Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a party's testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]). Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party's testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for cross-examination

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 104874 December 14, 1993

DANILO HERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Marcelo Y. Hernandez for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for People of the Philippines.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 05877, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, FINDING the decision appealed from to be in accordance with law and evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED except as to Criminal Case No. 21-87 where, for reasons above discussed, the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED (Rollo, p. 33).

CA-G.R. CR No. 05877 was an appeal by petitioner from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cavite City in Criminal Cases Nos. 21-87 to 29-87, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds Danilo Hernandez guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the following cases: Crim. Case No. 21-87, for Estafa and he is hereby ordered sentenced to an indeterminate prison term from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P150,000.00 corresponding to the value of jewelries embezzled and unreturned and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 22-87, for Estafa, he is hereby ordered sentenced for an indeterminate prison term of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P100,000.00 for the value of the jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 23-87, Violation of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 25-87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P250,000.00 for the value of the jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 26-87, for Viol. of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 27-87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P280,000.00 for the value of jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 28-87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P100,000.00 value of the jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. case No. 29-87, for Viol. of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision correccional, and to pay the costs (Rollo, pp. 49-50).

It appears that sometime in August 1986, petitioner was introduced to Remedios de Leon by his aunt, as one engaged in the business of buying and selling jewelry (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 18, 20).

In their first transaction, petitioner paid in cash the several pieces of jewelry which he bought from de Leon. In their subsequent dealings, petitioner either paid in cash or by way of postdated checks (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 22-23). On one occasion, petitioner issued post-dated checks with the aggregate amount of P275,000.00. These checks bounced. However, upon notice of dishonor by the drawee banks concerned, petitioner paid de Leon cash in exchange for the dishonored checks. Some checks were likewise exchanged with cash even prior to their due date (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 33, 37).

Several days before October 20, 1986, petitioner told de Leon that he was interested in buying some more pieces of jewelry (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 60). On that date, at around 10:00 A.M., petitioner, together with his common-law wife, Rosemarie Rodriguez, and two other companions, went to the house of de Leon in Cavite City (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 70). Petitioner selected a pair of 2-carat diamond earrings worth P150,000.00 for which he issued BPI Check No. 798246 payable to "cash" in the said amount and post-dated it to October 26, 1986. The amount of the check was filled in by Rosemarie Rodriguez and petitioner affixed his signature as drawer (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 69).

Petitioner and Rodriguez returned to de Leon's house at about 7:00 P.M. and bought one choker with 20 diamond stones and one bracelet with 16 diamond stones, for which he issued BPI Check No. 798247 payable to "cash" in the amount of P250,000.00 and postdated it to October 27, 1986. Petitioner specifically instructed de Leon to give him one week to confer with his buyer before de Leon negotiates the check. The check was also prepared by Rodriguez and signed by petitioner (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 73-79).

In the evening of October 22, 1986, petitioner again went to the house of de Leon and bought one heart-shaped diamond set. In payment thereof, he issued BPI Check No. 798248 payable to "cash" in the amount of P280,000.00 and post-dated it to November 9, 1986 (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 84-89).

On October 23, 1986, petitioner made a long-distance call to de Leon and inquired whether she still had jewelry for sale. When she said that she did, petitioner made an appointment with her. Petitioner arrived at de Leon's house at around 2:30 P.M. The two went to a restaurant, where petitioner selected a set of earrings and a ring, each piece with a 1-carat diamond (TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 15-16). In payment for the set, petitioner issued to de Leon BPI Check No. 798250 payable to "cash" in the amount of P100,000.00 and dated that same day (October 23, 1992). Petitioner told de Leon that the check was funded and that she could even withdraw the amount on that day. De Leon did not encash the check for the bank was closed (TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 16, 19).

In the evening of October 24, 1986, petitioner with Rodriguez went to de Leon's house and bought a 5-carat diamond piece. In payment thereof, petitioner indorsed to de Leon ASB Check No. 245964 in the amount of P150,000.00 post-dated to November 10, 1986 and issued by one Enrique Araneta (TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 21-26).

BPI Checks Nos. 798246, 798247 and 798250 were drawn against insufficient funds, while BPI Check no. 798248 and ASB Check No. 245964 were drawn against a closed account.

Petitioner was charged in nine informations with estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges (Rollo, pp. 16-17).

After a joint trial, petitioner was convicted of the nine charges in a joint decision.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the conviction of petitioner was affirmed as to Criminal Cases nos. 22-87, 23-87, 24-87, 25-87, 26-87, 27-87, 28-87 and 29-87, and reversed as to Criminal Case No. 21-87.

In this petition, petitioner claims that his conviction of nine distinct offenses subject of nine separate informations in a single judgment is reversible error, This contention is untenable.

The case of United States v. Tanjuatco, 1 Phil. 116, relied upon by petitioner, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Tanjuatco, we held that the trial court improperly rendered a single judgment for two offenses in one of the two criminal cases, in the absence of a consolidation of the two cases. In the case at bench, the trial court rendered a judgment for each of the nine separate informations, albeit in the same decision.

We further stated in Tanjuatco that the trial court violated "an essential right of the accused, inasmuch as he is entitled, although accused of two offenses, to a trial in each of the two cases upon the proofs adduced in each individual case, and upon the allegations set forth in each information. It is not permissible to take into account or consider in one case the facts proved in the other, and vice versa" (at pp. 117-118).

The trial of the nine criminal cases was conducted jointly without any objection from petitioner. Even had he signified his opposition to the joint trail, such opposition would have been unavailing. A consolidation of trails, at the court's discretion, is allowed in "charges for offenses founded on the same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character" (1985 Rules on Criminal procedure, Rule 119, Sec. 14).

Petitioner also complains that while he assigned eight errors, the Court of Appeals did not make a complete findings of fact as to the last two assigned errors (Rollo, pp. 11-12).

In the last two assigned errors, petitioner claims that the trial court erred:

VII

IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 21-87 TO 29-87 NOTWITHSTANDING ABSENCE OF INCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND PRESENCE OF NUMEROUS PROOFS NEGATING THE SOUNDNESS OF SUCH VERDICT.

VIII

IN PRONOUNCING THE ACCUSED, THROUGH A SINGLE JUDGMENT, GUILTY OF ALL THE NINE DISTINCT OFFENSES COVERED BY THE NINE SEPARATE INFORMATIONS SUBJECT MATTER OF CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 21-87 TO 29-87, INCLUSIVE (Rollo, p. 56).

Obviously, the Court of Appeals did not deem it necessary to make a separate findings of fact for said assigned errors, because they were just the necessary consequences of the previous, assigned errors.

Petitioner next questions: (i) as violative of the constitutional mandate that decisions shall contain the facts and the law on which they are based (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, sec. 14, par. 1), the decision of the Court of Appeals which merely adopted the statement of facts of the Solicitor general in the appellee's brief, and (ii) as violative of the constitutional mandate requiring that any denial of a motion for reconsideration must state the legal basis thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2), the denial of his motion of reconsideration on the basis of a comparison of said motion with the "comment thereon" (Rollo, pp. 10-12).

In its decision the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The facts of the case as summarized in the Appellee's Brief are as follows: " and the quoted in full the statement of facts of the Solicitor General (Rollo, p. 20). According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals did not make its own "independent judicial opinion" by such act of adopting the statement of facts made by the advance party (Rollo, p. 11).

What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that it found the facts as presented by the Solicitor General as supported by the evidence. The constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is based. There is no proscription made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the same in its own words.

Precisely briefs or memoranda are required in order to aid the courts in the writing of decisions.

We note that aside from adopting the statement of facts of the Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals also made findings of facts in the course of its discussion of the assignment of errors.

As to the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals stated in its Resolution dated March 30, 1992:

Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused-appellant of the decision dated December 13, 1991 and the comment thereon of the Solicitor General, the Court finds no cogent reason that could justify a modification or reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered.

Accordingly, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit (Rollo, p. 35).

The denial, therefore, was based on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not find any "cogent reason that could justify a modification or reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered."

Petitioner claims that the decision of the trial court is not supported by the evidence, which is contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that said decision is "in accordance with law and the evidence" (Rollo, p. 12). He points out that the appellate court should not have believed the trial court's conclusion that "the sole testimony of the offended party would have sufficed to sustain her assertions (Rollo, p. 47). He claims that self-serving declarations of a party favorable to himself are not admissible and that none of the alleged witnesses to the transactions were presented.

The common objection known as "self-serving" is not correct because almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is "hearsay" (Wenke, Making and Meeting Objections, 69).

Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a party's testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]).

Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party's testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for cross-examination.

It is not true that none of the alleged witnesses to the transactions was presented in court (Rollo, p. 13). Yolanda Dela Rosa, an eye-witness to some of the transactions, testified for the prosecution. Assuming that Dela Rosa was not presented as a witness, the testimony of de Leon sufficed to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The conviction of an accused may be on the basis of the testimony of a single witness (People v. Rumeral, 200 SCRA 194 [1991]). In determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not counted (People v. Villalobos, 209 SCRA 304 [1992] ).

Petitioner also contends that while he was condemned by the trial court to pay civil indemnity, no evidence was actually presented in court to prove the existence, ownership and worth of the pieces of jewelry other than the checks (Rollo, p. 14).

The existence of the jewelry was established by de Leon herself, who testified that petitioner even selected the pieces of jewelry before buying them.

As to the ownership of the jewelry, we held in People v. Dy, 109 SCRA 400 [1981] that:

Ownership is not a necessary element of the crime of estafa, . . . In estafa, the person prejudiced or then immediate victim of the fraud need not be the owner of the goods. This, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "Any person who shall defraud another (it does say 'owner') by any means mentioned herein below shall be punished . . . ." All that is necessary is that the loss should have fallen on someone other than the perpetrators of the crime. . . ." (at p. 408).

The trial court based the civil indemnity on the actual price of the jewelry as agreed upon by petitioner and de Leon at the time of the transactions and this is reflected by the face value of the checks.

Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in admitting the checks in evidence without the prosecution first proving that his signature on the checks were authentic (Rollo, pp. 13-14). If petitioner claims that his signatures on the checks were forged, the burden is on him to prove such fact. He who alleges must prove his allegations.

In the trial court, petitioner presented a certification issued by the San Juan Police Station to the effect that he reported as lost several blank checks, to wit: BPI Checks Nos. 798246, 798247, 798248, 798249, and 798250, and AB Check No. 245964. We agree with the trial court when it gave little weight to the certification. Like the trial court, we wonder why petitioner never filed a criminal case against de Leon, if said checks were really stolen.

Lastly, petitioner contends that because "the amounts covered by the checks were deposited by the offended party in her savings account with the Prudential Bank, it becomes the liability of the bank by its acceptance to pay for the amounts of the checks" (Rollo, pp. 14-15).

The case of Banco de Oro v. Equitable Banking Corporation, 157 SCRA 188 (1988) cited by petitioner as authority, dealt with the negligence of a collecting bank which facilitated the payment by the drawee bank of the value of a check with a forged endorsement and signature of the payee. No such issue is involved in the case at bench.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party’s testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for cross-examination.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 188130               July 26, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARY LOU OMICTIN y SINGCO, Accused-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the November 25, 2009 Decision¹ of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02793, entitled People of the Philippines v. Mary Lou Omictin y Singco. The CA Decision affirmed the Decision² dated May 3, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104 in Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Mary Lou Omictin guilty of violating Section 6, in relation to Sec. 7(b), of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Specifically, accused-appellant was charged with and adjudged guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and three (3) counts of Estafa.

The Facts

Primo Arvin Guevarra, one of the private complainants, arrived home sometime in September 2003 after his employment contract in Libya expired. In January 2004, he contacted a college classmate, Rebecca Joy Roque, who previously informed him that she knew of a recruiter for overseas employment. Roque thus set up a meeting between him and the recruiter, who turned out to be accused-appellant Omictin.³

Omictin met Guevarra along with Anthony Ambrosio and Elisa Dotimas.⁴ In that meeting, the three agreed to pay Omictin PhP 40,000 each for their deployment in London as caregivers. All three each gave Omictin, there and then, PhP 10,000 as initial payment. Omictin assured them that they would leave for London within 60 to 90 days.⁵

For such deployment, Guevarra had a medical examination, during which occasion he paid Omictin an additional PhP 10,000. Later, Guevarra completed his placement payment by giving Omictin the balance of PhP 20,000. Upon said payment, Omictin informed Guevarra that she would schedule an orientation and contract signing at a later date. However, the promised orientation and contract signing never took place. Sometime in February 2004, Guevarra was able to meet with Omictin, who promised to return his money during the first week of March. Like the earlier promises, the promise to reimburse remained unfulfilled.⁶

Another private complainant, Veronica Caponpon, was assured of employment in New Zealand as an apple picker, for which she was required by Omictin to pay PhP 20,000 as placement fee for the deployment. Caponpon initially paid Omictin PhP 10,000 and was then promised by the latter that she would leave for New Zealand within two months provided that she complies with all the requirements for deployment.⁷ On April 22, 2003, Caponpon submitted her resumé to Omictin and paid the amount of PhP 8,000. The remaining PhP 2,000 was paid on April 27, 2003. For all her efforts and the repeated promises of Omictin, Caponpon still was not able to leave for New Zealand.⁸

Roy Fernandez Mago, another private complainant, was promised employment abroad as a caregiver within three months from payment of a placement fee of PhP 40,000 and submission of the required documents. Mago paid the total placement fee and submitted the required documents. However, the promised overseas employment remained unfulfilled.⁹

For PhP 40,000, Omictin undertook to send private complainant Anthony Ambrosio overseas for employment within three to four months. Ambrosio was only able to pay the amount of PhP 16,000. The promised employment never materialized.¹⁰

On March 8, 2004, all four private complainants filed complaints against Omictin with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa. Before Joffrey Dela Merced, the Supervising Agent of the Bureau’s Counter-Intelligence Division, Mago related that, the previous day, he was able to contact Omictin, who required him to pay an additional PhP 60,000 for his deployment abroad. The designated place for the payment was McDonald’s Restaurant at the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue. Thus, the NBI prepared an entrapment operation to arrest Omictin and provided Mago with PhP 60,000 marked money.¹¹

On March 9, 2004, the entrapment operation was set in motion. After receiving the marked money, Omictin was arrested by the accompanying NBI agents.¹²

As a result, separate informations were filed before the Quezon City RTC charging Omictin with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-04-125442 to 45. The informations read:

Crim. Case No. Q-04-125442

That on or about the 9th day of March 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously for a fee, enlist, recruit, and promise overseas employment to the following persons, to wit: PRIMO ARVIN S. GUEVARRA, ANTHONY P. AMBROSIO, ROY FERNANDEZ MAGNO and VERONICA G. CAPONPON, without first securing the required license from the Department of Labor and Employment, in violation of said law.

That the above-described crime is committed in large scale, as the same was perpetrated against four (4) persons individually or as a group as penalized under Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995.

Crim. Case Nos. Q-04-125443-45

That on or about the period comprised from January to March 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud [Roy Fernandez Magno, Anthony P. Ambrosio, Primo Arvin S. Guevarra, respectively] in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which she made to said complainant[s] to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ the said complainant[s] in U.K. London as caregiver[s] and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said [complainants] to give and deliver, as in fact, gave and delivered to said accused the amount[s] of [PhP 40,000, PhP 16,000, PhP 40,000, respectively] x x x, on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made to solely [obtain], as in fact she did obtain the amount[s] of [PhP 40,000, PhP 16,000, PhP 40,000, respectively], which amount[s] once in possession, with intent to defraud [said complainants] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said [complainants] in the aforesaid amount[s] of [PhP 40,000, PhP 16,000, PhP 40,000, respectively] x x x.¹³

During trial, Omictin gave the following version of the facts: She claimed that she was merely asked by the private complainants to help them in the processing of their visas for the United Kingdom and other papers for possible employment in London. They agreed in their preliminary meeting to pay her PhP 40,000 each for the processing fees. A week after, she averred that Dotimas issued a check for PhP 106,000 as the initial payment for the processing fees of all four private complainants. Then, on January 31, 2004, Mago and Guevarra paid her their respective balances for the processing fees, but both later backed out from the placement agreement. She thus promised Mago and Guevarra that they would be reimbursed. On March 9, 2004, she met with Mago at McDonald’s Restaurant at the corner of EDSA and Quezon Ave. to discuss the possibility of changing his United Kingdom visa application to a United States visa application. For such purpose, she asked from Mago the amount of PhP 60,000. After Mago paid her the money, she was arrested by the NBI agents.¹⁴

On May 3, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Omictin guilty as charged, the dispositive portion reading:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 04-125442, the Court finds accused MARY LOU OMICTIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE defined and penalized in Section 6 in relation to Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, and sentences her to life imprisonment and a fine of One Million Pesos.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 04-125443, the Court finds accused MARY LOU OMICTIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of ESTAFA, defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Roy Fernandez Mago in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 04-125444, the Court finds accused MARY LOU OMICTIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of estafa defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven days of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Anthony Ambrosio in the amount of Sixteen Thousand (P16,000.00) Pesos.

(4) In Criminal Case No. 04-125445, the Court finds accused MARY LOU OMICTIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of ESTAFA, defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Arvin Guevarra in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.¹⁵

Aggrieved, Omictin appealed¹⁶ to the CA, raising in her Brief for the Accused-Appellant,¹⁷ the following issues:

(1) Primo Guevarra was not the one who paid the accused, but Elisa Dotenes,¹⁸ who issued a check in favor of accused-appellant in behalf of Guevarra. Thus, without the supporting testimony of Dotenes who was not presented by the prosecution, Guevarra’s testimony is unsubstantiated and hearsay;¹⁹ and

(2) As to private complainant Ambrosio, there was no receipt presented to show payment to accused-appellant, rendering his testimony uncorroborated and self-serving.²⁰

Eventually, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in light of the [foregoing] disquisitions, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-04-125442, Q-04-125443, Q-04-125444, and Q-04-125445, finding appellant Mary Lou Omictin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.²¹

Hence, we have this appeal.

Through a Manifestation (In lieu of Supplemental Brief)²² dated October 12, 2009, Omictin repleads and adopts all the defenses and arguments raised in her Brief for the Accused-Appellant²³ dated January 22, 2008.

The Ruling of the Court

The appeal is without merit.

An examination of the issues raised by Omictin in her Brief would readily reveal that the same are all factual issues. Subject to well-defined exceptions, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not delve once more into the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. The Court, in Dueñas v. Guce-Africa,²⁴ has articulated the rule as follows:

We will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals especially where, as in this case, such findings coincide with those of the trial court, since we are not a trier of facts. The established rule is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the RTC are conclusive and binding on us. We are not wont to review them, save under exceptional circumstances as: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (7) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Emphasis supplied.)

None of the foregoing exceptions is present in the instant case. We thus perceive no reason to disturb the findings of fact and conclusions of law arrived at by the courts a quo.

Omictin, however, maintains that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain facts, which, if considered, would lead to her acquittal. Omictin asserts in her brief the following:

The testimony of Primo Guevarra undoubtedly shows that he was not the one who paid the accused-appellant. His testimony, to the effect that the check, issued by a certain Elisa Dotenes, was paid by the bank, clearly falls within the rules proscribing the admission of hearsay evidence.1awph!1 It bears stressing that the failure of the prosecution to present Elisa Dotenes renders the testimony of witness Guevarra as unsubstantiated and hearsay.

Another prosecution witness, Mr. Anthony Ambrosio, testified that he gave the accused-appellant the amount of sixteen thousand (16,000.00) pesos, representing initial payment in consideration of the work abroad. It is borne on record however, that Anthony’s testimony was unsubstantiated by any proof that he made such payment, i.e., receipts.

A perusal of the records will show that Anthony’s testimony that he was divested of said amount, through the misrepresentation of the accused-appellant, amounts to nothing but a mere uncorroborated and self-serving allegation.

Surely, mere allegation, without proof, is not enough to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

It is submitted that the trial court should have first considered these testimonies before rendering a judgment of conviction.²⁵

These contentions are erroneous.

First, the testimony of Ambrosio cannot be considered as self-serving evidence. The phrase "self-serving evidence" is a concept which has a well-defined judicial meaning. Hernandez v. Court of Appeals²⁶ clarified what self-serving evidence is and what it is not, thus:

The common objection known as "self-serving" is not correct because almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is "hearsay" (Wenke, Making and Meeting Objections, 69).

Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a party’s testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]).

Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party’s testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for cross-examination.

This principle was reiterated in the more recent People v. Villarama,²⁷ where the Court ruled, "x x x [A] self-serving declaration is one that is made by a party, out of court and in his favor. It does not include the testimony he gives as a witness in court." Assayed against the foregoing standards, Ambrosio’s testimony is not self-serving and is admissible in evidence.

We can hypothetically assume, as a second consideration, that the testimonies of Guevarra and Ambrosio are unsubstantiated and self-serving. Still, the unsubstantiated and self-serving nature of said testimonies would not carry the day for Omictin, since she admitted, during trial, the substance of their testimonies. Omictin testified thus before the RTC:

Q So how much did each of the four complainants paid (sic) you for the processing of their visa?
A Arvin [Guevarra] and Roy [Mago], P40,000.00 each.
Q How about this Anthony Ambrosio?
A P16,000.00²⁸

Through her testimony, Omictin admitted and established the fact that she was paid by Guevarra the amount of PhP 40,000 and Ambrosio the amount of PhP 16,000.

In all, we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings and core disposition of the CA, confirmatory of that of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the November 25, 2009 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02793 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ Rollo pp. 2-32. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.

² CA rollo, pp. 14-18.
³ Rollo, p. 7.

⁴ Also referred to by accused-appellant Omictin as "Dotenes" in her pleadings.

⁵ Rollo, p. 8.
⁶ Id. at 8-9.
⁷ Id. at 9.
⁸ Id. at 9-10.
⁹ Id. at 10.
¹⁰ Id. at 12.
¹¹ Id. at 11.
¹² Id. at 11-12.
¹³ Id. at 4-7.
¹⁴ Id. at 13-14.
¹⁵ CA rollo, pp. 60-61.
¹⁶ Id. at 64.
¹⁷ Id. at 80-94.
¹⁸ Referred to as "Dotimas" by the courts a quo.
¹⁹ CA rollo, pp. 90-91.
²⁰ Id. at 91.
²¹ Rollo, pp. 30-31.
²² Id. at 46-48.
²³ Id. at 46-47.
²⁴ G.R. No. 165679, October 5, 2009, 603 SCRA 11, 20-21.
²⁵ CA rollo, pp. 91-92.
²⁶ G.R. No. 104874, December 14, 1993, 228 SCRA 429, 436.
²⁷ G.R. No. 139211, February 12, 2003, 397 SCRA 306, 319.
²⁸ CA rollo, p. 116.

Granting there is such doubt, Janice's statement, nevertheless, is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule for being part of res gestae. In order for a statement to be considered part of res gestae, the following elements must concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.13 All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bench. First, the stabbing incident constituted the startling occurrence. Second, Janice never had the opportunity to fabricate a statement implicating Calinawan because she immediately identified him as her attacker when Jonathan saw her shortly after the assault took place. Lastly, the statement of Janice concerned the circumstances surrounding her stabbing. Thus, Calinawan's denial and alibi have no leg to stand. They are inherently weak as defenses, especially when faced with the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses identifying the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.14

February 13, 2017

G.R. No. 226145

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
ROMEO D. CALINA WAN a.k.a "MEO", Accused-Appellants

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the January 30, 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04593, which affirmed the July 21, 2010 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2007-0672-D, convicting accused-appellant Romeo D. Calinawan a.k.a "Meo" (Calinawan) of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

In an Information, dated October 24, 2007, Calinawan was charged with murder for killing Janice Nevado Silan (Janice). During his arraignment, he entered a plea of "Not Guilty." After the pre-trial was terminated, trial ensued.3

The Version of the Prosecution

At around midnight on September 26, 2007, Marigor Silan (Marigor), Janice's seven (7)-year old daughter, saw Calinawan stabbing her mother in their kitchen. Thereafter, Calinawan quickly fled the scene. Meanwhile, Jonathan Nevado (Jonathan), Janice's brother and neighbor, was awakened by shouts coming from his sister's house. He rushed to her house and saw her children crying. After bringing her children to his house, he went looking for Janice whom he saw outside a neighbor's house pleading for help. Seeing her bloodied, he carried her and asked her who stabbed her, and she answered it was Calinawan who did it. Then, Jonathan brought Janice to the hospital. When Darwin Silan, Janice's husband, arrived at the hospital, he also asked her who stabbed her and she reiterated that it was Calinawan. After three (3) days, Janice died in spite of the medical treatment at the hospital.4

The Version of the Defense

On September 26, 2007, Calinawan went to his mother's house in Cablong, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, and arrived there at around 7:30 o'clock in the evening. From 8:00 o'clock to 9:00 o' clock in the evening, he was drinking with his older brother. At around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day, Calinawan was awakened by police officers asking him about the killing of Janice. He replied that he knew nothing about it, but he was still invited by the police to go with them. At the police station, Calinawan was asked if he had with him the dress worn by Janice which .was soaked in blood. He presented the dress to the police but it had no bloodstain. Thereafter, he was released by the police and he went directly to his mother's house.5

The RTC Ruling

In its May 14, 2012 decision, the RTC convicted Calinawan for murder. The trial court noted that Marigor positively and categorically identified him as the one who stabbed her mother. It noted that she was able to identify him because of his amputated fingers. In addition, the trial court pointed out that the dying declaration of Janice to Jonathan corroborated Marigor's statement that Calinawan killed her mother. The RTC stated that his positive identification trumped his denial and alibi, which were considered as inherently weak defenses.6

Further, the trial court found that the killing of Janice was attended by treachery. It stressed that the killing was carried out during nighttime when Janice was defenseless. Thus, the RTC concluded that given the circumstances surrounding the stabbing, Calinawan consciously adopted the method and form of attack to insure its execution. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Romeo Calinawan @ Meo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and pursuant to law, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to indemnify the legal heirs of the victim, ₱50,000.00 as actual damages, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.7

Aggrieved, Calinawan appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its January 30, 2015 Decision, the CA sustained Calinawan's conviction but modified the award of damages. The appellate court agreed that the killing was attended with treachery. It noted that Calinawan was a frequent visitor of Janice; and that he took advantage of his knowledge that her husband was working at night and that she was only accompanied by her children. The CA was of the view that the sudden and unexpected attack against an unarmed victim constituted treachery.8

Moreover, the CA stated that Calinawan's denial and alibi could not prosper in light of the positive identification by the witness. It pointed out that Marigor's identification of him, despite his hooded jacket, was sufficient because she identified him on the basis of his physical deformity. The CA observed that he was the neighbor of the victim for a long time and so, Marigor was familiar with the farmer's physique - particularly his amputated fingers. It added that the dying declaration of Janice corroborated Marigor's identification of Calinawan. Thus, it disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, in Criminal Case No. 2007-0672-D, finding accused-appellant Romeo Calinawan @ "Meo" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Romeo Calinawan @ "Meo" is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the amounts of ₱75,ooo.oo as civil indemnity for death, ₱75,ooo.oo for moral damages and ₱30,ooo.oo for exemplary damages as well as interest on all these damages assessed at the legal rate of 6% from date of finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.9

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES

I

WHETHER CALINAWAN WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS THE ASSAILANT.

II

WHETHER THE KILLING OF JANICE WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY.

Calinawan argues that Marigor's identification of him was unreliable because she admitted she never saw the face of her assailant as it was covered by a black hood and that she closed her eyes during the commotion. He claims that treachery was not established and that the trial court merely made a general assumption that the victim was defenseless because it was night time. He insists that there was no evidence to show that he consciously and deliberately adopted the means, method or form of attack.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds that Calinawan is criminally liable for the killing of Janice.

The defense of Denial and Alibi fails in light of Positive Identification

Calinawan challenges Marigor's identification of him on the basis of her statement that she never saw the face of the assailant because the latter was wearing a hooded jacket. He fails to persuade.

In People v. Caliso, 10 the Court explained that in criminal prosecution, the identity of the accused must be established with moral certainty, but this did not necessarily require that the witness must have seen the face of the accused. Thus it ruled:

xxx In every criminal prosecution, no less than moral certainty is required in establishing the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. xxx The test to determine the moral certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.11 [Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, it suffices that the witness recognized the accused through identifying marks which would make the latter unmistakeably stand out from other individuals. In the case at bench, Marigor's family and Calinawan had been neighbors for a long time. Hence, she was very familiar with the latter's unique physical characteristics, particularly his amputated fingers. Through this distinct physical feature of Calinawan, Marigor was able to identify him in open court as the one who stabbed her mother. Thus, her identification of him was credible, even if she was not able to clearly see his face, but saw the notable feature of his hand, which set him apart from others.

Dying Declaration; Rule on Res Gestae

Marigor's positive identification was further bolstered by the statement of Janice to Jonathan that it was Calinawan who stabbed her.

The courts a quo considered the said statement as an admissible dying declaration. For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay rule, the following conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim.12

In this case, the Court notes that in her affidavit, Janice said that she thought she could survive the attack. She never thought that she was dying. In fact, she was optimistic of her recovery. In view of this, there seems to be a doubt whether she was aware of her impending death.

Granting there is such doubt, Janice's statement, nevertheless, is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule for being part of res gestae. In order for a statement to be considered part of res gestae, the following elements must concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.13 All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bench.

First, the stabbing incident constituted the startling occurrence. Second, Janice never had the opportunity to fabricate a statement implicating Calinawan because she immediately identified him as her attacker when Jonathan saw her shortly after the assault took place. Lastly, the statement of Janice concerned the circumstances surrounding her stabbing.

Thus, Calinawan's denial and alibi have no leg to stand. They are inherently weak as defenses, especially when faced with the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses identifying the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.14

Killing is Homicide only if Not Attended by Qualifying Circumstances

The courts a quo convicted Calinawan of murder because they were of the view that the killing was qualified by treachery considering that the attack on Janice was so sudden that it rendered her defenseless.

"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."15

The following elements must be established before the existence of treachery may be appreciated: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.16 The suddenness or unexpectedness alone, however, of the attack is insufficient to support the finding of treachery.17

In People v. Silva, 18 the Court ruled that treachery could not be presumed and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself, to wit:

The trial court reasoned that the killing was attended by treachery because the suddenness of the attack caught Leo offguard thus preventing him from putting up any defense. We ruled in a litany of cases that treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. The same degree of proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required before treachery may be considered either as an aggravating or qualifying circumstance. Further, treachery must be based on some positive conclusive proof and not only upon hypothetical facts or on mere suppositions or presumptions.

The trial court erred when it presumed that the killing was qualified by treachery although the record shows that the witness did not see the commencement of the assault. xxx

xxx

In her earlier testimony, Estelita explained that it was the first shot that prompted her to turn her head and it was only then that she saw Gerry Silva pointing his gun at her son who was already bloodied. These statements are fraught with possibilities.

Nagging doubts would crop up as to how the three (3) assailants started the assault considering that there was an interval of time from the moment Estelita's back was towards Leo until she heard the first shot. Before that she did not notice the presence of accused-appellants. One can argue that between the time when Estelita's back was turned from the victim after she had taken about two (2) steps away and the first shot, there was a lapse of more or less four (4) seconds. No other logical conclusion then could be drawn but that the attack was sudden and unexpected. But this is not that simple. Where all indicia tend to support the conclusion that the attack was sudden and unexpected but there are no precise data on this point, treachery cannot be taken into account. It can in no way be established from mere suppositions, drawn from the circumstances prior to the moment of the aggression, that the accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.19 [Emphases supplied]

In short, the evidence of the prosecution must be able to present the whole scenario to establish to exact manner of the killing, for treachery to be appreciated. In the case at bench, it was only Marigor who witnessed Calinawan stabbing her mother. Her testimony is as follows:

On direct examination

Prosecutor Catungal

Q: Why do you say that your mother is already in heaven?

Witness

A: She is already dead, sir.

Q: You mean your mother is already dead, do you know why she died?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If yes, will tell the Hon. Court why she died?

A: She was stabbed, sir.

xxx

Q: Can you still recall the time whether it is day time or night when the incident took place?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you please tell the Hon. Court if it is day time or night time?

A: It is night time, sir.

Q: You said that your mother was stabbed, where did you see your mother when she was stabbed?

A: In the kitchen, sir.

Q: When you said you saw your mother was stabbed in the kitchen was she alone or had someone?

A: She has companion, sir.

Q: Who is this person with her?

A: It was Meo, sir.

Q: You mean Meo again?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you actually see how Meo stab your mother?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You said that you saw your mother and Meo in the kitchen, and you said you saw Meo stabbed your mother, was the kitchen room with light?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: After you saw Meo stabbed your mother, what did Meo do next, if any?

A: He ran away, sir.

xxx

On cross examination

Atty. Carpizo

Q: You said earlier Marigor that you saw Meo and your mother in the kitchen on September 26, 2007 in the midnight of said date?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What were they doing at that time?

A: My mother was stabbed, sir.20 [Emphases supplied]

Other than Marigor's first-hand account, no other witness actually saw the stabbing incident. Obviously, her narration of the events that unfolded was crucial in determining how the killing was perpetrated because she was the only one who actually saw its execution. Her testimony, however, was lacking in details; thus, it is insufficient to conclude that the killing was attended with treachery.

Absent clear and convincing evidence on how the attack was perpetrated, the conclusion that there was treachery is nothing more but an assumption.1âwphi1 It is unfortunate that the particular means, manner or method of attack was never clearly illustrated in her testimony leaving the evidence for murder wanting.

Under Article 24921 of the RPC, the crime of homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. Calinawan's prison sentence shall then be subject to the rules provided in the Indeterminate Sentence Law.22 Thus, the maximum term should be that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC.

Here, no aggravating or mitigating circumstance can be appreciated. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty prescribed by law shall be imposed in its medium period.23

The aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be factored in because there was no showing that Calinawan especially sought the same or took advantage of it, or that it had facilitated the commission of the crime by insuring his immunity from identification or capture.24 It is noteworthy that the attack occurred in the kitchen of the house of Janice, which was sufficiently lighted, enabling Marigor to identify him as the assailant. Therefore, the sentence should be within the range of prision mayor, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.

Also, to conform with the prevailing jurisprudence,25 the award of civil indemnity and moral damages should be decreased from ₱75,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. Absent any aggravating circumstance, the award of exemplary damages should be removed. The award of temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 is also in order.

WHEREFORE, the January 30, 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04593 is hereby MODIFIED, in that, accused-appellant Romeo D. Calinawan a.k.a Meo is found guilty of Homicide and sentenced 1] to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Eleven (11) Years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and 2] to pay the heirs of Janice Nevado Silan the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 2416-M dated January 4, 2017.

1 Rollo, pp. 2-16. Penned by Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Mario V. Lopez, concurring.

2 CA rollo, 57-67. Penned by Judge Emma M. Torio.
3 Id. at 57.
4 Rollo, pp. 3-4.
5 CA rollo, pp. 14-15.
6 Id. at 16-21.
7 Id. at 23.
8 Rollo. pp. 8-9.
9 Id.at 15-16.
10 675 Phil. 742 (2011).
11 Id. at 756.
12 People v. Palanas, G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015, 759 SCRA 318, 319.
13 People v. Outing, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015.
13 People v. Lastrollo, G.R. No. 212631, November 7, 2016.
14 Id.
15 Article 14(16) of the RPC.
16 Rustia v. People, G.R. No. 208351, October 5, 2016.
17 People v. Vilbar, 680 Phil.767, 785 (2012).
18 372 Phil. 1267 (1999).
19 Id. at 1276.
20 TSN, dated November 19, 2008, pp 2-8.

21 Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

22 Act No. 4103, as amended.
23 Article 64(1) of the RPC.
24 People v. Cortes, 413 Phil. 386, 392 (2001).
25 People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.