INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
RUFO AVILES and JOSEPHINE AVILES, respondents.
Balane, Barican, Cruz, Alampay Law Office for petitioner.
Francisco G. Mendoza private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
This
case hinges on the proper interpretation and application of the rules
on the admissibility of documentary evidence and the viability. of a
civil action for damages arising from the same acts imputed to the
defendant in a criminal action where he has been acquitted.
In the
information filed against Rufo and Josephine Aviles, the private
respondents herein, it was alleged that being then sub-agents of
Interpacific Transit, Inc. and as such enjoying its trust and
confidence, they collected from its various clients payments for airway
bills in the amount of P204,030.66 which, instead of remitting it to
their principal, they unlawfully converted to their own personal use and
benefit. 1
At the
trial, the prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills
supposedly received by the accused for which they had not rendered
proper accounting. This was done in, the course of the direct
examination of one of the prosecution witnesses. 2
The defense objected to their presentation, invoking the best evidence
rule. The prosecution said it would submit the original airway bills in
due time. Upon such undertaking, the trial court allowed the marking of
the said documents a s Exhibits "B" to "OO." The e prosecution n did
submit the original airway bills nor did it prove their loss to justify
their substitution with secondary evidence. Nevertheless, when the
certified photocopies of the said bills formally were offered, 3 in evidence, the defense interposed no objection.
In
acquitting the accused, Judge Herminio I. Benito of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati rejected the agency theory of the prosecution and held
that the relationship between the petitioner and Rufo Aviles was that of
creditor and debtor only. "Under such relationship,' it declared, "the
outstanding account, if any, of the accused in favor of ITI would be in
the nature of an indebtedness, the non- payment of which does not
Constitute estafa." 4
The court' also held that the certified photocopies
of the airway by were not admissible under the rule that "there can be
no evidence of a writing the content of which is the subject of inquiry
other' than the writing itself." Loss of the originals had not been
proved to justify the exception to the rule as one of the prosecution
witness had testified that they were still in the ITI bodega. Neither
had it been shown that the originals had been "recorded in an existing
record a certified copy of which is made evidence by law."
In its
order denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court declared
that it "had resolved the issue of whether the accused has civil
obligation to ITI on the basis of the admissibility in evidence of the
xerox copies of the airway bills." 5
Right or wrong, the acquittal on the merits of the
accused can no longer be the subject of an appeal under the double
jeopardy rule. However, the petitioner seeks to press the civil
liability of the private respondents, on the ground that the dismissal
of the criminal action did not abate the civil claim for the recovery of
the amount. More to the point, ITI argues that the evidence of the
airways bills should not have been rejected and that it had sufficiently
established the indebtedness of the private respondents to it.
The Court of Appeals 6
affirmed, the decision of the trial court in toto, adding that the
existing record spoken of in Section 2 (e) and (d) of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court must be in the custody, of a public officer only. It also
declared that:
Since
no evidence of civil liability was presented, no necessity existed on
the part of the private respondents to present evidence of payment of an
obligation which was not shown to exist.
The
petitioner now asks this Court to annul that judgment as contrary to law
and the facts established at the As in the courts below, it is
insisting on the admissibility of its evidence to prove the civil
liability of the private respondents.
We agree with the petitioner. The certified photocopies of the airway bills should have been considered.
In assessing this evidence, the lower courts confined
themselves to the best evidence rule and the nature of the documents
being presented, which they held did not come under any of the
exceptions to the rule. There is no question that the photocopies were
secondary evidence and as such were not admissible unless there was
ample proof of the loss of the originals; and neither were the other
exceptions allowed by the Rules applicable. The trouble is that in
rejecting these copies under Rule 130, Section 2, the respondent court
disregarded an equally important principle long observed in our trial
courts and amply supported by jurisprudence.
This is the rule that objection to documentary
evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered. as an exhibit
and not before. Objection prior to that time is premature.
It is instructive at this paint to make a distinction
between Identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as
an exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence an an exhibit. The second is
done only when the party rests its case and not before. The mere fact
that a particular document is Identified and marked as an exhibit does
not mean it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the
party. The party may decide to formally offer it if it believes this
will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at
all. In the latter event, the trial court is, under Rule 132, Section
35, not authorized to consider it.
Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at
the time it is formally offered, not earlier. The Identification of the
document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the
formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it.
Objection to the Identification and marking of the document is not
equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in
evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the
time it is formally offered as an exhibit.
In the case
at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the
private respondents as secondary evidence only when they, were being
Identified for marking by the prosecution. They were nevertheless marked
as exhibits upon the promise that the original airway bills would be
submitted later. it is true that the originals were never produced. Yet,
notwithstanding this omission, the defense did not object when the
exhibits as previously marked were formally offered in evidence. And
these were subsequently admitted by the trial court. 7
In People v. Teodoro, 8
a document being Identified by a prosecution witness was objected to as
merely secondary, whereupon the trial judge ordered the testimony
stricken out. This Court, in holding the objection to be premature,
said:
It
must be noted that the Fiscal was only Identifying the official records
of service of the defendant preparatory to introducing them as
evidence. ... The time for the presentation of the records had not yet
come; presentation was to be made after their Identification. For what
purpose and to what end the Fiscal would introduce them as evidence was
not yet stated or disclosed. ... The objection of counsel for the
defendant was, therefore, premature, especially as the Fiscal had not
yet stated for what purpose he would introduce the said records. ...
The time for objecting the evidence is when the same is offered. (Emphasis supplied).
The
objection of the defense to the photocopies of the airway bins while
they were being Identified and marked as exhibits did not constitute the
objection it should have made when the exhibits were formally offered
in evidence by the prosecution. No valid and timely objection was made
at that time. And it is no argument to say that the earlier objection
should be considered a continuing objection under Sec. 37 of Rule 132,
for that provision obviously refers to a single objection to a class of
evidence (testimonial or documentary) which when first offered is
considered to encompass the rest of the evidence. The presumption is, of
course, that there was an offer and a seasonable objection thereto.
But, to repeat, no objection was really made in the case before us
because it was not made at the proper time.
It would have been so simple for the defense to
reiterate its former objection, this time seasonably, when the formal
offer of exhibits was made. It is curious that it did not, especially so
since the objections to the formal offer of exhibits was made in
writing. In fact, the defense filed no objection at all not only to the
photocopies but to all the other exhibits of the prosecution.
The effect
of such omission is obvious. The rule is that evidence not objected to
is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in
arriving at its judgment. 9
This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and
would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper
time.
The
records certainly would have been the, beet proof of such former
conviction. The certificate was not the best proof. There seems to be no
justification for the presentation of proof of a character. ... Under
an objection upon the ground that the said certificate was not the best
proof, it should have been rejected. Once admitted, however, without
objection, even though not admissible under an objection, we are not
inclined now to reject it. If the defendant had opportunely presented an
objection to the admissibility of said certificate, no doubt the
prosecution would have presented the best proof upon the questions to
which said certificate relates. 10
(It)
is universally accepted that when secondary or incompetent evidence is
presented and accepted without any objection on the part of the other
party, the latter is bound thereby and the court is obliged to grant it
the probatory value it deserves. 11
We hold
therefore that it was erroneous for the lower courts to reject the
photocopies of the airway bills to prove the liability of the private
respondents to the petitioner. While we may agree that there was really
no criminal liability that could attach to them because they had no
fiduciary relationship with ITI, the rejected evidence sufficiently
established their indebtedness to the petitioner. Hence, we must reverse
the ruling below that "on account of the inadmissibility of the
prosecution's Exhibits 'B' and 'OO', coupled with the denial made by the
accused, there appears to be no concrete proof of such accountability."
Accoording to Rule 120, Section 2, of the Rules of Court:
In
case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall
make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the
offended party.
With the
admission of such exhibits pursuant to the ruling above made, we find
that there is concrete proof of the defendant's accountability. More
than this, we also disbelieve the evidence of the private respondents
that the said airway bills had been paid for. The evidence consists only
of check stubs corresponding to payments allegedly made by the accused
to the ITI, and we find this insufficient.
As it is Aviles who has alleged payment, it is for
him to prove that allegation. He did not produce any receipt of such
payment. He said that the cancelled payment checks had been lost and
relied merely on the check stubs, which are self-serving. The
prosecution correctly stressed in its motion for reconsideration that
the accused could have easily secured a certification from the bank that
the checks allegedly issued to ITI had been honored. No such
certification was presented. In short, the private respondents failed to
establish their allegation that payment for the airway bills delivered
to them had been duly remitted to ITI.
In Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 12 we held:
There
appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to
still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case
have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the
accused was acquitted. He was, in fact, exonerated of the charge. The
constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts
on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener
awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a
more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of
applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action
simply because the accused was I acquitted would mean needless clogging
of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its
attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
By the same
token, we find that remand of this case to, the trial court for further
hearings would be a needless waste of time and effort to the prejudice
of the speedy administration of justice. Applying the above ruling, we
hereby declare therefore, on the basis of the evidence submitted at the
trial as reflected in the records before us, that the private
respondents are liable to the petitioner in the sum of P204,030.66,
representing the cost of the airway bills.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered
ORDERING the private respondents to. pay to the petitioner the sum of
P204,030.66, with 6% interest from November 16, 1981, plus the costs of
this suit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco and Medialdea, concur.
Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
2 TSN, May 23, 1984.
3 Original Records, pp. 178-184.
4 Ibid., p. 265
5 Rollo, pp. 67-69.
6 Penned by De pano, Jr., J., with Fule and Torres, JJ., concurring.
7 Original Records, p. 352.
8 98 Phil. 669.
9 Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1; US v. Choa Tong, 22 Phil. 562.
10 US v. Ong Shin, 28 Phil. 242.
11 Hodges v. Sales, et al., 63 Phil. 567.
12 129 SCRA 559.
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