1. Arrested in a
buy-bust operation, Edmond was brought to the police station where he was
informed of his constitutional rights. During the investigation, Edmond refused
to give any statement. However, the arresting officer asked Edmond to
acknowledge in writing that six (6) sachets of "shabu" were
confiscated from him. Edmond consented and also signed a receipt for the amount
of P3,000.00, allegedly representing the "purchase price of the
shabu." At the trial, the arresting officer testified and identified the
documents executed and signed by Edmond. Edmond's lawyer did not object to the
testimony. After the presentation of the testimonial evidence, the prosecutor
made a formal offer of evidence which included the documents signed by Edmond.
Edmond's
lawyer objected to the admissibility of the documents for being the "fruit
of the poisoned tree." Resolve the objection with reasons
2. In
the early morning of December 8, 1995, accused-appellant hired Jimbo Pelagio, a
tricycle driver working the night shift, to take him to Paco, Obando,
Bulacan. When they reached their destination, he ordered Pelagio to get
off the tricycle. Then, accused-appellant robbed Pelagio of his money and
repeatedly struck him on the head with a gun. Pelagio fell on the ground
unconscious. Accused-appellant shot him on the head and fled on board his
tricycle.
That same morning, SPO1 Froilan Bautista got a call
from the Valenzuela Emergency Hospital stating that a man had been shot on the
head and was in their hospital. SPO1 Bautista and SPO1 Jose Sta. Ana
rushed to the hospital and found the still conscious Pelagio lying on a
stretcher.
SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio in a
question and answer method, which he took down on two sheets of yellow
paper. After his statement was taken, Pelagio affixed his thumbmark on
both sheets.The statement is as follows:
T:
Alam mo ba ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa Valenzuela Emergency Hospital
at kinukunan ka ng salaysay?
S:
Opo, dahil pinagpapalo po ako ng baril ni RAMIL PEÑA sa ulo at kinuha and
tricycle kong minamaneho.
T: Taga saan itong si Ramil Peña?
S: Sa Dulong Tangke, Valenzuela,
(Malinta), M.M.
T: Saan, kailan at anong oras
nangyari ito?
S: Sa Paco, Obando, Bulacan,
kaninang ika-8 ng Disyembre 1995 sa ganap na ika-4:15 ng umaga.
T: Sakay mo ba itong si Ramil Peña?
S: Oho, sumakay sa may gasolinahan
ng Petron sa Malinta, Valenzuela, M.M.
T: Dati mo bang kilala si Ramil
Peña?
S:
Opo.
T:
Ano ba ang tatak ng tricycle mo?
S:
Yamaha RS-100, kulay itim.
T:
Sino and may-ari ng tricycle?
S:
Si Rey Dagul.
T:
Binaril ka ba ni Ramil?
S:
Muntik na ho.
T:
Bakit sa iyo ginawa ni Ramil and bagay na ito?
S:
Ewan ko ho.[i][4]
Eventually, Pelagio died, and Ramil Peña was charged
for the death of Pelagio.
On the basis of said statement as above-written, would
you consider the same admissible as a “dying declaration”? Can it be admitted
as part of the “res gestae”? What are the elements of res gestae?
3. Johnny Bolanon
(Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca (Salafranca) on the night of
July 31, 1993, after the said incident, the assailant ran away. Bolanon still
being able to walk, went to his uncle, Rodolfo
B. Estaño to seek help. After having known of the incident, Estaño then brought
Bolanon to PGH. On their way to the hospital on board a taxi, Bolanon confided
to Estaño about the incident and told him that it was Salafranca who stabbed
him and a certain Augusto Mendoza witnessed the said incident. At around 2:30am, despite receiving medical
attention, Bolanon succumbed to death.
Question:
Is
the utterance of Bolanonis qualified as a dying declaration or part of
the res gestae?
4. Accused is
charged of murder. The Judge issued a warrant of arrest without bail. Accused
filed a motion for bail alleging that evidence against him is not strong. The
bail hearing was conducted, and Elizabeth was offered as witness. The bail was
not granted on the basis of her testimony. In the trial proper, Elizabeth was
presented as principal witness. Due to lack of material time, and in giving the
defense ample time to cross-examine Elizabeth, the trial was set on another
date for the cross-examination.
Before the cross-examination could be conducted,
Elizabeth died of cardiac arrest.
The defense moved that the testimony of Elizabeth be
expunged for lack of cross-examination.
On the other hand, the prosecution moved that the
testimony of Elizabeth during the bail hearing be adopted as part of her main
testimony.
As judge how would you rule on the two motions.
5. Arriving
home one late afternoon of April 4, 1987, Amador Organez was informed by his
wife that their six (6) year old daughter, Maritess, was missing. Upon inquiry,
Cristy Manalastas, one of his neighbors, told Amador that a pregnant woman was
seen near the vicinity of his house. This was corroborated by two other
neighbors, namely, Julie and Baby Wycoco. Amador searched for the pregnant
woman at Tondo. She chanced upon Shirley Martinez whose child was also missing.
Shirley related to Amador that, after one, Zenaida Isla, who was her former
classmate, visited her at her house, her child disappeared. Amador, continued
his search in Caloocan and met Lola Danding whose grandchild was also missing.
She told Amador that it was appellant who took her granddaughter when the
latter went to her house.
On July 18, 1987, the police authorities from Malabon
went to Amador’s house and informed him that appellant had been arrested.
Amador then went to the Malabon Police Headquarters where appellant told him to
proceed to San Simon, Pampanga to fetch his child. On that same day, Amador
went to Pampanga together with six Malabon policemen, Lola Danding, appellant,
and Mrs. Loring whose child was also missing. After coordinating with the
police authorities of Pampanga, they proceeded to the town of Sta. Monica, to
meet Maura “Orang” Mabalot.
Upon reaching the house of Maura, the police
authorities showed her a picture of Maritess and she identified the child in
the picture as the same child who was with appellant when the latter went to
her house in April, 1987. She also related that during the said visit,
appellant told her that she was looking for someone to adopt the child known as
Maritess. Appellant, upon hearing Maura’s statement reacted by telling the
group that she sold the child at Angeles City. Thereafter, the same group went
to a dry goods store at the Angeles City Market. The owner of the said store
answered positively when the policemen inquired if a child was sold to her but,
upon verification, the child was not Maritess. Then the group checked on
another child, who was sold but again upon verification, did not turn out to be
Maritess.
Subsequently, appellant was brought back to the
Malabon Police Department but was transferred to the Western Police District of
Manila. On July 21, 1987, appellant was investigated before P/Cpl. Pablito
Marasigan, an investigator at the WPD General Assignment Section. Thereafter,
she executed an extrajudicial statement wherein she admitted that she took
Maritess Organez and brought her to Teofilo Ablaza for adoption. Said
extrajudicial statement was executed with Atty. Domingo Joaquin of the
Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), Department of Justice, beside her.
Appellant on the other hand, denied the charges hurled
against her. She claimed that she has no knowledge of the contents of the sworn
statement attributed to her which is marked as Exhibit “B” nor had she read it.
She alleged that she was lured into signing the said document when Marasigan
promised to release her after affixing her signature thereat. More so, she
alleged that when she affixed her signature in the document, she was not
assisted by a counsel as Atty. Domingo Joaquin of CLAO arrived at the police
station after the document was already prepared and finished.
In this appeal, appellant interposes the following as
errors of the court a quo:
“The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused
guilty of kidnapping, inasmuch as:
1. The decision
was basically based on hearsay evidence;
2. The alleged extra-judicial
confession is inadmissible in evidence, being extracted in violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused(sic).”
6. In convicting the accused in People v. Ador (22004) for murder, the
trial court relied on the following circumstances to wit: (1) that he was seen
fleeing from the crime scene (2) that he allegedly surrendered the hand gun (3)
that the slug taken from the head of the victim was fried from the gun he
surrendered (4) that the victim made a dying declaration identifying him and
(5) paraffin test showed that he was positive for gunpowder. IS THE CONVICTION
PROPER?
7. Accused in the case of People v. Barlis (1994) duly assisted by counsel,
confessed to having robbed the watches, jewelry and cash, and then killed one
Honorian Balmaseda. During his trial, the confession was presented and admitted
in evidence. Insofar as the robbery is concerned, the extra-judicial statement
of the accused constituted as the only evidence of the taking of the property
of the victim. Based on said premises, (a) is the conviction of the accused for
the crime of robbery proper? (b) can he be convicted of homicide?
8. To successfully
invoke the defense of alibi as a defense in a criminal case, what evidence must
be adduced by the accused? How did the Supreme Court uphold the acquittal of
Hubert Webb in its decision? What principles of evidence were used by it?
9.Normer
Velasco was convicted by the RTC of murder. The conviction was based on
the testimony of the lone eyewitness to the incident, Leonardo Lucaban. After
Lucaban gave his testimony, the judge recalled him to the witness stand.
Velasco avers that the recall of Lucaban had no basis and was made with grave
abuse of discretion. Is the act of the judge in recalling the
witness to the witness stand upon his own order valid? Explain.
10. A criminal complaint for
adultery was filed by Dr. Neri (husband) against Ruby (wife) and Arroyo
(petitioner). After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner
and the wife, based, among others on the wife's admission to her husband that
she sex with petitioner Arroyo. This decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The wife later filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial
contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband. The husband filed a
manifestation praying for the dismissal of the case as he had "tacitly
consented" to his wife's infidelity. IS the admission of adulterous conduct by the wife to her
husband without the presence of her counsel is admissible in evidence?
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