Tome ;miguel 38/50
Tenorio 37
Adorable 36
Zulueta ;mayormita; manlangit; lumanta 35
Legaspi 33
Aliman 31
Ozoa 30
Flores 29
Barbaso ;lacaya; nieves;dionglay 28
Estologa 27 brasileño
Jumanquin 26
=============================cut off score
Dimpas 24
Garcia 23
Limen 22
Campomanes 20
Ebillo 18
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 28
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y LIM, Defendant-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CRUZ, J.:
The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133 dated October 13, 1987, convicting Mario Tandoy of the crime of violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is before us on appeal.
The information against the accused-appellant read as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of May 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell eight (8) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops, two (2) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops, which are prohibited drug, for and in consideration of P20.00.
Upon arraignment, Tandoy entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, Judge Buenaventura J. Guerrero rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which declared:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Mario Tandoy y Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and cost.: nad
The marijuana confiscated in this case is declared confiscated and forfeited and ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal.
SO ORDERED.
The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in this appeal:
1. The Court a quo erred in finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite lack of evidence to prove that he sold marijuana to the poseur-buyer.
2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.
The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows:
On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de la Cruz, and Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de la Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines, Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay Singkamas, Makati.
The target area was a store along the said street, and Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone near the store waiting for any pusher to approach. The other members of the team strategically positioned themselves. Soon, three men approached Singayan. One of them was the accused-appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and there — two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas and Candolesas made a body search of the accused-appellant and took from him the marked money, as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed leaves.: nad
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati Police Station, for investigation by Detective Marvin Pajilan. The accused-appellant chose to remain silent after having been informed of his constitutional rights.
These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz, Singayan and Pajilan. 1 Microscopic, chemical and chromotographic examination was performed on the confiscated marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles, forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who later testified that the findings were positive. The marijuana was offered as an exhibit. 2
As might be expected, the accused-appellant had a different story. His testimony was that from 1:30 to 4:00 p.m. of the day in question, he was playing "cara y cruz" with 15 other persons along Solchuaga St. when somebody suddenly said that policemen were making arrests. The players grabbed the bet money and scampered. However, he and a certain Danny (another "cara y cruz" player) were caught and taken to the Narcotics Command headquarters in Makati. There they were mauled and warned that if they did not point to their fellow pushers, they would rot in jail. The accused-appellant denied he had sold marijuana to Singayan and insisted the bills taken from him were the bet money he had grabbed at the "cara y cruz" game. 3
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to listen to their respective testimonies, gave more credence to the statements of the arresting officers. Applying the presumption that they had performed their duties in a regular manner, it rejected Tandoy's uncorroborated allegation that he had been manhandled and framed. Tandoy had not submitted sufficient evidence of his charges, let alone his admission that he had no quarrel with the peace officers whom he had met only on the day of his arrest.
In People v. Patog, 4 this Court held:
When there is no evidence and nothing to indicate the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
Tandoy submits that "one will not sell this prohibited drug to another who is a total stranger until the seller is certain of the identity of the buyer."
The conjecture must be rejected.: nad
In People v. Paco, 5 this Court observed:
Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is made, the illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of other people may not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as these factors may even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall (People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA 329; People v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 252), in front of a store (People vs. Khan, supra) along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 67609, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 259), and in front of a house (People v. Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February 23, 1988).
As the Court has also held, "What matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves." 6
Under the second assigned error, the accused-appellant invokes the best evidence rule and questions the admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked P10.00 bill.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted that contention thus:
This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission of the P10.00 bill marked money (Exh. E-2-A) which, according to the appellant, is excluded under the best evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy. Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence except in the five (5) instances mentioned therein.:-cralaw
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. (Cf. Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-77; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78.)
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the conviction of the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately proved by the testimony of the police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal omission.
We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt. He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those who would visit the scourge of drug addiction upon our people.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the accused-appellant.: nad
SO ORDERED
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Endnotes
1. TSN, October 1, 1986; TSN, November 19, 1986; TSN, January 7, 1987.
2. Exhibit "D."
3. TSN, February 16, 1987, p. 6; Exhibit "E."
4. 144 SCRA 429.
5. 170 SCRA 681.
6. People v. Rodriguez y Teves, 172 SCRA 742.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 107606 June 20, 1996
MERCEDES N. ABELLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO COLARINA, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
FRANCISCO, J.:p
On May 26, 1987, petitioner Mercedes N. Abella, as lessor, and private respondent Conrado Colarina, as lessee, signed a contract of lease 1 of a portion of Juanabel Building situated at Elias Angeles Street, Naga City. The duration of the contract is from "July 1, 1987 until July 1, 1991" 2 or for a term of four (4) years 3 with a stipulated monthly rental of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00). 4 Upon the signing of the contract, Colarina paid an amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to Abella which the latter acknowledged by issuing the corresponding receipt. 5 Intending to use the premises for his pawnshop business, Colarina introduced thereon certain improvements 6 for which he spent Sixty Eight Thousand Pesos (P68,000.00). Colarina paid the monthly rental on a regular basis but discontinued payment from November 1987 to April 1988. 7 Thereafter, Abella then made repeated demands to pay with notice of extrajudicial rescission pursuant to paragraph thirteen (13) 8 of the lease contract which were all unheeded. Thus, Abella took possession of the premises on May 1, 1988, with the assistance of the Naga City PNP and some Barangay officials 9 who made an inventory 10 of all the items found therein.
On May 5, 1988, Colarina filed an action for "enforcement of contract of lease with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages" 11 against Abella before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga. After trial, the lower court among others ordered: (1) Abella to return the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) less Eighteen Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) representing unpaid rental from November-December, 1987, to April, 1988 or for a period of six (6) months, or the sum of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND Pesos (P22,000.00) to Colarina together with the destroyed and removed materials and improvements introduced by him in the premises leased; and (2) the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. 12
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered petitioner Abella: (1) to restore to Colarina the possession of the leased premises under the same terms and conditions stated in the contract of lease; (2) to restore in the premises the improvements introduced by Colarina which were demolished or removed by Abella or to pay the value thereof in the sum of P68,000.00, with interest until fully paid; and (3) to pay the costs of the Suit. 13 Aggrieved, Abella filed this petition for review on certiorari faulting the respondent Court of Appeals with five assigned errors which basically dwell on the following issues, to wit: (1) whether or not respondent Colarina violated the contract of lease warranting its extrajudicial rescission; and (2) whether or not possession of the premises may properly be restored to Colarina.
Anent the first issue. It is not disputed that petitioner received the sum of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) from Colarina. 14 Petitioner and Colarina, however, are at loggerheads with respect to the purpose of such payment. The trial court agreed with the petitioner that the amount represents only a "goodwill money" given to the latter by Colarina in payment for the privilege to occupy the vacant portion of Juanabel Building. 15 On the other hand, the respondent Court of Appeals sided with Colarina and held that the same is an "advance deposit to answer for any rental which Colarina may fail to pay." 16 We uphold the findings of the respondent Court of Appeals.
Our careful review of the record reveals that Colarina did not violate the subject contract of lease with respect to his rental obligation in view of his payment of forty thousand pesos. Reproduced hereunder are the contents of the receipt acknowledging the acceptance by the petitioner of the said amount of forty thousand pesos:
RECEIVED FROM MR. CONRADO O. COLARINA THE SUM OF FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) AS ADVANCE DEPOSIT, TO ANSWER FOR ANY RENTAL WHICH MR. CONRADO COLARINA MAY FAIL TO PAY DURING THE TERM OF THE LEASE AS PER CONTRACT, DATED 26TH DAY OF MAY, 1987 NOTARIZED BEFORE NOTARY PUBLIC OSCAR VILLAMORA, DOC. NO. 398; PAGE NO. 80; BOOK NO. 9, SERIES OF 1987, THIS 26TH DAY OF MAY, 1987, AT NAGA CITY. (Emphasis supplied.)
(Sgd.) MERCEDES N. ABELLA 17
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that "if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control". 18 The above-quoted receipt is clear and unequivocal that the disputed amount is an advance deposit which will answer for any rental that Colarina may fail to pay. No amount of extrinsic aids are required and no further extraneous sources are necessary
in order to ascertain the parties' intent, determinable as it is, from the receipt itself. 19
We are, thus, more convinced that the receipt expresses truly the parties' intent on the purpose of said payment as against the oral testimony of the petitioner that said amount is but only a "goodwill money". Without any doubt, oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. 20 "I would sooner trust the smallest slip of paper for truth", said Judge Limpkin of Georgia, "than the strongest and most retentive memory ever bestowed on mortal man." 21 This is especially true in this case where such oral testimony is given by the petitioner himself, a party to the case who has an interest in its outcome, and by Jesus Hipolito, a witness who claimed to have received a commission from the petitioner. 22 In addition, the trial court itself has found that this receipt is genuine when it brushed aside the petitioner's claim that her signature appearing thereon was a forgery. 23 The authenticity of the receipt further enhances its probative value as against the oral testimony of the petitioner and of her witness.
We also find unmeritorious petitioner's contention that the receipt failed to reflect her true intention warranting a reformation thereof. Petitioner, being of age and a businesswoman, is presumed to have acted with due care and to have signed the receipt in question with full knowledge of its contents and import. 24 Equally unmeritorious is petitioner's insistence that Colarina procured her signature "thru fraud and any other deceitful means", 25 an issue which was never raised below. It is a settled rule that an issue which was not threshed out below may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Moreover, no iota of evidence was ever adduced at the trial to support her allegation of fraud. The reformation of said receipt simply lacks basis.
Hence, we rule that respondent Colarina was not yet in arrears with his rental payment when petitioner took possession of the leased premises on May 1, 1988. Accordingly, petitioner's rescission of the subject contract of lease was improper.
The second issue, however, has been rendered moot and academic by the timely expiration of the term of the subject contract of lease on July 1, 1991. 26 Colarina, therefore, has no more right to be restored to the possession of the leased premises, said right being coterminous with the term of the contract.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. Petitioner Mercedes N. Abella is hereby ordered to:
1. return to private respondent Conrado Colarina the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) less Eighteen Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) (unpaid rental from November, 1987 to April, 1988 or for a period of six (6) months), or the sum of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND Pesos (P22,000.00);
2. pay private respondent Colarina the sum of Sixty Eight Thousand Pesos (P68,000.00), representing the value of the improvements demolished, with legal interest reckoned from May 1, 1988, the date when petitioner took possession of the premises, until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Annex "A-1", Rollo, pp. 40-42.
2 Id., p. 40.
3 Both the RTC-Naga and the Court of Appeals' decisions stated five (5) years.
4 Annex "A-1", supra, at p. 40.
5 Annex "A-2"; Rollo, p. 43.
6 Construction of mezzanine, toilet, installation of telephone lines and electric lights: Rollo, p. 77.
7 Id; Rollo, p. 77.
8 13. That violation of LESSEE and/or their agents and employees of any terms and conditions, rules and regulations in this contract or promulgated by the LESSOR shall automatically cancel this contract without the need for any previous demand or notice or any court action for rescission or ejectment, and the LESSOR and/or her agents and employees shall have the right to enter, take immediate possession of, secure and/or padlock the premises leased and to exclude LESSEE, their agents and employees, etc. therefrom, and to retain the contents thereof, including furnitures, equipments, utensils, goods, stocks, personal belongings, appliances, . . . .
9 Petition, p. 5, Rollo, p. 11.
10 Exhibit 9.
11 Annex "A"; Rollo, pp. 36-39.
12 Decision dated April 1, 1991, RTC-Naga Branch 25, Presided by Judge Jose D. Pajarillo, p. 8; Rollo, p. 65.
13 Decision promulgated on September 30, 1992, Court of Appeals, First Division, penned by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul with Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Segundino G. Chua, concurring p. 6-7; Rollo, p. 80-81.
14 Pre-trial Order dated August 31, 1989, p. 1; Rollo, p. 56.
15 RTC Decision, supra, at p. 63; Petition, supra, at p. 16.
16 Court of Appeals Decision, supra, at p. 79.
17 Annex "A-2"; Rollo, p. 43.
18 Article 1370, Civil Code of the Philippines; Syquia v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 624 (1993); Lufthansa German Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 708 (1992); Cachola, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 496 (1992).
19 Honrado, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 326 (1991).
20 See De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 612 (1992).
21 Miller v. Cotten, 5 Ga. 341, 349.
22 Petition, supra, at p. 19.
23 RTC Decision, supra, at p. 64.
24 See BA Finance Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 217 SCRA 261 (1993); Sierra v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 785 (1992); Tan Tua Sia v. Yu Biao Santua, 56 Phil. 707 (1932).
25 Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 15; Rollo, p. 127.
26 Annex "A-1", supra, at p. 40.
