RICKY S. KYAMKO ' digest

G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ vs. JUDGE DEL ROSARIO and SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON

FACTS: The Spouses Sanson filed a complaint before the MCTC for forcible entry with damages against the Tupaz family and about 120 John Does. The Sansons alleged that they own 1 hectare of land as evidenced by the TCT in their name. That the Tupazes, in the morning of April 16, 2006, came in to the property armed with bolos and suspected firearms, with force and intimidation, took possession of the disputed property of the Sansons and built a nipa and bamboo structure. The MCTC ruled in favor of the Sansons, finding that the latter had previous possession of the disputed land since 1993 up to 2006 when the land was taken. The MCTC issued the injunction prayed for. The petitioners (Tupazes)appealed to the RTC. Upon motion of the Sansons, the RTC granted the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction and also issued a writ of demolition against the Tupazes. The MR filed by the Tupazes was denied. So the Tupazes went to the CA through rule 42, to have the Injunction and Writ of Demolition reviewed. While in the CA, the sheriff of Aklan served the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition to the Tupazes. Thus, the Tupazes came before the SC praying for 3 remedies: Certiorari under Rule 65, the issuance of the writ of Habeas Data and the issuance of  the writ of Amparo.

ISSUE : Whether or not petition for habeas data is proper.

RULING: No. The SC found the petition for writ of habeas data as fatally defective in this case.

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that: “a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same”

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the fishing expedition that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. Petition denied.

Submitted By: RICKY S. KYAMKO

Writ of habeas data

It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

ROWENA  PADILLA-RUMBAUA vs. EDWARD RUMBAUA

GR 166738, August 14, 2009

FACTS:  Rowena Padilla and Edward Rumbaua were married. However, they never lived together in one habitat because their marriage was a secret to Edward's family. Rowena filed for nullity of their marriage due to psychological incapacity. She alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise to be true with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her for his mother‘s death; he represented himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman.

The RTC nullified the marriage in its decision. The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals due to prematurity, as it was rendered despite the absence of required certifications from the Solicitor General. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court due to prematurity thus denied the nullification of the parties' marriage. Rowena, then filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying for the Court of Appeal's decision be set aside and RTC's decision be reinstated.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the psychologist was able to prove that the respondent is indeed psychologically incapacitated according to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

RULING: No. The testimony of Dr. Tayag, together with her report, suffers from very basic flaws. 

First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way.  In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.  All these are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.

Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her.  As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, only the petitioner.  Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires, of course,that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.  If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit.  No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondent’s early life and associations, and about events on or about the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter.

Submitted by: RICKY S. KYAMKO