G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995
People vsTeehankee Jr.
Facts:
JussiLeino was taking
Maureen Hultman to her home. Roland Chapman tagged along. When they enteredDasmarinas village,
Maureen asked Leino to stop about a block away from her house. Leino offered to
walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car.
While walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by
accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the
middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked:
"Who are you? (Show me your) I.D."Leino handed his Asian Development
Bank (ADB) I.D but accused did not bother to look at it as he just grabbed
Leino's wallet and pocketed it. Chapman saw what happened and approached
them. He asked what was happening but the accused pushed him, pulled out a gun
and shot him.
The
accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Maureen who became
hysterical and started screaming couldn’t stay still and circled around
accused’s car to put some distance between them. When the accused caught her,
he ordered her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. The accused stood 2-3
meters away from them. He shot Leino who fell backwards but did not lose
consciousness and then shot Maureen. Leino saw the accused return to his car
and drive away. He shouted for help and noticed at least 3 people who saw the
incident.
Accused
relied on the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that during the shooting incident, he was in his house in Pasig
and that he only came to know the 3 victims when he read the newspaper reports
about it. He admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi
Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. Heclaimed that said car ceased to be in good
running condition after its involvement in an accident. Until the day of the
shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mother’s house in
Dasmarinas Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused conceded that
although the car was not in good running condition, it could still be used.
Issues:
1. Whether
the accused had been positively identified by Leino, Cadenas and Mangubat as
the one who shot Leino, Chapman and Hultman.
2. Whether
the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
3.
Whether the publicity given the case against the appellant was massive,
overwhelming, and prejudicial as to effectively deprive the accused of right to
impartial trial.
4.
Whether the killing of Chapman and Hultman and
the shooting of Leino was attended by treachery.
Held:
1.) Using the totality of circumstances
test, the alleged irregularities cited by the accused did not result in his
misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in
Leino’s identification of the accused in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park.
The records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for
security reasons. The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched
and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials
and brought to the house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos
refused to have the identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with
people and with high security risk. Leino’s fear for his safety was not
irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the
exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis.There is no hard and
fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses.
Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while
the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim.
Accused can’t also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and
TV accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him. The records
show that while Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown 3 pictures of
different men by the investigators. He identified the accused as the gunman
from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug
shot identification, he has not seen any picture of accused or read any report
relative to the shooting incident. The burden is on accused to prove that his
mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible
suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-court
identification by Leino.
There is no reason to doubt the
correctness of the accused’s identification by Leino. The scene of the crime
was well-lighted by a lamp post. The accused was merely 2-3 meters away when he
shot Leino. The incident happened for a full 5 minutes. Leino had no ill-motive
to falsely testify against the accused. His testimony at the trial was
straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense
counsels. He never wavered in his identification of the accused. When asked how
sure he was that the accused was responsible for the crime, he confidently
replied: “I’m
very sure. It could not have been somebody else.”
The accused cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the
investigators to reduce to a sworn statement the information revealed by Leino
during his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established that Leino’s
extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility.
The day he identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable
to speak. He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat. There is also
no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness
whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing.
The SC also rejected the accused’s contention that the NBI suppressed
the sketch prepared by the CIS on the basis of the description given by Leino.
There is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was turned over by the
CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the sketch was
suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble the accused is not
evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.
The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it was incredible
for Leino to have remembered the accused’s face when the incident happened
within a span of 5 minutes. Five minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch
in his mind the picture of the accused. Experience shows that precisely because
of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses,
especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of
reliability the identity of criminals. The natural reaction of victims of
criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and
observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body
movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased
from their memory. In this case, there is absolutely no improper motive for
Leino to impute a serious crime to the accused. The victims and the accused
were unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If Leino identified
the accused, it must be because the accused was the real culprit.
The SC also gave credence to the testimony of the other two witnesses.
As to the testimony of Cadenas, his initial reluctance to reveal to the
authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial – he
feared for his and his family’s safety. The Court has taken judicial notice of
the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution of crimes
considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all too real
risks, the court has not considered the initial reluctance of fear-gripped
witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an authorities as an indicium of
credibility. As to the testimony of Mangubat, the SC found nothing in the
records to suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself.
2.)In the case at bar, the reference by the
trial judge to reports about the troublesome character of appellant is a
harmless error. The reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence
appreciated by the trial judge in convicting the accused. As aforestated, the
accused was convicted mainly because of his identification by 3 eyewitnesses
with high credibility.The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired
from the fatal gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The
omission, however, cannot exculpate the accused. The omitted comparison cannot
nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of the accused.
There is also little to the contention of the accused that his Lancer
car was not in running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when
the NBI towed his car from Dasmarinas Village where it was parked to the NBI
office. Again, the argument is negated by the records which show that said car
was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which was then in the
possession of the accused. Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in
running condition. Even the accused’s evidence show that said car could run.
After its repairs, the accused’s son, Claudio Teehankee III, drove it from the
repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmarinas Village, in Makati, where it
was parked.
Nor was the SC impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the
eyewitnesses’ description of the color of the gunman’s car. Leino described the
car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat white (“medyoputi”);
Mangubat declared the car was white; and Cadenas testified it was silver
metallic gray. These alleged discrepancies amount to no more than shades of
differences and are not meaningful, referring as they do to colors white,
somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and shocking
nature of the incident which happened before the break of dawn, these slight
discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution
eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.
The accused’s attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the
adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration. The accused
cites a newspaper item where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying to the
gunman: “Huwag,
Daddy. Huwag, Daddy.” The evidence on record, however, demonstrates
that Anders Hultman could not have been the gunman. It was clearly established
that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen
did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as “Papa,” not “Daddy.”
Moreover, Leinooutrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still in the hospital
and when informed that the Makati police were looking into this possibility,
Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. Leino is a reliable
witness.
The accused cannot also capitalize on
the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates. Scientific experts
concur in the view that the paraffin test has “. . . proved extremely
unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the
presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be
established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites
was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a
number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or
nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and
leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco
may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances
are present in the products of combustion of tobacco.” In numerous rulings, we
have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the
assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of
the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the
time of firing. In the case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified
and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands with the use of
warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She
likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than
seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the shooting may not lead to a reliable
result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been removed by
washing or perspiration. In the Report on the paraffin test conducted on
appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when the accused was
tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed from
the time of the alleged shooting.
3.) The SC
did not sustain the accused’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial
trial due to prejudicial publicity. It’s true that the print and broadcast
media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and
high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused
to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible
reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out,
“a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective
judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . . The press does
not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage
of justice by subjecting in the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism.”
At best, the accused can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the
part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case. The SC had previously rejected this
standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice
as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply
that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the
records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and
trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove
that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial
publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the
trial. The accused has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden. There is no evidence showing that the trial judge
allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or
condone any manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the
courtroom during the trial of the case at bar.
Parenthetically,
the accused should be the last person to complain against the press for
prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented in court no
less than 7 newspaper reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of
their reports for his defense. The defense’s documentary evidence consists
mostly of newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar
and which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and
unfair to appellant at the same time.
4.) The 3 Informations charged the accused
with having committed the crimes with treachery and evident premeditation.
Evident premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for,
admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance
meeting on the street since the victims were unknown to the accused and vice-versa. It, however, appreciated the presence of
the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the
killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of
events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent reason, the
accused suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman who
were then walking along the sidewalk.
Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino
handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked what was
going on. Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant
what was wrong. There and then, the accused pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from
inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. “Why did you
shoot me?” was all Chapman could utter. Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was
carried out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend himself. Even then,
there is no evidence on record to prove that the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his
criminal design without risk to himself. The accused acted on the spur of the
moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The
time between the initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The
shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the
part of the accused rather than a deliberate act of will. Mere suddenness of
the attack on the victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery. Hence,
absent any qualifying circumstance, the accused should only be held liable for
Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman, treachery
clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after
shooting Chapman in cold blood, the accused ordered Leino to sit on the
pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant’s
car. When the accused went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to
put some distance between them. After a minute or two, the accused got to
Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated,
unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by the accused .
Clearly, the accused purposely placed his two victims in a completely
defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of
time between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman – a
period which the accused used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the
execution of the crime without risk to himself.
