All administrative determinations require only substantial proof and not clear and convincing evidence as erroneously contended by pubic respondents.
Clear and convincing proof is ". . . more than mere preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases . . ." 13 while substantial evidence ". . . consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance . . . ." 14 Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order.
G.R. No. 102358 November 19, 1992
SPOUSES VICENTE and GLORIA MANALO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR, in her capacity as Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, JOSE SARMIENTO as POEA Administrator, CAREERS PLANNERS SPECIALISTS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and SPOUSES VICTOR and ELNORA FERNANDEZ, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The
Court views with grave concern the alarming incidents of illegal
recruitment which demonstrate all too clearly that overseas employment
has fast developed into a major source not only of much-needed foreign
exchanged but also, for the cunning and the crafty, of easy money.
In response to a newspaper advertisement looking for a couple to work as driver and tutor cum
baby sitter, petitioners Vicente and Gloria Manalo went to Career
Planners Specialists International, Inc. (CPSI), a licensed service
contracting firm owned by private respondents, the spouses Victor and
Elnora Fernandez. After the requisite interview and testing, they were
hired to work for a family in Saudi Arabia for a monthly salary of
US$350.00 each. According to petitioners, a placement fee of P40,000.00
was imposed as a precondition for the processing of their papers. They
paid only P30,000.00 in cash and executed a promissory note for the
balance. Then they were allowed by respondent Elnora Fernandez to sign
their contract papers but did not issue a receipt for the placement fee
despite demand.
Shortly before boarding their flight to Saudi Arabia,
petitioners were handed their contracts. According to Gloria, she was
surprised to discover that her position had been changed to that of
domestic help. However, a CPSI employee assured her that the change was
only for the purpose of facilitating her departure and did not in any
way alter her employment as tutor. Incidentally, CPSI provided
petitioners with the Travel Exit Pass (TEP) of Filipino Manpower
Services, Inc. (FILMAN), a duly licensed recruitment agency.
Contrary to the representation of her recruiter,
Gloria was actually hired as a domestic help and not as a tutor, so that
after working for only twenty-five (25) days in Jeddah, she returned to
Manila. Soon after, Vicente also resigned from his work and followed
her home. He could not stand the unbearable working conditions of his
employment. However, before leaving, he had to execute a promissory note
to cover his plane fare which respondent Victor Fernandez advanced.
Vicente also had to sign a quitclaim in favor of CPSI and his employer.
On 29
February 1988, petitioners sued private respondents before the
Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) charging them with
illegal exaction, 1 false adverstisement, 2
and violation of other pertinents laws, rules and regulations. They
demanded the refund of the amount exacted from them, plus payment of
moral damages and the imposition of administrative sanctions. 3
Private
respondents countered: (1) that Gloria applied as domestic help fully
aware that she could not be a tutor since she did not speak Arabic; (2)
that the promissory note for P10,000.00 was required of petitioners
because they were hired without paying placement fees; (3) that it was
unlikely for petitioners, who were mature, educated and experienced in
overseas work, to part with P30,000.00 without securing a receipt; (4)
that Vicente executed a quitclaim in favor of CPSI duly authenticated by
embassy officials in Saudi Arabia; (5) that there was no impropriety in
having the employment papers of petitioners processed by FILMAN because
it was a sister company of CPSI, and private respondents Victor and
Elnora were officers in both agencies.
Private respondents prayed for the disqualification
of petitioners from overseas employment, and sought to recover from them
the SR 1,150 plane fare advanced by Victor for Vicente, P10,000.00 as
placement fee evidenced by a promissory note, and attorney's fees.
Mainly, on
the basis of the transcripts of petitioners' testimonies in the
clarificatory questioning before the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor in a
related criminal case, 4 the POEA issued its Order of 7 May 1990 giving more weight and credence to petitioners' version thus —
After
a careful evaluation of the facts and the evidence presented, we are
more inclined to give weight to complainants' posture. Complainants'
version of the case spontaneously presented in their pleadings is, to
our mind, more convincing than respondent's stand. Moreover, the manner
by which complainants narrated the whole incident inspired belief in the
allegation that respondent Career is indeed guilty of illegal exaction.
Thus, the actual expenses incurred by herein complainants computed
hereinbelow less the allowable fees of P3,000.00 (P1,500.00 per worker,
respondent being a service contractor) should be returned to them.
Actual Expenses —
14.00 — application form
300.00 — psychological test
1,400.00 — medical exam
P31,000.00 — total
less 3,000.00 — processing fees at
P1,500.00 per applicant
P28,714.00 — amount to be refunded
It appearing, however, that only respondent Career
Planners Specialist(s) Int'l. Inc., took part in the collection of the
aforesaid amount, the same should be solely held liable.
We cannot likewise give credence to the Final
Quitclaim signed by complainant Vicente Manalo before he left for the
Philippines and presented by respondent as defense. While its
genuineness may not be in question, we believe that it has no bearing on
the issue at bar. The aforesaid Quitclaim deals more with matters
concerning complainants' employment abroad. However, the subject of the
instant claim is the refund of complainants' expenses prior to their deployment to Saudi Arabia.
On the other hand, we hold FILMAN liable for allowing
its document such as the TEP to be used by other agency. Respondent's
defense that there is nothing wrong in this because FILMAN is a sister
company of CAREER does not merit consideration because such practice is
not allowed under the POEA Rules and Regulations. A check with our
records, however, showed that respondent FILMAN had been put in the list
of forever banned agencies effective April 5, 1989.
Anent the claim for moral damages, this Office has no jurisdiction to entertain the same.
WHEREFORE, . . . the Authority of Career Planners
Specialist(s) International is hereby suspended for four (4) months or
in lieu thereof, a fine of P40,000.00 is hereby imposed for illegal
exaction on two counts plus restitution of the amount of P28,714.00 to
herein complainants in both instances.
Filipino Manpower Services, Inc. is hereby meted a
fine of P40,000.00 for two counts of misrepresentation. Its perpetual
disqualification from recruitment activities is hereby reiterated.
The claim for moral damages is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent Career's counterclaim is likewise dismissed or lack of merit. 5
Private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and on 4 February 1991,
POEA issued a resolution setting arise its earlier order stating that —
It
is worth mentioning at this point that our sole basis for holding
respondent Career liable for illegal exaction was the uncorroborated
testimony of the complainants.
As we have consistently held, (the) charge of illegal
exaction is a serious charge which may cause the suspension or
cancellation of the authority or license of the offending agency. Hence,
it should be proven and substantiated by a clear and convincing
evidence. Mere allegation of complainant that the agency charged more
than the authorized fee will not suffice to indict the agency for
illegal exaction unless the allegation is supported by other
corroborative circumstantial evidence.
Thus, for lack of concrete evidence or proof to
support our initial findings, we are inclined to reconsider the penalty
imposed upon respondent.
Foregoing premises, the penalty of suspension imposed
upon respondent Career Planners Specialist(s) International, Inc.
pursuant to our Order dated May 7, 1990 is hereby LIFTED.
Accordingly, the alternative fine of P40,000.00 which was paid under protest by respondent is hereby ordered refunded to them. 6
Petitioners
appealed to the Secretary of Labor. On 5 July 1991, then Undersecretary
of Labor Ma. Nieves Roldan-Confesor (now Secretary of Labor) sustained
the reconsideration of POEA. Her Order reads in part —
We find . . . no cogent reason or sufficient justification to reverse or modify the assailed Order.
Records reveal that the only basis for holding
respondent Career Planners Specialist(s) International, Inc., liable for
illegal exaction, as held in the previous POEA Order dated May 7, 1990
was the uncorroborated testimony of the complainants. There was no
concrete evidence or proof to support the POEA Administrator's initial
findings.
We
take this opportunity to inform the complainants that the charge of
illegal exaction is a serious charge which may cause the suspension or
cancellation of the authority or license of a recruitment agency.
Therefore, said charge must be proven and substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. A mere allegation will not suffice to find an
agency liable for illegal exaction unless said allegation is supported
by other corroborative circumstantial evidence. In this connection,
records show that complainants could not narrate the specific
circumstances surrounding their alleged payment of the amount of
P30,000.00. They could not even remember the specific date when said
amount was paid to respondent agency. In addition, when complainants
were separately questioned as to how the money was kept bundled together
prior to being handed to respondent agency for payment, Gloria Manalo
said it was wrapped in a piece of paper while Vicente Manalo said it was
placed inside an envelope. 7
On the
charge of petitioners that they were given jobs (driver/domestic help)
different from those advertised by private respondents, the
Undersecretary ruled that there was no misrepresentation by way of false
advertisement because it was established that private respondents also
caused to be printed in the same newspaper page a second box looking for
a couple driver/domestic help.
In her Order of 9 October 1991, then Undersecretary Ma. Nieves Roldan-Confesor denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 8
In the
present recourse, petitioners claim that public respondent POEA
committed a fatal jurisdictional error when it resolved private
respondents' motion for reconsideration in violation of Rule V, Book VI
of the 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations directing the transmittal of
motions for reconsideration to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for determination. Consequently, for want of legal competence to
act on said motion, the Order of 4 February 1991, as well as the
subsequent orders of public respondent Undersecretary of Labor dated 5
July 1991 and 9 October 1991, is null and void.
In Aguinaldo Industries Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 9 We ruled —
To
allow a litigant to assume a different posture when he comes before the
court and challenge the position he had accepted at the administrative
level, would be to sanction a procedure whereby the court — which is
supposed to review administrative determinations — would not
review, but determine and decide for the first time, a question not
raised at the administrative forum. This cannot be permitted, for the
same reason that underlies the requirement of prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies to give administrative authorities the prior
opportunity to decide controversies within its competence, and in much
the same way that, on the judicial level, issues not raised in the lower
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
The
alleged procedural lapse by respondent POEA was raised by petitioners
only before Us, notwithstanding that such ground was already existing
when they appealed to the Secretary of Labor. Ironically, petitioners
now question the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor over the appeal
which they themselves elevated to that office. When petitioners filed
their motion for reconsideration with the Undersecretary of Labor, this
procedural issue was not even mentioned. Clearly, it would be the height
of unfairness and inequity if We now allow petitioners to backtrack
after getting an unfavorable verdict from public respondents whose
authority they themselves involved. In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy 10
We said: ". . . we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only
if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse . .
. ."
In this regard, however, We find no procedural infirmity constituting reversible error.
The 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations 11
is divided into eight (8) Books. Book VI, cited by petitioners, is
entitled "Adjudication Rules". The procedure outlined therein relates to
the original and exclusive jurisdiction exercised by POEA through its
Adjudication Department "to hear and decide all cases involving
employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of a law or
contact involving Filipino workers for overseas employment," involving
"[v]iolation of the terms and conditions of employment . . . .
[d]isputes relating to the implementation and interpretation of
employment contracts . . . [m]oney claims of workers against their
employers and/or their duly authorized agents in the Philippines or vice
versa . . . . [c]laims for death, disability and other benefits arising
out of employment . . . . and . . . . [v]iolations of our
non-compliance with any compromise agreement entered into by and between
the parties in an overseas employment contract."
On the
other hand, Book II entitled "Licensing and Regulations" of the 1985
POEA Rules and Regulations, notably Rule VI cited by private
respondents, refers particularly to the procedure for suspension,
cancellation and revocation of Authority or License 12 through the POEA Licensing and Regulation Office (LRO).
The controversy in the present case centers on the
liability of private respondents for illegal exaction, false
advertisement and violation of pertinent laws and rules on recruitment
of overseas workers and the resulting imposition of penalty of
suspension of the Authority of respondent CPSI. Quite plainly, We are
not concerned here with employer-employee relations, the procedure of
which is outlined in Book VI; rather, with the suspension or revocation
of Authority embodied in Book II.
Evidently, no jurisdictional error was accordingly
committed because in cases affecting suspension, revocation or
cancellation of Authority, the POEA has authority under Sec. 18, Rule
VI, Book II, to resolve motions for reconsideration which may thereafter
be appealed to the Secretary of Labor. Section 18, provides: "A motion
for reconsideration of an order o suspension (issued by POEA) or an
appeal to the Minister (now Secretary of Labor) from an order cancelling
a license or authority may be entertained only when filed with the LRO
within ten (10) working days from the service of the order or decision"
(parenthesis supplied).
Petitioners also argue that public respondents
gravely abused their discretion when they violated petitioners' right to
administrative due process by requiring clear and convincing evidence
to establish the charge illegal exaction. This point is well taken.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
In the administrative proceedings for cancellation,
revocation or suspension of Authority or License, no rule requires that
testimonies of complainants be corroborated by documentary evidence, if
the charge of unlawful exaction is substantially proven. All
administrative determinations require only substantial proof and not
clear and convincing evidence as erroneously contended by pubic
respondents.
Clear and
convincing proof is ". . . more than mere preponderance, but not to
extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in
criminal cases . . ." 13
while substantial evidence ". . . consists of more than a mere
scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance . . .
." 14
Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof
beyond reasonable doubt at the highest level, followed by clear and
convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial
evidence, in that order.
That the administrative determination of facts may
result in the suspension or revocation of the authority of CPSI does not
require a higher degree of proof. The proceedings are administrative,
and the consequent imposition of suspension/revocation of
Authority/License does not make the proceedings criminal. Moreover, the
sanctions are administrative and, accordingly, their infliction does not
give rise to double jeopardy when a criminal action is instituted for
the same act.
Thus We held in Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr. 15 —
. .
. it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported
by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings of
fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial evidence
is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and
substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642; Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 762 [1984].
The
POEA, after assessing the evidence of both parties, found that private
respondents collected from petitioners P30,000.00 as placement fees;
consequently, it ruled that there was illegal exaction. Surprisingly,
without altering its findings of fact, POEA reconsidered its order. It
held that uncorroborated testimonies were not enough to conclude that
illegal exaction was committed, particularly so that this might result
in the suspension or revocation of respondents' authority to engage in
recruitment activities. The premise that testimonies of petitioners
should be supported by some other form of evidence is, to say the least,
fallacious. In Castillo v. Court of Appeals, 16 where the appellate court reversed the findings of fact of the trial court by requiring a higher degree of proof, We held —
. .
. we find no strong and cogent reason which justifies the appellate
court's deviation from the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
As pointed out in Hernandez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (189 SCRA
758 [1990]), in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial
evidence. Hence, the agrarian court's findings of fact which went
beyond the minimum evidentiary support demanded by law, that is,
supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive and cannot
be reversed by the appellate tribunal.
The
seeming discrepancy in the statements of the witnesses (one saying the
money was wrapped in paper, the other, that the money was in an
envelope; neither testified on the specific date of the exaction),
refers only to minor details. Perhaps it would be different if the
variance refers to essential points, e.g., whether the amount of
P30,000.00 was actually paid by petitioners to private respondents.
Consequently, whether the money was wrapped in paper, or placed in an
envelope, or unwrapped or whether the parties could not recall when
there payment was effected is unimportant. After all, the money could
have been wrapped in paper and placed in the envelope, or placed in the
envelope without being wrapped, or wrapped with use of an unpasted
envelope that appeared to be the envelope itself. In either case,
petitioners, could have viewed them differently; but the difference is
ultimately inconsequential. The crucial point to consider is that the
petitioners categorically and unequivocally testified that respondents
collected from them the amount of P30,000.00 as their placement fees and
that they paid the amount demanded. In this regard, it may be worth to
emphasize that only substantial evidence, not necessarily clear and
convincing evidence, is required. Moreover, when confronted with
conflicting assertions, the rule that "as between a positive and
categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a bare
denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail . . . ." 17 applies.
But even on the supposition that there was no payment
of P30,000.00, it cannot be denied that private respondents required
petitioners to execute a promissory note for P10,000.00 purportedly
because petitioners were hired without paying placement fees. The mere
charging of P10,000.00, standing alone, is enough to hold private
respondents answerable for illegal exaction because the allowable amount
to be collected per contract worker according to respondent POEA was
only P1,500.00, or P3,000.00 for both petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged
Orders of respondent Undersecretary of Labor dated 5 July 1991 and 9
October 1991, as well as the Resolution of respondent POEA dated 4
February 1991, having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction are SET ASIDE, and the
original Order of respondent POEA dated 7 May 1990 is ordered REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
2 Engaging in act(s) of misrepresentation, such as publication or advertisement of false or deceptive notices or information in relation to the recruitment and placement of worker (Sec. 2, par. [b], Ibid.).
3 Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, p. 30.
4 I.S. No. 88-647, "Gloria Manalo v. Victor Fernandez and Elnora Fernandez", and I.S. No. 88-718, "Vicente Manalo v. Victor Manalo v. Victor Fernandez and Elnora Fernandez", both for estafa/illegal recruitment.
5 Petition, Annex "E", Rollo, pp. 122-124.
6 Petition, Annex "G", Rollo, pp. 133-134.
7 Petition, Annex "I", Rollo, pp. 138-139.
8 Petition, Annex "K", Rollo, p. 166.
9 No. L-29790, 25 February 1982; 112 SCRA 136, 140.
10 No. L-21450, 15 April 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 36, citing a number of related cases.
11 The 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations was then in effect during the proceedings before POEA. However, it is now superseded by the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations promulgated 31 May 1991.
12 "Authority" is a document issued by the Minister (now Secretary of Labor) to a private recruitment entity authorized to deploy its own workers for its project overseas (Sec. 1, par. [d], Rule II Book I, 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations. "License" is a document issued by the Minister (now Secretary of Labor) to an agency authorizing it to recruit and hire Filipino workers for overseas employment (Sec. 1, par. [q], Ibid. Public respondent POEA appears to confuse Authority with License, for while POEA refers to CPSI, a licensed service contractor, what it suspended actually was the Authority of CPSI.
13 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 227, citing Fred C. Walker C. Walker Agency, Inc. v. Lucas, 215 Va. 535, 211 S.E. 2d 88, 92.
14 Ibid., p. 1281, citing Marker v. Finch, D.C. Del., 322 F. Supp. 905, 910.
15 G. R. No. 75501, 15 September 1987; 154 SCRA 49, 54.
16 G. R. No. 98028, 27 January 1992; 205 SCRA 529, 535.
17 People v. Caballes, G. R. Nos. 93437-45, 12 July 1991; 199 SCRA 152, 167.
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