In
G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's
decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute rule
under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to him,
the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case.
Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not
object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him
and the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of
stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to
pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross
examination regarding such testimony.
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence) States:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of
fact accruing before the death of such deceased person or before such
person became of unsound mind." (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The purpose of the rule has been explained by this Court in this wise:
The reason for the rule is that if persons having a
claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties were allowed
to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person),
many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons
as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly
subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or
demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard against the temptation to
give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the
part of the surviving party." (Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi
Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., 622 [1955])
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. (See Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927])
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the
appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the
affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent
Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and
the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500
shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant
unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never
happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate
of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.
allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC., respondents.
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