G.R. No. 94570 September 28, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMICIANO PERALTA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The
lifeless body of Rosita Peralta was found in her house in the early
morning of March 2, 1982. Blood trickled from her nostrils and mouth and
there were nail marks and bruises on her chin and neck. She had been
strangled.
After
investigation, particularly of the victim's daughter Siony, an
information for parricide was filed against Rosita's husband, Domiciano
Peralta. He pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment before the Regional
Trial Court of Camarines Sur. The trial that followed was presided by
four judges in succession. 1 Judge Benjamin V. Panga rendered the decision convicting the accused and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and
all accessory penalties. It also made him liable to the victim's heirs
in the amount of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P5,000.00 in moral
damages, and for the costs. 2
The prosecution witnesses were Dr. Wilfredo Galan, the medical officer who performed the autopsy on Rosita Peralta; 3 Atanacia Ramos, her mother; 4 and Judge Juan B. Paaño, Jr., who took Rosita's sworn statement. 5 The defense presented the accused himself 6 and his daughter Siony. 7
Dr. Galan established the cause of death and declared that it occurred at about half past four in the morning of March 2, 1982. 8
Atanacia
testified that at about 4:30 that morning, her granddaughter Siony came
to her house and frantically told her that the accused was strangling
his wife, Rosita. The two rushed to the couple's house and, after
unlocking the door, found Rosita already dead. Domiciano was nowhere in
sight. They immediately reported the matter to the police, who
eventually arrested the appellant as the suspected killer. 9
For
his part, Domiciano claimed that at the supposed time of his wife's
strangulation, he was at his place of work in Maybayawas, Catagbacan,
Goa, Camarines, Sur. He learned of her death at 3:00 o'clock that
afternoon and, later, that he was suspected of her killing. That same
day, he proceeded to the Goa Police Station where he was made to sign a
document, which turned out to be a confession. Disclaiming it at the
trial, he said that he signed it without the assistance of counsel or
full awareness of its contents. 10
Siony,
the daughter, had earlier implicated her father in the sworn statement
she made at the preliminary investigation of the case. 11 She
now appeared to testify on his behalf. She swore on the stand that she
did see someone strangling her mother in the morning in question but
insisted that she could not identify that person. 12 In
effect, she said that the culprit was not her father, thus
contradicting her earlier assertion that she saw him strangling her
mother.
After the
defense had rested, the prosecution presented Judge Paaño as rebuttal
witness. He affirmed the regularity of the preliminary investigation he
conducted and declared that Siony's narration of the strangulation of
her mother by the accused was completely voluntary. 13
After
assessing the evidence (mostly the testimonies of the witnesses as
recorded), Judge Panga opted in favor of the prosecution and rejected
both the appellant's alibi and his daughter's change of stand. The
decision held that Siony's statement at the preliminary investigation
was more credible because it was made shortly after the occurrence of
the killing. Moreover, her narration of the incident jibed with the
detailed medical findings of the injuries sustained by the victim as
indicated in the autopsy report. 14
We
agree with the conclusion of the trial court. There were, in our view,
certain circumstances that way have persuaded the daughter to change her
former declaration and testify in favor of her father.
First, the
appellant was her father after all, and she probably felt that she
should not be responsible for his incarceration for the rest of his
life. Second, her testimony was given seven years after the incident and
therefore could not be expected to be as accurate as the statement she
made in the preliminary investigation only hours after the killing.
Third, during all this time, her father had been under detention and she
must have believed that this was punishment enough for him. Lastly, she
was, at the time she testified in court, living with her father's
sister, 15 who may have greatly influenced her testimony and caused her to recant her earlier statement.
There is another important point. The statement she
made to her grandmother when she rushed to inform her of her father's
attack on her mother was part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This section provides:
Statements
made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae.
So also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae.
Res gestae means the "thing done." As held in People v. Sanchez, 16 it
refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and
there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement.
There are three requisites for the admission of evidence as constituting part of the res gestae, to wit: 1) that the principal act, the res gestae,
is a startling occurrence; 2) that the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) that the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. 17
Siony
rushed to Atanacia immediately upon seeing her father strangling her
mother to death. Her spontaneous declaration to Atanacia was part of the
res gestae and is assumed to preclude the probability of premeditation or fabrication. 18 Since
the utterance was made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination
of the senses rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief
period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully
brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing Siony's real
belief as to the facts just observed by her. 19
Besides,
it is settled that where a witness testified for the prosecution and
retracts his testimony and subsequently testified for the defense, the
test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled
with the application of the general rules of evidence. 20 The well-known rule is that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. 21 In
the case before us, Siony testified during the preliminary examination
conducted by Judge Paaño that the appellant choked her mother to death.
Her subsequent retraction was an afterthought and has no probative value
at all.
The appellant's alibi is flawed, not only by its
inherent weakness but also by its implausibility. There is only a
five-minute walking distance between his place of work and his house,
where the killing occurred. It was not impossible or even difficult for
him to commit the crime and return or go to Maybayawas, assuming he was
really there. Significantly, no one has corroborated his alibi, which is
all the weaker for this deficiency.
There is no
reason to impute improper motives, or even inaccuracy, to Judge Paaño,
who testified to facts relating to the discharge of his official duties.
Credence is generally accorded the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
who are enforcers of the law and are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner. 22
We
also reject the defense theory that Judge Panga could not have
correctly evaluated the testimony of the witnesses because he had not
presided at the trial of the case. While it is true that the trial judge
who did so would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or
falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily
follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a
valid and just decision. He can also rely on the transcribed
stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis for his decision,
which is what Judge Panga did. As we observed in People v. Abaya: 23
.
. . And the mere fact that Judge Alfredo C. Flores did not preside at
the trial of this case in its entirety, having taken over only when the
last defense witness was to be presented, did not detract from the
validity, much less the correctness, of his decision. The full record
was available to him. It is evident from the knowledgeable and
analytical decision he has written that he thoroughly examined the
testimonial and documentary evidence before him and carefully assessed
the credibility of the witnesses with the seasoned perceptiveness he has
developed as a trial judge.
There
is no need to rule on the appellant's extrajudicial confession as it
was not submitted in evidence by the prosecution. Evidence not formally
offered or whose purpose has not been specified is not supposed to be
considered by the court. 24 In
any event, the confession was not necessary to prove the appellant's
guilty beyond the shadow of a doubt as this has been established by the
evidence of the prosecution.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
cannot be appreciated in this case because the appellant went to the
police station not to give himself up but to verify the charge filed
against him. Neither can the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength be considered because only of the fact that the
husband was stronger than the wife, which is usually the situation
between a man and a woman. There is no evidence of the gross physical
disparity between the appellant and his victim. Moreover, the appellant
was unarmed and it has not been shown that he sought the aid of other
persons or employed any other physical advantage to enable him to kill
his wife.
Domiciano Peralta admitted at the trial that Rosita was his lawful wife. 25 Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code provides that any person who shall kill
his father, mother or child, whether or illegitimate or any of his
ascendants or descendants or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide
and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances in this
case, the lesser penalty shall be imposed, conformably to Article 63 of
the said Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
trial court is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the civil indemnity
is hereby increased to P50,000.00, in accordance with present policy.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
2 Rollo, pp. 16-22.
3 TSN, June 21, 1983.
4 Ibid., August 17, 1983.
5 Id., April 7, 1987.
6 id., February 27, 1985.
7 id., January 6, 1987.
8 id., June 21, 1983, p. 8; Exh. "A."
9 id., August 17, 1983, pp. 7-13.
10 id., February 27, 1985, pp. 2-8.
11 Exh. "B."
12 TSN, January 6, 1987, pp. 5-7.
13 Ibid., April 7, 1987, pp. 3-10.
14 Exh. "A."
15 TSN, January 6, 1987, p. 20.
16 213 SCRA 70.
17 People vs. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70.
18 Ibid.
19 Id.
20 People vs. Mindae, 216 SCRA 572.
21. People vs. Logronio, 214 SCRA 519; People vs. del Pilar, 188 SCRA 37; People vs. Domenden, 6 SCRA 343.
22 People vs. Pacleb, 217 SCRA 92.
23 185 SCRA 424.
24 Section 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court.
25 TSN, July 1, 1986, p. 3.
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