MANALO
vs. ROLDAN-CONFESOR
G.R. No.
102358 November 19, 1992
FACTS: In
response to a newspaper advertisement looking for a couple to work as driver
and tutor cum baby sitter, petitioners Vicente and Gloria Manalo went to
Career Planners Specialists International, Inc. (CPSI), a licensed service
contracting firm owned by private respondents, the spouses Victor and Elnora
Fernandez. After the requisite interview and testing, they were hired to work
for a family in Saudi Arabia. According to petitioners, a placement fee of
P40,000.00 was imposed as a precondition for the processing of their papers.
They paid only P30,000.00 in cash and executed a promissory note for the
balance. Then they were allowed by respondent Elnora Fernandez to sign their
contract papers but did not issue a receipt for the placement fee despite
demand. Shortly before boarding their flight to Saudi Arabia,
petitioners were handed their contracts. According to Gloria, she was surprised
to discover that her position had been changed to that of domestic help.
However, a CPSI employee assured her that the change was only for the purpose
of facilitating her departure and did not in any way alter her employment as
tutor. Incidentally, CPSI provided petitioners with the Travel Exit Pass (TEP)
of Filipino Manpower Services, Inc. (FILMAN), a duly licensed recruitment
agency. Contrary to the representation of her recruiter, Gloria was
actually hired as a domestic help and not as a tutor, so that after working for
only twenty-five (25) days in Jeddah, she returned to Manila. Soon after,
Vicente also resigned from his work and followed her home. He could not stand
the unbearable working conditions of his employment. However, before leaving,
he had to execute a promissory note to cover his plane fare which respondent
Victor Fernandez advanced. Vicente also had to sign a quitclaim in favor of
CPSI and his employer.
Petitioners sued
private respondents before the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) charging them with illegal exaction, 1 false
adverstisement, 2 and violation of other pertinents laws,
rules and regulations. They demanded the refund of the amount exacted from
them, plus payment of moral damages and the imposition of administrative
sanctions. 3Mainly, on the basis of the transcripts of
petitioners' testimonies, 4 the POEA issued its Order of 7
May 1990 giving more weight and credence to petitioners' version thus — After a careful evaluation of the facts and
the evidence presented, we are more inclined to give weight to complainants'
posture. Complainants' version of the case spontaneously presented in their
pleadings is, to our mind, more convincing than respondent's stand. Moreover,
the manner by which complainants narrated the whole incident inspired belief in
the allegation that respondent Career is indeed guilty of illegal exaction. On
the other hand, we hold FILMAN liable for allowing its document such as the TEP
to be used by other agency. Respondent's defense that there is nothing wrong in
this because FILMAN is a sister company of CAREER does not merit consideration
because such practice is not allowed under the POEA Rules and Regulations. A
check with our records, however, showed that respondent FILMAN had been put in
the list of forever banned agencies effective April 5, 1989. WHEREFORE, . . . the Authority of
Career Planners Specialist(s) International is hereby suspended for four (4)
months or in lieu thereof, a fine of P40,000.00 is hereby imposed for illegal
exaction on two counts plus restitution of the amount of P28,714.00 to herein
complainants in both instances. Filipino Manpower Services, Inc. is hereby
meted a fine of P40,000.00 for two counts of misrepresentation. Its perpetual
disqualification from recruitment activities is hereby reiterated. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and
on 4 February 1991, POEA issued a resolution setting aside its earlier order stating that —
It is worth
mentioning at this point that our sole basis for holding respondent Career
liable for illegal exaction was the uncorroborated testimony of the
complainants. As we have consistently held, (the) charge of illegal exaction is
a serious charge which may cause the suspension or cancellation of the
authority or license of the offending agency. Hence, it should be proven and
substantiated by a clear and convincing
evidence. The penalty of suspension imposed upon respondent Career Planners
Specialist(s) International, Inc. pursuant to our Order dated May 7, 1990 is
hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the alternative fine of P40,000.00 which was paid
under protest by respondent is hereby ordered refunded to them. 6Petitioners appealed to the Secretary of
Labor. On 5 July 1991, then Undersecretary of Labor Ma. Nieves
Roldan-Confesor (now Secretary of Labor) sustained
the reconsideration of POEA. Her Order reads in part —In her Order of 9 October
1991, then Undersecretary Ma. Nieves Roldan-Confesor denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 8
ISSUE: Whether or not a charge of illegal exaction, which is a
serious charge, in an administrative proceeding, should be proven and
substantiated by a clear and convincing evidence.
RULING: The controversy in the present case
centers on the liability of private respondents for illegal exaction, false
advertisement and violation of pertinent laws and rules on recruitment of
overseas workers and the resulting imposition of penalty of suspension of the
Authority of respondent CPSI. Petitioners argue that public respondents gravely
abused their discretion when they violated petitioners' right to administrative
due process by requiring clear and convincing evidence to establish the charge
illegal exaction. This point is well taken. There was grave abuse of discretion.
In the administrative proceedings for
cancellation, revocation or suspension of Authority or License, no rule
requires that testimonies of complainants be corroborated by documentary
evidence, if the charge of unlawful exaction is substantially proven. All
administrative determinations require only substantial proof and not clear and
convincing evidence as erroneously contended by pubic respondents. Clear and convincing proof is ". .
. more than mere preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty as is
required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases . . ." 13
while substantial evidence ". . . consists of more than a mere scintilla
of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance . . . ." 14
Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond
reasonable doubt at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing
evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order.
That the administrative determination
of facts may result in the suspension or revocation of the authority of CPSI
does not require a higher degree of proof. Thus We held in Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v.
Factoran, Jr. 15 — it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are
supported by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings of
fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial evidence is all
that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,
69 Phil. 635, 642; Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 762 [1984]. The POEA,
after assessing the evidence of both parties, found that private respondents
collected from petitioners P30,000.00 as placement fees; consequently, it ruled
that there was illegal exaction. Surprisingly, without altering its findings of
fact, POEA reconsidered its order. In
Castillo v. Court of Appeals, 16
where the appellate court reversed the findings of fact of the trial court by
requiring a higher degree of proof, We held — we
find no strong and cogent reason which justifies the appellate court's
deviation from the findings and conclusions of the trial court. As pointed out
in Hernandez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (189 SCRA 758 [1990]), in agrarian
cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence. Hence, the agrarian
court's findings of fact which went beyond the minimum evidentiary support
demanded by law, that is, supported by substantial evidence, are final and
conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunal. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
challenged Orders of respondent Undersecretary of Labor dated 5 July 1991 and 9
October 1991, as well as the Resolution of respondent POEA dated 4 February
1991, having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction are SET ASIDE, and the original Order of respondent POEA
dated 7 May 1990 is ordered REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
E
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