The documents in question are "ancient documents" as envisioned in Sec. 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Further proof of their due execution and authenticity is no longer required.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals wrong­fully applied the "ancient document rule" provided in Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.^[14] The rule states that:

"SEC. 22.  Evidence of execution not necessary. – Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it  would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given."

It is submitted by petitioners that under this rule, for a document to be classified as an "ancient document", it must not only be at least thirty (30) years old but it must also be found in the proper custody and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from suspicion.^[15] Thus, according to petitioners, exhibits "3" and "7", entitled "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" and "Escritura de Venta Absoluta", respectively, can not qualify under the foregoing rule, for the reason that since the "first pages" of said documents do not bear the signatures of the alleged parties thereto, this constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget unlimited alterations.^[16]

We are not persuaded by the contention.  Under the "ancient document rule", for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled:  (1) that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.^[17]

The first document, Exhibit "3", entitled "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" was executed on 7 April 1923 whereas the second document, exhibit "7", entitled "Escritura de Venta Absoluta” was executed on 20 January 1924.  These documents are, there­fore, more than thirty (30) years old.  Both copies of the aforementioned documents were certified as exact copies of the original on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by the Deputy Register of Deeds.  There is a further certification with regard to the Pampango translation of the document of extrajudicial partition which was issued by the Archives division, Bureau of Records Management of the Department of General Services.^[18]

Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind third parties, must be recorded with the appropriate Register of Deeds.  The documents in question, being certified as copies of originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to be found in the proper custody.  Clearly, therefore, the first two (2) requirements of the "ancient document rule" were met.

As to the last requirement that the document must on its face appear to be genuine, petitioners did not present any conclusive evidence to support their allegation of falsification of the said documents.  They merely alluded to the fact that the lack of signatures on the first two (2) pages could have easily led to their substitution.  We cannot uphold this surmise absent any proof whatsoever.  As held in one case, a contract apparently honest and lawful on its face must be treated as such and one who assails the genuineness of such contract must present conclusive evidence of falsification.^[19]

Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that a document must be unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality of the document itself.  The lack of signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any alterations or circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that the documents in question, which were certified as copies of the originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and free from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.

The documents in question are "ancient documents" as envisioned in Sec. 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.  Further proof of their due execution and authenticity is no longer required.  Having held that the documents in question are private writings which are more than thirty (30) years old, come from the proper repository thereof, and are unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion, there is no further need for these documents to fulfill the requirements of the 1903 Notarial Law.  Hence, the other contentions of the petitioners that the documents do not fulfill the mandatory requirements of the Notarial Law^[20] and that the proper person or public official was not presented to testify on his certification of the documents in question,^[21] need not be resolved as they would no longer serve any purpose.

A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence because no person who knows of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.[27] As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as follows: (1) the declaration is made by the deceased under the consciousness of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; and (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant’s death is the subject of inquiry.[28]

That the last words were uttered by the deceased is established by the testimony of Corazon,^[25] thus:

Q -What did you do when you saw David Ambre laid flat from (sic) the ground?
A - I called for his wife because he wanted to tell something, sir.

Q -Who wanted to tell something?
A -David Ambre, sir.

Q -Do you mean to tell that David Ambre still alive when you saw him? (sic)
A -Yes, sir.

Q -And what did you do when you saw David Ambre wanting to say something?
A -I pulled his wife and we put our ear(s) near the mouth of David Ambre, sir.

Q -And what happened next when you went near the body of David Ambre?
A -The wife asked from David Ambre who shot him, sir.

Q -And what did David Ambre tell his wife?
A -He told ‘it was Pare Pran’, sir.

Q -Do you know this Pare Pran being referred to by David Ambre?
A -Yes, sir.

Q - If he is in Court today, can you point at him?
A -Yes, sir.

Q -Will you point at the Pare Pran you mentioned who is now in Court today?
A – There, sir.

 

It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by the decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence -- not so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is at hand.^[29] This may be proven by the statement of the deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedent’s wounds, or other relevant circumstances.^[30]

In the case at bar, the victim’s declaration consisted of the words “Pare Pran.” Under the circumstances, however, he could not have been expected to articulate his awareness of something so obvious -- the inevitability of his demise -- or to have the energy to do so. The nature and extent of said injuries underscored the seriousness of his condition and they later proved by themselves that the utterances of the deceased were made under a consciousness of an impending death.^[31] That his demise thereafter came swiftly, although not instantaneously, further emphasized the victim’s realization of the hopelessness of his recovery.^[32]

We stress that when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. It was the height of jocularity for appellant to have suggested that it was highly possible that the deceased mentioned his name to Lolita so that she would tell him to come to decedent’s succor, or for another reason. Such conjecture finds no basis on record. On the other hand, this speculation is belied by the clear, straightforward testimonies of Lolita and Corazon. Despite several attempts, counsel for the defense failed to make Lolita admit that the victim mentioned appellant’s name for a vague and undefined purpose, other than to identify his assailant.^[33] Lolita adamantly stuck to her testimony that her husband told her that he was shot by “Pare Pran.”^[34] The unrebutted testimony of Corazon further clarified that the victim said those words in answer to his wife’s question as to who shot him.^[35]

The deceased’s condemnatory antemortem statement naming appellant as his assailant deserves full faith and credit and is admissible in evidence as a dying declaration.

Furthermore, the same declaration was also properly admitted in evidence by the trial court as part of res gestae, and rightly so. A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as such when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.^[36] The utterance of the victim satisfies these three requisites. Clearly, it is admissible as part of the res gestae.

mak jerome labad case digest

G.R. No. L-12435          November 9, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REGINO BLANCO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

The defendant and appellant was convicted originally in the court of the justice of peace of the municipality of Castillejos, Province of Zambales, and fined P25 on a charge of violation of an ordinance of that municipality prohibiting and penalizing the obstruction of the public highways. On appeal to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Zambales, the accused was again convicted and fined P25. The case in before us on appeal from the judgment entered in the Court of First Instance.  On this appeal counsel relies wholly upon his contentions —

First. That a doubt arises as to whether the ordinance in question was in force at the date of its alleged violation. Section 9 of the ordinance reads as follows:

Esta ordenanza entrara en vigor desde su aprobacion por la honorable Junta Provincial. (This ordinance will take effect from the date of its approval by the honorable provincial board.)

Counsel contends that since no affirmative proof was offered in the court below as to the date of approval of the ordinance, the court had no evidence before it on which to base a finding that the ordinance was in force at the date of its alleged violation.

It is contented further, that the ordinance having been enacted under authority of the provisions of article 39, subsection (j) of Act No. 82 (The Municipal Code), and that Code having been repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code, the ordinance should be deemed to have been abrogated at the same time

ISSUES:

1.       Whether or not the Court of the Justice of the Peace should take judicial notice of the Municipal Ordinances in force in the municipality where it sits.

2.       Whether or not the Court of First Instance may take judicial notice in an appeal from the judgment of a Court of the Justice of the Peace wherein the case originated.

3.       Whether or not the ordinance is deemed to have been abrogated.

RULING:           We have no doubt, however, that the court of a justice of the peace may, and should, take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality wherein it sits; and we are furthermore of the opinion that in an appeal from the judgment of a court of the justice of the peace the appellate courts may take judicial notice of municipal ordinances in force in the municipality wherein the case originated, and to that end may adopt the findings and conclusions of the court of the justice of the peace in that regard as developed by the record, in the absence of affirmative proof that such findings and conclusions are erroneous. (U. S. vs. Hernandez, 31 Phil. Rep., 342; Cf. sec. 51, Manila Charter.)

The doctrine is well stated by Judge McQuillin in the following citation from his work on Municipal Corporations, and we are of the opinion that under the judicial system in force in these Islands, the rule which should be adopted is that set forth in the last paragraph of the citation as the "better view" with regard to the matter dealt therein:

Par. 861. While, as we have seen, municipal or city courts will take notice of the ordinances and resolutions passed and in force within the jurisdiction of the court, without being pleaded and proved, in many jurisdictions it is held, and the weight of authority seems to be that, on appeal from such courts to a state the latter will not take judicial notice of ordinances unless they have been pleaded in the municipal or city court and set out in the record. But the better view appears to be that where an action for the violation of an ordinance has been commenced in a municipal or police court and the case is appealed, the latter court, whether state or municipal, will take judicial notice of the incorporation of the city and of the existence or substance of its ordinances.

Finally, It is sufficient answer to this contention to indicate that the Administrative Code, while it repealed the Municipal Code, conferred upon and confirmed to all duly organized municipalities the power to enact and maintain ordinances such as that now under consideration, in substantially the same language as that found in the Municipal Code. (Cf. Administrative Code, sec. 2242, subsecs. (e) and (h). Section 3 of the Administrative Code expressly provides that the provisions of that Code incorporating prior laws shall be deemed to be made in continuation thereof, and to be in the nature of amendments thereto, without prejudice to any right already accrued. It follows that the enactment of the Administrative Code did not have effect of abrogating or repealing a municipal ordinance enacted and maintained in the exercise of a power confirmed to the municipality by the code itself. We find no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the accused; and conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

case digest, mark labad

G.R. No. 140405             March 4, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. MAJOR EMILIO COMILING et. al.

FACTS:

On September 2, 1995, Ysiong Chua, the owner of Masterline Grocery and his helper Mario were about to close the store when someone knocked on the door to buy some cigarettes. As soon as Mario opened the door, three masked, armed men suddenly barged into the store and announced a hold-up. Ysiong darted to the adjacent Good Taste Bakery and out to the Tayug Police Station to report the incident.

SPO1 Rolando Torio, PO3 Erwil Pastor and SPO4 Emilio Nagui of the Tayug Police Station rushed to the crime scene. While SPO1 Torio was standing outside the store's door, he heard three gunshots coming from inside the store, all directed towards Bonifacio Street. PO3 Pastor was then on the street while Nagui was some 50 meters away. PO3 Pastor ran and hid behind a concrete marker, then moved westward as if to return to the police headquarters. Unfortunately, in his attempt to flee, PO3 Pastor was shot in the face. He was rushed to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital. On September 6, 1995, PO3 Pastor died from the injury he suffered.

Meanwhile, Ysiong discovered that he lost three gold necklaces worth P26,000 and cash amounting to P81,000.

On September 26, 1995, bothered by her conscience, prosecution witness Naty Panimbaan decided to reveal to police authorities what she knew about the case. During the trial, she testified that she was present in all the four meetings in which the plan to rob the Masterline Grocery was hatched.

On the other hand, all the accused denied culpability for the felony. Each of them claimed to be somewhere else at the time the crime happened on September 2, 1995. The witnesses for the defense also tried to impugn the credibility of the lead witness for the prosecution, Naty Panimbaan.

On September 1, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision, convicting MAJ. EMILIO COMILING, GERALDO GALINGAN alias "BongandRICKY MENDOZA,

Appellants Comiling and Galingan filed separate appeal briefs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court is correct in convicting the accused of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

RULING:

Appellant Comiling, assails his conviction by asserting that the killing of PO3 Erwil Pastor happened after the robbery took place, hence the "homicide" could not have been a necessary means of committing the robbery. Neither could it be said that the robbery produced another offense.

The argument is specious. As correctly stressed by the Solicitor General, robbery with homicide is a "special complex crime." It is enough that in order to sustain a conviction for this crime, the killing, which is designated as "homicide," has a direct relation to the robbery, regardless of whether the latter takes place before or after the killing. For as long as the killing occurs during or because of the heist, even if the killing is merely accidental, robbery with homicide is committed.

Appellant Comiling likewise contends that Naty's testimony was inadmissible against him to prove conspiracy because of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Admission by conspirator. – The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

This rule prescribes that any declaration made by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy is admissible against him alone but not against his co-conspirators unless the conspiracy is first shown by other independent evidence.

According to Comiling, Naty's testimony showed that she was also a conspirator, thus, the existence of conspiracy must be shown by evidence other than Naty's admission. As there was no independent proof of conspiracy except the testimony of Naty, the latter's testimony concerning appellant's participation in the conspiracy was inadmissible against him. This contention is misplaced. The res inter alios acta rule refers only to extrajudicial declarations or admissions and not to testimony given on the witness stand where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.⁸ In the present case, Naty's admission implicating appellant Comiling was made in open court and therefore may be taken in evidence against him.

            While we are convinced that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, we cannot impose the penalty of death on them. Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code,²⁴ the crime of robbery carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of band, evident premeditation, craft and disguise against appellants. However, these circumstances were not specifically alleged in the information as required under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hence, inasmuch as no aggravating and mitigating circumstances can be deemed to have attended the commission of the offense, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Emilio Comiling, Geraldo Galingan and accused Ricky Mendoza are hereby found guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

MARK JEROME C. LABAD case digest

MANALO vs. ROLDAN-CONFESOR

G.R. No. 102358 November 19, 1992

FACTS:                  In response to a newspaper advertisement looking for a couple to work as driver and tutor cum baby sitter, petitioners Vicente and Gloria Manalo went to Career Planners Specialists International, Inc. (CPSI), a licensed service contracting firm owned by private respondents, the spouses Victor and Elnora Fernandez. After the requisite interview and testing, they were hired to work for a family in Saudi Arabia. According to petitioners, a placement fee of P40,000.00 was imposed as a precondition for the processing of their papers. They paid only P30,000.00 in cash and executed a promissory note for the balance. Then they were allowed by respondent Elnora Fernandez to sign their contract papers but did not issue a receipt for the placement fee despite demand. Shortly before boarding their flight to Saudi Arabia, petitioners were handed their contracts. According to Gloria, she was surprised to discover that her position had been changed to that of domestic help. However, a CPSI employee assured her that the change was only for the purpose of facilitating her departure and did not in any way alter her employment as tutor. Incidentally, CPSI provided petitioners with the Travel Exit Pass (TEP) of Filipino Manpower Services, Inc. (FILMAN), a duly licensed recruitment agency. Contrary to the representation of her recruiter, Gloria was actually hired as a domestic help and not as a tutor, so that after working for only twenty-five (25) days in Jeddah, she returned to Manila. Soon after, Vicente also resigned from his work and followed her home. He could not stand the unbearable working conditions of his employment. However, before leaving, he had to execute a promissory note to cover his plane fare which respondent Victor Fernandez advanced. Vicente also had to sign a quitclaim in favor of CPSI and his employer.

Petitioners sued private respondents before the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) charging them with illegal exaction, ¹ false adverstisement, ² and violation of other pertinents laws, rules and regulations. They demanded the refund of the amount exacted from them, plus payment of moral damages and the imposition of administrative sanctions. ³Mainly, on the basis of the transcripts of petitioners' testimonies, ⁴ the POEA issued its Order of 7 May 1990 giving more weight and credence to petitioners' version thus —   After a careful evaluation of the facts and the evidence presented, we are more inclined to give weight to complainants' posture. Complainants' version of the case spontaneously presented in their pleadings is, to our mind, more convincing than respondent's stand. Moreover, the manner by which complainants narrated the whole incident inspired belief in the allegation that respondent Career is indeed guilty of illegal exaction. On the other hand, we hold FILMAN liable for allowing its document such as the TEP to be used by other agency. Respondent's defense that there is nothing wrong in this because FILMAN is a sister company of CAREER does not merit consideration because such practice is not allowed under the POEA Rules and Regulations. A check with our records, however, showed that respondent FILMAN had been put in the list of forever banned agencies effective April 5, 1989. WHEREFORE, . . . the Authority of Career Planners Specialist(s) International is hereby suspended for four (4) months or in lieu thereof, a fine of P40,000.00 is hereby imposed for illegal exaction on two counts plus restitution of the amount of P28,714.00 to herein complainants in both instances. Filipino Manpower Services, Inc. is hereby meted a fine of P40,000.00 for two counts of misrepresentation. Its perpetual disqualification from recruitment activities is hereby reiterated. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and on 4 February 1991, POEA issued a resolution setting aside its earlier order stating that —

It is worth mentioning at this point that our sole basis for holding respondent Career liable for illegal exaction was the uncorroborated testimony of the complainants. As we have consistently held, (the) charge of illegal exaction is a serious charge which may cause the suspension or cancellation of the authority or license of the offending agency. Hence, it should be proven and substantiated by a clear and convincing evidence. The penalty of suspension imposed upon respondent Career Planners Specialist(s) International, Inc. pursuant to our Order dated May 7, 1990 is hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the alternative fine of P40,000.00 which was paid under protest by respondent is hereby ordered refunded to them. ⁶Petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Labor. On 5 July 1991, then Undersecretary of Labor Ma. Nieves Roldan-Confesor (now Secretary of Labor) sustained the reconsideration of POEA. Her Order reads in part —In her Order of 9 October 1991, then Undersecretary Ma. Nieves Roldan-Confesor denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 8

ISSUE:                 Whether or not a charge of illegal exaction, which is a serious charge, in an administrative proceeding, should be proven and substantiated by a clear and convincing evidence.

RULING:             The controversy in the present case centers on the liability of private respondents for illegal exaction, false advertisement and violation of pertinent laws and rules on recruitment of overseas workers and the resulting imposition of penalty of suspension of the Authority of respondent CPSI. Petitioners argue that public respondents gravely abused their discretion when they violated petitioners' right to administrative due process by requiring clear and convincing evidence to establish the charge illegal exaction. This point is well taken. There was grave abuse of discretion.

In the administrative proceedings for cancellation, revocation or suspension of Authority or License, no rule requires that testimonies of complainants be corroborated by documentary evidence, if the charge of unlawful exaction is substantially proven. All administrative determinations require only substantial proof and not clear and convincing evidence as erroneously contended by pubic respondents. Clear and convincing proof is ". . . more than mere preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases . . ." ¹³ while substantial evidence ". . . consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance . . . ." ¹⁴ Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order.

That the administrative determination of facts may result in the suspension or revocation of the authority of CPSI does not require a higher degree of proof. Thus We held in Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr. ¹⁵ —  it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642; Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 762 [1984]. The POEA, after assessing the evidence of both parties, found that private respondents collected from petitioners P30,000.00 as placement fees; consequently, it ruled that there was illegal exaction. Surprisingly, without altering its findings of fact, POEA reconsidered its order. In Castillo v. Court of Appeals, ¹⁶ where the appellate court reversed the findings of fact of the trial court by requiring a higher degree of proof, We held —                          we find no strong and cogent reason which justifies the appellate court's deviation from the findings and conclusions of the trial court. As pointed out in Hernandez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (189 SCRA 758 [1990]), in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence. Hence, the agrarian court's findings of fact which went beyond the minimum evidentiary support demanded by law, that is, supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunal.  WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Orders of respondent Undersecretary of Labor dated 5 July 1991 and 9 October 1991, as well as the Resolution of respondent POEA dated 4 February 1991, having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction are SET ASIDE, and the original Order of respondent POEA dated 7 May 1990 is ordered REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

 E