harayo

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA

FACTS:
A civil case was filed by Lamberto Chua against Lilibeth Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia), daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga(hereafter Jacinto), for "Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages.

Respondent alleged that he and the deceased Jacinto have entered into a partnership made orally for the distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). Upon the death of Jacinto, his wife and daughter took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite without respondent's consent.
Respondent resorted to the introduction of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership.
Petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule.

ISSUE

Applicability of dead man statute

RULING:
We are not persuaded. Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:
"SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."
Before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

 People of the Philippines vs Lazarte
Facts
On October 14,1986 an information for murder of one Nonito Jambunganan y Hundana against Antonio Lazarte, Ricardo Ignacio , Rodolfo Mundido and Eliseo Henares who are also known for their nicknames " Tony, Ric, Su-ay/Suway, and Junior" accordingly , of which are the names mentioned by the deceased when asked by Lorenzo Lara prior to the victim's death as to who stabbed him,and on the sole account of the deductions or conclusion of Lara upon the former's dying declaration, hence it was filed.

Only Lazarte and Ignacio were apprehended, the latter was acquitted for demurer of evidence. The other two remain at large.

The defendant denied knowing the deceased and contended that on the night of the event he was at home taking care of his sick child while his wife was on a night shift duty which was affirmed by the latter. His testimony was corroborated by one Teodora Damanhog, a faith healer who was asked by the defendant to cure his child, and stayed at the defendant's home until one o'clock dawn. The same was corroborated with the testimony of Fortunata Abe and her daughter, that on or about 11:45 in the evening of October 8, 1986 while on their way home they witnessed a person being stabbed several times by Miguel, in addition to Fortunata's testimony, Reynaldo de Paz also testified that in between 11 to 12 in the evening of the same date,he saw from afar at about 10 meters that a certain Miguel was stabbing a person 3 times.

Noberto Lazarte, the brother of of the defendant also testified that on that night almost of the the same time Miguel knocked at the door, sought for his permission to sleep with the accompaniment of the following statement "nakadisgrasya ako."

The regional court of pasig metro manila was not convinced of the testimonies of the witnesses presented of the defense. Hence the case was elevated on appeal.

Issue

The weight given to the dying declaration vs the alibi and the testimonies of the witnesses of the defense.

Ruling

The court ruled in favor of the accused-reversed the decision of the trial court-hence the accused-appellant was acquitted.

The court cited that, the inadmissibility of a hearsay evidence admits certain exceptions, wherein in the case at bar, the trial court relied its judgment solely on the the dying declaration of the deceased which was testified by Lorenzo Lara. Such exception is deemed admissible provided that it is attended with the requisites as provided on Section 37 of Rule 130.

In this case the prosecution failed to established that the victim was conscious of his imminent death while relaying the statement to Lara. Consciousness of the declarant of an impending death is essential, regardless of the fact that death supervenes, hence his ante mortem statement does not constitute a dying declaration.

The court further stated that courts should not only determine the admissibility of the evidence but also to appreciate the weight of the oral dying declaration without prejudice to the evidence that the defense will present. No other evidences were presented other than the dying declaration. The state should rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.