that appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to is admitted.47
Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi was no longer with Cipriano’s consent as the latter was already demanding its return.
x x x
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the
taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the
same.48
While the nature of appellant’s possession of the
taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and was
entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner,
which is contrary to company practice and against the owner’s consent
transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful oneAppellant himself admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi was no longer with Cipriano’s consent as the latter was already demanding its return.
x x x
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.51 Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.52
The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also
includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected
from the act which is performed.53 Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.54
In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission55 which was reiterated in Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co, Inc.,56
Justice Claudio Teehankee (later Chief Justice), interpreting the theft
clause of an insurance policy, explained that, when one takes the motor
vehicle of another without the latter’s consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft, there being intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain:
Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was "temporary" and for a "joy ride", the Court sustains as the better view57
that which holds that when a person, either with the object of going to
a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride,
takes possession of a vehicle belonging to another, without the consent
of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking possession of the personal property belonging to another and using it, his
intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility,
satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites in
his work Groizard who holds that the use of a thing constitutes gain and
Cuello Calon who calls it "hurt de uso."58 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
xxx
Thus, in People v. Panida66 which
involved the crime of carnapping and the penalty imposed was the
indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years
and 4 months, as maximum, this Court did not apply the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-carnapping law provides
for its own penalties which are distinct and without reference to the
said Code.
The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable
penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not
more than 17 years and 4 months. There can be no suppletory effect
of the rules for the application of penalties under the Revised Penal
Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on, or applicable
only to, the rules for felonies under the Code. While it is true that
the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is
virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal,
such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that
penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping
attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not
correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the
Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and
special laws of the same formulation. For this reason, we hold that the
proper penalty to be imposed on each of accused-appellants is an
indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years
and 4 months, as maximum.67 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under
the first clause of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, the
imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8
months, not more than 17 years and 4 months,68 for, as
discussed above, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
applied suppletorily and, therefore, the alleged aggravating
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence cannot be appreciated.
Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,69 as
amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the
offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not
be less than the minimum prescribed by the same – the penalty imposed
being a range.70
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Crim Case No. Q-97-71956, finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and another judgment entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539,
as amended and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of Fourteen
(14) Years and Eight (8) Months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and
Four (4) Months, as maximum.
G. R. No. 148233 June 8, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.
vs. LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.
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