedly refused respondents’ demand for partition.

As petitioners failed to file an Answer within the reglementary period, they were declared in default and respondents were allowed to present evidence ex parte. The trial court rendered a decision on October 5, 1979 ordering the partition of the six parcels of land.¹ However, upon motion of Primitivo Cavili and Quirino Cavili who were not properly served with summons, the trial court held a new trial and allowed said parties to present evidence. Among the evidence they proferred was a Deed of Partition which appeared to have been executed by the heirs of Bernardo Cavili on April 5, 1937.² Giving weight to the documentary evidence presented by Primitivo Cavili and Quirino Cavili, the trial court rendered another decision on May 7, 1991 dismissing the complaint for partition.³ The court reasoned:

"xxx

The court observes that there is only one important issue in this case, that is, was there already division or partition made by the co-owners of the properties left by the deceased Bernardo Cavili. All other issues are subsidiary. Partition is the division of the property or properties by those entitled to them with the desire to put an end to co-ownership. In 1937, a document of partition, marked as Exhibit "1" for the defendants, was executed, it is known as Doc. No. 41; Book No. II; Page No. 100; Series of 1937; and ratified by Notary Public Iluminado Golez; which reveals Simplicia Cavili, the only child of Bernardo Cavili of his first marriage, participated and concurred in the same partition; likewise, the children of the second marriage, were also represented and also the spouse Tranquilina Galon of the third marriage gave her concurrence as well as her legitimate children had with the deceased Bernardo Cavili. In the said document, all the parcels of land acquired during the third marriage were partitioned into two (2) parts: one part pertained to Bernardo Cavili which in turn divided by his children, namely: Simplicia Cavili, the only child of the first marriage, Lucio Cavili in representation of Fortunato Cavili eldest son in the second marriage; Vicenta Navarra in representation of Vevencia Cavili second child of the second marriage; and Susana Cavili, Castor Cavili and Benedicta Cavili, the third marriage; and the second part, or the other half, was equally divided by the three children of the third marriage, namely: Susana, Castor and Benedicta all surnamed Cavili.

That the court observed further, that in the same document of deed of partition the share of Bernardo Cavili which was up to the extent of one-half (1/2) share of the conjugal properties with Tranquilina Galon was sold to Castor Cavili for the sum of P166.00 by his legal heirs, likewise, the other one-half (1/2) share of Tranquilina Galon was sold for the same amount by her rightful heirs in favor also of Castor Cavili, who in turn took immediate possession, exercised acts of ownership and made subsequent transfers. Likewise, other heirs of Bernardo Cavili did the same act of subsequent transfers of what they had inherited just as the heirs of Tranquilina Galon also made subsequent transfer of what they succeeded as inheritance.

xxx"

Respondents appealed the case to the Court of Appeals raising the following errors:

1. The court a quo erred in concluding that the properties in question were partitioned in 1937;

2. The court a quo erred in admitting the Deed of Partition (Exhibit "1"); and

3. The court a quo erred in dismissing the complaint.⁴

The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that the trial court erred in admitting the Deed of Partition as evidence without proof of its authenticity and due execution. It held that said Deed cannot be considered as an ancient document whose authenticity and due execution need not be proved as the respondents have presented evidence that cast doubt on its authenticity and due execution. The respondents presented the testimonies of Ramona Tacang and Filomena Pareja who testified that Simplicia Cavili, one of the signatories in the Deed, resided in Mindanao from 1934 until 1947. It further observed that the supposed thumbprint of Simplicia Cavili imprinted on the document appeared more like an inkblot than a thumbmark. The Court of Appeals thus directed the trial court "to immediately appoint and constitute the necessary number of commissioners who shall expeditiously effect the partition and accounting of the subject properties in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines."⁵

Hence, this petition. Petitioners pose the following issues for resolution by the Court:

1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals acted in accordance with law in ruling that the notarized Deed of Partition (Exhibit "1"), a public document, could not be validly admitted in evidence because its genuineness and due execution was not proved by the petitioners?

2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals acted in accordance with law and prevailing jurisprudence in not ruling that prescription had set in since the petitioners have been in open and adverse occupation of the subject properties for more than forty-five (45) years without recognizing the alleged co-ownership with the respondents?⁶

Petitioners essentially argue that the Deed of Partition is a public document duly acknowledged before a Notary Public. Hence, its genuineness and due execution need not be proved. Its character as an ancient document under the Revised Rules on Evidence is immaterial in this case since said rule applies only to private documents. They further contend that the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence to the testimonies of Ramona Tacang and Filomena Pareja which were mere general denials.

Respondents, on the other hand, pray for the denial of the petition on two grounds: first, it violates the rule on the certification against forum shopping required to be attached to petitions for review filed with this Court; and second, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error in its assailed decision. Respondents harp on the fact that only one of the twenty-two (22) petitioners, Thomas George Cavili, Sr., executed and signed the certification against forum shopping when the Rules require that said certification must be signed by all the petitioners. Furthermore, respondents argue that the Deed of Partition presented by the petitioners may not be admitted in evidence as said document has not been identified and its due execution has not been fully established. Respondents allege that said document is tainted with forgery because it was shown that Simplicia Cavili was in Mindanao before, during and after its execution.

Before going into the substantive issue raised in the petition, we shall first resolve the procedural issue raised by the respondents, that is, that the certification against forum shopping attached to the petition was signed by only one of the petitioners.

The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the signing by only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.⁷ The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.⁸

We find that the execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the other petitioners of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules. All the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a common interest thereon. They also share a common defense in the complaint for partition filed by the respondents. Thus, when they filed the instant petition, they filed it as a collective, raising only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question. There is sufficient basis, therefore, for Thomas George Cavili, Sr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners that they have not filed any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Moreover, it has been held that the merits of the substantive aspects of the case may be deemed as "special circumstance" for the Court to take cognizance of a petition for review although the certification against forum shopping was executed and signed by only one of the petitioners.⁹

After a thorough study of the records of this case, we find the petition to be meritorious.

We hold that the trial court was correct in dismissing the complaint for partition, it appearing that the lawful heirs of Bernardo Cavili have already divided the properties among themselves, as evidenced by the Deed of Partition dated April 5, 1937. The terms of the Deed read:

"DEED OF PARTITION

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

THAT Susana Cavile, Castor Cavile, Benedicta Cavile, Simplicia Cavile, Lucio Cavile and Vicenta Navarra both (sic) of legal age and residents in the Municipality of Tolong, Province of Oriental Negros, Philippine Islands, after being duly sworn to in legal form, WITNESSETH:

That Susana Cavile, Castor Cavile and Benedicta Cavile are the only children of Bernardo Cavile with his wife Tranquilina Galon, and that Simplicia Cavile and Fortunato Cavile and Vevencia Cavile are the children of Bernardo Cavile outside from the conjugal home of Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon.

That Fortunato Cavile and Vevencia Cavile having already been dead are survived by their corresponding children and represented in this document by their oldest child, Lucio Cavile and Vicenta Navarra, respectively.

That during the union of Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon several properties have been acquired by them and declared under the name of Bernardo Cavile all situated in the Municipality of Tolong, Province of Oriental Negros, which properties are described as follows:

xxx

That by this document it is hereby agreed by the legal heirs of Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon to divide and by these presents it is hereby divided the above mentioned properties in the following manner:

1 – That the conjugal properties of said Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon which are already described are hereby divided into two parts ONE (1) part which corresponds to the share of Bernardo Cavile is also divided into SIX (6) equal parts, that is among Susana Cavile, Castor Cavile, Benedicta Cavile, Simplicia Cavile, Fortunato Cavile represented by his oldest son, Lucio Cavile, and Vevencia Cavile represented by her oldest child Vicenta Navarra.

2 – That the other ONE (1) part which corresponds to the share of Tranquilina Galon is also hereby equally divided into THREE (3) parts, that is among Susana Cavile, Castor Cavile and Benedicta Cavile.

SHARE OF BERNARDO CAVILE

xxx

That the share of Bernardo Cavile in parcels Tax Declaration Nos. 7421, 7143 and 7956 are sold by the legal heirs to Castor Cavile in consideration of the sum of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY(-) SIX PESOS (P166.00), Philippine currency, which amount has been received and divided equally among them.

That parcel under Tax Declaration No. 5729 is hereby sold to Ulpiano Cavile by the legal heirs of Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon, in consideration of the sum of FIFTY PESOS (P50.00), Philippine currency, which amount has been received and divided equally among them.

SHARE OF TRANQUILINA GALON

xxx

That the share of Tranquilina Galon in parcels Tax Declaration Nos. 7421, 7143 and 7956 are hereby sold by the heirs of said Tranquilina Galon to Castor Cavile in consideration of the sum of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY(-)SIX PESOS (P166.00), Philippine currency(,) which sum has been received and divided equally among them.

That the said heirs of Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon above mentioned hereby agree and accept as it is hereby agreed and accepted all the items and conditions in this DEED OF PARTITION.

IN WITNESS HEREOF we have this 5th day of April, 1937, A.D., sign our names below in the Municipality of Tolong, Province of Oriental Negros, Philippine Islands.

(sgd)CASTOR CAVILE	(sgd)SUSANA CAVILE
(sgd)BENEDICTA CAVILE
(sgd)SIMPLICIA CAVILE	(sgd)LUCIO CAVILE
(sgd)VICENTA NAVARRA
Signed in the presence of:
(sgd) F.B. Malanog	(sgd) Iluminado Golez
WITH MY CONSENT:
(thumbmarked)
TRANQUILINA GALON
-------------------------------------------------

ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA
COMMONWEALTH DE FILIPINAS
PROVINCIA DE NEGROS ORIENTAL S.S.
MUNICIPIO DE TOLONG.

En el dia de hoy 6 de Abril de 1937, A.D., ante mi comparecieron personalmente Castor Cavile, Lucio Cavile, Susana Cavile, Benedicta Cavile, Simplicia Cavile, y Vicenta Cavile y Tranquilina Galon de quienes doy fe que los conozco por ser las personas que otorgaron el documento preinserto y ratificaron ser este un acto de sus libres voluntades y otorgamiento. Castor Cavile me exhibe su cedula personal No. F1138758 expedida el dia 1 de Febrero de 1937, y Lucio Cavile me exhibe con el No. F11393521 expedida el dia 2 de Abril de 1937, y las comparecientes no me exhiben por razon de sus sexos.

El documento se refiere a un convenio de particion entre los comparecientes arriba mencionados sobre ciertas porciones de terreno radicadas todas en el municipio de Tolong, Negros Oriental consistente en cuatro (4) paginas utiles inclusive la de ratificacion, cada una de las cuales estan firmadas pos los otorgantes y pos los testigos instrumentales al pie y al margen izquierdo que lleva mi sello notarial y ratifican que el documento preinserto se otorgo bajo sus libres y expontanea voluntad.

A N T E M I:	(sgd)
ILUMINADO GOLEZ Notario Publico Mi comision expira el Diciembre 31,1937

Reg. Not. No . 41
Pag. . . . . . . . . 100
Lib. II
Serie de 1937"

The document speaks for itself. The foregoing document was acknowledged before Notary Public Iluminado Golez and recorded in his notarial book as "Reg. Not. No. 41; Pag. 100; Lib. II, Serie de 1937." Documents acknowledged before notaries public are public documents which are admissible in evidence without necessity of preliminary proof as to their authenticity and due execution. They enjoy the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. To overcome the presumption, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld.¹⁰

Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, we find that respondents in this case failed to overcome the presumption of regularity. The appellate court based its conclusion on the testimonies of Ramona Tacang and Filomena Pareja who both testified that Simplicia Cavili resided in Mindanao from 1934 until 1947.¹¹ Granting such fact to be true, it does not preclude the possibility that Simplicia Cavile could have traveled from her residence in Mindanao to Tolong, Negros Oriental to participate in the execution of the Deed of Partition. Filomena Pareja, a granddaughter of Simplicia Cavili, in fact stated during cross examination that the latter was in perfect health and was completely mobile at that time. She also admitted that there was available transportation from Mindanao to Negros Oriental.¹² Their testimonies, therefore, are insufficient to overturn the presumption that the questioned Deed of Partition has been duly executed. Furthermore, a close examination of the questioned Deed of Partition shows that what respondents claim to be mere inkblot is actually a thumbmark. We note the visible grooves or lines on the imprint that indicate that they are not mere drops of ink but an actual thumbprint. Hence, we uphold the ruling of the trial court finding that the properties left by Bernardo Cavili have already been partitioned among his heirs.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the issue on prescription raised by petitioners.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Sometimes spelled in the records as "Cavile."

¹ Original Records, vol. 1, pp. 47-51.

² Exhibit 1, Original Records, vol. 5, pp. 1047-1050.

³ Id., vol. 5, pp. 1112-1116.

⁴ CA Rollo, p. 70.

⁵ Rollo, pp. 33-50.

⁶ Id., p. 18.

⁷ See Docena vs. Lapesura, 355 SCRA 658 (2001); Dar vs. Alonzo-Legasto, 339 SCRA 306 (2000).

⁸ MC Engineering, Inc. vs. NLRC, 360 SCRA 183 (2001).

⁹ Uy vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, 336 SCRA 419 (2000).

¹⁰ Ruiz, Sr. vs. CA, 362 SCRA 40 (2001); Llana vs. CA, 361 SCRA 27 (2001); Abapo vs. CA, 327 SCRA 180 (2000); Cleofas vs. St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc., 324 SCRA 223 (2000).

¹¹ TSN, June 14, 1990, pp. 10-12; TSN, July 13, 1990, pp. 6-8.

¹² TSN, July 13, 1990, pp. 9-10.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that Exhibit "1" for the private respondent, the deed of sale in a private writing executed on 15 May 1931 in favor of Manuel Raguirag and Clara Tapec, private respondent's grandparents, is an ancient document whose proof of authenticity was no longer necessary because of the concurrence of the requisites in Section 21, 24 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 25 It was already more than thirty years old at the time it was offered in evidence in 1986. 26 It was produced from the custody of respondent Raguirag, an heir of the vendees in the said instrument. And it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 111952 October 26, 1994

JULIO TAPEC and PRISCA GALANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO RAGUIRAG, respondents.

Evangelista & Evangelista for petitioners.

Sylvia R.T. Rubio for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In resolving the issue of which document should be given more weight in deciding ownership, the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at irreconcilably conflicting judgments. The former held that the deeds of sale in favor of the petitioners, being duly acknowledged before a notary public and registered under Act No. 3344, although executed much later, should prevail over a prior conveyance in a private document in favor of the private respondent's predecessor-in-interest. On appeal by the private respondent, the Court of Appeals held otherwise on the ground that the private document is an ancient document under the rules of evidence and overturned the decision of the trial court.

Hence this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

There can be no question that the determination of which of the two documents should prevail, in the manner it was done by the courts below, is a question of law. At its heart, however, is a question of fact which, under the general rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review, should not be entertained by this Court. The instant case, however, falls within one of the exceptions to such rule: that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.1 Accordingly, we gave due course to this petition.

The procedural and factual antecedents are disclosed by the pleadings.

On 4 December 1994, the petitioners, who are husband and wife, filed a complaint for recovery of ownership with the Regional Trial Court at Batac, Ilocos Norte, against David Cabuyadao and herein private respondent Loreto Raguirag. The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 11,850 square meters, located at Barangay
No. 26, Oaiag-Upay, Paoay, Ilocos Norte, more specifically described as follows:

RURAL, part of which is riceland and the rest a pasture, bounded on the North by the Heirs of Oligario Cabuyadao and others; on the East, by Tony Cac (formerly Luis Bacud); on the South, by Rufino Macoco et al.; and, on the West by the successors of Eusebio Agdeppa and Luis Cueva, with an area of 11,850 square meters more or less.

They further averred that during the cadastral survey of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, unknown to them and without their consent, the above-described property was surveyed and subdivided into Lot Nos. 7452, 7444, and 7450, and that under baseless claims of ownership, David Cabuyadao and Loreto Raguirag threatened to enter Lot No. 7452 and Lot No. 7444, respectively. The petitioners then prayed that they be declared the owners of Lot Nos. 7452 and 7444 and that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ordering the defendants and their agents and representatives to desist from entering the lots.

David Cabuyadao was declared in default 2 for failure to file his answer.

In his answer with counterclaim, 3 private respondent (defendant) Loreto Raguirag denied having knowledge of the property claimed by the petitioners but by way of special defense asserted that he is the absolute owner of the parcel of land described as follows:

UNCULTIVATED LAND — situated at Dumalaoaig, # 19, Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with an area of 3,487 sq. meters, more or less, designated as Lot
No. 7444, Cad. 445D of Paoay, Ilocos Norte. Bounded on the north by Benigno Raguirag; on the East by Manuel Raguirag; on the South by Felipe Cueva, and on the West by Gregorio Agdeppa.

The petitioners' claim of ownership is based on two deeds of absolute sale, one executed on 2 January 1950 by Trinidad Gonzales in favor of petitioner Julio Tapec,4 and the other executed on 28 May 1949 by Rosario Gonzales in favor of the petitioners, 5 both acknowledged before the same notary public and duly registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds under Act No. 3344 on 8 March 1950 and 29 July 1949, respectively.

The property subject of the sale by Trinidad Gonzales is described as follows:

A parcel of an unirrigated riceland measuring 4832 sq. m. and
pasto 6 measuring 2380 sq. m. and both bounded on the North by Aquilino Oamil and others, East Rufino Diaz and others, South Leocadio Macoco and others and West Felipe Cueva and others and that said land is valued at P180.00 for this current year as per Tax No. 016399 (previously under Tax No. 68663) in the name of Miguel Gonzales. . . .

while the parcel sold by Rosario Gonzales is described thus:

A parcel of unirrigated riceland measuring 4832 sq. m. and bounded on the North by Oligario Cabuyadao, Manuel Raguirag and Aquilino Oamil, East by Luis Bacud and Rufino Diaz, South by Leocadio Macoco and Ariston Cueva, and West by Eusebio Agdeppa and Felipe Cueva. It is valued at P180 for this current year as per Tax No. 016399 under the name of the late Miguel Gonzales. . . .

Respondent Loreto Raguirag, on the other hand, anchored his defense on a document, dated 15 May 19317 and handwritten in Ilocano, wherein the brothers Victoriano, Gregorio, Matias, and Alejandro, all surnamed Gonzales,8 sold to the spouses Manuel Raguirag and Clara Tapec, grandparents of respondent Raguirag, for a consideration of P150.00 a pasture situated in Dumalaoing, Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with an area of 3,450 sq. meters and bounded:

. . . as follows, North Victoriano Gonzalis I, East Alejandro Gonzalis, Miguel Gonzalis and others, South Pelipi Cuyba West Grigorio Agdippa.9

Witnesses to the said handwritten document were Manuel Raguirag, Cornelio Cabuyao, and Miguel Gonzales.

At the trial, petitioner Julio Tapec identified the deeds of sale executed by Trinidad and Rosario Gonzales and the sketch plan of Lot Nos. 7444, 7450, and 7452 of the Paoay Cadastre 10 and declared that the area sold by Trinidad corresponds to Lot Nos. 7450 and 7452 while the parcel sold by Rosario corresponds to Lot No. 7444. 11 He further alleged that he has been in possession of the lots since he purchased them and had them declared for taxation purposes in his name in 1950 12 and that before he bought the property of Trinidad Gonzales, he had to first redeem it from Ireneo Raguirag to whom it was mortgaged by Trinidad for P100.00 on 10 November 1947 and who (Trinidad) was in possession thereof. 13

On the other hand, private respondent Raguirag presented the 1931 private writing which, according to him, was shown to him when he was a boy by his grandfather, Manuel Raguirag, who said, "all of these are our properties of which I bought from Alejandro Gonzales." 14 He claimed that his grandfather was in possession of the property until his death during the Japanese occupation. Then his father, Ireneo Raguirag, continued such possession until he died in 1967. 15 Ireneo had the property declared for taxation purposes in 1962. 16 After his father's death, Loreto took over the possession of the property and during the cadastral survey of Paoay, it was claimed by Leoncia Raguirag, a sister of Ireneo. The private respondent is merely possessing it as tenant-administrator. Thus:

ATTY. LUMBO —

q I understand that the land in suit has already a lot number, do you know who is the survey claimant of the lot in suit?

xxx xxx xxx

a Leoncia Raguirag, sir.

q Who is this Leoncia Raguirag?

a A sister of my father, sir.

q You said that from the death of your late father up to the present you are the one possessing this land in suit, my question is, why are you in possession of this property?

a Yes, sir, because my father is no longer living.

q And since according to you this survey claimant is Leoncia Raguirag, a sister of your late father, in what capacity are you possessing the land in suit?

a As a tenant-administrator, sir.

q Tiller-administrator of what?

a That pastureland in the land of my father, sir.

q What is that pastureland you are referring to in the name of your father?

a That is the pastureland that is being claimed by Julio Tapec, sir. 17

On 31 October 1989, the trial court rendered a decision, 18 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

In view of all the foregoing, it is hereby ordered:

1. That the plaintiffs are absolute owners of Lot Nos. 7942 19 and 7444.

2. That the defendants pay the costs.

In support thereof, it made the following findings and conclusion:

That an impartial assessment of the evidence adduced disclosed that the deed of sale executed in favor of the plaintiffs by the vendees Trinidad Gonzales and Rosario Gonzales marked as Exh. "A" and "B" respectively are public documents registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte while that of the defendant is in a private document.

That between a deed of sale in a public document and a deed of sale in private document, the former must prevail;

That a contract may be entered into in whatever form except where the law requires a document or other special form.

"When the law requires that a contract be in a public document in order that it may be valid or enforceable, such as contracts which have for their object the creation or transmission of rights over immovable property, that requirement is absolute and indispensable." (Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 35365, 9 April '87, Second Division).

Art. 1358 N.C.C. (No. 1). Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public document (Gallardo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 67742, 21 Oct. '87, First Division).

Loreto Raguirag appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. CV No. 26093.

In its decision 20 of 20 September 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision. It declared:

The plaintiffs-appellee raise for the first time, on appeal, the question of the genuineness of the Deed of Sale offered as documentary evidence by the defendants-appellants. It has been decided by the Supreme Court that objection to the admission of evidence must be made seasonably, at the time it is introduced or offered, otherwise they are deemed waived and will not be entertained for the first time on appeal. (People of the Philippines vs. Benjamin Bañares, G.R. No. 68298, November 25, 1986, 145 SCRA 680) The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time. (Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Rufo Aviles and Josephine Aviles, G.R. No. 86062, June 6, 1990, 186 SCRA 385).

Aside from that, a private document may be exempted from proof of due execution and authenticity under the "ancient document rule."
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. — Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given.

In this case, the Deed of Sale dated 15 May 1931 complies with the first requirement of Section 22 since it was offered in evidence in 1986. It was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it complying with the requirement that it be produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine. (Resurreccion Bartolome, et al., vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 76792, March 12, 1990, 183 SCRA 102) Neither is there any evidence of alterations or any circumstances that would cause a doubt on the genuineness of the document.

Thus, all the elements of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, are present, such as: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. In addition, Article 1477 of the same Code provides that "the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon actual or constructive delivery thereof." The plaintiff-appellee Julio Tapec himself, testified during cross-examination that Ireneo Raguirag (father of defendants-appellants) was already in possession of the parcel of land when the subject land was offered to him by the vendor, Rosario Gonzales. (Original Records, TSN, June 26, 1986, p. 8) Moreover, Constancia Gonzales, a sister of the vendor of the plaintiffs-appellees, and a witness for the defendants-appellants, testified that the subject pastureland was sold to the grandfather of the defendants-appellants as told to her by her parents; and that the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants-appellants have been in possession of the property since they bought it. (Original Records, TSN, November 23, 1988, pp. 2-3).

The validity of the sale of the subject pastureland to the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants-appellants cannot be disputed. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. (Article 1356, New Civil Code) We do not agree with the ruling of the trial judge that under Article 1358 of the New Civil Code, a contract which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public document to be valid and enforceable.

Article 1358 of the New Civil Code enumerates certain contracts that must appear in public or private documents. This provision does not require such form in order to validate the act or contract but to insure its efficacy. Contracts enumerated by this article are, therefore, valid as between the contracting parties, even when they have not been reduced to public or private writings. (Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume Four, 1985 ed., pp. 549-550) Therefore, the Deed of Sale in favor of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants-appellants is considered valid and enforceable, even if it was only embodied in a private writing.

In upholding the validity of the 1931 sale of the subject pastureland, we can only conclude that when the land was sold to the plaintiffs-appellees in 1950, the vendor had no right to sell the subject property since at that time her family no longer owned the land and thus no legal right was transferred by the vendor to the plaintiffs-appellees. Article 1459 of the New Civil Code requires that the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered, otherwise the contract of sale is void.

Article 1544 of the New Civil Code on double sales does not apply in this case. The article provides that if an immovable property should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry Property. In order that the abovementioned provision may be invoked, it is necessary that the conveyance must have been made by a party who has an existing right in the thing, and the power to dispose of it. It cannot, therefore, be invoked in a case where the two different contracts of sale are made by two different persons, one of them not being the owner of the property sold. (Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume Five, 1959, pp. 83-84). 21

Before us, the petitioners raise the sole issue of whether the deeds of sale to them, which were embodied in public instruments and registered under Act No. 3344, 22 should prevail over the alleged sale to the ancestors of respondent Raguirag executed much earlier in a private instrument.

It appears that the petitioners no longer question the validity and due execution of the 1931 deed of conveyance. Nevertheless, they stand firm on their argument that such instrument is valid and enforceable only as to the parties thereto and cannot bind third persons and innocent purchasers. 23

We agree with the Court of Appeals that Exhibit "1" for the private respondent, the deed of sale in a private writing executed on 15 May 1931 in favor of Manuel Raguirag and Clara Tapec, private respondent's grandparents, is an ancient document whose proof of authenticity was no longer necessary because of the concurrence of the requisites in Section 21, 24 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 25 It was already more than thirty years old at the time it was offered in evidence in 1986. 26 It was produced from the custody of respondent Raguirag, an heir of the vendees in the said instrument. And it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the said private instrument is a deed of sale in which all the requisites of a valid contract are present and which is binding upon the parties. The trial court erroneously held that it is invalid because it is not in a public document as required by Article 1358 of the Civil Code and pursuant to Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals. 27 Article 1358 does not invalidate the acts or contracts enumerated therein if they are not embodied in public documents. As one noted civilian has said:

This Article enumerates certain contracts that must appear in public or private documents. This provision does not require such form in order to validate the act or contract but to insure its efficacy. It is limited to an enumeration of the acts and contracts which should be reduced to writing in a public or private instrument. The reduction to writing in a public or private document, required in this article, is not an essential requisite for the existence of the contract, but is simply a coercive power granted to the contracting parties by which they can reciprocally compel the observance of these formal requisites. Contracts enumerated by this article are, therefore, valid as between the contracting parties, even when they have not been reduced to public or private writings. Except in certain cases where public instruments and registration are required for the validity of the contract itself, the legalization of a contract by means of a public writing and its entry in the register are not essential solemnities or requisites for the validity of the contract as between the contracting parties, but are required for the purpose of making it effective as against third person. 28

What the trial court referred to in Manotok is not the ruling of this Court but the claim of the petitioner therein, What this Court stated was that "the sale made by Legarda to Lucero should have been embodied in a public instrument in accordance with Article 1358 of the Civil Code and should have been duly registered with the Register of Deeds to make it binding against third persons." (emphasis supplied).

While we uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the 15 May 1931 sale in favor of the private respondent's grandparents was valid and enforceable, we cannot, however, accept its findings that:

In upholding the validity of the 1931 sale of the subject pastureland, We can only conclude that when the land was sold to the plaintiffs-appellees [petitioners herein] in 1950, the vendor had no right to sell the subject property since at the time her family no longer owned the land and thus no legal right was transferred by the vendor to the plaintiffs-appellees.

Secondly, while the petitioners sufficiently established the identity of the property claimed by them, the private respondent failed to prove the identity of the property covered by Exhibit "1." Since he specified in his special defenses the property he claimed and asked the court in his prayer that he be declared "the lawful owner and possessor" thereof, the burden was on him to prove its identity. 34

Thirdly, it was established that Trinidad Gonzales had mortgaged her property to the private respondent's father, Ireneo Raguirag, on 10 November 1947. 35 The mortgage was redeemed only shortly before its sale to the petitioners in 1950. If Ireneo were its owner as heir of Manuel Raguirag, there was no reason for Ireneo to have accepted the mortgage thereof.

Finally, the private respondent categorically admitted that he is only a tenant-administrator of Lot No. 7444. This admission belies any claim of ownership. It was his aunt, Leoncia Raguirag, who claimed ownership over it during the cadastral survey. 36

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 26093 is hereby REVISED, and the dispositive portion of the decision of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court at Batac, Ilocos Norte, in Civil Case No. 1669-17 is REINSTATED, subject to the correction of the portion therein which reads "Lot Nos. 7942" to "Lot Nos. 7452."

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Medina vs. Asistio, 191 SCRA 218 [1990]; Misa vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 217 [1992]; Borillo vs. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 130 [1992].

2 OR, 14.

3 Id., 5-8.

4 Exhibit "A"; Id., 61.

5 Exhibit "B"; OR, 62.

6 So in original. Probably should be "pasture."

7 Exhibit "1"; OR.

8 Written in the document as "Gonzalis."

9 Translation of Exhibit "1"; OR, 139.

10 Exhibit "C."

11 TSN, 16 January 1986, 4.

12 Exhibit "D."

13 Exhibits "K" and "K-1" (Translation); TSN, 27 August 1986, 1-3.

14 TSN, 6 November 1986, 2.

15 TSN, 6 November 1986, 5.

16 Exhibit "2."

17 TSN, 6 November 1986, 6-7.

18 OR, 150-155; Rollo, 17-22. Per Judge Jose P. Tabanda.

19 Should be 7452.

20 Per Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros.

21 Rollo, 27-30.

22 Act No. 3344 is the law amending Act No. 2837, which in turn amended Section 194 of the Administrative Code, otherwise known as the SYSTEM OF RECORDING FOR UNREGISTERED REAL ESTATE.

23 Rollo, 13.

24 It used to be Section 22, as referred to by the Court of Appeals. Said Section 21 reads:

Sec. 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary. — Where a private document is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be given.

25 See Claveris vs. Quingco, 207 SCRA 66 [1992].

26 See RICARDO J. FRANCISCO, Evidence (Rules of Court in the Philippines, Rules 128-134), 1993 ed., 507.

27 149 SCRA 174 [1987].

28 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. IV, 1985 ed.,
549-550.

29 Exhibit "A"; OR 61.

30 Exhibit "B"; Id., 62.

31 Paragraph 1, Special Defense and Counterclaim; Id., 5-6.

32 TSN, 26 June 1986, 6-7 (a.m.).

33 Exhibit "G"; OR, 78; TSN, 6 January 1986, 6.

34 Misa vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 217 [1992].

35 Exhibits "K" and "K-1" (Translation).

36 TSN, 6 November 1986, 7.

Firstly, it should be remembered that per the testimony of petitioner Julio Tapec, the sale in 1950 was that executed on 2 January 1950 by Trinidad Gonzales and the property subject thereof corresponds to Lot Nos. 7450 and 7452, 29 while the sale executed on 28 May 1949 by Rosario Gonzales 30 corresponds to Lot No. 7444. It is the latter lot which is claimed by the private respondent. 31 The original owner of the property sold by Trinidad and Rosario was their father, Miguel Gonzales, 32 and as indicated in the deeds of sale they executed, the portion each sold was declared for taxation purposes in the name of their father. 33 With respect to the 1931 sale, Miguel Gonzales was not a vendor therein but a mere witness thereto. The vendors were Victoriano, Matias, Alejandro, and Gregorio, all surnamed Gonzales. Obviously, the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Trinidad had no more right to sell the property.

Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.17

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 79597-98             May 20, 1991

HEIRS OF DEMETRIA LACSA, represented by: BIENVENIDO CABAIS, VIRGINIA CABAIS, LEONOR CABAIS-PENA and DOLORES CABAIS-MAGPAYO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AURELIO D. SONGCO, ANGEL D. SONGCO ENCARNACION D. SONGCO, LOURDES D. SONGCO, ANGELA S. SONGCO, LUDIVINA S. SONGCO, JOSEPHINE S. SONGCO, ALBERT S. SONGCO, INOSENCIO S. SONGCO, JAIME S. SONGCO, MARTIN S. SONGCO, and BERNARD S. SONGCO, Being Heirs of Inocencio Songco, respondents.

Norbin P. Dimalanta for petitioners.
Dante S. David for private respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 08397-08398 dated 16 July 1987 affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, in favor of private respondents, and its resolution dated 14 August 1987 denying the motion for reconsideration.

This petition which originated with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga involves two (2) cases, namely: Civil Case No. G-1190 and Civil Case No. G-1332.1

Civil Case No. G-1190 is an action for recovery of possession with damages and preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioners, the heirs of Demetria Lacsa, against Aurelio Songco and John Doe based on the principal allegations that petitioners are heirs of deceased Demetria Lacsa who, during her lifetime, was the owner of a certain parcel of land consisting partly of a fishpond and partly of uncultivated open space, located in Bancal, Guagua, Pampanga, evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-1038 (11725); that the principal respondent and his predecessor-in-interest who are neither co-owners of the land nor tenants thereof, thru stealth, fraud and other forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or possessing the fishpond of said parcel of land and caused the open space therein to be cleared for expanded occupancy thereof, and refused to vacate the same despite petitioner's demands on them to vacate.2

Civil Case No. G-1332 is an action also by herein petitioners against private respondents before the same lower court for cancellation of title, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction, based on the allegations that they are the heirs of Demetria Lacsa who was the owner of the land also involved in Civil Case No. G-1190; that the herein private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, thru stealth, fraud and other forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or possessing the fishpond of the said parcel of land, and later abandoned the same but only after the case was filed and after all the fish were transferred to the adjoining fishpond owned by the private respondents; that on 31 October 1923 and 15 March 1924, by presenting to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga certain forged and absolutely simulated documents, namely: "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" and "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA", respectively, and by means of false pretenses and misrepresentation, Inocencio Songco, the private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, succeeded in transferring the title to said property in his name, to the damage and prejudice of the petitioners; and that a preliminary injunction was necessary to prevent the private respondents from disposing of said property.3

Private respondents denied the material allegations of both complaints and alleged as special and affirmative defenses, petitioners' lack of cause of action, for the reason that Original Certificate of Title No. RO-1038 (11725) was merely a reconstituted copy issued in April 1983 upon petitioners' expedient claim that the owner's duplicate copy thereof had been missing when the truth of the matter was that OCT No. RO-1038 (11725) in the name of Demetria Lacsa, had long been cancelled and superseded by TCT No. 794 in the name of Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin by virtue of the document entitled "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRA-JUDICIAL" entered into by the heirs of Demetria Lacsa; that the latter TCT was in turn superseded by TCT No. 929 issued in the name of Inocencio Songco (father of private respondents) by virtue of a document entitled "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA" executed by spouses Juan Limpin and Alberta Guevarra in favor of said Inocencio Songo.4

Private respondents, in their answer, pleaded a counterclaim against petitioners based on allegations that the latter headed by Carlito Magpayo, by force and intimidation, took possession of a portion of the fishpond in the land and occupied a hut therein, that at that time, private respondents had 3,000 bangus fingerlings left in the fishpond which upon petitioners' harvest thereof left private respondents deprived and damaged in the amount of P50,000.00 more or less; that such illegal occupancy caused private respondents to suffer unrealized income and profits, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and serious anxiety which entitled them to actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and P500.00 appearance fee for every hearing.5

On 20 January 1985, the parties assisted by their respective counsel filed in Civil Case No. G-1332 a joint stipulation of facts, alleging:

1. That on June 9, 1982, the plaintiffs, being heirs of Demetria Lacsa, filed Civil Case No. 1190;

2. That after the defendants filed their Answer in the said Civil Case No. G-1190, and learning the land subject of the two (2) abovementioned cases (sic), said plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended and/or Supplemental Complaint.

3. That the said motion was denied by the Honorable Court, hence, said plaintiffs filed Civil Case No. G-1332, the above-entitled case, with the same cause of action as that of the proposed Amended and/or Supplemental Complaint;

4. That the evidences of both parties in Civil Case No. G-1190 and in the above-entitled case are practically and literally the same;

5. That in view of the foregoing, and in order to avoid duplicity of action by repeatedly presenting the same act of evidences and same set of witnesses, the parties mutually agreed as they hereby agree and stipulate that any and all evidences presented under Civil Case No. 1190 shall be adopted as evidences for both parties in the above-entitled case, and upon submission for resolution of Civil Case No. G-1190, the above-entitled case shall likewise be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence presented in the same Civil Case No. G-1190.6

On the basis of this joint stipulation of facts, the lower court held that:

. . . the fishpond in question was originally owned by Demetria Lacsa under Original Certificate of Title No. 11725. After Demetria Lacsa died her two daughters Alberta Guevarra and Ambrocia Guevarra with their respective husbands Juan Limpin and Damaso Cabais entered into an extrajudicial partition of the properties left by Demetria Lacsa under the document "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Partition Extra-judicial" dated April 7, 1923 (Exhibits "3","3-A" and "3-B") wherein the fishpond in question was adjudicated to Alberta Guevarra and which deed was duly registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as evidenced by the certification of the Deputy Register of Deeds marked as Exhibit "3-C". Aside from the "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" written in the Spanish language, the spouses Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin and the spouses Ambrosia Guevarra and Damaso Cabais executed on April 7, 1923, another deed of partition in the Pampango dialect marked as Exhibit "3-D" "wherein the fishpond in question was adjudicated to Alberta Guevarra. As a consequence, Original Certificate of Title No. 794 (Exhibit "4") was issued to spouses Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin. On January 20, 1924, the spouses Juan Limpin and Alberta Guevarra sold the fishpond in question to Inocencio Songco under the deed entitled "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" (Exhibits "7" and "7-A") which was duly registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as evidenced by the certification of the Deputy Register of Deeds marked Exhibit "7-B". As a result of the sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 794 (Exhibit "4") in the name of the spouses Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin was cancelled by the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 929 was issued to Inocencio
Songco."7

The lower court thus held that the fishpond in question belongs to the private respondents, having been inherited by them from their deceased father Inocencio Songco.8

The dispositive portion of the judgment in favor of private respondents reads:

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered

In Civil Case No. G - 1190

(A) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. G-1190;

In Civil Case No. G-1332

(B) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. G-1332;

In Both Civil Case No. G-1190 and Civil Case No. G-1332

(C) Ordering the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. RO-1038 (11725) in the name of Demetria Lacsa;

(D) Ordering the plaintiffs to restore possession of the fishpond in question located in Bancal, Guagua, Pampanga, to the defendants (sic);

(E) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the defendants the sum of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as and for moral damages;

(F) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the defendants the sum of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as and for exemplary damages;

(G) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the defendants the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as attorney's fees;

(H) Costs against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.9

Petitioners appealed the above-mentioned decision to the respondent Court of Appeals assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the lower court:

I. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS THAT THE TWO DOCUMENTS (EXHS. 3 & 7 AND THEIR SUB-MARKINGS) WERE FORGED AND ABSOLUTELY SIMULATED DOCUMENTS. HENCE, NULL AND VOID;

II. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SIGNATURE OF JUAN LIMPIN AND THUMBMARK OF ALBERTA GUEVARRA APPEARING ON THE EXCRITUA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA (EXHS. 7 & 7-A) WERE FORGED;

III. IN APPRECIATING IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY WITNESS JESUS CRUZ WHEN THEIR SOURCES COULD NOT BE ACCOUNTED FOR AND THEIR AUTHENTICITY IS IN QUESTION;

IV. IN HOLDING THAT INOCENCIO SONGCO, THE PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF THE APPELLEES WAS AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE;

V. IN HOLDING THAT TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 929 WAS ISSUED TO INOCENCIO SONGCO BY THE REGISTERED TRY OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA;

VI. IN HOLDING THAT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. RO-1038 (11725) WAS ISSUED BY THE COURT (CFI-III PAMPANGA) IN EXCESS OF OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND THEREFORE NULL AND VOID;

VII. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT THE VOLUNTARY ABANDONMENT OF THE FISHPOND IN QUESTION BY THE APPELLEES WAS A RECOGNITION OF APPELLANTS' TITLE TO IT;

VIII. IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE APPELLEES.10

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in the appealed case, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that appellants are not liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.11

Petitioners flied a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in its resolution dated 14 August 1987.12 Hence, this petition.

Petitioners assign the following alleged errors to the Court of Appeals:

I. IN APPLYING THE "ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE" ON THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENT ENTITLED "ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" AND "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA; AND MARKED DURING THE TRIAL AS EXHIBITS "3" AND "7", RESPECTIVELY, FOR THE RESPONDENT HEREIN;

II. IN DISREGARDING THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF THE NOTARIAL LAW WHICH TOOK EFFECT AS EARLY AS FEBRUARY 1, 1903;

III. IN DISREGARDING THE RULE ON PROOF OF PUBLIC OR OFFICIAL RECORD, (SEC. 25, RULE 132, RULES OF COURT)13

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals wrongfully applied the "ancient document rule" provided in Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.14 The rule states that:

Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary.— Were a private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given.

It is submitted by petitioners that under this rule, for a document to be classified as an "ancient document", it must not only be at least thirty (30) years old but it must also be found in the proper custody and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from suspicion.15 Thus, according to petitioners, exhibits "3" and "7", entitled "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" and "Escritura de Venta Absoluta", respectively, can not qualify under the foregoing rule, for the reason that since the "first pages" of said documents do not bear the signatures of the alleged parties thereto, this constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget unlimited alterations.16

We are not persuaded by the contention. Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.17

The first document, Exhibit "3", entitled 'Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" was executed on 7 April 1923 whereas the second document, exhibit "7", entitled "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" was executed on 20 January 1924. These documents are, therefore, more than thirty (30) years old. Both copies of the aforementioned documents were certified as exact copies of the original on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by the Deputy Register of Deeds. There is a further certification with regard to the Pampango translation of the document of extrajudicial partition which was issued by the Archives division, Bureau of Records Management of the Department of General Services.18

Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind third parties, must be recorded with the appropriate Register of Deeds. The documents in question, being certified as copies of originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to be found in the proper custody. Clearly, therefore, the first two (2) requirements of the "ancient document rule" were met.

As to the last requirement that the document must on its face appear to be genuine, petitioners did not present any conclusive evidence to support their allegation of falsification of the said documents. They merely alluded to the fact that the lack of signatures on the first two (2) pages could have easily led to their substitution. We cannot uphold this surmise absent any proof whatsoever. As held in one case, a contract apparently honest and lawful on its face must be treated as such and one who assails the genuineness of such contract must present conclusive evidence of falsification.19

Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that a document must be unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality of the document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any alterations or circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that the documents in question, which were certified as copied of the originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and free from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.

The documents in question are "ancient documents" as envisioned in Sec. 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.1âwphi1 Further proof of their due execution and authenticity is no longer required. Having held that the documents in question are private writings which are more than thirty (30) years old, come from the proper repository thereof, and are unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion, there is no further need for these documents to fulfill the requirements of the 1903 Notarial Law. Hence, the other contentions of the petitioners that the documents do not fulfill the mandatory requirements of the Notarial Law20 and that the proper person or public official was not presented to testify on his certification of the documents in question,21 need not be resolved as they would no longer serve any purpose.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Herrera, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.

Footnotes

* Penned by Justice Gloria C. Paras, with the concurrence of Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Conrado T. Limcaoco.
1 Rollo, p. 57.
2 Rollo, p. 57.
3 Rollo, p. 58.
4 Rollo, pp. 57-58.
5 Rollo, p. 59.
6 Rollo, p. 59.
7 Rollo, p. 60.
8 Ibid.
9 Rollo, pp. 60-61.
10 Rollo, pp. 61-62.
11 Rollo, p. 65.
12 Rollo, p. 8.
13 Rollo, p. 8.
14 Rollo, p. 8.
15 Rollo, pp. 8-9.
16 Rollo, p. 9.
17 Francisco, Vicente J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines. Volume III, Part II, 1973 Edition, p. 432.
18 Exhibit "3-D", Original Folder of Exhibits for the Plaintiffs and Defendants.
19 Dy vs. Sacay, G.R. Nos. 78535-36, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 473.
20 Rollo, p. 9.
21 Rollo, p. 10.