The Facts:
Adriano and Wenifreda (Tambuyat), married since 1965, owned several
properties, among them a parcel of lot bought by Adriano. The deed of
sale was signed by Adriano as vendee, while Rosario (Baguis) signed as
one of the witnesses. When the title to the lot was issued (TCT No.
T-145321(M), however, it was registered in the name of “ADRIANO TAMBUYAT
married to ROSARIO E. BAGUIS”. When Adriano died intestate in 1998,
Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of TCT T-145321, alleging
that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano; TCT T-145321 was
erroneously registered; that Rosario is married to one Eduardo Nolasco;
and the registration was a result of the insidious machination of
Rosario with the assistance of the broker. She prayed that TCT T-145321
be cancelled and a new one issued indicating her as the spouse married
to Adriano. Opposing, Rosario denied that the property was acquired by
the spouses Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage; that it was she
who bought it using her personal funds; she and Adriano were married on
September 2, 1988 and lived together as husband and wife, producing a
son named Adrian; that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
proceeding as it is merely a summary proceeding and a thorough
determination will have to be made if the property is conjugal or
personal.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favour of Wenifreda. It
ordered the cancellation of TCT T-145321 and issuance of a new one
indicating Wenifreda as married to Adriano, as well as the payment of
damages in her favour. It ruled that Section 1081 of
PD 1529 required court authorisation for any alteration or amendment if
any mistake, error or omission was made in entering a certificate of
title. It was proved that Wenifreda is the surviving spouse of Adriano;
that Rosario had a prior subsisting marriage to Nolasco, and TCT No.
T-145321 was issued with her erroneously indicated as Adriano’s spouse.
Adrian’s filiation may not be proved in a land registration case.
On appeal to the CA, the later ruled that a separate and different
proceeding is not necessary to resolve her opposition to the petition in
the case as she in effect acquiesced and freely submitted her issues to
the court to prove her allegations; the distinction between the trial
court sitting as a land registration court and as a general court had
been eliminated by PD 1529; Adriano and Rosario were not co-owners of
the property as both of them had prior subsisting marriages at the time
of their adulterous relations; Adriano alone was the vendee in the deed
of sale and no evidence was proved that Rosario contributed to the
purchase of the property.
Rosario elevated her case to the Supreme Court. She argues that the
case is essentially a partition of Adriano’s estate which deprives her
and her son of their share; Section 108 cannot apply to the case as
there were contentious issues which need to be resolved by a court of
general jurisdiction; based on the evidence, she acquired the property
using her own funds.
The Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in allowing the cancellation of TCT
T-143521 to indicate Wenifreda as the surviving spouse of Adriano.
The Court’s ruling:
The Court denies the Petition.
The trial court in LRC Case No. P-443-99 was not precluded from
resolving the objections raised by Banguis in her opposition to the
petition for cancellation; a separate action need not be filed in a
different court exercising general jurisdiction. Banguis should be
considered to have acquiesced and freely submitted the case to the trial
court for complete determination on her opposition, when she went to
trial and adduced and submitted all her relevant evidence to the court.
“The active participation of the party against whom the action was
brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the
court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount
to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning
the court or body’s jurisdiction.”2
Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure,
alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to in
seven instances: (1) when registered interests of any description,
whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and
ceased; (2) when new interests have arisen or been created which do not
appear upon the certificate; (3) when any error, omission or mistake was
made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any
duplicate certificate; (4) when the name of any person on the
certificate has been changed; (5) when the registered owner has been
married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and
no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected;
(6) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been
dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its
dissolution; and (7) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment
or alteration of title.3
The present case falls under (3) and (7), where the Registrar of Deeds
of Bulacan committed an error in issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of
“Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis” when, in truth and
in fact, respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful
spouse.
Proceedings under Section 108 are “summary in nature, contemplating
corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but
certainly not controversial issues.”4
Banguis’s opposition to the petition for cancellation ostensibly raised
controversial issues involving her claimed ownership and the hereditary
rights of Adrian, which she claims to be her son by Adriano. However,
apart from the fact that evidence of Banguis’s ownership is irrelevant
in Wenifreda’s petition, the evidence apparently indicates that Banguis
could not be the owner of the subject property, while a resolution of
the issue of succession is irrelevant and unnecessary to the complete
determination of Wenifreda’s petition. The Court is thus led to the
conclusion that the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan simply erred in
including Banguis in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse.
As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of
evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of
Adriano. Documentary evidence – among others, the parties’ respective
marriage contracts, which, together with marriage certificates, are
considered the primary evidence of a marital union5
– indicates that Adriano was married to Wenifreda, while Banguis was
married to Nolasco – and both marriages were subsisting at the time of
the acquisition of the subject property and issuance of the certificate
of title thereto. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were
husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a
common-law relationship at all. Consequently, Banguis cannot be included
or named in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse; the right and privilege
belonged to Wenifreda alone.
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law
marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally married in common
law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that
such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a
community of properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of
co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in
any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras,
interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and
Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: “Be it
noted however that with respect to ‘spouse’, the same must be the
legitimate ‘spouse’ (not common-law spouses).”
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,
the term “spouse” embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption
from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code
article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose
cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who
are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the
facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil
Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when
referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her;
in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.6 (Emphasis supplied)
The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. P-443-99
is – who should be included in the title to the subject property as
Adriano’s spouse, Banguis or Wenifreda? Was there error in placing
Banguis’s name in the title as Adriano’s spouse? If Banguis is Adriano’s
spouse, then there would be no need to amend or even cancel the title.
On the other hand, if Wenifreda is Adriano’s spouse, the inclusion of
Banguis would then be erroneous, and TCT T-145321 would have to be
cancelled. All that is required in resolving this issue is to determine
who between them is Adriano’s spouse; it was unnecessary for Banguis to
prove that she is the actual owner of the property. Title to the
property is different from the certificate of title to it.
x x x. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, the Court made a clear distinction between title and the certificate of title:
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register
of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the
law refers to ownership which is represented by that document.
Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel
of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from
a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a
piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of
title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that
the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in
the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that
other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of
the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent
of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of
ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as
evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. x x
x.
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such
title. Land registration laws do not give the holder any better title
than what he actually has.7
Nonetheless, if Banguis felt that she had to go so far as to
demonstrate that she is the true owner of the subject property in order
to convince the trial court that there is no need to cancel TCT
T-145321, then she was not precluded from presenting evidence to such
effect. Understandably, with the quality of Wenifreda’s documentary and
other evidence, Banguis may have felt obliged to prove that beyond the
certificate of title, she actually owned the property. Unfortunately for
her, this Court is not convinced of her claimed ownership; the view
taken by the CA must be adopted that she and Adriano could not have been
co-owners of the subject property as she failed to present sufficient
proof that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property,
while the deed of sale covering the subject property showed that Adriano
alone was the vendee. This Court is not a trier of facts, so it must
rely on the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals, which are thus
considered conclusive and binding.8
Moreover, the Court notes that while Banguis claims that she alone paid
for the property using her own funds and money borrowed from her
sister, she nonetheless acknowledges that Adriano is a co-owner thereof,
thus implying that he contributed to its acquisition. Such
contradictory statements cast serious doubts on her claim; basically, if
she were the sole purchaser of the property, it would only be logical
and natural for her to require that her name be placed on the deed of
sale as the vendee, and not as mere witness – which is what actually
occurred in this case. On the other hand, if Adriano contributed to its
purchase, Banguis would have required that her name be placed on the
deed as a co-vendee just the same. Her failure to explain why – despite
her claims that she is the purchaser of the property – she allowed
Adriano to be denominated as the sole vendee, renders her claim of
ownership doubtful. “Where a party has the means in his power of
rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him, if it does
not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong
inference against him.”9 One cannot also ignore the principle that “the rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common sense.”10
Neither can the Court believe Banguis’s assertion that Wenifreda’s
petition for cancellation of TCT T-145321 is in reality a partition of
Adriano’s estate which in effect transfers the subject property to
Wenifreda and thus divests Banguis and her son Adrian of their rights
and interests therein. LRC Case No. P-443-99 is simply a case for the
correction of the wrongful entry in TCT T-145321; it simply aims to
reflect the truth in the certificate of title – that Adriano is married
to Wenifreda – and nothing else. It would have been a summary
proceeding, but Banguis complicated matters by injecting her claims of
ownership, which are irrelevant in the first place for, as earlier
stated, registration is not the equivalent of title.
Finally, with the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to
resolve the other issues raised by the petitioner, particularly those
relating to the trial court’s March 30, 2004 Order directing the
issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, as well as the April 14,
2004 Writ of Execution issued, as they have become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 14, 2012 Decision and July 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84954 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Brion, (Acting Chairperson),* Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe,** and Leonen, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015, ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT, PETITIONER, VS. WENIFREDA BALCOM-TAMBUYAT, RESPONDENT.
1 Section 108. Amendment and alteration of
certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon
the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a
memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of
Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A
registered owner or other person having an interest in registered
property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval
of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the
court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description,
whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the
certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not
appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an
omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum
thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or any
person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner
has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been
terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby
be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has
been dissolved has not convened the same within three years after its
dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear
and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and
may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or
cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other
relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if
necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this
section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the
judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or
ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a
purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his
heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the
owner’s duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may
be filed as provided in the preceding section.
All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as
under any other provision of this Decree after original registration
shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree or
registration was entered.
2 Maneja v. National Labor Relations Commission, 353
Phil. 45, 60 (1998), citing Marquez v. Secretary of Labor, 253 Phil.
329, 336 (1989).
3 See also Paz v. Republic, G.R. No. 157367, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 74, 81.
4 Bagayas v. Bagayas, G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517,
September 18, 2013, 706 scra 73, 87 citing Philippine Veterans Bank v.
Valenzuela, 660 Phil. 358 (2011).
5 Vda. De Chua v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 465,
483 (1998); Vda. de Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22,
2014, 714 SCRA 447, 455.
6 Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014, citing Eugenio, Sr. v. Judge Velez, 263 Phil. 1149, 1159-1160 (1990).
7 Torbela v. Rosario, G.R. No. 140528, December 7, 2011, 661 SCRA 633, 658-659.
8 Philamlife. v. Gramaje, 484 Phil. 880, 889 (2004).
9 Medija v. Patcho, 217 Phil. 509, 522 (1984).
10 People v. Toledo and Holgado, 51 Phil. 825, 833 (1928).
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