[T]he combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the trial court's finding of guilt: First, appellant was in a store right in front of the house where the crime was committed, just before the victim was found dead. Second, he was seen climbing over the fence of the house where the murder had occurred a few moments before. Third, he was spotted walking away from the house while tucking in his bloodied shirt. Fourth, he was the only person seen leaving the house prior to the discovery of the victim's lifeless body. Fifth, he hastily left for Manila soon after the commission of the crime. Sixth, he attempted to elude the police authorities until a warrant for his arrest was presented to him. Seventh, he was observed by the trial court to be restless and fidgety during the course of his testimony. x x x x The pieces of circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together, definitely lead to no other conclusion than that appellant perpetrated the dastardly deed. On the basis of the foregoing established facts, it can reasonably be inferred that appellant was the only person inside the house with the victim when the latter was brutally killed. Before the dead body was found, no other person had been seen entering or leaving the house. The act of appellant - climbing over the fence of the house with his clothes soaked in blood, coupled with the subsequent discovery of the dead body lying in a pool of blood - impels us to arrive at the logical conclusion that he was responsible for the killing. If he truly had nothing to do with it, he would have gone out through the gate of the house and immediately asked for help from the neighbors. Instead, he left the victim sprawled in a dreadful bloodbath and surreptitiously fled from the scene of the crime, hoping that nobody would notice him leaving. Furthermore, appellant immediately left for Manila when the police authorities began to look for him. When he was finally located there, he tried to run away again, even when the police had shown him a valid warrant for his arrest. If he were really innocent of the charges as he claims, he would have wasted no time in submitting himself to the investigators, so that he would have a chance to disprove the accusations against him at the soonest possible opportunity.75

November 8, 2017

G.R. No. 226158

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
LIBERA TO PENTECOSTES y CRONICO, Accused-appellant

D E C I S I O N

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is an Appeal1 under Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the Decision2 dated September 4, 2015 (questioned Decision) of the Court of Appeals, Special Fourteenth Division (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06498. The questioned Decision affirmed the Decision3 dated December 28, 2012 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. T-2830, which found herein accused-appellant Liberato C. Pentecostes (Liberato) guilty of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about March 24, 2005 at Barangay Tinawagan, Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, with treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and attack VIVIAN VARGAS Y BRIONES, a 7 year old4 minor by submerging (drowning) her in water thus causing her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.5

When arraigned, Liberato pleaded "not guilty."6 After termination of the pre-trial conference on February 8, 2006, trial on the merits ensued.7

The Facts

The prosecution alleged the following:

On March 24, 2005, Liberato was having a drinking spree at the house of Angel Vargas (Angel), the father of the victim, Vivian Vargas (Vivian).8 Likewise present were Joel Basagre, Mesio Caruito, Gerardo Rabal, and Daniel Briones.9 The drinking spree ended at around 2:00 in the aftemoon.10 At that time, Angel asked Vivian to go to the house of a certain Auring Rabal, which was about two hundred (200) meters away, to return a chair that they borrowed.11 Vivian would never return.12

Meanwhile, Liberato went home at 3:00 in the afternoon.13 At around 3:30 to 4:30 p.m., Antonio Vargas (Antonio), the cousin of Vivian, together with his friend, Jason Basagre (Jason), encountered Liberato at Antonio's com plantation.14 The plantation was around a kilometer away from the house of Liberato.15 During the encounter, Liberato was seen carrying Vivian on his back and appeared to be headed towards a nearby body of water.16 Jason greeted Liberato, who then merely looked back at them angrily.17

Later that day, with Vivian still missing, Angel began searching for Vivian with the help of some relatives and barangay tanod, but to no avail.18 The following morning, however, on March 25, 2005, Vivian's lifeless body was recovered near the house of Joel Basagre, the father of Jason.19

Immediately thereafter, the policemen summoned and investigated all those present at the drinking spree in Angel's house.20 However, when Liberato's turn for questioning came, he ran away.21

An autopsy later performed on Vivian's body revealed "asphyxia by submersion" or drowning as the cause of death by Dr. Raoul Alcantara.22

On the other hand, Liberato, as sole witness for the defense, presentedthe following counter-statement of facts:

At the outset, Liberato denied knowing Vivian or any of the children of Angel.23 He confirmed his presence at the drinking spree and claimed that he went home alone at around 3:00 p.m. of March 24, 2005.24 He arrived home shortly at around 3:10 p.m.25 A few minutes later, at around 3:20 p.m., Liberato claimed to have seen Joel Basagre passing by his house with Vivian.26

Thereafter, at around 3:30 p.m., Angel arrived at Liberato's house to ask for help in searching for Vivian.27 Liberato then claimed to have told Angel that he saw Vivian with Joel Basagre.28

On the following day, during the investigation of Vivian's death, Liberato admitted to running away from the authorities but testified that it was because he was afraid of being shot by one of the investigating officers.29

Later on, during his testimony before the RTC, Liberato retracted his previous statements and admitted to knowing Vivian because he was able to talk to her on a separate occasion.30 Upon further questioning, however, Liberato suddenly claimed that he never talked to Vivian and only learned about her name when he was helping Angel search for her.31 It was also placed on record that Liberato was previously convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was released from prison sometime in 2003.32

Ruling of the RTC

In the Decision dated December 28, 2012, the RTC found Liberato guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery. Therein, the RTC found that there was enough circumstantial evidence to produce a conviction and to overcome Liberato's defense of alibi and denial.33 The dispositive portion stated:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused Liberato Pentecostes is hereby found GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the felony of Murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, as well as to pay to the heirs of Vivian Vargas the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.34

Liberato appealed to the CA via Notice of Appeal.35 Liberato filed his Brief dated April 16, 2014,36 while the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Brief dated July 22, 2014.37 In a Manifestation dated August 11, 2014, Liberato waived his right to file a Reply Brief.38

Ruling of the CA

In the questioned Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction with modification only as to the damages awarded, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. the appellant is not eligible for parole;

2. the award of civil liability ex delicto is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00;

3. the appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱30,000.00 and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary and temperate damages, respectively;

4. the appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the amounts of damages awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.

IT IS SO ORDERED.39

Hence, this Appeal.40

In lieu of filing supplemental briefs, Liberato and plaintiff-appellee filed separate manifestations respectively dated March 28, 201741 and February 28, 2017,42 foregoing their right to file the same.

Issues

Liberato assigns the following errors committed by the CA in the questioned Decision:

I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON A DEVIOUS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF MOTIVE IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.43

The Court's Ruling

The Appeal is denied. The issues, being interrelated, shall be jointly discussed below.

The circumstantial evidence
sufficiently proves Liberato's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of Murder

Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not indispensable to criminal prosecutions; a contrary rule would render convictions virtually impossible given that most crimes, by their very nature, are purposely committed in seclusion and away from eyewitnesses.44 Thus, our rules on evidence and jurisprudence allow the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence alone, provided that the following requisites concur:

(i) there is more than one circumstance;

(ii) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(iii) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.45

Simply put, an accused may be convicted when the circumstances established form an unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion and pointing to the accused - to the exclusion of all others - as the guilty person.46

Now to this case. As summarized by the lower courts, the following factual circumstances are undisputed:

1. Liberato was present at the residence of the victim on March 24, 2005 when Vivian was reported to be missing;47

2. Liberato left the residence of Vivian after the drinking spree at about 3:00 in the aftemoon;48

3. Angel sent Vivian to return a chair to Auring Habal also after the drinking spree and she failed to return home;49

4. Antonio and Jason both saw Liberato carrying Vivian on his back at around 3:30 or 4:30 in the afternoon at the com plantation;50

5. On the following morning, March 25, 2005, the lifeless body of Vivian was found in the com plantation;51

6. Antonio and Jason both testified that Liberato, while carrying Vivian on his back, proceeded to the direction of the stream, according to Antonio, and the creek, according to Jason;52

7. The cause of death of Vivian is "asphyxia by submersion (drowning);"53

8. Liberato fled while being investigated by the police.54

Based on the foregoing, the Court is simply tasked to determine whether the foregoing pieces of evidence, considered in their totality, are sufficient to prove Liberato's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Vivian.

The Court rules in the affirmative.

First. Liberato was positively identified as the last person seen with Vivian before she disappeared on the afternoon of March 24, 2005. The concurring testimonies of Antonio and Jason show this:

[Direct Examination of Antonio]

Q: While you were at your com plantation with Jason, do you remember having seen a person?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And tell us who was that person?

A: Pay Batoy, sir.

Q: Do you know the complete name of that person?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Tell us.

A: Liberato Pentecostes.

Q: Was Liberato Pentecostes alone at that time?

A: They were two (2), sir.

Q: And who was with Liberato Pentecostes? According to you they were two (2) persons?

A: Vivian Vargas.

Q: How did you observe the two (2) persons when you said it was Liberato Pentecostes and Vivian Vargas?

A: He was carrying her at [his] back, sir.

Q: Who was that person carrying another on his back?

A: Liberato Pentecostes.

Q: And who was that person being carried by Liberato Pentecostes.

A: Vivian Vargas.55

x x x x

[Direct Examination of Jason]

Q: Alright. When you reach (sic) the com plantation what happened next?

A: I saw Pay Batoy, sir.

Q: Are you referring to the accused in this case?

A: Yes, sir.

x x x x

Q: Was he carrying anything?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was he carrying at that time?

A: A child, Vivian Vargas, sir.

x x x x

Q: How did Liberato Pentecostes carrying (sic) Vivian Vargas?

A: He was carrying Vivian on his back with Vivian's arms encircled on the neck of Liberato, sir.56

While Liberato strongly disputes this fact, pointing instead to Joel Basagre as the last person he saw with Vivian, no independent testimony was ever presented to corroborate Liberato's version of the facts. Hence, when weighed against Liberato' s bare allegations, the testimonies of Antonio and Jason placing Liberato near the scene of the crime with the victim deserve more credit. The Court echoes the keen observations of the RTC on this issue:

Accused's testimony that Angel went to his house at 3:30 in the afternoon and asked for his help in searching for Vivian is also doubtful. Angel sent Vivian to return the chair to Awing Habal after the drinking spree. According to Angel, the drinking spree ended at 2:00 o'clock (sic) while according to the accused, the drinking spree ended at 3 :00 in the afternoon. Whatever may be the actual time the drinking spree ended, it would appear that Vivian was gone for only 30 minutes before Angel came looking for her. Indeed, the accused concocted the story that Angel asked for his help in searching for Vivian at 3 :30 p.m. in order to counter the testimonies of Angel and Jason that they saw him carrying the victim on his back at around 3:30 or 4:30 in the afternoon. Angel's testimony that he asked for the help of the accused in searching for Vivian at 6:00 o'clock in the evening is more credible.57

Moreover, the fact that Liberato was the last person seen with Vivian assumes significance in this case. In People v. Lagao, Jr.,58 the Court convicted the accused solely based on circumstantial evidence, among which was the fact that the accused was identified as the last person seen with the deceased. Notably, Lagao resulted in a conviction notwithstanding the fact that the corpus delicti was only recovered the following day, as in the present Appeal.

Second. The records disclose that Vivian's cause of death was "asphyxia by submersion (drowning).59 Significantly, both Antonio and Jason testified to the fact that Liberato, while carrying Vivian on his back, was headed towards a body of water within the vicinity of Antonio's com plantation.60 Furthermore, Vivian's body was later recovered in the same com plantation.61 These factual circumstances form an unbroken chain of events that is consistent with the prosecution's theory that Vivian drowned to her death at the hands of Liberato.

To discredit the prosecution's eyewitness accounts, Liberato makes much of certain discrepancies in the testimonies of Antonio and Jason.62 However, such discrepancies, which pertained only to peripheral matters, have already been thoroughly reconciled by the RTC, as affirmed in toto by the CA:

Antonio Vargas and Jason Basagre both testified that they saw the accused carrying Vivian at his back. There were some inconsistencies in their testimonies: for one, Antonio testified that he saw the accused at around 3:30 in the afternoon, while Jason testified that he saw him at around 4:30 in the afternoon. Antonio claimed that the accused headed down the slope towards the stream while Jason said that he headed towards the creek where there were banana plants. At any rate, they appear to refer to one and the same body of water. This Court thinks that these inconsistencies or discrepancies in their statements refer to trivial and inconsequential details. Antonio only finished Grade VI while Jason did not even finish Grade II. Hence, they cannot be expected to know or remember the exact time when they saw the accused carrying the victim. The discrepancy of one hour in their testimonies is also inconsequential. It should be remembered that at the time of the incident, Antonio Vargas was only fourteen (14) years old while Jason Basagre was only thirteen (13). It is settled that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declarations, their veracity, or the weight of their testimonies; slight contradictions in fact serve to strengthen the sincerity of a witness and prove that his testimony is not rehearsed. x x x

Antonio Vargas also testified that the accused, while carrying Vivian on his back, proceeded to the direction of the stream; Jason Basagre testified that he went towards the direction of the creek. While they may have used different terms to describe the body of water where the accused proceeded, it appears from their description of the location thereof that they are referring to one and the same body of water. Taken together with the testimony of Dr. Alcantara and his medical certificate that the cause of death of the victim is "asphyxia by submersion (drowning)," the theory that the accused is responsible for the death of the victim is rendered much stronger.63 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

It is a settled rule that the trial court is in the most advantageous position to assess the credibility of witnesses as well as their testimonies given its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses' behavior when placed on the stand, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts.64 Hence, the trial court's assessment is necessarily accorded great weight and respect by the Court, especially when affirmed by the CA.65 Verily, considering the uniform findings of the RTC and CA, the Court finds that no cogent reason exists in the records warranting a disturbance of such findings.

Third. During the investigation of Vivian's death, which included four (4) other suspects who were present during the drinking spree at Angel's house, Liberato fled the police station.66 In countless occasions, the Court has held that the flight of an accused may be taken as evidence to establish his guilt;67 "[t]he wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as the lion."68

To explain his sudden departure, Liberato paints an atmosphere of intimidation by the police officers, claiming that the investigators "cocked their firearms at him" and that he was in solitude while being subject to inquiry.69 However, as observed by the RTC, his flip-flopping testimony on this very matter drives the Court to conclude against the truthfulness of his assertions:

x x x In the said investigation, accused was asked what happened to the missing child and he answered that they were searching for her but could not find her. Accused narrated that he fled during the investigation because he was afraid of PO Artita who cocked his gun on (sic) his presence. He thought that the said officer would shoot him, hence, he ran away to their farm. x x x

On cross-examination, x x x [h]e declared that he was investigated by some police officers together with other suspects. He admitted that he indeed fled because he was frightened but only after the investigation was finished and the investigators cocked their firearms at him.

On re-direct examination, accused confirmed that he was the fifth suspect who was investigated. During the investigation, he was alone with the three policemen. Upon clarificatory question from the court, the accused responded that: "you see, your honor, we are five (5) suspects and all the suspects were present but when we were investigated, we are only alone when we were investigated by these three (3) policemen." (TSN, November 29, 2011, pg. 16)

On re-cross examination, accused admitted that when he was investigated alone, the other four suspects were just beside him and that they could even hear what was being asked from him.70

Notably, despite Liberato's admission that there were four (4) other suspects around that could have easily witnessed the alleged impropriety of the police officers, not one of them was ever presented to corroborate his claims. Neither was there any indication in the records that Liberato filed a criminal complaint or administrative charge against the police officers concemed.71 Hence, without more, Liberato's claim of intimidation cannot be given credence by the Court.

In criminal cases, "proof beyond reasonable doubt" does not entail absolute certainty of the fact that the accused committed the crime, and neither does it exclude the possibility of error.72 What is only required is that degree of proof which, after a scrutiny of the facts, produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty of the culpability of the accused.73

In People v. Casitas, Jr., the Court explained that establishing guilt through circumstantial evidence is akin to weaving a "tapestry of events that culminate in a vivid depiction of the crime of which the accused is the author:"74

[T]he combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the trial court's finding of guilt:

First, appellant was in a store right in front of the house where the crime was committed, just before the victim was found dead.

Second, he was seen climbing over the fence of the house where the murder had occurred a few moments before.

Third, he was spotted walking away from the house while tucking in his bloodied shirt.

Fourth, he was the only person seen leaving the house prior to the discovery of the victim's lifeless body.

Fifth, he hastily left for Manila soon after the commission of the crime.

Sixth, he attempted to elude the police authorities until a warrant for his arrest was presented to him.

Seventh, he was observed by the trial court to be restless and fidgety during the course of his testimony.

x x x x

The pieces of circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together, definitely lead to no other conclusion than that appellant perpetrated the dastardly deed.

On the basis of the foregoing established facts, it can reasonably be inferred that appellant was the only person inside the house with the victim when the latter was brutally killed. Before the dead body was found, no other person had been seen entering or leaving the house. The act of appellant - climbing over the fence of the house with his clothes soaked in blood, coupled with the subsequent discovery of the dead body lying in a pool of blood - impels us to arrive at the logical conclusion that he was responsible for the killing. If he truly had nothing to do with it, he would have gone out through the gate of the house and immediately asked for help from the neighbors. Instead, he left the victim sprawled in a dreadful bloodbath and surreptitiously fled from the scene of the crime, hoping that nobody would notice him leaving.

Furthermore, appellant immediately left for Manila when the police authorities began to look for him. When he was finally located there, he tried to run away again, even when the police had shown him a valid warrant for his arrest. If he were really innocent of the charges as he claims, he would have wasted no time in submitting himself to the investigators, so that he would have a chance to disprove the accusations against him at the soonest possible opportunity.75

Meanwhile, the Court concurs with the RTC and CA in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery in this case. Treachery or alevosia is present in the killing of children who, by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense.76 In People v. Diaz, the Court held that the killing of an eleven (11)-year old was deemed ipso facto qualified by treachery by reason of the child's "inherent defenselessness."77 The Court therefore relies on the Diaz ruling in this case, especially considering that Vivian was murdered at the tender age of six (6) years old.78

Thus, after thorough examination of the records of this case, the Court is fully convinced that the evidence presented by the prosecution constitutes proof of Liberato's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While it is true that no direct evidence was adduced by the prosecution, circumstantial evidence is by no means a "weaker" form of evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence.79 Our prevailing jurisprudence has recognized that in its effect upon the courts, circumstantial evidence may even surpass direct evidence in weight and probative force.80 Accordingly, to the mind of the Court, the confluence of the established circumstances leads to the fair and reasonable conclusion that Liberato was indeed responsible for the death of Vivian.

Liberato's defense of alibi and denial
failed to overcome the prosecution's
evidence establishing his guilt

The defenses of denial and alibi are inherently weak and unreliable due to the ease by which they may be fabricated or concocted.81 If not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, such defenses are considered self-serving and are bereft of weight in courts of law.82 Such is the case in this Appeal.

After the prosecution successfully overcame Liberato's presumption of innocence, it was incumbent upon him to present evidence to the contrary. In doing so, Liberato resorted to mere denial and alibi, claiming instead that he was alone at his house during the time that he was seen by Antonio and Jason.83 However, as already discussed above, Liberato's sole testimony is highly deficient to counteract the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

Furthermore, for alibi to prevail, it must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission, and not merely that he was somewhere else.84 In People v. Consorte, the Court held that a distance of twenty (20) kilometers was not enough to establish such physical impossibility.85 Here, as borne out by the records, the body of Vivian was recovered only a few kilometers away from the house of Liberato. Thus, the Court affirms the questioned Decision on this matter, which held in the following wise:

The defense invoked by the appellant is mere denial and alibi. He contends that he was just in his house at about 3:10 in the afternoon of 24 March 2005. For alibi to prosper, however, it is not enough to prove that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.

Here, the appellant failed to establish that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The appellant's house, where he claims to have stayed at the time of the commission of the crime, is not that far from the place where the body of the victim was found so as not to afford him the opportunity to be at the crime scene to commit the felony. Furthermore, the appellant failed to present any corroborative evidence to support his defense that he was in his house at the time of the commission of the crime.

In the same vein, the appellant's bare denial must fail. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, such as in this case, regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.86

Motive is not an essential element of
the crime and the absence thereof
does not preclude a finding of guilt

Finally, insisting on his innocence, Liberato makes the claim that the CA erred in convicting him despite the prosecution's failure to establish a motive for the killing.87 Liberato is gravely mistaken.

Motive pertains to the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity.88 It is not an essential element of a crime and need not be proven by the State in criminal prosecutions.89 Hence, proof of motive alone will not establish guilt in the same way that the absence thereof cannot establish innocence.90 In previous occasions, the Court has held that the question of motive only becomes material when there is doubt as to the identity of the malefactor committing the offense charged.91

Here, the totality of circumstantial evidence on record sufficiently dispels any doubt that Liberato was responsible for the ghastly death of Vivian. Thus, in People v. Rendaje,92 where the Court similarly grappled with circumstantial evidence only, the accused was still convicted despite the absence of proof of motive:

After a careful review of the records of the case, this Court is convinced that the trial court did not err in convicting appellant on the strength of six (6) pieces of circumstantial evidence, which form an unbroken chain leading to the fair and logical conclusion that he killed the victim.

x x x x

Due to the lack of direct evidence to establish the identity of the assailant, appellant insists that proof of motive becomes essential.1âwphi1 However, as already discussed, the Court believes that the prosecution has established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It was able to pinpoint him, to the exclusion of all other persons, as the one responsible for the crime. Thus, the presence or the absence of motive is not essential.93 (Emphasis supplied)

Following Rendaje, considering that Liberato was positively identified by two (2) eyewitnesses, coupled with the other pieces of circumstantial evidence establishing Liberato's authorship of the crime, the Court finds that the RTC and CA did not err in convicting Liberato despite the lack of evidence showing motive.

Finally, in view of prevailing jurisprudence,94 the Court hereby increases the damages awarded by the CA as follows: One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as civil indemnity; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as moral damages; and One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as exemplary damages. The award of temperate damages is hereby increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated September 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals, Special Fourteenth Division in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06498, finding accused-appellant Liberato C. Pentecostes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as civil indemnity, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as moral damages, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as exemplary damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as temperate damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

(On official leave) ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE* Associate Justice

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On official leave.
1 Rollo,pp.17-19.

2 Id. at 2-16. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with Associate Justices Danton Q. Bueser and Pedro B. Corales concurring.

3 CA rollo, pp. 38-48. Penned by Presiding Judge Ma. Angela Acompañado-Arroyo.

4 The Birth Certificate of Vivian indicated that she was six (6) years of age at the time of her death; id. at 42.

5 Rollo, p. 3.
6 Id.; CA rollo, p. 38.
7 Id.; id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 See rollo, p. 4; see also CA rollo, p. 41.
13 CA rollo, p. 42.
14 Rollo, pp. 3-4.
15 TSN, March 22, 2007, pp. 3-4; CA rollo, p. 57.
16 Rollo, pp. 3-4.
17 See CA rollo, p. 40.
18 Id. at 41.
19 Rollo, p. 4.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 CA rollo, p. 39.
23 Id. at 42.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 43.
29 See id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 44-45.
34 Id. at 48.
35 See id. at 5.
36 Id. at 22-37.
37 Id. at 54-68.
38 Id. at 69-72.
40 Id. at 17-19.
41 Id. at 34-38.
42 Id. at 29-33.
43 CA rollo, pp. 24-25.
44 See People v. Casitas, Jr., 445 Phil. 407, 417-419 (2003).
45 People v. Obosa, 429 Phil. 522, 534 (2002).
46 People v. Casitas, Jr., supra note 44, at 419.
47 Rollo, p. 7.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 8.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 TSN, March 22, 2007, pp. 5-6; id. at 8-9.
56 TSN, August 25, 2010, pp. 5-6; id. at 9-10.
57 CA rollo, pp. 45-46.
58 337 Phil. 497 (1997).
59 CA rollo, p. 39.
60 See id. at 39-40.
61 Id. at 45.
62 See id. at 30-33.
63 Id. at 46-47.
64 People v. Sanico, 741Phil.356, 374 (2014).
65 See id.
66 See CA rollo, p. 43.

67 People v. Lobrigas, 442 Phil. 382, 392 (2002); see People v. Cruz, 348 Phil. 539, 548 (1998).

68 People v. Magdadaro, 274 Phil. 427, 433 (1991).
69 CA rollo, p. 43.
70 Id. at 42-43.
71 See People v. Ponseca, 422 Phil. 113, 122 (2001).
72 People v. Tropa, 424 Phil. 783, 789 (2002).
73 People v. Casitas, Jr., supra note 44, at 420.
74 Id. at 419.
75 Id. at 417-420.
76 People v. Diaz, 377 Phil. 997, 1005 (1999).
77 Id.
78 CA rollo, p. 42.
79 People v. Delim, 559 Phil. 771, 780 (2007).
80 Id.
81 People v. Bulfango, 438 Phil. 651, 657 (2002).
82 Id.
83 See CA rollo, p. 42.
84 See People v. Consorte, 738 Phil. 723, 733 (2014).
85 See id.
86 Rollo, pp. 12-13.
87 CA rollo, p. 25.
88 People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 448 (2003).
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 People v. Abillar, 400 Phil. 245, 256 (2000).
92 398 Phil. 687 (2000).
93 Id. at 698-703.

94 People v. Sabida, G.R. No. 208359, June 19, 2017, p. 4, citing People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331.

[T]he doctrine on circumstantial evidence has been recognized as part of the legal tradition when it was declared that "a rule of ancient respectability somolded into tradition is that circumstantial evidence suffices to convict only if the following requisites concur: first, there is more than one circumstance; second, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and finally, the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.12

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 210760               January 26, 2015

KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the July 15, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its January 8, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 34428, entitled People of the Philippines v. Kyle Anthony Zabala. The assailed CA Decision affirmed the July 7, 2011 Judgment in Crim. Case No. 1676-M-2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Malolos City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, punishable under Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code. The assailed Resolution, meanwhile, denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

An Information was filed against petitioner Kyle Anthony Zabala (Zabala) before the RTC, Branch 22, Malolos City, charging him with theft, the pertinent text of which states:

That on or about the 18th day of June 2007 in San Jose del Monte City, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away with him,one envelope containing cash amounting to SIXTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (Ph₱68,000.00) belonging to Randolph V. Alas, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the amount of Ph₱68,000.00. Contrary to law.1

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued. During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the complaining witness, Randolph Alas (Alas), and petitioner’salleged former girlfriend, Marlyn Piñon (Piñon). On the other hand, the defense presented the testimonies of petitioner and of one Muriel John Ganas (Ganas), his alleged companion on the day that the incident took place.2

Version of the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution tends to establish that Zabala is a jeepney driver who earns Two Hundred Pesos (₱200) to Four Hundred Pesos (₱400) per day on an alternate day basis. Complainant Alas, meanwhile, works at the Manila City Hall. It is through this job that he was able to save the Sixty-Eight Thousand Pesos (₱68,000) stolen by Zabala.3 Piñon, on the other hand, had been the girlfriend of Zabalafor about five months when the incident pertinent to this case occurred.

Alas testified that he and Zabalawere neighbors in San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan. As neighbors,he had treated Zabala as his kumpare and would often invite the latter to drinking sessions inside his house. At times, he would also call Zabala to repair his vehicle, because Zabala is also a mechanic. He would allow Zabala to follow him to his bedroom to get cash whenever spare parts are to be bought for the repair of his vehicle.4

Alas further testified that on June 18, 2007, at about 4:00 in the morning, he left his house to go to work. When he returned from work, at around 11:00 in the evening, he discovered that his money amounting to Sixty Eight Thousand Pesos (₱68,000), which he kept in an envelope inside his closet, was missing.5 During that time, there were only five (5) persons living in their house: Alas, his parents, his nine (9) year-old son, and his aunt. He asked his parents and aunt if they knew where he kept his money, but they did not know.6

Witness Piñon, on the other hand, testified that in the early morning of June 18, 2007, she and Zabala, her boyfriend at the time, were together at a store owned by the latter, which was six to seven steps away from the complainant’s house. She then saw Zabala climb the fence and scale the tree in front of the complainant’s house, and enter the house. When he returned, she noticed that he had a bulge in his pocket, which she later found to be a plentiful sum of money. Zabala then brought her home, and agreed to meet her again at about 10:00 in the morning. They then went to Greenhills, where Zabala bought two Nokia mobile phones, which cost about Eight Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱8,500).7

Version of the Defense

For his defense, Zabala testified that in the early morning of June 17, 2007, he was driving his passenger jeepney, together with his friend, witness Ganas. They parted ways at around 6:00 in the morning of the following day. During the whole time they were together, they did not drop by the house of the private complainant. Neither did he have the time to meet Marilyn Piñon, of whom he regarded only as an acquaintance and not his girlfriend.8

Witness Ganas corroborated the declaration of Zabala. He testified that he was with petitioner, acting as the conductor, while petitioner was plying the route of his driven jeepney. He had known petitioner since his childhood, and was his good friend.9

Ruling of the RTC

On July 7, 2011, the RTC rendered its Judgment convicting petitioner of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 1676-M-2008 CONVICTING accused KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA with the crime of theft defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby [sentenced] to suffer imprisonment of, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the MINIMUM penalty of prision correccional which is 6 years, to a MAXIMUM penalty of prision mayorin its maximum period [of] 8 years.

Accused Zabala is likewise ordered to indemnify and pay the amount of sixty eight thousand pesos (Php68,000.00) to complaining witness Randolph V. Alas by way of reparation of the damage caused on him.

Furnish both the public prosecutor and defense counsel of this judgment including the accused.10

Aggrieved by the Judgment, petitioner appealed to the CA, attributing to the lower court the following errors: (1) there was a grave error in not giving credence to petitioner’s version; (2) petitioner was convicted of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) petitioner cannot be convicted based on circumstantial evidence.

Ruling of the CA

In its presently assailed Decision promulgated on July 15, 2013, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court, but with modification as to the penalty to be imposed upon petitioner. The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant through circumstantial evidence.

Citing People v. Modesto,11 the CA said:

x x x [T]he doctrine on circumstantial evidence has been recognized as part of the legal tradition when it was declared that "a rule of ancient respectability somolded into tradition is that circumstantial evidence suffices to convict only if the following requisites concur: first, there is more than one circumstance; second, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and finally, the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.12

The CA then found that the series of circumstances present in this case supports a conviction, and constitutes the basis for a reasonable inference of the existence of the facts thereby sought to be proved.13

Rejecting the defense of petitioner, the CA ruled that he offered no evidence other than an alibi to exculpate him from the crime charged. It then cited the rule that alibi is a weakdefense, and cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a truthful witness.14

The CA disposed of petitioner’s appeal as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, accused-appellant is sentenced to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years, eight (8) months and eight (8) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Accused Zabala is likewise [ordered to] indemnify and pay the amount of Sixty Eight Thousand Pesos (Php68,000.00) to complaining witness Randolph V. Alas by way of reparation of the damage caused on him.15

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,but in its assailed Resolution dated January 8, 2014,the CA denied it.

Thus, the present recourse before this Court. Petitioner now argues that there is no sufficient evidence on record to support his conviction for the charge of theft.

In its Comment, respondent People insists that the prosecution was able to establish petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It argues that the CA correctly ruled that the series of circumstances presented before the trial court is sufficient to support a conviction.16

The Issues

I.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER’S CONVICTION BY GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES’ TESTIMONIES.

II.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION.17

In fine, petitioner alleges that the evidence presented before the trial court is insufficient to convict him of the offense charged.

The Court’s Ruling

We reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA. We agree with petitioner, and find that the evidence presented below does not constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficientto convict petitioner of theft. Thus, he must be acquitted.

Discussion

Given that the case for the prosecution is largely based on circumstantial evidence, a short discussion on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to convict an accused is in order.

Circumstantial evidence asbasis for conviction

It is a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, and that direct evidence isnot always necessary. This is but a recognition of the reality that in certain instances, due to the inherent attempt to conceal a crime, it is not always possible to obtain direct evidence. In Bacolod v. People, this Court had the occasion to say:

The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence. Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence. The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence. Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that which "goes to prove a fact or series of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in issue."18

The Rules of Court itself recognizes that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, under certain circumstances:

Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

Moreover, in Lozano v. People, this Court clarified the application of the circumstantial evidence rule:

To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed the crime.19 (emphasis in the original)

The prosecution failed to establish, by circumstantial

evidence, that petitioner is guilty of theft

Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this Court finds that the prosecution failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the petitioner of the offense charged. We find that the pieces of evidence presented before the trial court fail to provide a sufficient combination of circumstances, as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

To recall, the evidence of the prosecution purports to establish the following narrative: first, that the complaining witness Alas hides ₱68,000 in cash in his closet inside their house; second, that petitioner is aware that Alas hides money in his bedroom closet; third, that on the night of the incident, petitioner was with his then girlfriend, witness Piñon; fourth, that petitioner climbed through the fence of Alas’s house, and was able to successfully gain entrance to his house; fifth, that petitioner later went out of the house with a bulge in his pockets; and sixth, that later that day, petitioner and Piñon went shopping for a cellphone.

The foregoing narration––based on the testimonies of the two witnesses of the prosecution, even if given full faith and credit and considered as established facts––failsto establish that petitioner committed the crime of theft. If at all, it may possibly constitute evidence that petitioner committed an offense, but not necessarily theft.

In the case before the Court,the evidence presented by the prosecution fails to establish the corpus delicti of theft. In Tan v. People, this Court said:

Corpus delicti means the "body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed." The "essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things." In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking.20

First, nobody saw Zabala enter the bedroom of Alas, where the money amounting to ₱68,000 was allegedly kept and hidden. It is interesting to note that while Alas testified that there were other persons living in that house, i.e. his family members, the prosecution failed to put any of them on the witness stand, to testify that they saw or heard something out of the ordinary at the time the incident allegedly took place, or to explain why nobody else was able to notice that the theft took place while Alas was absent. Witness Piñon, meanwhile, merely testified that she saw Zabala scale the fence of Alas’ house and enter it. She did not actually see Zabala enter the room of Alas, where the money was hidden.

Second, the evidence presented below is insufficient to determine without a reasonable doubt that the ₱68,000 in cash was lost due to felonious taking, and,more importantly, that it was petitioner who committed the felonious taking. Even if believed in its entirety, the testimony of witness Piñon does not show that when petitioner left the house of Alas, he was carrying the ₱68,000 incash which was supposedly lost. All that Piñon saw was the bulge in petitioner’s pockets. Piñon’s testimony can considered as evidence to prove that when petitioner entered the house of Alas, he did so because of his intent to commit asportation.

Third, Piñon' s testimony fails to establish that Alas' pocket indeed contained the stolen money, as she never actually saw what was inside the pocket of Zabala. While she testified that later that day, they went to buy 2 cellphones amounting to ₱8,500, she failed to testify whether the money that Zabala used in paying for the cellphone was retrieved from the very same bulging pocket which she saw earlier in the day, which would have led to the conclusion that Zabala's pocket contained money. Failing this, what is left is the fact that Pifion saw a bulge in Zabala's pocket, and there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that his pocket in fact was used to hide the money that he allegedly stole. The trial and appellate courts committed error in accepting as fact that Zabala's pocket contained money, when there is a dearth of evidence to support such allegation.

And fourth, the rule in circumstantial evidence cases is that the evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person committed the crime.21 In the case here, however, the prosecution failed to prove, or even allege, that it was impossible for some other person to have committed the crime of theft against Alas. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence that at the time the theft was committed, there was no other person inside the house of Alas, or that no other person could have taken the money from the closet of Alas. Alas himself admitted that there were other residents in the house, but these persons were never presented to prove their whereabouts at the time the incident took place. This failure of the prosecution leads the Court to no other conclusion but that they failed to establish that culpability could only belong to Zabala, and not to some other person.

Given the foregoing discussion, We find that petit10ner was wrongfully convicted of theft.1âwphi1 In the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence must be upheld, and thus, petitioner should be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the July 15, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its January 8, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 34428 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Kyle Anthony Zabala is ACQUITTED of the offense of theft, on account of reasonable doubt. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN*
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Additional member per raffle dated September 10, 2014.
1 Rollo, p. 28.
2 Id. at 76.
3 Id. at 78.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 80.
6 Id. at 12.
7 Id. at 79.
8 Id. at 55.
9 Id. at 31.
10 Id. at 70-71. Penned by Pairing Judge Albert R. Fonacier.
11 No. L-25484, September 21, 1968, 25 SCRA 36.
12 Rollo, p. 35.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 36.

15 Id. at 40-41. Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba and concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Stephen C. Cruz.

16 Id. at 112.
17 Id. at 14.
18 G.R. No. 206236, July 15, 2013, 701 SCRA 229, 233.
19 G.R. No. 165582, July 9, 2010, 624 SCRA 597, 608.
20 G.R. No. 134298, August 26, 1999, 313 SCRA 220, 231.
21 People v. Anabe, G.R. No. 179033, September 6, 2010, 630 SCRA 10.