Case digest by Mark Jerome Labad

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. FREDDIE LADIP Y RUBIO, Accused–Appellant.

G.R. No. 196146, March 12, 2014

FACTS:

The Prosecution’s Version of Facts

The prosecution presented Police Officer (PO) 1 Marcelino Sibal (PO1 Sibal) and PO1 Romeo Tayag (PO1 Tayag), who both testified that while on duty in the morning of 7 December 2006, together with other police operatives namely: PO2 Zamora, PO1 Almario, and PO2 Salas, at the Station Anti–Illegal Drugs (SAID) – Station Operation Task Group, Quirino Police Station (PS–09), Anonas Road, Project 2, Quezon City, a male confidential informant came to the station and provided them with the information that a certain Freddie Ladip was selling illegal drugs in Area 1, Barangay Batasan, Quezon City.  Consequently, a buy–bust operation was conducted on the same day whereupon the accused was arrested for selling methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.⁵

As narrated during the trial, PO1 Sibal, who acted as poseur–buyer, and the informant went to a house located in the abovementioned area around 1 o’clock in the afternoon of 7 December 2006, wherein the accused was already waiting for them outside the said house.  The informant introduced PO1 Sibal to the accused as a buyer of shabu. Accused immediately inquired as to the quantity of shabu that he intends to purchase by asking, “magkano?”  PO1 Sibal replied that he wanted to buy P300.00 worth of shabu.  Accused then asked for the payment, for which PO1 Sibal readily gave him the marked money consisting of three 100–peso bills.  In return, accused handed to PO1 Sibal a transparent heat–sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline granules.  Upon the exchange and conveyance of shabu and the marked money having been completed, PO1 Sibal gave the pre–arranged signal by removing the cap from his head to signify to his back–up team, strategically stationed near the scene of the crime, that the transaction was consummated.  Afterwards, the accused was arrested by the team.⁶

It was further stated under oath that, prior to the turnover of the evidence to the investigator–on–duty in said station, PO1 Sibal and PO1 Tayag revealed that they placed their respective markings on the two (2) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachets,⁸ denominated as MS–FL–12–07–06 and RT–PU–12–07–06.  Subsequently, an inventory of the seized items was made in the presence of the police operatives and the arrested persons. Photographs of the arrested persons, the marked money, and the seized items were likewise taken, followed by various requests for laboratory examination of said specimens, and for drug dependency examination of the arrested persons.⁹  Later on, the subject sachets were brought to the Quezon City Police District (QCPD) Crime Laboratory.

The Defense’s Version of the Facts

Accused testified that at around 1 o’clock in the afternoon of 7 December 2006, he was engaged in a drinking session inside the house of his live–in partner’s (Perlyn) friend (a certain Wilma) at BarangayBotocan, Quezon City.¹¹  Suddenly, three men in civilian clothes arrived and searched the house but found nothing illegal.  Nevertheless, the three men grabbed and handcuffed him and Perlyn,boarded them in a vehicle and brought them to a police station to show them the shabu without explaining where it came from.To corroborate the testimony of the accused, Lerma testified that she was in the house of her friend Wilma having a drinking spree with them when the accused was unexpectedly and swiftly arrested by a group of three male individuals clad in civilian clothes for no apparent reason. 

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision¹⁵ finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (for drug pushing).  The dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted
            CA:On appeal, the accused contended that the confiscated drugs were not marked immediately at the time and place of its seizure, and that the subsequent physical inventory thereof was not made in the presence of representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the media, and any elected public official, in violation of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, thus, destroying the identity and integrity of the evidence against him; that there were inconsistencies in the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution; and that ultimately, the prosecution miserably failed to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.¹⁷The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC and dismissed the appeal.¹⁸  The case was then elevated to the Supreme Court

ISSUE:           

Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused of the alleged sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, in violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

RULING:

The Court finds no merit in the appeal.
It has been consistently ruled that for the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.²⁴  In other words, there is a need to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused actually sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the former indeed knew that what he had sold and delivered to the latter was a prohibited drug.²⁵  To reiterate, what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, plus the presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence.²⁶

The point, understandably, of the accused is noncompliance by the arresting officers with Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 regarding the chain of custody of  seized drugs, particularly as to the following:
We are not persuaded by these arguments.
This Court has time and again spoken on the chain of custody rule,³⁴ a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.  This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.  These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.³⁵

As often as there are occasions to apply the chain of custody rule, the Court has pronounced that the requirements under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR are not inflexible.  What is essential is “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.” ³⁷  Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

From the point of view of jurisprudence, we are not beating any new path by holding that the failure to undertake the required photography and immediate marking of seized items may be excused by the unique circumstances of a case.  In People v. Resurreccion, we already stated that “marking upon immediate confiscation” does not exclude the possibility that marking can be at the police station or office of the apprehending team.  In the cases of People v. Rusiana, People v. Hernandez, andPeople v. Gum–Oyen, the apprehending team marked the confiscated items at the police station and not at the place of seizure. Nevertheless, we sustained the conviction because the evidence showed that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized had been preserved.  To reiterate what we have held in past cases, we are not always looking for the strict step–by–step adherence to the procedural requirements; what is important is to ensure the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. We succinctly explained this in People v. Del Monte when we held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We would like to add that non–compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence.  Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.  For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception.  If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will [be] accorded it by the courts. x x x

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non–admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non–compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non–compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight — evidentiary merit or probative value — to be given the evidence.The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.³⁸ (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.  The Court of Appeals Decision in CA–G.R. CR–H.C. No. 03635 dated 22 September 2010, is AFFIRMED in all respects.

the prosecution evidence had established the unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs from the buy-bust team, to the investigating officer and to the forensic chemist.

Appellant assails the trial court's assessment of the credibility of prosecution witness PO2 Coronel. He faults the RTC in giving more faith and credit to PO2 Coronel's testimony regarding the buy-bust operation over his defense of denial.

"[P]rosecution of cases involving illegal drugs depends largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is fundamental that the factual findings of the trial [court] and those involving credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the [CA],"13 as in this case. The Court has thoroughly examined the records of this case and finds the testimony of PO2 Coronel credible. The said testimony is pertinently supported by documents such as the marked buy-bust money, chemistry report, affidavit of arrest, among others, which all clearly attest to the fact that a sale of shabu took place between him and appellant. On the other hand, appellant's defense of denial, aside from being self-serving, is unsubstantiated and thus, has little weight in law. Hence, the lower courts correctly gave more credence to the evidence of the prosecution.

Appellant banks on the prosecution's alleged failure to comply with the requirements of law14 with respect to the proper marking, inventory, and taking of photograph of the seized specimen. However, it does not escape the Court's attention that appellant failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the seized item during trial. In fact, at no instance did he manifest or even hint that there were lapses on the part of the police officers in handling the seized item which affected its integrity and evidentiary value. As held by the Court in People v. Domado,15 citing People v. Hernandez,16 objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. In this case, appellant raised the police operatives' alleged non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the first time on appeal before the CA. Thus, following established jurisprudence, the alleged flaws do not adversely affect the prosecution's case.

In any event, it is "settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. [No.] 9165, for as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken."17 Here, it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was able to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody of the subject specimen from the moment it was seized from appellant up to the time it was presented during trial as proof of the corpus delicti. As aptly observed by the CA:

[T]he contention of appellant that the police officers failed to comply with the provisions of paragraph 1, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for the proper procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs, is untenable. Record shows that PO2 Coronel marked the confiscated sachet of "shabu" at the police station and in the presence of appellant and the duty investigator. PO2 Coronel clarified that the reason why he marked the said "shabu" at the police station and not at the scene of the crime was because the place where they transacted was dark. Thus, it is only proper to preserve the confiscated item and mark it in a lighted and safe place which is at the police station. Then, the said "shabu" was properly turned over to the duty investigator, together with the marked money. Afterwards, the alleged "shabu" was brought to the forensic chemist for examination. Likewise, the members of the buy-bust team executed their affidavits of arrest immediately after appellant was apprehended and at the trial, PO2 Coronel positively identified the seized drugs. Indeed, the prosecution evidence had established the unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs from the buy-bust team, to the investigating officer and to the forensic chemist. Thus, there is no doubt that the "shabu" presented before the court a quo was the same "shabu" seized from appellant and that indeed, he committed the crime charged in the information.18

All told, the Court finds appellant's conviction of the offense charged, as well as the imposition upon him of the penalty of life imprisonment and payment of fine of P500,000.00, proper.1âwphi1 It must be added, however, that appellant shall not be eligible for parole.19

WHEREFORE, the assailed February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04206 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Allan Diaz y Roxas shall not be eligible for parole.

G.R. No. 197818               February 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALLAN DIAZ y ROXAS, Accused-Appella

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were promulgated to ensure the protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and security.^[57] The rules on these writs were issued in light of the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.^[58] The Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007,^[59] and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February 2008.^[60]

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.^[61] It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.^[62] Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.^[63] It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.^[64]

Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.^[65] As an independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy – especially the right to informational privacy^[66] – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification.[

[ G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011 ]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, AN OFFICER NAMED MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC UNDER THE NAME “HARRY,” ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN “BONG” PASICOLAN AND VINCENT CALLAGAN, RESPONDENTS.

The Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring members of the bench. At the same time, however, the Court should not hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. This Court could not be the instrument that would destroy the reputation of any member of the bench, by pronouncing guilt on mere speculation.

The charge of manifest bias and partiality against respondent judge is bereft of factual support.  As held in Mamerto Maniquiz Foundation, Inc. v. Judge Rogelio M. Pizarro:^[9]
In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of his complaint.  Notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of a judge's functions, hence bias, prejudice and even undue interest cannot be presumed, specially weighed against a judge's sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any person and do equal right to the poor and to the rich.  In a long line of cases decided by this Court, it was held that bare allegations of bias are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor.  In Sinnott v. Barte, it was further held, mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough.  There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself.  Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. (Emphasis supplied)

ROVINNA DE JESUS ELEFANT, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE SOCORRO B. INTING AND BRANCH CLERK OF COURT SHIRLEY M. PAGALILAUAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 4, MANILA, RESPONDENTS.

the finding of probable cause of the Judge may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed; the evidence seized by the police officers based on said search warrant may be suppressed if the accused presents clear and convincing evidence that the police officers and/or a government informant made a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in said affidavit/deposition or testimony which is essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause

It bears stressing that the policemen saw to it that the search of petitioner's house was conducted with the assistance and in the presence of Barangay Captain Mangaliag and Kagawad Garcia.  They testified that the regulated drugs confiscated by the policemen were found in the searched premises.  Petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the policemen and the barangay officials had any improper motive to frame her and falsely ascribe to her the crime of violating R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
x x x
However, the finding of probable cause of the Judge may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed; the evidence seized by the police officers based on said search warrant may be suppressed if the accused presents clear and convincing evidence that the police officers and/or a government informant made a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in said affidavit/deposition or testimony which is essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause.  Such evidence must focus on the state of mind of the affiants/deponents that he was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation.^[83]  The requirement that a search warrant not issue but upon probable cause would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer and his informant are able to use deliberately falsehood allegations to demonstrate probable cause and, having misled the Judge, was able to remain confident that the ploy succeeded.^[84]  However, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of a police officer or government informant will not invalidate a search warrant.  And even if the police officer or government informant may have deliberately made a falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in his or her affidavit/deposition but the remaining portions thereof are sufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant will not be quashed for lack of probable cause.<sup>[85]

x x  x</sup>
 The well-entrenched rule is that the findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing evidence that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant the modification or reversal of the outcome of the case.  In this case, petitioner failed to establish any such circumstance.

[ G.R. NO. 168773, October 27, 2006 ]

ELIZA ABUAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

 

"clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, REPRESENTED BY THE PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. AND JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, RESPONDENTS.

On the issue of partiality and manifest bias, the rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. Clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge is required.

On the issue of partiality and manifest bias, the rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. Clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge is required.  The burden to prove that respondent Judge committed the acts complained of rest on the complainant.  It is complainant's asseveration that respondent Judge was protecting the defendants who are rich and influential; that some of them are townmates of the respondent judge; and they were sometimes seen together. These allegations remain as mere allegations without any evidence to support them. Complainant averred that her sister and relatives saw the respondent Judge with the defendants talking and eating in a restaurant.  However, said sister and relatives were not presented to testify on that allegation.  Mere allegation of partiality and bias without more cannot discharge the burden bestowed upon the complainant to prove respondent Judge's partiality and bias. Charges against any member of the judiciary must be supported at least by substantial evidence.  Applying the foregoing principles to this case, the undersigned finds that the charges of the complainant against respondent Judge for partiality and bias failed to measure up to the yardstick of substantial evidence.

[ A.M. No. MTJ-06-1631 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-1744-MTJ), September 30, 2008 ]

FENINA R. SANTOS, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ERASTO D. TANCIONGCO, RESPONDENT.