Sunday, February 23, 2020


1. Accused is charged of murder. The Judge issued a warrant of arrest without bail. Accused filed a motion for bail alleging that evidence against him is not strong. The bail hearing was conducted, and Elizabeth was offered as witness. The bail was not granted on the basis of her testimony. In the trial proper, Elizabeth was presented as principal witness. Due to lack of material time, and in giving the defense ample time to cross-examine Elizabeth, the trial was set on another date for the cross-examination.
Before the cross-examination could be conducted, Elizabeth died of cardiac arrest.
The defense moved that the testimony of Elizabeth be expunged for lack of cross-examination.
On the other hand, the prosecution moved that the testimony of Elizabeth during the bail hearing be adopted as part of her main testimony.
As judge how would you rule on the two motions.

2. The accused was caught in flagrante sniffing shabu inside a beach cottage in a resort. He was arrested by the police officers P01 Redoble and P02 Rosete,, accosted by Huling, the caretaker of the cottage, and Romel, the errand boy of the resort.
In convicting the accused, the Judge relied on the testimony of P01 Redoble, since Huling and Romel were not presented as witnesses for the prosecution.
On appeal the accused assigned as one of the errors the non-presentation of PO1 Rosete, Huling and Romel, claiming that the prosecution willfully suppressed other evidence which gives the presumption that the same is adverse to the prosecution, and could have resulted to his acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Rule on said assigned error.

3. Arriving home one late afternoon of April 4, 1987, Amador Organez was informed by his wife that their six (6) year old daughter, Maritess, was missing. Upon inquiry, Cristy Manalastas, one of his neighbors, told Amador that a pregnant woman was seen near the vicinity of his house. This was corroborated by two other neighbors, namely, Julie and Baby Wycoco. Amador searched for the pregnant woman at Tondo. She chanced upon Shirley Martinez whose child was also missing. Shirley related to Amador that, after one, Zenaida Isla, who was her former classmate, visited her at her house, her child disappeared. Amador, continued his search in Caloocan and met Lola Danding whose grandchild was also missing. She told Amador that it was appellant who took her granddaughter when the latter went to her house.
On July 18, 1987, the police authorities from Malabon went to Amador’s house and informed him that appellant had been arrested. Amador then went to the Malabon Police Headquarters where appellant told him to proceed to San Simon, Pampanga to fetch his child. On that same day, Amador went to Pampanga together with six Malabon policemen, Lola Danding, appellant, and Mrs. Loring whose child was also missing. After coordinating with the police authorities of Pampanga, they proceeded to the town of Sta. Monica, to meet Maura “Orang” Mabalot.
Upon reaching the house of Maura, the police authorities showed her a picture of Maritess and she identified the child in the picture as the same child who was with appellant when the latter went to her house in April, 1987. She also related that during the said visit, appellant told her that she was looking for someone to adopt the child known as Maritess. Appellant, upon hearing Maura’s statement reacted by telling the group that she sold the child at Angeles City. Thereafter, the same group went to a dry goods store at the Angeles City Market. The owner of the said store answered positively when the policemen inquired if a child was sold to her but, upon verification, the child was not Maritess. Then the group checked on another child, who was sold but again upon verification, did not turn out to be Maritess.
Subsequently, appellant was brought back to the Malabon Police Department but was transferred to the Western Police District of Manila. On July 21, 1987, appellant was investigated before P/Cpl. Pablito Marasigan, an investigator at the WPD General Assignment Section. Thereafter, she executed an extrajudicial statement wherein she admitted that she took Maritess Organez and brought her to Teofilo Ablaza for adoption. Said extrajudicial statement was executed with Atty. Domingo Joaquin of the Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), Department of Justice, beside her.
Appellant on the other hand, denied the charges hurled against her. She claimed that she has no knowledge of the contents of the sworn statement attributed to her which is marked as Exhibit “B” nor had she read it. She alleged that she was lured into signing the said document when Marasigan promised to release her after affixing her signature thereat. More so, she alleged that when she affixed her signature in the document, she was not assisted by a counsel as Atty. Domingo Joaquin of CLAO arrived at the police station after the document was already prepared and finished.
In this appeal, appellant interposes the following as errors of the court a quo:
“The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused guilty of kidnapping, inasmuch as:
1. The decision was basically based on hearsay evidence;
2. The alleged extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence, being extracted in violation of the constitutional rights of the accused(sic).”
Rule on the assigned errors on the basis of PP. V. Isla, GR 96176, Aug. 21, 1997).

4. In a case for property heirship, the alleged niece testified about her ‘being a niece” to the decedent. She testified that allegedly, her deceased childless Aunt, the owner of the property in questions, since her lifetime had always declared her as her niece, who would be capacitated to inherit her property.
The adverse party claims that it is hearsay evidence, and hence inadmissible.
The Judge sustained the objection. Is the Judge Correct?

5.In a rape case, the following witnesses testified as follows:
Witness Lucela testified that she saw the victim a retardate, who went voluntarily with the accused in the bushes, where the accused had sex with her. The accused removed his pants, sat on the grasses where the victim sat on top of him. Her affidavit beforehand submitted did not mention of said fact.
Witness Rosario, an Aunt of the retardate, testified that the accused after the incident left their place, and even wrote a letter asking for forgiveness.
The retardate testified and pointed to the accused as the person who had sex with her in the bushes.
The trial court convicted the accused on the basis of said testimonies.
On appeal, the accused assigned the following errors:
(1) The testimony of the retardate is inadmissible and should not have been believed.
2) That his asking for forgiveness and his leaving the place are irrelevant matters and should not have been considered by the court.
3) The testimony of Lucela should have been discredited as it did not jibe with her affidavit.
Rule on the three assigned errors.

6. Do you agree with the ruling of the judge when he decided that ” Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases” ? Why? What is the correct rule with respect to tax declarations used as evidence to prove ownership of land?

7. In a criminal case for murder, the prosecution presented as evidence the pictures of the reenactment depicting the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. The accused objected saying that said evidence is inadmissible as evidence, as he was not assisted by counsel when the reenactment was done. The prosecution objected saying that the reenactment was voluntarily done by the accused before he was charged, and the pictures were taken thereon without any objection from him.
The Judge ruled that said pictures are admissible as evidence and that they are not covered by the right against self-incrimination.
Rule of the contentions of the parties. Is the judge correct?

8. On May 21, 1982, petitioner Dumez Company, a French company, through petitioner Trans-Orient Engineers, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged the services of private respondent Veronico Ebilane as carpenter for one of its projects in the Middle East, with Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as his place of actual employment. The parties executed and signed a one-year overseas employment agreement embodying the terms and conditions of private respondent's employment.
Private respondent commenced performance of said contract on July 3, 1982. On August 31, 1982, while at the job site, private respondent was suddenly seized by abdominal pain and rushed to the Riyadh Central Hospital were appendectomy was performed on him. During his confinement, he developed right-sided weakness and numbness and difficulty of speaking which was found to have been caused by Atrial Fibrillation and CVA embolism.
In a letter dated September 22, 1982, petitioners formally terminated private respondent's employment effective September 29, 1982, up to which time petitioners paid private respondent his salaries under his employment contract. Thereafter, on October 13, 1982, private respondent was repatriated to Manila.
On November 23, 1982, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners. Such complaint was filed with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA.
In deciding the case in favor of respondent, the POEA took judicial notice of Social Insurance Law of Saudi Arabia.
Question: is the POEA correct in taking judicial notice of the Social Insurance Law of Saudi Arabia, which was not duly proved during the hearing? Explain.

9. Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law, stated —
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. 3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. 4
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, and appreciated the documents annexed to the records but which were not offered by the Solicitor General.
The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court assigning as error: that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
Rule on the assigned error: was it correct for the CA to appreciate evidence not formally offered?

10.( Bordalba v. CA, Jan. 25, 2002)In a  complaint to nullify the issuance of  a Free Patent and the certificate of Title derived from it, complainants presented an extra-judicial partition executed in 1947.The purpose of complainant was to show that the land covered by the Free Patent is not an exclusive property of defendant but was previously partitioned among their predecessors in interest. They thus presented witnesses to attest to the 1947 extra-judicial partition.
Questions: Are said witnesses barred by the Dead Man’s Statute from testifying considering that the parties to the document  are all deceased? Explain your answer.

guide question in evidence


1. Arrested in a buy-bust operation, Edmond was brought to the police station where he was informed of his constitutional rights. During the investigation, Edmond refused to give any statement. However, the arresting officer asked Edmond to acknowledge in writing that six (6) sachets of "shabu" were confiscated from him. Edmond consented and also signed a receipt for the amount of P3,000.00, allegedly representing the "purchase price of the shabu." At the trial, the arresting officer testified and identified the documents executed and signed by Edmond. Edmond's lawyer did not object to the testimony. After the presentation of the testimonial evidence, the prosecutor made a formal offer of evidence which included the documents signed by Edmond.
Edmond's lawyer objected to the admissibility of the documents for being the "fruit of the poisoned tree." Resolve the objection with reasons

2. In the early morning of December 8, 1995, accused-appellant hired Jimbo Pelagio, a tricycle driver working the night shift, to take him to Paco, Obando, Bulacan.  When they reached their destination, he ordered Pelagio to get off the tricycle.  Then, accused-appellant robbed Pelagio of his money and repeatedly struck him on the head with a gun. Pelagio fell on the ground unconscious.  Accused-appellant shot him on the head and fled on board his tricycle.
That same morning, SPO1 Froilan Bautista got a call from the Valenzuela Emergency Hospital stating that a man had been shot on the head and was in their hospital.  SPO1 Bautista and SPO1 Jose Sta. Ana rushed to the hospital and found the still conscious Pelagio lying on a stretcher.  
SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio in a question and answer method, which he took down on two sheets of yellow paper.  After his statement was taken, Pelagio affixed his thumbmark on both sheets.The statement is as follows:
                                         
T:    Alam mo ba ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa Valenzuela Emergency Hospital at kinukunan ka ng salaysay?
S:    Opo, dahil pinagpapalo po ako ng baril ni RAMIL PEÑA sa ulo at kinuha and tricycle kong minamaneho.
T:    Taga saan itong si Ramil Peña?
S:    Sa Dulong Tangke, Valenzuela, (Malinta), M.M.
T:    Saan, kailan at anong oras nangyari ito?
S:    Sa Paco, Obando, Bulacan, kaninang ika-8 ng Disyembre 1995 sa ganap na ika-4:15 ng umaga.
T:    Sakay mo ba itong si Ramil Peña?
S:    Oho, sumakay sa may gasolinahan ng Petron sa Malinta, Valenzuela, M.M.
T:    Dati mo bang kilala si Ramil Peña?
S:    Opo.
T:    Ano ba ang tatak ng tricycle mo?
S:    Yamaha RS-100, kulay itim.
T:    Sino and may-ari ng tricycle?
S:    Si Rey Dagul.
T:    Binaril ka ba ni Ramil?
S:    Muntik na ho.
T:    Bakit sa iyo ginawa ni Ramil and bagay na ito?
S:    Ewan ko ho.[i][4]

Eventually, Pelagio died, and Ramil Peña was charged for the death of Pelagio.
On the basis of said statement as above-written, would you consider the same admissible as a “dying declaration”? Can it be admitted as part of the “res gestae”? What are the elements of res gestae?


3. Johnny Bolanon  (Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca (Salafranca) on the night of July 31, 1993, after the said incident, the assailant ran away. Bolanon still being able to walk, went to his uncle, Rodolfo B. Estaño to seek help. After having known of the incident, Estaño then brought Bolanon to PGH. On their way to the hospital on board a taxi, Bolanon confided to Estaño about the incident and told him that it was Salafranca who stabbed him and a certain Augusto Mendoza witnessed the said incident.  At around 2:30am, despite receiving medical attention, Bolanon succumbed to death.

Question:
Is the utterance of Bolanonis qualified as a dying declaration or part of the res gestae?

4. Accused is charged of murder. The Judge issued a warrant of arrest without bail. Accused filed a motion for bail alleging that evidence against him is not strong. The bail hearing was conducted, and Elizabeth was offered as witness. The bail was not granted on the basis of her testimony. In the trial proper, Elizabeth was presented as principal witness. Due to lack of material time, and in giving the defense ample time to cross-examine Elizabeth, the trial was set on another date for the cross-examination.
Before the cross-examination could be conducted, Elizabeth died of cardiac arrest.
The defense moved that the testimony of Elizabeth be expunged for lack of cross-examination.
On the other hand, the prosecution moved that the testimony of Elizabeth during the bail hearing be adopted as part of her main testimony.
As judge how would you rule on the two motions.

5. Arriving home one late afternoon of April 4, 1987, Amador Organez was informed by his wife that their six (6) year old daughter, Maritess, was missing. Upon inquiry, Cristy Manalastas, one of his neighbors, told Amador that a pregnant woman was seen near the vicinity of his house. This was corroborated by two other neighbors, namely, Julie and Baby Wycoco. Amador searched for the pregnant woman at Tondo. She chanced upon Shirley Martinez whose child was also missing. Shirley related to Amador that, after one, Zenaida Isla, who was her former classmate, visited her at her house, her child disappeared. Amador, continued his search in Caloocan and met Lola Danding whose grandchild was also missing. She told Amador that it was appellant who took her granddaughter when the latter went to her house.
On July 18, 1987, the police authorities from Malabon went to Amador’s house and informed him that appellant had been arrested. Amador then went to the Malabon Police Headquarters where appellant told him to proceed to San Simon, Pampanga to fetch his child. On that same day, Amador went to Pampanga together with six Malabon policemen, Lola Danding, appellant, and Mrs. Loring whose child was also missing. After coordinating with the police authorities of Pampanga, they proceeded to the town of Sta. Monica, to meet Maura “Orang” Mabalot.
Upon reaching the house of Maura, the police authorities showed her a picture of Maritess and she identified the child in the picture as the same child who was with appellant when the latter went to her house in April, 1987.  She also related that during the said visit, appellant told her that she was looking for someone to adopt the child known as Maritess. Appellant, upon hearing Maura’s statement reacted by telling the group that she sold the child at Angeles City. Thereafter, the same group went to a dry goods store at the Angeles City Market. The owner of the said store answered positively when the policemen inquired if a child was sold to her but, upon verification, the child was not Maritess. Then the group checked on another child, who was sold but again upon verification, did not turn out to be Maritess.
Subsequently, appellant was brought back to the Malabon Police Department but was transferred to the Western Police District of Manila. On July 21, 1987, appellant was investigated before P/Cpl. Pablito Marasigan, an investigator at the WPD General Assignment Section. Thereafter, she executed an extrajudicial statement wherein she admitted that she took Maritess Organez and brought her to Teofilo Ablaza for adoption. Said extrajudicial statement was executed with Atty. Domingo Joaquin of the Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), Department of Justice, beside her.
Appellant on the other hand, denied the charges hurled against her. She claimed that she has no knowledge of the contents of the sworn statement attributed to her which is marked as Exhibit “B” nor had she read it. She alleged that she was lured into signing the said document when Marasigan promised to release her after affixing her signature thereat. More so, she alleged that when she affixed her signature in the document, she was not assisted by a counsel as Atty. Domingo Joaquin of CLAO arrived at the police station after the document was already prepared and finished.
In this appeal, appellant interposes the following as errors of the court a quo:
“The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused guilty of kidnapping, inasmuch as:
1.       The decision was basically based on hearsay evidence;
2.       The alleged extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence, being extracted in violation of the constitutional rights of the accused(sic).”


6. In convicting the accused in People v. Ador (22004) for murder, the trial court relied on the following circumstances to wit: (1) that he was seen fleeing from the crime scene (2) that he allegedly surrendered the hand gun (3) that the slug taken from the head of the victim was fried from the gun he surrendered (4) that the victim made a dying declaration identifying him and (5) paraffin test showed that he was positive for gunpowder. IS THE CONVICTION PROPER?

7. Accused in the case of People v. Barlis (1994) duly assisted by counsel, confessed to having robbed the watches, jewelry and cash, and then killed one Honorian Balmaseda. During his trial, the confession was presented and admitted in evidence. Insofar as the robbery is concerned, the extra-judicial statement of the accused constituted as the only evidence of the taking of the property of the victim. Based on said premises, (a) is the conviction of the accused for the crime of robbery proper? (b) can he be convicted of homicide?
 8. To successfully invoke the defense of alibi as a defense in a criminal case, what evidence must be adduced by the accused? How did the Supreme Court uphold the acquittal of Hubert Webb in its decision? What principles of evidence were used by it?
 9.Normer Velasco was convicted by the RTC  of murder. The conviction was based on the testimony of the lone eyewitness to the incident, Leonardo Lucaban. After Lucaban gave his testimony, the judge recalled him to the witness stand. Velasco avers that the recall of Lucaban had no basis and was made with grave abuse of discretion.   Is the act of the judge in recalling the witness to the witness stand upon his own order valid? Explain.
10. A criminal complaint for adultery was filed by Dr. Neri (husband) against Ruby (wife) and Arroyo (petitioner). After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner and the wife, based, among others on the wife's admission to her husband that she sex with petitioner Arroyo. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The wife later filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband. The husband filed a manifestation praying for the dismissal of the case as he had "tacitly consented" to his wife's infidelity. IS the admission of adulterous conduct by the wife to her husband without the presence of her counsel is admissible in evidence?