EN BANC
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T.
Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order
dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private
respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying
the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by
the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition
alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there
is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines
and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for
the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June
20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the
People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong
Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an
advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention
of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7)
counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common
law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of
arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong
Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of
private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila
issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the
NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying
that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision
granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the
Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final
and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo
Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo,
Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there
is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited
himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then
raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for
bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December
20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to
accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is
granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the
condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer
the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold
himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further
appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond
will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate
notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order
before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest
office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused,
real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition
that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited
in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation
be noted therein accordingly.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge
in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that
there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely
to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent
maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh
process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in
this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this
Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective
extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1
this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision
on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only
in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word
"conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well
as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows
from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should
not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ).
It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a
case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right
to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted
that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art.
VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to
private respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the
individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century,
has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now
being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights
in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court
to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is
the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the
sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the
individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now
taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international
law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the
second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials
after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of
individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws
of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently,
under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former
Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is
now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II,
both international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental
rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the
principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3
the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the
land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights
of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the
family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides:
"The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release
if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan
limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
however, in light of the various international treaties giving
recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to
life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the
State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings
would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who
are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed
in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5
is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure
to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail
pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had
committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to
treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to
law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of
the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the
provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7
this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal
charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of
an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see
no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases.
Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be
invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not
in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to
apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should
see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069
(The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal
of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation
directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under
the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right
of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one
accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and
the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the
demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9
Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition
proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a
crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13
Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of
a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for
the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding,
it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused"
if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that
Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for
the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;"
and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest
and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged
restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state
following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary
step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001,
when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime.
By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious
deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this
prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to
grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due
process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however,
should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter,
the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence
of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this
major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to
bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the
premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee.
This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from
justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands
that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty
it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life,
liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed,
not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to
which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis,
the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither
be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard
of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used
in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from
fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According
to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential
extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a
flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of
"clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED
to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled
to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the
trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his
immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings
with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
| LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Asscociate Justice |
| ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Asscociate Justice |
| RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Asscociate Justice |
| ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Asscociate Justice |
| MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Asscociate Justice |
| CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Asscociate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice
Footnotes
2 90 Phil. 70 (1951).
3
Sec. 2, Art. II states "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument
of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations."
4 In cases involving quarantine to prevent the spread of communicable diseases, bail is not available. See State v. Hutchinson, 18 So.2d. 723, 246 Ala. 48; Varholy v. Sweat, 15 So.2d. 267, 153 Fla. 571, Baker v. Strautz, 54 NE2d. 441, 386 lll. 360.5 12 Phil. 490 (1909).
6 Supra, footnote 2.
7 90 Phil. 256 (1951).
8 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 US 276, 78 L. Ed. 315, 54 S. Ct. 101; Terlindon v. Ames, 184 US 270, 46 L.Ed. 534, 22 S.Ct. 484; Fong Yue Ting v. US, 149 US 698, 37 L.Ed. 905, 13 S.Ct. 1016; Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F2d. 40; US v. Godwin, 97 F. Supp. 252, affd. 191 F2d. 932; Dominguez v. State, 234 SW 701, 90 Tex. Crim. 92.
9 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377.10 US ex rel Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F2d. 955, cert den. 273 US 969, 71 L. Ed. 883, 47 S. Ct. 572.
11 State v. Chase, 107 So. 541, 91 Fla. 413; State v. Quigg, 108 So. 409, 91 Fla. 197.
12 Benson v. McMahon, 127 US 457, 32 L. Ed. 234, 8 S. Ct. 1240; Jimenez v. Aristequieta, 311 F2d. 547, stay den. 314 F2d. 649.
13 Spatola v. US, 741 F. Supp. 362, Affd. 925 F2d. 615.14 Re Henderson, 145 NW 574, 27 ND 155; State ex rel Tresoder v. Remann, 4 P2d. 866, 165 Wash. 92.
15 Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 554 F.2d 1.
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