It Should Be Stressed That The Right To Appeal Is Neither A Natural Right Nor A Part Of Due Process. It Is Merely A Procedural Remedy Of Statutory Origin And May Be Exercised Only In The Manner Prescribed By The Provisions Of Law Authorizing Its Exercise…

The Facts:

On November 25, 2008, Corazon was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of the crime of Estafa. According to her, she received the decision on January 13, 2009 and filed a timely motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied on May 20, 2009, copy of the order of which she received on July 31, 2009. She then filed her Notice of Appeal on August 3, 2009, which the RTC, by order dated June 29, 2010, denied for allegedly being belatedly filed. Because of this, Corazon thru counsel filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, assailing the denial of her Notice of Appeal, the Decision convicting her of Estafa, as well as the Motion For Reconsideration/New Trial filed by her.

The Court’s ruling:

We deny the petition.

At the outset, the Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities which this Court cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioner’s cause. It appears that petitioner assails not only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be discussed below, the petition is bound to fail, because of petitioner’s complete disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the Court.

First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit:

SEC. 2. Where to appeal. – The appeal may be taken as follows:

x x x x

(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and

x x x x

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. – (a)  The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x x x.

Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself[1]. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken[2]. The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal[3].

The Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the task of determining under which rule a petition should fall. It has likewise warned lawyers to follow the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to the client’s cause[4].

Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts[5]. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed[6]. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case[7].

Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the trial court’s decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration.  In utter disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her motion for reconsideration[8]. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment[9]. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition[10].

The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation of the petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders, resolutions, decisions, pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that are material and relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying on the case records of the lower court[11].

Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioner’s repeated disregard of the Rules and the Court’s lawful orders. In a Resolution[12] dated September 15, 2010, the Court required petitioner to fully comply with the Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:
x x x x

2. petitioner to FULLY COMPLY with the Rules by submitting: (a) an affidavit of service on the RTC and on the Office of the Solicitor General; (b) a proper verification in accordance with Section 1, Rule 45 in relation to Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules, and a valid certification of non-forum shopping in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7, with properly accomplished jurat showing that the affiant exhibited before the notary public at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the affiant as required under Sections 6 and 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended by Court En Banc Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; and (c) her counsel’s contact details pursuant to the En Banc Resolution dated 10 July 2007 in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC, all within five (5) days from notice.  x x x[13]

Despite the directive, no such compliance was made prompting the Court to require her counsel to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for non-compliance. Records likewise show that petitioner also failed to file a Reply to respondent’s Comment to the petition.

On August 2, 2011, petitioner’s counsel submitted his explanation for non-compliance and asked for more time within which to comply with the Court’s resolution, because of heavy workload and his failure to contact petitioner who apparently transferred residence. In a Resolution[14] dated August 31, 2011, the Court, while granting the motion for extension requested, admonished petitioner’s counsel for the unsatisfactory explanation. Yet again, petitioner failed to file the required Reply prompting the Court again to ask for the counsel’s explanation why he should not be disciplinary dealt with. Petitioner’s counsel claimed that he could not prepare the required reply because the documents needed had been destroyed by typhoon “Pedring.” He, likewise, pointed out that he exerted earnest efforts to locate petitioner but he could not do so at that point[15]. After the Court required him again to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for not complying with the Court’s resolutions, and since his efforts to communicate with his client proved futile, he asked the Court that he be relieved of all his duties and responsibilities as counsel on record[16]. In a Resolution[17] dated December 10, 2012, we required petitioner herself to comment thereon, but no such compliance was made to date.

Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections in order to serve better the ends of justice[18] It is the duty of the counsel to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, to determine which court has appellate jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for appeal[19]. Any error in compliance may be fatal to the client’s cause[20]. It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise[21]. The requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded at whim. In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, parties have to abide by these rules with greater fidelity in order to facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases[22].

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 193217, February 26, 2014, CORAZON MACAPAGAL, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.


[1] Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, 433 Phil. 844, 854 (2002).
[2] Id.
[3] Id. at 855.
[4] Id. at 856.
[5] Heirs of Teofilo Gaudiano v. Benemerito, 545 Phil. 311, 319 (2007).
[6] Id. at 319-320.
[7] Id. at 320.
[8] Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 4 reads:

SEC. 4. Contents of the petition. – The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by petitioner, and shall x x x (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the  court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition; x x x.
[9] Spouses Lanaria v. Planta, 563 Phil. 400, 414 (2007).
[10] Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 5.
[11] B.E. San Diego, Inc. v. Alzul, 551. Phil. 841, 860 (2007).
[12] Rollo, pp. 27-28.
[13] Id. at 27.  (Emphasis in the original)
[14] Id. at 54-55.
[15] Id. at 57-61.
[16] d. at 65-68.
[17] Id. at 70.
[18] Hilario v. People, G.R. No. 161070, April 14, 2008, 551 SCRA 191, 203.
[19] ] Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, supra note 10, at 855.
[20] Id. at 856.
[21] Heirs of Teofilo Gaudiano v. Benemerito, supra note 14, at 320; id. at 867.
[22] Basuel v. Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), 526 Phil. 608, 614 (2006).

Where A Party Has The Means In His Power Of Rebutting And Explaining The Evidence Adduced Against Him, If It Does Not Tend To The Truth, The Omission To Do So Furnishes A Strong Inference Against Him.

The Facts:

Adriano and Wenifreda (Tambuyat), married since 1965, owned several properties, among them a parcel of lot bought by Adriano.  The deed of sale was signed by Adriano as vendee, while Rosario (Baguis) signed as one of the witnesses.  When the title to the lot was issued (TCT No. T-145321(M), however, it was registered in the name of “ADRIANO TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BAGUIS”.  When Adriano died intestate in 1998, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of TCT T-145321, alleging that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano; TCT T-145321 was erroneously registered; that Rosario is married to one Eduardo Nolasco; and the registration was a result of the insidious machination of Rosario with the assistance of the broker.  She prayed that TCT T-145321 be cancelled and a new one issued indicating her as the spouse married to Adriano.  Opposing, Rosario denied that the property was acquired by the spouses Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage; that it was she who bought it using her personal funds; she and Adriano were married on September 2, 1988 and lived together as husband and wife, producing a son named Adrian; that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the proceeding as it is merely a summary proceeding and a thorough determination will have to be made if the property is conjugal or personal.

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favour of Wenifreda.  It ordered the cancellation of TCT T-145321 and issuance of a new one indicating Wenifreda as married to Adriano, as well as the payment of damages in her favour.  It ruled that Section 108^⁠1 of PD 1529 required court authorisation for any alteration or amendment if any mistake, error or omission was made in entering a certificate of title.  It was proved that Wenifreda is the surviving spouse of Adriano; that Rosario had a prior subsisting marriage to Nolasco, and TCT No. T-145321 was issued with her erroneously indicated as Adriano’s spouse.  Adrian’s filiation may not be proved in a land registration case.

On appeal to the CA, the later ruled that a separate and different proceeding is not necessary to resolve her opposition to the petition in the case as she in effect acquiesced and freely submitted her issues to the court to prove her allegations; the distinction between the trial court sitting as a land registration court and as a general court had been eliminated by PD 1529; Adriano and Rosario were not co-owners of the property as both of them had prior subsisting marriages at the time of their adulterous relations; Adriano alone was the vendee in the deed of sale and no evidence was proved that Rosario contributed to the purchase of the property.

Rosario elevated her case to the Supreme Court.  She argues that the case is essentially a partition of Adriano’s estate which deprives her and her son of their share; Section 108 cannot apply to the case as there were contentious issues which need to be resolved by a  court of general jurisdiction;  based on the evidence, she acquired the property using her own funds.

The Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in allowing the cancellation of TCT T-143521 to indicate Wenifreda as the surviving spouse of Adriano.

The Court’s ruling:

The Court denies the Petition.

The trial court in LRC Case No. P-443-99 was not precluded from resolving the objections raised by Banguis in her opposition to the petition for cancellation; a separate action need not be filed in a different court exercising general jurisdiction. Banguis should be considered to have acquiesced and freely submitted the case to the trial court for complete determination on her opposition, when she went to trial and adduced and submitted all her relevant evidence to the court. “The active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.”^⁠2 

Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances: (1) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2) when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (3) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (4) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (5) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (6) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (7) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.^⁠3  The present case falls under (3) and (7), where the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan committed an error in issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of “Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis” when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful spouse.

Proceedings under Section 108 are “summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues.”^⁠4  Banguis’s opposition to the petition for cancellation ostensibly raised controversial issues involving her claimed ownership and the hereditary rights of Adrian, which she claims to be her son by Adriano. However, apart from the fact that evidence of Banguis’s ownership is irrelevant in Wenifreda’s petition, the evidence apparently indicates that Banguis could not be the owner of the subject property, while a resolution of the issue of succession is irrelevant and unnecessary to the complete determination of Wenifreda’s petition. The Court is thus led to the conclusion that the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan simply erred in including Banguis in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse.

As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Documentary evidence – among others, the parties’ respective marriage contracts, which, together with marriage certificates, are considered the primary evidence of a marital union^⁠5 – indicates that Adriano was married to Wenifreda, while Banguis was married to Nolasco – and both marriages were subsisting at the time of the acquisition of the subject property and issuance of the certificate of title thereto. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a common-law relationship at all. Consequently, Banguis cannot be included or named in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse; the right and privilege belonged to Wenifreda alone.

x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: “Be it noted however that with respect to ‘spouse’, the same must be the legitimate ‘spouse’ (not common-law spouses).”

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term “spouse” embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.^⁠6 (Emphasis supplied)

The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. P-443-99 is – who should be included in the title to the subject property as Adriano’s spouse, Banguis or Wenifreda? Was there error in placing Banguis’s name in the title as Adriano’s spouse? If Banguis is Adriano’s spouse, then there would be no need to amend or even cancel the title. On the other hand, if Wenifreda is Adriano’s spouse, the inclusion of Banguis would then be erroneous, and TCT T-145321 would have to be cancelled. All that is required in resolving this issue is to determine who between them is Adriano’s spouse; it was unnecessary for Banguis to prove that she is the actual owner of the property. Title to the property is different from the certificate of title to it.

x x x. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, the Court made a clear distinction between title and the certificate of title:

The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. x x x.

Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.^⁠7 

Nonetheless, if Banguis felt that she had to go so far as to demonstrate that she is the true owner of the subject property in order to convince the trial court that there is no need to cancel TCT T-145321, then she was not precluded from presenting evidence to such effect. Understandably, with the quality of Wenifreda’s documentary and other evidence, Banguis may have felt obliged to prove that beyond the certificate of title, she actually owned the property. Unfortunately for her, this Court is not convinced of her claimed ownership; the view taken by the CA must be adopted that she and Adriano could not have been co-owners of the subject property as she failed to present sufficient proof that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property, while the deed of sale covering the subject property showed that Adriano alone was the vendee. This Court is not a trier of facts, so it must rely on the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals, which are thus considered conclusive and binding.^⁠8  Moreover, the Court notes that while Banguis claims that she alone paid for the property using her own funds and money borrowed from her sister, she nonetheless acknowledges that Adriano is a co-owner thereof, thus implying that he contributed to its acquisition. Such contradictory statements cast serious doubts on her claim; basically, if she were the sole purchaser of the property, it would only be logical and natural for her to require that her name be placed on the deed of sale as the vendee, and not as mere witness – which is what actually occurred in this case. On the other hand, if Adriano contributed to its purchase, Banguis would have required that her name be placed on the deed as a co-vendee just the same. Her failure to explain why – despite her claims that she is the purchaser of the property – she allowed Adriano to be denominated as the sole vendee, renders her claim of ownership doubtful. “Where a party has the means in his power of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him, if it does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong inference against him.”^⁠9 One cannot also ignore the principle that “the rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common sense.”^⁠10 

Neither can the Court believe Banguis’s assertion that Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation of TCT T-145321 is in reality a partition of Adriano’s estate which in effect transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus divests Banguis and her son Adrian of their rights and interests therein. LRC Case No. P-443-99 is simply a case for the correction of the wrongful entry in TCT T-145321; it simply aims to reflect the truth in the certificate of title – that Adriano is married to Wenifreda – and nothing else. It would have been a summary proceeding, but Banguis complicated matters by injecting her claims of ownership, which are irrelevant in the first place for, as earlier stated, registration is not the equivalent of title.

Finally, with the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the petitioner, particularly those relating to the trial court’s March 30, 2004 Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, as well as the April 14, 2004 Writ of Execution issued, as they have become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 14, 2012 Decision and July 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84954 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Brion, (Acting Chairperson),^* Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe,^** and Leonen, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015, ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT, PETITIONER, VS. WENIFREDA BALCOM-TAMBUYAT, RESPONDENT.

¹ Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not convened the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the owner’s duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.

All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other provision of this Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was entered.

² Maneja v. National Labor Relations Commission, 353 Phil. 45, 60 (1998), citing Marquez v. Secretary of Labor, 253 Phil. 329, 336 (1989).

³ See also Paz v. Republic, G.R. No. 157367, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 74, 81.

⁴ Bagayas v. Bagayas, G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517, September 18, 2013, 706 scra 73, 87 citing Philippine Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela, 660 Phil. 358 (2011).

⁵ Vda. De Chua v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 465, 483 (1998); Vda. de Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014, 714 SCRA 447, 455.

⁶ Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014, citing Eugenio, Sr. v. Judge Velez, 263 Phil. 1149, 1159-1160 (1990).

⁷ Torbela v. Rosario, G.R. No. 140528, December 7, 2011, 661 SCRA 633, 658-659.

⁸ Philamlife. v. Gramaje, 484 Phil. 880, 889 (2004).

⁹ Medija v. Patcho, 217 Phil. 509, 522 (1984).

¹⁰ People v. Toledo and Holgado, 51 Phil. 825, 833 (1928).

buy bust is a form of entrapment

In People v. Sembrano³⁴ citing People v. Agulay,³⁵ this Court held that a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation, as in this case, deserves judicial sanction.³⁶ Moreover, in a buy-bust operation, the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the same are not only authorized but also duty-bound to apprehend the violator and consequently search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.

frame-up and extortion

Denial or frame up is a standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. As such, it has been viewed by the court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted.³⁹ It should not accord a redoubtable sanctuary to a person accused of drug dealing unless the evidence of such frame up is clear and convincing.⁴⁰ Without proof of any intent on the part of the police officers to falsely impute appellant in the commission of a crime, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the principle that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect, deserve to prevail over the bare denials and self-serving claims of appellant that he had been framed up.⁴¹ Neither can appellant’s claim of alleged extortion by the police operatives be entertained. Absent any proof, appellant’s assertion of extortion allegedly committed by the police officers could not be successfully interposed. It remains one of those standard, worn-out, and impotent excuses of malefactors prosecuted for drug offenses. What appellant could have done was to prove his allegation and not just casually air it

G.R. No. 187047 June 15, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MANUEL CRUZ y CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.

This Court held that neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any of the money used in a buy-bust operation, much less is it required that the boodle money be marked. The only elements necessary to consummate the crime is proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.⁴⁵ Both elements were satisfactorily proven in the present case. There is also no rule that requires the police to use only marked money in buy-bust operations. This Court has in fact ruled that failure to use marked money or to present it in evidence is not material since the sale cannot be essentially disproved by the absence thereof. Its non-presentation does not create a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence for as long as the sale of the illegal drugs is adequately established and the substance itself is presented before the court

harayo

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA

FACTS:
A civil case was filed by Lamberto Chua against Lilibeth Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia), daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga(hereafter Jacinto), for "Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages.

Respondent alleged that he and the deceased Jacinto have entered into a partnership made orally for the distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). Upon the death of Jacinto, his wife and daughter took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite without respondent's consent.
Respondent resorted to the introduction of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership.
Petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule.

ISSUE

Applicability of dead man statute

RULING:
We are not persuaded. Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:
"SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."
Before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

 People of the Philippines vs Lazarte
Facts
On October 14,1986 an information for murder of one Nonito Jambunganan y Hundana against Antonio Lazarte, Ricardo Ignacio , Rodolfo Mundido and Eliseo Henares who are also known for their nicknames " Tony, Ric, Su-ay/Suway, and Junior" accordingly , of which are the names mentioned by the deceased when asked by Lorenzo Lara prior to the victim's death as to who stabbed him,and on the sole account of the deductions or conclusion of Lara upon the former's dying declaration, hence it was filed.

Only Lazarte and Ignacio were apprehended, the latter was acquitted for demurer of evidence. The other two remain at large.

The defendant denied knowing the deceased and contended that on the night of the event he was at home taking care of his sick child while his wife was on a night shift duty which was affirmed by the latter. His testimony was corroborated by one Teodora Damanhog, a faith healer who was asked by the defendant to cure his child, and stayed at the defendant's home until one o'clock dawn. The same was corroborated with the testimony of Fortunata Abe and her daughter, that on or about 11:45 in the evening of October 8, 1986 while on their way home they witnessed a person being stabbed several times by Miguel, in addition to Fortunata's testimony, Reynaldo de Paz also testified that in between 11 to 12 in the evening of the same date,he saw from afar at about 10 meters that a certain Miguel was stabbing a person 3 times.

Noberto Lazarte, the brother of of the defendant also testified that on that night almost of the the same time Miguel knocked at the door, sought for his permission to sleep with the accompaniment of the following statement "nakadisgrasya ako."

The regional court of pasig metro manila was not convinced of the testimonies of the witnesses presented of the defense. Hence the case was elevated on appeal.

Issue

The weight given to the dying declaration vs the alibi and the testimonies of the witnesses of the defense.

Ruling

The court ruled in favor of the accused-reversed the decision of the trial court-hence the accused-appellant was acquitted.

The court cited that, the inadmissibility of a hearsay evidence admits certain exceptions, wherein in the case at bar, the trial court relied its judgment solely on the the dying declaration of the deceased which was testified by Lorenzo Lara. Such exception is deemed admissible provided that it is attended with the requisites as provided on Section 37 of Rule 130.

In this case the prosecution failed to established that the victim was conscious of his imminent death while relaying the statement to Lara. Consciousness of the declarant of an impending death is essential, regardless of the fact that death supervenes, hence his ante mortem statement does not constitute a dying declaration.

The court further stated that courts should not only determine the admissibility of the evidence but also to appreciate the weight of the oral dying declaration without prejudice to the evidence that the defense will present. No other evidences were presented other than the dying declaration. The state should rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.

del cas

Ong Ching Po vs. CA

G.R. Nos. 113472-73

December 20, 1994

FACTS:

On July 1947, Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to private respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong Yee, who died in January 1983. The said sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English. Subsequently, the document was registered with the RD of Manila, which issued a TCT dated September 2, 1947 in the name of private respondent Parian.

According to private respondent, she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to the brother of her husband, petitioner Ong Ching Po when the spouses settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded that the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, petitioners refused to vacate the said premises.

On March 19, 1984, Parian filed a case for unlawful detainer against petitioner Ong Ching Po before the MTC of Manila. The inferior court dismissed her case, and so did the RTC, Manila and the CA, the CA decision final and executory.

Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong Ching Po bought the said parcel of land from Joi Jong. The sale was evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale written in Chinese. An English translation of said document read as follows:

Deed of Sale

I, Ong Joi Jong, a party to this Deed of Sale hereby sell in absolutely (sic) manner a lot located on No. 4 Fundidor Street, San Nicolas an (sic) area consisting 213 square meters including a one-story house erected thereon unto Mr. Ong Ching Po for the sum of P6,000.00 the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by me and consequently I have executed and signed the government registered title (sic) the said lot inclusive of the house erected thereon, now belong (sic) to Mr. Ong Ching Po unequivocally. And the purpose of this document is to precisely serve as proof of the sale.

Addendum: I have acceded to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po into signing another document in favor of Soledad Parian (She is the Filipino wife of Ong Yee, brother of Ong Ching Po) for the purpose of facilitating the issuance of the new title by the City Register of Deeds and for the reason that he is not yet a Filipino. I certify to the truthfulness of this fact.

Lot Seller: Ong Joi Jong

On Dec. 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to his children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong, the same property sold by Joi Jong to private respondent Parian  in 1947.

On Dec. 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy and David filed an action for reconveyance and damages against private respondent in the RTC, Manila.

On July 26, 1986, private respondent Parian  filed an action for quieting of title against petitioners Ong Ching Po and his wife, petitioner Yu Siok Lian, in the RTC, Manila. Upon her motion, the case was consolidated with the earlier civil case. (petitioner Ong Ching Po died in October 1986.)

On May 30 1990, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent.

On appeal by petitioners to the CA, the said court affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

 According to petitioners, the CA erred:

(1) When it gave full faith and credit to the Deed of Sale (Exh. A) in favor of private respondent, instead of the Deed of Sale (Exh, B) in favor of petitioner Ong Ching Po.

(2) When it concluded that the acts of petitioners were not acts of ownership; and

(3) When it ruled that no express nor implied trust existed between petitioners and private respondent (as stated in Exh. B)

RULING: 

The petition is dismissed

1. The CA did not give any credence to Exhibit “B” and its translation, because these documents had not been properly authenticated. Petitioners likewise failed to adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale, Exhibit “B”.

On the other end of the legal spectrum, the deed of sale executed by Joi Jong in favor of private respondent (Exh. “A”) is a notarized document.

2. As to the contention of petitioners that all the tax receipts, tax declaration, rental receipts, deed of sale (Exh. “B”) and transfer certificate of title were in their possession, private respondent explained that she and her husband entrusted said lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo.

As observed by the Court of Appeals:

We find, however, that these acts, even if true, are not necessarily reflective of dominion, as even a mere administrator or manager may lawfully perform them pursuant to his appointment or employment

It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of private respondent and her husband. The rental receipts were also in the name of her husband.

3. We cannot go along with the claim that petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private respondent as a dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an alien he was disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To sustain such an outrageous contention would be giving a high premium to a violation of our nationalization laws.

Assuming that Exhibit “B” is in existence and that it was duly executed, still petitioners cannot claim ownership of the disputed lot by virtue thereof.

Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provides, as follows:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the “disposition, exploitation, development and utilization” of all “lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the Philippines” for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.

Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of Exhibit “B” has been established, the same is null and void, it being contrary to law.

On expressed trust:

There is no document showing the establishment of an express trust by petitioner Ong Ching Po as trustor and private respondent Parian as trustee. Not even Exhibit “B” can be considered as such a document because private respondent, the registered owner of the property subject of said “deed of sale,” was not a party thereto. The oral testimony to prove the existence of the express trust will not suffice.

Under Article 1443 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “No express trust concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parole evidence.”

On implied trust:

Undaunted, petitioners argue that if they cannot prove an express trust in writing, they can prove an implied trust orally. While an implied trust may be proved orally (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1457), the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, because such kind of evidence may be easily fabricated. It cannot be made to rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.

Petitioners do not claim that Ong Yee was not in a financial position to acquire the land and to introduce the improvements thereon. On the other hand, Yu Siok Lian, the wife of petitioner Ong Ching Po, admitted in her testimony in court that Ong Yee was a stockholder of Lam Sing Corporation and was engaged in business.

1. It is not correct to say that private respondent never took possession of the property. Under the law, possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.” If what petitioners meant was that private respondent never lived in the building constructed on said land, it was because her family had settled in Iloilo.

2. Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:

Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and lost or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of the witnesses.

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.

The due execution of the document may be established by

1.    the person or persons who executed it;

2.    by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged;

3.    or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures;

4.    or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof.

Petitioner Yu Siok Lian testified that she was present when said document was executed, but the trial court rejected her claim and held:

If it is true that she was present, why did she not sign said document, even merely as a witness? Her oral testimony is easy to concoct or fabricate. Furthermore, she was married only on September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff, Ong Ching Po, in Baguio City where she apparently resided, or after the deed of sale was executed. The Court does not believe that she was present during the execution and signing of the deed of sale involved therein, notwithstanding her pretensions to the contrary.



Kneedler V. Paterno G.R. No. L-1349          December 29, 1949

85 Phil 183

FACTS:

On October 14,1941, the Kneedler Realty Co. sold to Simon Paterno a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Pasay (now Rizal City), continuing an area of 6,830.81 square meters, and more particularly described in transfer certificate of title No. 6555, for the sum of P111,000. Paterno made an initial payment of P30,000 and agreed to pay the balance of P81,000 in eleven monthly installments of P7,000 each and a twelfth installment of P4,000, with interest at 9 % per annum. To guarantee the payment of the said balance of P81,000 plus interest, attorney's fees, and the cost of collection, Paterno mortgaged the same property to the Kneedler Realty Co., and the mortgage was duly annotated on new transfer certificate of title No. 44470 issued in his name by virtue of the deed of sale. The last mentioned transfer certificate of title was subsequently lost.lawphi1.net

On May 24,1946, this action was commenced to foreclose said mortgage. On June 26,1946, the defendant Simon Paterno wrote to the plaintiff H.D. Kneedler, in his capacity as liquidator of the Kneedler Realty Co., as follows:

Dear Sir:

With reference to our conversation of the 22nd instant and the suit you instituted against myself, Vicente Madrigal, and the Registers of Deeds of Manila and Rizal, Civil Case No. 7729, I beg to confirm the arrangement we have entered into in settlement of that suit.

I acknowledge an indebtedness to you of P81,000, together with the interest at the rate of 5 % per annum from ..........................., exclusive of the time of the Japanese occupation. of this amount I will pay you P5,000 upon your accepting this letter and the dismissal of that suit. The balance, I will pay as follows:

P20,000.00 within 90 days

P20,000.00 within 180 days

P20,000.00 within 270 days

Balance — within 360 days

With interest at 5% per annum on unpaid balances. These payments will be guaranteed by don Vicente Madrigal. In case you accept the foregoing, kindly advise me ad send me a copy of your motion to dismiss the case, whereupon I will send you Mr. Vicente Madrigal's guaranty.

Very truly your,

(Sgd.) Simon Paterno

Because Paterno refused to sign a mortgage to guarantee the new schedule of payments as contained in the foregoing letter, the plaintiff did not move to dismiss this case.

On July 6,1946, the defendants Paterno and Madrigal filed their answer, wherein they admitted the purchase by Paterno of the property in question and the execution by him of a mortgage thereon to guarantee the payment of P81,000 plus interest, attorney's fees, and the cost of collection, as alleged in paragraph III of the complaint; but averred as a special defense "that during the Japanese occupation Simon Paterno paid to the Japanese currency, due and owing under the mortgage referred to in paragraph III of the complaint."

After due trial His honor Judge Eulalio Garcia declared proven the alleged payment to the Japanese Enemy Property Custodian but held that such payment was null and void and that therefore the obligation in favor of the plaintiff had not been extinguished. Hence the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff never admitted the alleged payment of the mortgage to the Japanese and insists in his brief before this court: "In the absence of the documentary proof plaintiff-appellee cannot accept the allegation of payment and wishes to invite the attention of the Court to the contradictions in the testimony of Mr. Paterno with regard thereto. . ."

ISSUE:

Whether or not defendant paterno has discharged the burden of proof required of a debtor to entitle him to be relieved by the court from paying his debt.

RULING:

 The following are the main considerations that lead us to this conclusion:

1. Said defendant has not presented the best evidence of which the case is susceptible. The payment was alleged to have been made by checks on the Yokohama Specie Bank. The records of said bank existed in the office of the Philippine Alien Property Administration of the United States in Manila, and the fact that it would have taken at least two weeks to locate the checks in question was not a sufficient ground for the acceptance of oral testimony as to the alleged payment. The present action was commenced on May 24, 1946, and the trial was not held until October 25, 1946. Defendant then had sufficient opportunity to produce the best evidence available had he exercised due diligence. If the intervening period of five months between the filing of the complaint and the date of the trial were not sufficient, said defendant could and should have asked the trial court for the postponement of the trial to enable him to locate the necessary documentary evidence in support of his defense.

"It is an elementary principle of the law of evidence that the best evidence of which the case in its nature is susceptible and which is within the power of the party to produce, or is capable of being produced, must always be adduced in proof of every disputed fact. Secondary evidence is never admissible unless it is made manifest that the primary evidence is unavailable, as where it is shown that it has been lost or destroyed, is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or is in the hands of the opposite party who, on due notice, fails to produce it . . . According to the great weight of authority . . ., where primary evidence is not available so that a fact may be proved by secondary evidence is required to produce the best secondary evidence which exists and which is in his power to produce." (20 Am. Jur., Evidence, secs. 403, 404, pp. 364, 365.)

2. From the records of cases that have come before us, we take judicial notice of the practice of the Japanese to issue a cancellation of mortgage in due form in a case like the present. In the present case, however, no such cancellation of mortgage is claimed to have been issued to the defendant-mortgagor. It is strange that in paying off a mortgage for such a big amount of money (more than P96,000 ) the defendant Paterno contented himself with a mere receipt in Japanese characters instead of securing a cancellation of the mortgage as other debtors of enemy nationals who made payments to the Japanese did. Thus it appears from defendant's own testimony and that of his witnesses that the Japanese Military Administration did not cancel or release the mortgage in question. under the circumstances the court must consider it still subsisting and enforceable.

3. Even if the oral evidence adduced in this case be held valid, it is too vague, uncertain, and full of contradictions to be relied on. According to Mr. Paterno the checks were paid to the "Alien Property Custodian " of the Japanese, whereas according to Mr. Pañganiban, who prepared said checks, they were paid to the Japanese Military Administration. According to Mr. Paterno the checks were issued in November or December, 1943, whereas according to Mr. Panganiban they were issued in March, 1943, and according to Mr. Bayani in January orFebruary, 1944. While these discrepancies do not necessarily indicate pre-variation, they demonstrate the frailty and unreliability of human memory.

Realizing the frailty and unreliability of human memory, especially with regard to figures, after the lapse of more than five years, we find no sufficient basis upon which to reverse the trial court's finding that this claim had not been satisfactorily proven.

In the judgment of the trial court we not two errors in favor of the defendant-appellant, to wit: (1) the exemption of defendant from paying interest during the years 1942 to 1944, for which there was no legal basis, and (2) the suspension of the payment until the lifting of the moratorium, which law has not been pleaded and invoked by the defendant. But inasmuch as the plaintiff has not appealed from said judgment, we are not justified in modifying it in this respect.

The judgment is affirmed, with cost against the appellant.

SANTOS V. CA and Philippine Geriatric Foundation Inc.

G.R. No. 135481.  October 23, 2001

FACTS:

In 1969, private respondent PGFI occupied the ground floor of the Geriatrics Center on Lions Road, Mayor Antonio J. Villegas Street, Ermita, Manila, upon the invitation of the president of the Philippine Federation of Medical Practitioners.  In 1971, PGFI built a gymnasium adjacent to said building.  This was later on converted into a canteen and leased to one Victor Jimenez.  Jimenez later on vacated the space after he failed to pay rentals therefor.

In 1989, petitioner occupied the canteen by virtue of a letter-contract executed between her and Vicente Pulido, president of PGFI.

Meanwhile, the City Mayor of Manila requested PGFI to vacate its office at the Geriatrics Center.  It agreed and planned to transfer to the canteen beside the Geriatrics Center.  On December 27, 1993, PGFI asked petitioner to vacate said space in a letter advising the latter of the termination of the lease contract.  However, petitioner refused to vacate.  In the meantime, the city government of Manila forcibly ejected PGFI from the Geriatrics Center on January 7, 1995.  On October 11, 1995, PGFI through counsel, sent another demand letter to petitioner asking her to pay rentals in arrears and to vacate the canteen space within ten days of receipt of the letter.  Still, petitioner refused.

Thereafter, PGFI filed an ejectment case against petitioner with a prayer for the payment of rentals in arrears for the period September 15, 1993 to September 30, 1995 totaling P36,750.00.  The parties agreed that the only issue to be resolved was whether or not petitioner may be ejected from the premises on the ground of non-payment of rentals.

The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed the complaint on the ground that PGFI failed to establish the existence of a lease contract between the parties. PGFI claimed that the contract had been lost when it was forcibly ejected from the Geriatrics Center. The contract was a letter-offer signed by petitioner and addressed to PGFI, stating petitioner’s intention to lease PGFI’s canteen under certain terms and conditions.  It was later on signed by Pulido as PGFI president, indicating its conformity with the terms thereof.

To prove the existence of the contract, PGFI presented affidavits of its trustees and officers  and presented to the trial court an unsigned photocopy of the same.  However, the trial court refused to admit the photocopy as secondary evidence.  Consequently, in a decision dated February 26, 1997,  the MeTC ruled that there is no evidence that would warrant ejectment of petitioner from the subject premises.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the decision of the MeTC.  PGFI filed a motion for reconsideration on October 6, 1997 and a motion to treat said motion as a motion for new trial on October 27, 1997, on the ground of newly discovered evidence. A few days earlier, on October 11, 1997, PGFI found its copy of the lease contract signed by petitioner and Pulido, as well as by its other trustees.  PGFI presented said contract to the RTC, which rejected it as “forgotten evidence”.

PGFI raised the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the ruling of the RTC.  According to the CA, the unsigned copy of the lease contract that was presented before the trial court qualified as secondary evidence under Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.  The CA noted that PGFI was able to prove the existence and due execution of the lease contract through the affidavits of its witnesses.  Finally, the contents of the contract itself were proven through the unsigned copy held by PGFI.  There is, thus, a valid lease contract executed between the parties, contrary to the ruling of the trial court.

The CA ruled that petitioner’s failure to abide by the terms stated in the contract, particularly the payment of rentals, warranted her eviction from the premises.  The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby GRANTED.  The Decision of the Regional Trial Court affirming the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court which dismissed plaintiff’s complaint is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered ordering the defendant Ligaya Santos, a.k.a. Ligaya Salvador, to vacate the premises in question subject of the complaint and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff; and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P24,500.00 as unpaid rentals from September 15, 1993 to September 30, 1995 at the rate of P1,000.00 a month as provided in the letter-contract and the further sum of P1,000.00 a month from October, 1995 until she vacates the premises as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy thereof, and to pay the costs of suit.

Costs against respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred;

I. …IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE FACT OF THE EXECUTION OF THE LETTER-CONTRACT OF LEASE.

II. …WHEN IT ADMITTED AS NEWLY FOUND EVIDENCE THE ALLEGEDLY SIGNED LETTER-CONTRACT OF LEASE EVEN THOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT FORMALLY OFFERED IN EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL.

III. …IN ITS DECISION, DATED JUNE 23, 1998, SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT WHICH DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFF

RULING:

The parties anchor their respective arguments on the admissibility, or non-admissibility in the case of petitioner, of the unsigned copy of the alleged letter-contract of lease executed between petitioner and PGFI.

Admittedly, the original copy of the contract was not presented during trial, so PGFI as plaintiff therein resorted to presentation of secondary evidence.  It presented the disputed unsigned copy of the contract as well as affidavits of persons who saw the contract and signed thereon representing PGFI.

The Rules of Court provides, in case the original of the document is lost:

SEC. 5.  When original document is unavailable. -- When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (Rule 130, Rules of Court).

Before the contents of an original document may be proved by secondary evidence, there must first be satisfactory proof of the following: (1) execution or existence of the original; (2) loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror.^[27] Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence.^[28]

In the present case, the existence and due execution of the lease contract had been established by the affidavits of trustees of PGFI who were signatories thereto.^[29] The loss of said contract was likewise established by the affidavit of Vicente Pulido, who attested to the fact that he kept the original and a duplicate copy^[30] of the contract at the PGFI office at the Geriatrics Center.  These copies were lost in the chaos that ensued when PGFI was forcibly evicted from its office.  Without a place to immediately move to, its files and records were left for sometime^[31] on the street where they were susceptible to theft. Secondary evidence, then, may be admitted to prove the contents of the contract.

The contents of the original document may be proved (1) by a copy; (2) by a recital of its contents in some authentic document; or (3) by the recollection of witnesses,^[32] in the order stated.

There is testimonial evidence on record to prove the contents of the lost lease contract.  The affidavits of the witnesses for PGFI contain a recital of the offer of petitioner to occupy the subject premises for a specified amount payable every month, and the conformity to these terms by the trustees of PGFI who signed thereon.^[33] Thus, even dispensing with the unsigned copy that was presented at the trial of this case, there is still evidence of the contents of the contract in the form of testimonial evidence.

Petitioner’s emphasis on the admissibility of the unsigned copy of the contract is misplaced.  The contents of the lost original copy may not only be proved by a copy thereof but also by the testimony of witnesses.^[34] At best, the original copy of  the contract  that was later found merely affirms what had already been established by secondary evidence.

When the original copy of the contract^[35] was found, PGFI attempted to present it before the trial court by moving for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.  On this point, we note that petitioner did not offer any objection as to the genuineness of the original contract or her signature thereon.^[36] She objected only insofar as claiming that PGFI could no longer present the document since it was not offered in evidence during the trial of this case.  We take this as an indication that, indeed, there is nothing questionable about the original contract insofar as its genuineness is concerned.

Having thus shown that a lease agreement exists between the parties, we come to the question of whether or not petitioner may be ejected from the subject premises for non-compliance with the terms of the agreement.

Under the contract, petitioner obligated herself to pay a monthly rental, denominated as donation per PGFI policy, to PGFI in the amount of P1,000.00 a month.  The lease period was two years.^[37] PGFI issued receipts,^[38] whose existence and issuance petitioner admitted,^[39] for petitioner’s monthly payments which was eventually increased from P1,000.00 to P1,500.00.  The agreement expired in December 1991.  In December 1993, petitioner admittedly stopped paying PGFI,^[40] while still occupying the subject premises.

We agree with the CA that after December 1991, with petitioner still in the premises, the lease was impliedly renewed on a month-to-month basis, per Article 1670, in relation to Article 1687, of the Civil Code.^[41]

Article 1670 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1670.  If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time established in articles 1682 and 1687.  The other terms of the original contract shall be revived.  (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, Article 1687 states:

Art. 1687.  If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily.  xxx  (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner’s obligation to pay rentals did not cease with the termination of the original agreement.  When she failed to remit the required amounts after December 1993, the time when she stopped paying, PGFI was justified in instituting ejectment proceedings against her.  Thus, under Article 1673 of the Civil Code:

Art. 1673.  The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes:

(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases under articles 1682 and 1687, has expired;

(2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated;

(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract;

xxx

Petitioner clearly violated the provisions of the lease when she stopped making payments to PGFI.  Hence, we find no reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of respondent appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.  The decision dated June 23, 1998, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 46629 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.