The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, known as estoppel against tenants, provides as follows: Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: x x x x (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Emphasis supplied). It is clear from the abovequoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation.13 If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply.14 Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord's title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount.15 In the present case, what respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 174436               January 23, 2013

JUANITA ERMITAÑO, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, ISABELO ERMITAÑO, Petitioner,
vs.
LAILANIE M. PAGLAS, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision¹ and Resolution² dated September 8, 2004 and August 16, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77617.

On November 5, 1999, herein respondent and petitioner, through her representative, lsabelo R. Ermitaño, executed a Contract of Lease wherein petitioner leased in favor of respondent a 336 square meter residential lot and a house standing thereon located at No. 20 Columbia St., Phase l, Doña Vicenta Village, Davao City. The contract period is one (1) year, which commenced on November 4, 1999, with a monthly rental rate of ₱13,500.00. Pursuant to the contract, respondent paid petitioner ₱2,000.00 as security deposit to answer for unpaid rentals and damage that may be cause to the leased unit.

Subsequent to the execution of the lease contract, respondent received information that sometime in March 1999, petitioner mortgaged the subject property in favor of a certain Charlie Yap (Yap) and that the same was already foreclosed with Yap as the purchaser of the disputed lot in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale which was registered on February 22, 2000. Yap's brother later offered to sell the subject property to respondent. Respondent entertained the said offer and negotiations ensued. On June 1, 2000, respondent bought the subject property from Yap for ₱950,000.00. A Deed of Sale of Real Property was executed by the parties as evidence of the contract. However, it was made clear in the said Deed that the property was still subject to petitioner's right of redemption.

Prior to respondent's purchase of the subject property, petitioner filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of the mortgage in favor of Yap as well as the sheriff's provisional certificate of sale which was issued after the disputed house and lot were sold on foreclosure.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 2000, petitioner sent a letter demanding respondent to pay the rentals which are due and to vacate the leased premises. A second demand letter was sent on March 25, 2001. Respondent ignored both letters.

On August 13, 2001, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City, a case of unlawful detainer against respondent.

In its Decision dated November 26, 2001, the MTCC, Branch 6, Davao City dismissed the case filed by petitioner and awarded respondent the amounts of ₱25,000.00 as attorney's fees and ₱2,000.00 as appearance fee.

Petitioner filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City.

On February 14, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed the case for unlawful detainer but modified in that the award of attorney's fees in defendant's herein respondent's favor is deleted and that the defendant respondent is ordered to pay plaintiff herein petitioner the equivalent of ten months unpaid rentals on the property or the total sum of ₱135,000.00.

SO ORDERED.³

The RTC held that herein respondent possesses the right to redeem the subject property and that, pending expiration of the redemption period, she is entitled to receive the rents, earnings and income derived from the property.

Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA.

On September 8, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, 11th Judicial Region, Davao City is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS as follows:

(a) Private respondent's obligation to pay the petitioner the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱135,000.00) equivalent of ten (10) months is hereby DELETED;

(b) Attorney's fees and litigation expenses were correctly awarded by the trial court having compelled the private respondent to litigate and incur expenses to protect her interests by reason of the unjustified act of petitioner (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 326), Thus: litigation expenses of only TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) not TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱25,000.00); and

(c) Attorney's fees REI NSTAT ED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) instead of only TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱2,000.00).

SO ORDERED.⁴

Quoting extensively from the decision of the MTCC as well as on respondent's comment on the petition for review, the CA ruled that respondent did not act in bad faith when she bought the property in question because she had every right to rely on the validity of the documents evidencing the mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated August 16, 2006.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following assignment of errors:

A.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE BY RULING THAT A SHERIFF'S FINAL CERTIFICATE OF SALE WAS ALREADY ISSUED WHICH DECISION IS NOT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH EVEN IF SHE WAS INFORMED BY PETITIONER THROUGH A LETTER ADVISING HER THAT THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE CONTRACT WAS SHAM, FICTITIOUS AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF FORGERY BECAUSE PETITIONER'S PURPORTED SIGNATURE APPEARING THEREIN WAS SIGNED AND FALSIFIED BY A CERTAIN ANGELA CELOSIA.

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES WHICH WAS DELETED BY RTC-BRANCH 16 OF DAVAO CITY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY EXPLANATION AND/OR JUSTIFICATION IN THE BODY OF THE DECISION.⁵

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure.⁶ It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable.⁷ In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants.⁸ Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property.⁹ The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.¹⁰

In the instant case, pending final resolution of the suit filed by petitioner for the declaration of nullity of the real estate mortgage in favor of Yap, the MTCC, the RTC and the CA were unanimous in sustaining the presumption of validity of the real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor of Yap as well as the presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of the public officers who subsequently conducted its foreclosure sale and issued a provisional certificate of sale. Based on the presumed validity of the mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale, the MTCC, the RTC and the CA also sustained the validity of respondent's purchase of the disputed property from Yap. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from these rulings of the MTCC, RTC and CA. Thus, for purposes of resolving the issue as to who between petitioner and respondent is entitled to possess the subject property, this presumption stands.

Going to the main issue in the instant petition, it is settled that in unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.¹¹ In such case, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.¹²

In the instant petition, petitioner's basic postulate in her first and second assigned errors is that she remains the owner of the subject property. Based on her contract of lease with respondent, petitioner insists that respondent is not permitted to deny her title over the said property in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

The Court does not agree.

The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, known as estoppel against tenants, provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

x x x x

(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Emphasis supplied).

It is clear from the abovequoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation.¹³ If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply.¹⁴ Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord's title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount.¹⁵ In the present case, what respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply.

The foregoing notwithstanding, even if respondent is not estopped from denying petitioner's claim for rent, her basis for such denial, which is her subsequent acquisition of ownership of the disputed property, is nonetheless, an insufficient excuse from refusing to pay the rentals due to petitioner.

There is no dispute that at the time that respondent purchased Yap's rights over the subject property, petitioner's right of redemption as a mortgagor has not yet expired. It is settled that during the period of redemption, it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property, since the rule up to now is that the right of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of redemption has expired without the right being exercised.¹⁶ The title to land sold under mortgage foreclosure remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the redemption period and conveyance by the master's deed.¹⁷ Indeed, the rule has always been that it is only upon the expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of his right of redemption, that the ownership of the land sold becomes consolidated in the purchaser.¹⁸

Stated differently, under Act. No. 3135, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale has, during the redemption period, only an inchoate right and not the absolute right to the property with all the accompanying incidents.¹⁹ He only becomes an absolute owner of the property if it is not redeemed during the redemption period.²⁰

Pending expiration of the period of redemption, Section 7 of Act No. 3135,²¹ as amended, provides:

Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

Thus, it is clear from the abovequoted provision of law that, as a consequence of the inchoate character of the purchaser's right during the redemption period, Act. No. 3135, as amended, allows the purchaser at the foreclosure sale to take possession of the property only upon the filing of a bond, in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve (12) months, to indemnify the mortgagor in case it be shown that the sale was made in violation of the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of the law. In Cua Lai Chu v. Laqui,²² this Court reiterated the rule earlier pronounced in Navarra v. Court of Appeals²³ that the purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale has a right to the possession of the property even during the one-year redemption period provided the purchaser files an indemnity bond. That bond, nonetheless, is not required after the purchaser has consolidated his title to the property following the mortgagor's failure to exercise his right of redemption for in such a case, the former has become the absolute owner thereof.²⁴

It, thus, clearly follows from the foregoing that, during the period of redemption, the mortgagor, being still the owner of the foreclosed property, remains entitled to the physical possession thereof subject to the purchaser's right to petition the court to give him possession and to file a bond pursuant to the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. The mere purchase and certificate of sale alone do not confer any right to the possession or beneficial use of the premises.²⁵

In the instant case, there is neither evidence nor allegation that respondent, as purchaser of the disputed property, filed a petition and bond in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135. In addition, respondent defaulted in the payment of her rents. Thus, absent respondent's filing of such petition and bond prior to the expiration of the period of redemption, coupled with her failure to pay her rent, she did not have the right to possess the subject property.

On the other hand, petitioner, as mortgagor and owner, was entitled not only to the possession of the disputed house and lot but also to the rents, earnings and income derived therefrom. In this regard, the RTC correctly cited Section 32, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows:

Sec. 32. Rents, earnings and income of property pending redemption. – The purchaser or a redemptioner shall not be entitled to receive the rents, earnings and income of the property sold on execution, or the value of the use and occupation thereof when such property is in the possession of a tenant. All rents, earnings and income derived from the property pending redemption shall belong to the judgment obligor until the expiration of his period of redemption. (Emphasis supplied)

While the above rule refers to execution sales, the Court finds no cogent reason not to apply the same principle to a foreclosure sale, as in this case.

The situation became different, however, after the expiration of the redemption period on February 23, 2001. Since there is no allegation, much less evidence, that petitioner redeemed the subject property within one year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, respondent became the owner thereof. Consolidation of title becomes a right upon the expiration of the redemption period.²⁶ Having become the owner of the disputed property, respondent is then entitled to its possession.

As a consequence, petitioner's ejectment suit filed against respondent was rendered moot when the period of redemption expired on February 23, 2001 without petitioner having redeemed the subject property, for upon expiration of such period petitioner lost his possessory right over the same. Hence, the only remaining right that petitioner can enforce is his right to the rentals during the time that he was still entitled to physical possession of the subject property – that is from May 2000 until February 23, 2001.1âwphi1

In this regard, this Court agrees with the findings of the MTCC that, based on the evidence and the pleadings filed by petitioner, respondent is liable for payment of rentals beginning May 2000 until February 2001, or for a period of ten (10) months. However, it is not disputed that respondent already gave to petitioner the sum of ₱27,000.00, which is equivalent to two (2) months’ rental, as deposit to cover for any unpaid rentals. It is only proper to deduct this amount from the rentals due to petitioner, thus leaving ₱108,000.00 unpaid rentals.

As to attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, the Court agrees with the RTC that since petitioner is, in entitled to unpaid rentals, her complaint which, among others, prays for the payment of unpaid rentals, is justified. Thus, the award of attorney'’ and litigation expenses to respondent should be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77617, dated September 8, 2004 and August 16, 2006, respectively, are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner ₱108,000.00 as and for unpaid rentals; (2) the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to respondent is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C A T l O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, certify that the conclusions in the ah<we Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag, with Associate Justices Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this Court) and Edgardo A. Camello concuning; Annex "A" to Petition, rollo, pp. 39-59.

² Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Mario V. Lopez concurring; Annex "B" to Petition, rollo, pp. 60-61.

³ Rollo, p. 66.
⁴ Id. at 57-58. (Emphasis in the original)
⁵ Id. at 21.

⁶ Barrientos v. Rapal, G.R. No. 169594, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 165, 170.

⁷ Id. at 170-171.
⁸ Id. at 171.
⁹ Id.
¹⁰ Id.

¹¹ Union Bank of the Philippines v. Maunlad Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 190071, August 15, 2012.

¹² Malabanan v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc., G.R. No. 163495, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 442, 448.

¹³ Santos v. National Statistics Office, G.R. No. 171129, April 6, 2011, 647 SCRA 345, 357.

¹⁴ Id.
¹⁵ Id.

¹⁶ Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133883, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 415, 428; 463 Phil. 77, 91 (2003); Medida v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98334, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 887, 897.

¹⁷ Medida v. Court of Appeals, supra.

¹⁸ St. James College of Parañaque v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 179441, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 328, 348-349.

¹⁹ Sta. Ignacia Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97872, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 513, 524.

²⁰ Id.

²¹ An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted In or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages.

²² G.R. No. 169190, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 227, 233.
²³ G.R. No. 86237, December 17, 1991, 204 SCRA 850, 856.

²⁴ Sta. Ignacia Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19, at 525.

²⁵ Gonzales v. Calimbas, G.R. No. L-27878, December 31, 1927, 51 SCRA 355, 358; 51 Phil. 355, 358 (1927).

²⁶ GC Dalton Industries, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 171169, August 24, 2009, 596 SCRA 723, 730.

The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of objection to hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking that such declarations are thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for it has no probative value.

FIRST DIVISION

January 23, 2017

G.R. No. 215009

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN SANTORIO GALENO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2

dated June 27, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated September 17, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02085, affirming the Orders dated October 13, 20064 and January 22, 20075 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumangas, Iloilo, Branch 68 (RTC), which allowed the correction of the area of Lot No. 2285 in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 46417 from 20,948 square meters to 21,298 square meters.

The Facts

On September 2, 2003, respondent Carmen Santorio Galeno (respondent) filed a petition6 for correction of the area of Lot No. 2285 covered by OCT No. 46417, Dingle Cadastre (subject property) before the RTC. She alleged therein that she is one of the co-owners of the subject property by virtue of a Deed of Sale7 dated July 6, 1962. The survey and subdivision of the subject property was duly approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) per its Approved Subdivision Plan of Lot No. 2285.8

Respondent further alleged that when she and her co-owners had the subject property resurveyed for the purpose of partition, they discovered a discrepancy in the land area of the subject property as appearing in OCT No. 46417,9 in that the title reflects an area of 20,948 square meters, while the Certification 10 issued by the DENR Office of the Regional Technical Director, Lands Management Services, shows an area of 21,298 square meters. Hence, she sought to correct the area of the subject property in order to avoid further confusion, and claimed to have notified the adjoining owners. 11

There being no opposition to the petition, the RTC allowed the presentation of respondent's evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk as well as for the satisfaction of the jurisdictional requirements. 12

The RTC Ruling

In an Order13 dated October 13, 2006, the RTC granted the petition upon a finding that respondent was able to substantiate the allegations in her petition to warrant a correction of the area of the subject property. Hence, it directed the Register of Deeds of the Province of Iloilo to correct such area in OCT No. 46417 from 20,948 to 21,298 square meters. 14

Herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the adjoining owners had not been notified, stressing that such notice is a jurisdictional requirement. 15 In the Order 16 dated January 22, 2007, the RTC denied the motion, finding that a Notice of Hearing 17 was sent to the adjoining owners. As such, respondent was able to prove compliance with the said jurisdictional requirement. 18

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.19

The CA Ruling

In a Decision20 dated June 27, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC Order.1âwphi1 It found that respondent, by a preponderance of evidence, was able to prove, based on the records of the proper government authority, i.e., the Office of the Technical Director, Land Management Services of the DENR, that the true and correct area of the subject property was 21,298 square meters as shown in the approved plan. Moreover, petitioner failed to rebut with contrary evidence respondent's claim that she and her co-owners followed the boundaries in the technical description of OCT No. 46417 when they caused its resurvey. In fact, no proof had been adduced to show that the boundaries had been altered. Also, the CA pointed out that none of the adjoining owners, who were properly notified of the proceedings and who stand to be adversely affected by the change in the land area of the subject property, objected to respondent's petition.21

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration22 was denied in a Resolution23 dated September 17, 2014; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in upholding the correction of the area of the subject property in OCT No. 46417.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A scrutiny of the evidence marked and formally offered by respondent before the court a quo shows that the former failed to prove that there was sufficient basis to allow the correction of the area of the subject property in OCT No. 46417 from 20,948 square meters to 21,248 square meters.

Records reveal that respondent offered in evidence the following documents: (a) the Certification24 issued by a certain Althea C. Acevedo (Acevedo), Engineer IV, Chief of the Technical Services Section of the Office of the Regional Technical Director, Land Management Services of the DENR in Iloilo City, which states that "the true and correct area of [L]ot 2285, Cad. 246 Dingle Cadastre is 21,928 square meters;" (b) the technical description25 of Lot No. 2285, a copy of which was certified by Ameto Caballero (Caballero), Chief of the Surveys Division, while another copy was certified correct by Acevedo; and (c) the approved subdivision plan of Lot No. 2258, 26 certified by Rogelio M. Santome (Santome), Geodetic Engineer; Alfredo Muyarsas (Muyarsas), Chief of the Regional Surveys Division, and Edgardo R. Gerobin (Gerobin), OIC, Regional Technical Director of the Land Management Services, DENR. On the strength of these pieces of evidence, respondent sought a reconciliation of the area of the subject property with the records of the DENR.

Unfortunately, the foregoing documentary evidence are not sufficient to warrant the correction prayed for. The Court cannot accord probative weight upon them in view of the fact that the public officers who issued the same did not testify in court to prove the facts stated therein.

In Republic v. Medida, 27 the Court held that certifications of the Regional Technical Director, DENR cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, holding that:

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

"Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. - Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications [do] not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public documents. x x x28 (Emphases supplied)

As such, sans the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public officers who issued respondent's documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the same are bereft of probative value and cannot, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. 29 At best, they may be considered only as prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.30

In fact, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondent's sole witness and attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno Barraca, was incompetent to testify on the veracity of their contents, 31 as she did not prepare any of the certifications nor was she a public officer of the concerned government agencies. Notably, while it is true that the public prosecutor who represented petitioner interposed no objection to the admission of the foregoing evidence in the proceedings in the court below,32 it should be borne in mind that "hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule,"33 which do not, however, obtain in this case. Verily, while respondent's documentary evidence may have been admitted due to the opposing party's lack of objection, it does not, however, mean that they should be accorded any probative weight. The Court has explained that:

The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of objection to hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking that such declarations are thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for it has no probative value.34

Besides, case law states that the "absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Neither is the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for reconstitution [or correction of title, as in this case] if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit."35 Moreover, "in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's."36

In fine, the Court holds that respondent did not present any competent evidence to prove that the true and correct area of the subject property is 21,298 square meters instead of 20,948 square meters to warrant a correction thereof in OCT No. 46417. Accordingly, respondent's petition for the correction of the said Certificate of Title must be denied, and the present petition be granted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 27, 2013 and the Resolution dated September 17, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02085 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Carmen Santorio Galeno's petition for correction of area of Lot No. 2285 on Original Certificate of Title No. 46417 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 27-55.

2 Id. at 62-71-A. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos with Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy concurring.

3 Id. at 80-81. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos with Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla concurring.

4 Id. at 139-140. Penned by Presiding Judge Gerardo D. Diaz.
5 Id. at 141-142.
6 Id. at 103-106.
7 Id. at 108-109.
8 Id. at 62-63.
9 See id. at 108.
10 Id. at 115.
11 Id. at 63-65.
12 Id. at 64-65.
13 Id. at 139-140.
14 Id. at 140.
15 Id. at 65-66.
16 Id. at 141-142.
17 Id. at 143.
18 Id. at 141.
19 Id. at 144-158.
20 Id. at 62-71-A.
21 Id. at 69-71.
22 Id. at 72-78.
23 Id. at 80-81.
24 Id.atll5.
25 Id. at 137-138.
26 Id. at 113.
27 692 Phil. 454 (2012).
28 Id. at 465-466.
29 Republic v. T.A.N Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441, 454-455 (2008).
30 Id.
31 See id. at 455.
32 See rollo, p. 69.

33 Philippine Home Assurance Corporation v. CA, 327 Phil. 255, 268 (1996) citing Baguio v. CA, G.R. No. 93417, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 366, 370.

34 People v. Parungao, 332 Phil. 917, 924 (1996).
35 Republic v. Lorenzo, 700 Phil. 584, 597 (2012). Citations omitted.
36 Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr., 708 Phil. 575, 588 (2013).

Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration. The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.

FIRST DIVISION

March 11, 2015

G.R. No. 185374

SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA and LIGAYA CERCADO-BELISON, Petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE CERCADO, JR., MANUELA C. ARABIT, LOLITA C. BASCO, MARIA C. ARALAR and VIOLETA C. BINADAS, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

Not too long ago, we were called to pass upon the issue of the probative value of a marriage contract issued by the church to prove the fact of marriage.1 Once again, it behooves upon us to determine whether the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial, as it is denominated in this case, is sufficient to prove the fact of marriage.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the 5 August 2008 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals and its 14 November 2008 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 89585 reversing the 30 January 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69, which nullified the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr. (Vicente) and Leonora Ditablan (Leonora).

In their Complaint against respondents Vicente Cercado, Jr., Manuela C. Arabit, Lolita Basco, Maria C. Aralar, Violeta C. Binadas and the Registrar of Deeds of Binangonan, Rizal, petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya Cercado-Belison (Ligaya) claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. Petitioners alleged that during the lifetime of their parents, their father acquired by gratuitous title a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 7627 Cad 609-D located at Barangay Kinagatan, Binangonan, Rizal with an area of 6,032 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. BIP-021-0253. Petitioners claimed that upon the death of their father Vicente and by virtue of intestate succession, ownership over the subject land pertained to them as heirs; that upon the death of Benita, her share was acquired by petitioners by operation of law. Sometime in September 1998, petitioners read from a newspaper a notice that the estate of Vicente and a certain Leonora Ditablan has been extrajudicially settled by their heirs, respondents herein. Upon verification, petitioners were furnished a copy of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate (Deed) executed and signed by respondents. Petitioners insist that Vicente and Leonora were not married or if they were so married, then said marriage was null and void by reason of the subsisting marriage of their parents, Vicente and Benita. Petitioners prayed for the declaration of the Deed as null and void; for the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal to correct the entry on the marital status of Vicente; and for the payment of damages and attorney’s fees.5

To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented the following documents: 1) Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage contract;6 2) Certification dated 19 November 2000 issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente of its acceptance of original marriage contract;7 3) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Simplicia issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal;8 4) Certificate of Baptism of Simplicia;9 5) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Ligaya issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal;10 and 6) Joint Affidavit of two disinterested persons attesting that Ligaya is the child of Vicente and Benita.11

In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal. They averred that petitioners are not the real-parties- interest to institute the case because they failed to present their birth certificates to prove their filiation to Vicente; that the marriage between Vicente and Benita was not valid; that the document showing that Vicente was married to Benita is not a certified true copy; and that they are now estopped by laches.12

On 30 January 2007, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1.The Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Benita Ditablan is hereby declared null and void and therefore no force and effect;

2.The [petitioners] and the [respondents] are entitled to share pro- indiviso in the subject property as follows:
a.2,639 square meters – For [petitioner] Simplicia Cercado-Siga;
b.2,639 square meters – For [petitioner]Ligaya Cercado-Belison;
c.150.8 square meters – For [respondent] Vicente Cercado, Jr.;
d.150.8 square meters – For [respondent] Manuela C. Arabit;
e.150.8 square meters – For [respondent]Lolita C. Basco;
f.150.8 square meters – For [respondent]Maria C. Aralar; and
g.150.8 square meters – For [respondent] Violeta C. Binadas;

3.In the event that the property has already been sold by the [respondents], they are hereby ordered to pay the [petitioners] the amount equivalent to their share, at the time the subject property was sold;

4.[respondents] to pay [petitioners] the amount of P30,000.00 attorney’s fees; and

5.To pay the cost of suit.13

The trial court reduced the issues into three: 1) whether the Extra- Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Leonora Ditablan-Cercado is valid; 2) whether petitioners are entitled to recover from respondents their share in the property; and 3) whether petitioners are entitled to damages and attorney’s fees.

In resolving the issues, the trial court relied on the following material findings:

The [petitioners] are the legitimate children of the late Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Benita Castillote/Castillo who were married on October 9, 1929, as evidenced by a Contrato Matrimonial x x x.14

The trial court first upheld the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita and considered the subsequent marriage between Vicente and Leonora as void and bigamous before it concluded that the subject property was part of the conjugal property of Vicente and Benita. Consequently, the trial court held that the Deed is null and void because it deprived Benita of her share of the property as surviving spouse and impaired the shares and legitimes of petitioners.15 Thus, the trial court ruled that petitioners are entitled to recover from respondents their share in the property subject of this action.

Respondents appealed from said judgment and assigned the following errors: 1) the trial court erred in passing upon the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Leonora; 2) the trial court failed to consider the probative value of the certificate of marriage between Vicente and Benita; 3) the trial court failed to consider the probative value of the certificate of live birth to prove filiation; and 4) the trial court erred when it relied on the baptismal certificate to prove filiation.16

The appellate court ruled that the trial court "can pass upon the issue of the validity of marriage of Vicente and Leonora [because] no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity and the court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same, as long as it is essential to the determination of the case before it."17 However, the appellate court found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a private document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence. Moreover, the appellate court did not consider the baptismal certificate submitted by petitioners as conclusive proof of filiation. The Joint Affidavit executed by a certain Mario Casale and Balas Chimlangco attesting to the birth of Ligaya to Vicente and Benita was not given credence by the appellate court for being a hearsay evidence. For failure of petitioners to prove their cause of action by preponderance of evidence, the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the RTC.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied it in its Resolution18 dated 14 November 2008.

Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

I

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT AS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT – AND SO WITH ITS DUPLICATE ORIGINAL. THE CONTRATO MATRIMONIAL BUTTRESSED A CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE IS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT, [IT] BEING REQUIRED BY LAW TO BE KEPT NOT ONLY BY THE CHURCH CONCERNED BUT BY THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR – AND THE NATIONAL STATISTIC OFFICE. AND THE DUPLICATE ORIGINAL COPY OF THE SAME IS ALSO CONSIDERED ORIGINAL (SECTION 4, RULE 130) (AND HENCE ALSO A PUBLIC DOCUMENT UNDER THE RULE) ON EVIDENCE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED ANOTHER REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE SAID DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE SUBJECT MARRIAGE CONTRACT AS AN ANCIENT DOCUMENT, BESIDES, THE SAID DOCUMENT, MORE THAN 30 YEARS IN EXISTENCE IS CONSIDERED AS AN ANCIENT DOCUMENT, OUTSIDE THE NEEDED REQUIREMENT OF AUTHENTICATION APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE DOCUMENT.

III

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF A BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE AND PETITIONERS’ PARENTS YEARS [OF] COHABITATION. THE BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE WHILE NOT ADMISSIBLE AS DIRECT EVIDENCE FOR A MARITAL CONTRACT, THE SAME IS OF STRONG EVIDEN[T]IARY SUPPORT TO THE EXISTENCE OF MARRIAGE OF [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS, EVIDENCED BY EXHIBIT "A" AND EXHIBIT "A-1" AND BY THE CERTIFICATE OF ITS DESTRUCTION DURING WORLD WAR II, ALSO, BY THE OPEN AND PUBLIC COHABITATION OF [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS, ADDED THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF SUCH MARRIAGE, BOLSTERED BY THE OPEN AND PUBLIC COHABITATION.

IV

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED ANOTHER REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE WEIGHT AND PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF TWO (2) DISINTERESTED PERSONS. THE AFFIDAVIT OF TWO (2) DISINTERESTED PERSONS BEING A REQUIREMENT BY THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR AND/OR THE NSO TO SUPPORT THE EXISTENCE OF [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS MARRIAGE, AND IN THAT SINCE BECOMES ALSO A PUBLIC DOCUMENT OR AT THE VERY LEAST, A CIRCUMSTANTIAL DOCUMENTARY PROOF, WHICH IF ADDED TO THE BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE EXHIBIT "H-1", THE CONTRATO MATRIMONIAL AND THE CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE TAKEN TOGETHER, PLUS THE OPEN AND PUBLIC COHABITATION OF THE [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS MARRIAGE, AND THE PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, BANDED TOGETHER, ARE STRONG EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS MARRIAGE.

V

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ANOTHER YET SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE RESPONDENTS’ PARENTS’ MARRIAGE AS BIGAMOUS. THE NULLITY OF THE [RESPONDENTS’] PARENTS’ MARRIAGE, FOR BEING BIGAMOUS, AND BEING THE INCIDENT NECESSARILY INTERTWINED IN THE ISSUES PRESENTED, AND IT BEING A BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE, CAN BE COLLATERALLY ATTACK[ED] OR SLAIN AT SIGHT WHEREVER AND WHENEVER ITS HEAD (THE [RESPONDENTS’] PARENTS MARRIAGE) IS EXHIBITED.19

Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should be regarded as original. Petitioners emphasize that the certification issued by the Iglesia Filipina Independiente Church, the joint affidavit of two disinterested persons, the baptismal certificate presented by petitioners, and the open and public cohabitation of petitioners’ parents are sufficient proof of their marriage.

Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that said document should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from the requirement of authentication.

Petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals should have considered the marriage between Vicente and Leonora as bigamous.

In their Comment,20 respondents submit that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document and the fact that marriages are required to be registered in the local civil registrar does not ipso facto make it a public document. Respondents assert that the certificate of baptism is likewise a private document which tends to prove only the administration of the sacrament of baptism and not the veracity of the declarations therein. Respondents moreover refute the certification issued by the local civil registry arguing that it does not prove filiation but only the fact that there is no record of Ligaya on file with said office.

With respect to the joint affidavit attesting to the marriage of Vicente and Benita, respondents assert that it is inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence because the two affiants were never presented on the witness stand.

The validity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora hinges on the existence of the first marriage of Vicente and Benita.

In support of the existence of the alleged first marriage, petitioners presented a copy of the Contrato Matrimonial.21 There is no dispute that said marriage contract was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente church.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in the case of U.S. v. Evangelista,22 it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 6823 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.24

Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court,25 before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof.26 As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during its execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.

Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a duplicate original, hence, the original need not be produced. We do not agree. We had previously ruled in Vallarta v. Court of Appeals27 that " a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non- production of the original. But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy."28

Next, while petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue that it is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration.

The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.

Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for.29

Gibson v. Poor30 cited the reason why it is required that an ancient document shall be produced from the proper depository:

x x x that thereby credit is given to its genuineness. Were it not for its antiquity, and the presumption that consequently arises that evidence of its execution cannot be obtained, it would have to be proved. It is not that any one particular place of deposit can have more virtue in it than another, or make that true which is false; but the fact of its coming from the natural and proper place, tends to remove presumptions of fraud, and strengthens the belief in its genuineness. It may be false, and so shown, notwithstanding the presumptions in its favor. If found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for; but that being done and all suspicions against its genuineness removed, we can discover no reason why it may not be read in evidence. The real question which is to affect its consideration is, whether the instrument offered is genuine, and contains a true statement of what it purports to. In the Bishop of Meath v. Marquis of Winchester, 2 Bing. 183, Tindal, C. J., speaking of ancient documents, holds this language. "It is not necessary that they should be found in the best and most proper place of deposit. If documents continued in such custody, there never would be any question as to their authenticity; but it is when documents are found in other than their proper place of deposit, that the investigation commences whether it was reasonable and natural under the circumstances in the particular case, to expect that they should have been in the place where they are actually found; for it is obvious, that while there can be only one place of deposit strictly and absolutely proper, there may be many and various that are reasonable and probable, though differing in degree; some being more so, some less; and in those cases the proposition to be determined is, whether the actual custody is so reasonably and probably accounted for, that it impresses the mind with the conviction, that the instrument found in such custody must be genuine." Some authorities hold, that the antiquity of the document is alone sufficient to entitle it to be read, and that the other circumstances only go to its effect in evidence.

In Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate Court,31 the Court ruled that the requirement of proper custody was met when the ancient document in question was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. In this case however, we find that Simplicia also failed to prove her filiation to Vicente and Benita. She merely presented a baptismal certificate which has long been held "as evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to her kinsfolk. "The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person baptized."32 As such, Simplicia cannot be considered as an heir, in whose custody the marriage contract is expected to be found. It bears reiteration that Simplicia testified that the marriage contract was given to her by Benita but that Simplicia cannot make out the contents of said document because she cannot read and write.

On the other hand, the document presented to prove Ligaya’s kinship is a Joint Affidavit executed by two persons to the effect that she was born to Vicente and Benita. These two affiants were never presented in court. Thus, their statement is tantamount to hearsay evidence.

Petitioners also presented certifications from the local civil registrar certifying that the records of birth from 1930 to 1946 were destroyed by fire and/or war. In said documents, there contains an advice that petitioners may make a further verification with the NSO because the local civil registrar submits a copy of the birth certificate of every registered birth with the NSO. The advice was not heeded. Petitioners failed to present a certification from NSO whether such records do exist or not.

While we acknowledge the difficulty of obtaining old records, we simply cannot ignore the rules on evidence, specifically the rule on authentication with respect to private documents which is precisely in place to prevent the inclusion of spurious documents in the body of evidence that will determine the resolutions of an issue.

Considering that petitioners failed to prove the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita, it follows that they do not have a cause of action in the case for the declaration of nullity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 5 August 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89585 reversing and setting aside the 30 January 2007 Decision and 16 April 2007 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69 of Binangonan, Rizal in Civil Case No. R-98-047 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Macua Vda. de Avenido v. Acenido, G.R. No. 173540, 22 January 2014, 714 SCRA 447, 457-458

2 Rollo, pp. 76-108; Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo concurring.

3 Id. at 142-143.
4 Id. at 144-171; Penned by Presiding Judge Narmo P. Noblejas.
5 Records, pp. 1-5.
6 Id. at 7.
7 Id. at 20.
8 Id. at 34.
9 Id. at 35.
10 Id. at 37.
11 Id. at 36.
12 Id. at 74-77.
13 Rollo, pp. 170-171.
14 Id. at 167.
15 Id. at 168.
16 Id. at 45-46.
17 Id. at 100.
18 Id. at 142-143.
19 Id. at 61-66.
20 Id. at 190-196.
21 Id. at 178.
22 29 Phil. 215 (1915).

23 On December 18, 1899, at the beginning of the American occupation of the Philippines, Major General Otis, exercising the legislative power vested in him as Commander-in-Chief of an American army in occupied territory, promulgated General Order No. 68 the purpose of which was to establish rules of law relating to marriage. It provides that marriages may be solemnized by a judge of a court inferior to the Supreme Court, by a justice of the peace, or by a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination. x x x. <http://kahimyang.info/kauswagan/articles/830/today- in-philippine-history-december-18-1899-major-general-otis-promulgated-general-order-no- 68known-as-the-marriage-law.> (visited 10 November 2014.)

24 U.S. v. Evangelista, supra note 21.

25 Rule 132, Section 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a)By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b)By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.26 Malayan Insurance, Co., Inc. v. Philippines Nails and Wires Corp., 430 Phil. 163, 168 (2002).

27 246 Phil. 596, 603 (1988) citing Mahilum v. CA, 123 Phil. 1335 (1966); and U.S. v. Zapanta, 33 Phil. 567 (1916). See Herrera, Remedial Law Vol. V, 1999 Edition, pp. 182-183.

28 Id.

29 29A Am Jur 2d Evidence § 1204 citing McGuire v. Blount, 199 U.S. 142, 26 S. Ct. 1, 50 L. Ed. 125 (1905); Nicholson v. Eureka Lumber Co., 156 N.C. 59, 72 S.E. 86 (1911); Gibson v. Poor, 21 N.H. 440, 1850 WL 2344 (1850). See Herrera, Remedial Law Vol. V, 1999 Edition, pp. 186-187.

30 21 N.H. 440.
31 262 Phil. 113, 122-123 (1990).

32 Heirs of Cabais v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 681, 689 (1999) citing Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 188 Phil. 192, 201 (1980); Paa v. Chan, 128 Phil. 815, 822 (1967).