mak jerome labad case digest

G.R. No. L-12435          November 9, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REGINO BLANCO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

The defendant and appellant was convicted originally in the court of the justice of peace of the municipality of Castillejos, Province of Zambales, and fined P25 on a charge of violation of an ordinance of that municipality prohibiting and penalizing the obstruction of the public highways. On appeal to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Zambales, the accused was again convicted and fined P25. The case in before us on appeal from the judgment entered in the Court of First Instance.  On this appeal counsel relies wholly upon his contentions —

First. That a doubt arises as to whether the ordinance in question was in force at the date of its alleged violation. Section 9 of the ordinance reads as follows:

Esta ordenanza entrara en vigor desde su aprobacion por la honorable Junta Provincial. (This ordinance will take effect from the date of its approval by the honorable provincial board.)

Counsel contends that since no affirmative proof was offered in the court below as to the date of approval of the ordinance, the court had no evidence before it on which to base a finding that the ordinance was in force at the date of its alleged violation.

It is contented further, that the ordinance having been enacted under authority of the provisions of article 39, subsection (j) of Act No. 82 (The Municipal Code), and that Code having been repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code, the ordinance should be deemed to have been abrogated at the same time

ISSUES:

1.       Whether or not the Court of the Justice of the Peace should take judicial notice of the Municipal Ordinances in force in the municipality where it sits.

2.       Whether or not the Court of First Instance may take judicial notice in an appeal from the judgment of a Court of the Justice of the Peace wherein the case originated.

3.       Whether or not the ordinance is deemed to have been abrogated.

RULING:           We have no doubt, however, that the court of a justice of the peace may, and should, take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality wherein it sits; and we are furthermore of the opinion that in an appeal from the judgment of a court of the justice of the peace the appellate courts may take judicial notice of municipal ordinances in force in the municipality wherein the case originated, and to that end may adopt the findings and conclusions of the court of the justice of the peace in that regard as developed by the record, in the absence of affirmative proof that such findings and conclusions are erroneous. (U. S. vs. Hernandez, 31 Phil. Rep., 342; Cf. sec. 51, Manila Charter.)

The doctrine is well stated by Judge McQuillin in the following citation from his work on Municipal Corporations, and we are of the opinion that under the judicial system in force in these Islands, the rule which should be adopted is that set forth in the last paragraph of the citation as the "better view" with regard to the matter dealt therein:

Par. 861. While, as we have seen, municipal or city courts will take notice of the ordinances and resolutions passed and in force within the jurisdiction of the court, without being pleaded and proved, in many jurisdictions it is held, and the weight of authority seems to be that, on appeal from such courts to a state the latter will not take judicial notice of ordinances unless they have been pleaded in the municipal or city court and set out in the record. But the better view appears to be that where an action for the violation of an ordinance has been commenced in a municipal or police court and the case is appealed, the latter court, whether state or municipal, will take judicial notice of the incorporation of the city and of the existence or substance of its ordinances.

Finally, It is sufficient answer to this contention to indicate that the Administrative Code, while it repealed the Municipal Code, conferred upon and confirmed to all duly organized municipalities the power to enact and maintain ordinances such as that now under consideration, in substantially the same language as that found in the Municipal Code. (Cf. Administrative Code, sec. 2242, subsecs. (e) and (h). Section 3 of the Administrative Code expressly provides that the provisions of that Code incorporating prior laws shall be deemed to be made in continuation thereof, and to be in the nature of amendments thereto, without prejudice to any right already accrued. It follows that the enactment of the Administrative Code did not have effect of abrogating or repealing a municipal ordinance enacted and maintained in the exercise of a power confirmed to the municipality by the code itself. We find no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the accused; and conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.