case digest

G.R. No. 207992               August 11, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROBERTO HOLGADO Y DELA CRUZ AND ANTONIO MISAREZ Y ZARAGA, Accused-appellants.

Facts:

Accused-appellants Roberto Holgado y Dela Cruz (Holgado) and Antonio Misarez y Zaraga (Misarez) were charged in an information dated January 19, 2007.Following their arrest, Holgado and Misarez were charged for violating Sections 5 (sale of dangerous drugs), in view of the plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance supposedly sold by Holgado to PO1 Aure. The charges for violations of Sections 11(possession of dangerous drugs) and 12(possession of drug paraphernalia) of Republic Act No. 9165, were in view of the items supposedly seized in enforcing the search warrant.

After trial, the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 154 found Holgado and Misarez guilty of illegal saleof dangerous drugs (i.e., violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165). They were acquitted of the charges pertaining to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 as the drugs supposedly seized were not introduced in evidence; and the charges relating to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165 asthe paraphernalia to which PO2 Castulo testified to in court were different from those indicated in the inventory supposedly made when the search warrant was enforced.Holgado and Misarez were sentencedto suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a penalty of P1million.

On March 4, 2013, Holgado and Misarez filed their notice of appeal.

On December 27, 2013, Holgado and Misarez filed their joint supplemental brief where they assailed the supposed lack of compliance with the requirements set by the chain of custody of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia as provided by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Issue:

Whether or not Holgado’s and Misarez’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 was established?

Held:

No. It was stated in People v. Morales, that:In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delictior the illicit drug as evidence.

Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner.

After a closer look, the Court finds that the linkages in the chain of custody of the subject item were not clearly established. As can be gleaned from his fore quoted testimony, PO1 Collado failed to provide informative details on how the subject shabu was handled immediately after the seizure. He just claimed that the item was handed to him by the accused in the course of the transaction and, thereafter, he handed it to the investigator.

There is no evidence either on how the item was stored, preserved, labeled, and recorded. PO1 Collado could not even providethe court with the name of the investigator. He admitted that he was not present when it was delivered to the crime laboratory.

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

It is true that Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a proviso to the effect that "noncompliance of (sic) these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." However, the prosecution has not shown that when the buy-bust operation was allegedly conducted on January 17, 2007 and the sachet was supposedly seized and marked, there were "justifiable grounds" for dispensing with compliance with Section 21. Rather, it merely insisted on its self-serving assertion that the integrity of the seized sachet has nevertheless been, supposedly, preserved.

While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a ground for acquittal, this circumstance underscores the need for more exacting compliance with Section 21.

The events of January 17, 2007 should be taken and appreciated as a whole even as they gave rise to four (4) distinct criminal cases which were separately docketed. The reasons for acquitting accused-appellants for the charges of violating Sections 11 and 12 seriously cast doubt, not only on accused-appellants’ own guilt, but more so on the soundness and reliability of the measures taken and procedures followed by the police operatives. These circumstances cast a heavy shadow on the integrity of the operation and the police operatives themselves.

CASE ON: NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

ISIDRO ABLAZA versus REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES             G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010

FACTS:

Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is the brother of Cresencio Ablaza, who filed a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila on the ground that their marriage was celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, rendering the marriage void ab initio for being solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

The RTC dismissed the petition. The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, stating that: action must be filed by the proper party, Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject petition.

ISSUE:        

Whether the petitioner is a real party-in-interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code

HELD:

 YES. A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. Thus, a Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.

Section 2 (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

2) Those filed in relation to marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Since the marriage is governed by the Civil code the court ruled , the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.

Acopiado, Junnaberl M.

CASE ON: HABEAS DATA

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,

vs. ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 202666     September 29, 2014

FACTS:

In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.

Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.

Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.

The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:

1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.

2.  The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;

3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;

They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.

The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD:

YES, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.

Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and

2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.

First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)

The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.

In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.

Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile page):

(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and

(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.

STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).

Acopiado, Junnaberl M.

 

CASE ON: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM

EUGENE C. FIRAZA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 179319   September 18, 2009

FACTS:

Firaza, is a confidential agent of NBI was issued a firearm and he also served as manager of RF Communications in his private capacity and dealt with Rivas, Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Sur. A heated exchange between the two parties ensued at the latter's restaurant regarding the delivery of a defective machine for the Public Calling Office and that Firaza pointed a gun at Rivas. After the incident it was discovered that Fiaza’s permit to carry firearm outside of his residence had already expired. A criminal complaint was filed. Firaza defended that he was on a Mission Order by the NBI and had the authority to carry the firearm.

Firaza was found guilty by the trial court. CA affirms the conviction.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or not Petitioner can be convicted of an offense different from that charged in the Complaint.

b. Whether or not the firearm seized from petitioner after an unlawful search without a warrant is inadmissible in evidence

HELD:

a. YES. SC affirms the decision of CA emphasizing that Firaza’s Mission Order only grants him permit to carry the firearm sixty days from the issuance thereof. Moreover, the offense need not be describe by the statute violated but according to acts and omissions of the accused. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

The Court also ruled that permit to carry firearm cannot be the same as a permit to carry firearm outside of residence. Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, a Mission Order is defined as "a written directive or order issued by government authority as enumerated in Section 5 hereof to persons who are under his supervision and control for a definite purpose or objective during a specified period and to such place or places as therein mentioned which may entitle the bearer thereof to carry his duly issued or licensed firearms outside of residence when so specified therein."

The Mission Order issued to petitioner authorized him to carry firearms "in connection with confidential (illegible) cases assigned to [him]." Admittedly, petitioner was at Rivas' restaurant in connection with a private business transaction. Additionally, the Mission Order did not authorize petitioner to carry his duly issued firearm outside of his residence.

b. NO. The petitioner's claim that he was searched without a warrant to thus render the firearm seized inadmissible in evidence, the same fails. As claimed by petitioner, his firearm was tucked inside his shirt, the plain view doctrine, of which the following requirements which must concur, viz: (1) the law enforcement officer has a prior justification for the intrusion, (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent, and, (3) the illegality of the evidence observed in plain view is apparent to the apprehending officer, justified the intervention by the police officers in petitioner's and Rivas' heated arguments in the course of which they noticed the suspicious bulging object on petitioner's waist to draw them to check what it was.

The Petition for Review is DENIED.

Acopiado, Junnaberl M.