in agrarian disputes application of the Rules of Court is actually prohibited

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-60054 July 2, 1991
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ANDRES LOMABAO, and JOSE M. MASAYA, respondents.
Benjamin R. Reonal for petitioner.
Eugenio C. Lindo for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:p

Any lawyer worth his salt knows that quanta of proof and adjective rules vary depending on whether the cases to which they are meant to apply are criminal, civil or administrative in character. In criminal actions, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for conviction; ¹ in civil actions and proceedings, preponderance of evidence, as support for a judgment; ² and in administrative cases, substantial evidence, as basis for adjudication. ³ In criminal and civil actions, application of the Rules of Court is called for, with more or less strictness. In administrative proceedings, however, the technical rules of pleading and procedure, and of evidence, are not strictly adhered to; they generally apply only suppletorily; ⁴ indeed, in agrarian disputes application of the Rules of Court is actually prohibited. ⁵

Quite incredibly, these familiar and elementary propositions were disregarded in the judgment a quo. The error is serious and must be, as it is here, corrected.

The facts are fairly simple and quickly recounted.

The case originated from the discovery by Meralco employees that a person by the name of Antonio Sanchez was consuming electricity at the house occupied by him at No. 2048 Amparo Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, although he had himself neither applied with Meralco for electric service nor made the requisite deposit in connection therewith. ⁶ It was learned that electricity was being supplied to Sanchez's house through a clandestine and illicit connection to a Meralco service line ("shunting the meter base and tapping its service drop direct to the service wire"); and household helpers of Sanchez and the owner of the house, a Mr. Castañeda, informed the Meralco investigator that it was a Meralco employee, Jose Masaya, who had made the unauthorized electric service connection.

The Meralco Legal Department thereupon sent Jose Masaya a letter charging him with a violation of the Company Code on Employee Discipline, and thereafter conducted a formal investigation of the matter. ⁷ Those who gave testimony at that investigation were Jose Masaya himself, and Renato Repuyan, Meralco field investigator.

Prior to being interrogated about the illegal connection and in response to preliminary questions by the investigator, Masaya stated for the record that he had received the letter accusing him of misconduct, that he had a copy of the code of discipline and understood the nature of the precise charge against him, and that he did not need to be assisted by a lawyer or a representative of his Union because, in his own words, "ang sasabihin ko naman dito ay pawang katotohanan lamang." Thereafter, Masaya deposed that he had indeed installed the connection in question in the following manner, again expressed in his own words: "Nilagyan ko ng shunt o kaputol ng alambre ang kanilang meter base at ang koneksiyon nito ay kinabit ko sa malapit na service wire;" and that for that job, he had received P200 from Antonio Sanchez. At the close of his testimony, he also sought forgiveness for the offense, viz.:

Nais ko po sanang ihingi ng kapatawaran sa kumpanya ang mga nagawa kong pagkakamali. Anim po ang aking mga anak at kung sakaling ako ay matanggal sa kompanya dahil sa pagkakamaling iyon, sila po ay walang aasahan kung hindi ako lamang. Kayat ipinakikiusap ko sa inyo na ipaabot ninyo sa kompanya ang aking pagmamakaawa.

Repuyan testified on the fact of the undenied and indisputable installation of the illegal electrical connection at the residence of Antonio Sanchez (his description of the manner of its accomplishment being substantially the same as Masaya's own), and also, the disclosures made to him by Sanchez's househelpers and the owner of the house, supra.

After the investigation, and on the basis of the results thereof, Meralco filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment an application for clearance to terminate Masaya's services, ⁸ serving copy on the latter. Meralco also placed Masaya under preventive suspension. ⁹

A week later, Masaya filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Meralco.

After issues were joined on the complaint for illegal dismissal as well as the application for clearance, and trial had thereon, Labor Arbiter Andres M. Lomabao rendered a decision in Masaya's favor, ¹⁰ disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, respondent Manila Electric Company is hereby ordered to pay complainant JOSE M. MASAYA his backwages corresponding to the period December 8, 1978 up to April 30, 1980 and separation pay of five (5) and a half months salary in lieu of reinstatement.

The Arbiter was of the view that the record of the investigation conducted by Meralco should not be accorded credence; that Meralco's contention that Masaya had "surreptitiously effected the direct connection of . . . electric service" was not credible, because Masaya "was employed as a bill collector, not as a lineman collector, hence, he does not know how to install electrical connection;" and that the money received by Masaya from Sanchez (P200 or P250) was not in consideration of any clandestine connection but was accepted as "representation expenses in following up Mr. Sanchez' application for installation of electric facilities . . . with the Engineer's Office at the City Hall of Manila. ¹¹

On appeal by Meralco, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the Arbiter's decision. ¹² In the Commission's "considered view" ¹³ —

. . while it is true that in administrative proceedings, substantial evidence only is required, the instant case is an exception for the reason that respondent-appellant in this case is charging complainant-appellee of a criminal offense, and, therefore, it is incumbent upon the former to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the crime, failing which, complainant-appellee must be absolved from responsibility. The alleged admission of complainant-appellee during the investigation conducted by the legal department of respondent-appellant does not, if at all, prove beyond reasonable doubt the criminal act allegedly committed by complainant-appellee in the absence of any showing that he was given the opportunity to be heard by counsel or at least, a representative to confront his accuser.

There is implicit concession that under the substantial evidence rule, the evidence would be adequate to make out a case of gross misconduct on the part of Masaya; however, the Commission theorizes that an adjudgment to this effect was precluded by the doctrine of proof beyond reasonable doubt, applicable exceptionally to Masaya's case. Echoing the Commission's views, the public respondent's comment points out that "since there is no causal connection between private respondent's duties to the crime imputed to him, mere substantial evidence is insufficient to hold private respondent guilty of installing electrical connection let alone deprive him of his right to labor."

There are two evident errors invalidating the Commission's conclusions.

The first is that contrary to the Commission's view, Masaya was in truth asked if he wished to be assisted by a lawyer or a representative of his Union, and his response was in the negative because, in his own words, "ang sasabihin ko naman dito ay pawang katotohanan lamang"

The second is that in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required as basis for a judgment of the legality of an employer's dismissal of an employee, nor even preponderance of evidence, substantial evidence being sufficient, ¹⁴ Particularly as regards proceedings of the precise nature in question, the Labor Code provides that — ¹⁵

. . . the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. . . .

And this Court has ruled that the ground for an employer's dismissal of an employee need be established only by substantial evidence, it not being required that the former's evidence "be of such degree as is required in criminal cases, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt." ¹⁶ It is absolutely of no consequence that the misconduct with which an employee may be charged also constitutes a criminal offense: theft, embezzlement, assault on another employee or company officer, arson, malicious mischief, etc. The proceedings being administrative, the quantum of proof is governed by the substantial evidence rule and not, as the respondent Commission seems to imagine, by the rule governing judgments in criminal actions.

It was thus serious error, and grave abuse of discretion for the Labor Arbiter and the respondent Commission, for the reasons given, to reject and exclude from consideration the express admissions made by Masaya during the administrative investigation conducted by Meralco.

The Court cannot close its eyes to the following facts of record, to wit:

1) the reality of the illegal electrical connection;

2) the written communication to Masaya that he was accused of that illegal connection and he would be subjected to a formal investigation thereon;

3) Masaya's acknowledgment that, having a copy of the company's code of discipline, he understood the nature of the accusation against him, and his declining to be assisted by a lawyer or a representative of his Union because, according to him, "ang sasabihin ko naman dito ay pawang katotohanan lamang;"

4) his voluntary admission that it was he who had made the illegal electrical connection, describing the manner by which he had made it, and that he had received P250.00 from the occupant of the house, Antonio Sanchez; and

5) his plea to the company for forgiveness for having made the illegal connection.

There is on record, too, testimony regarding identification of Masaya by Antonio Sanchez' servants and by Castañeda, the owner of the house occupied by Sanchez. There is, finally, nothing in the record to demonstrate that Masaya's admissions were made otherwise than voluntarily; his subsequent assertion before the Arbiter that he had been "starved" into signing the typewritten record of the administrative investigation containing said admissions is not persuasive, and was not in fact accepted by the Arbiter or the Commission.

The Court is satisfied that the evidence sufficiently proves the commission by Masaya of an act of dishonesty against his employer, specifically described in the Meralco Code on Employee Discipline as follows:

SECTION 7. Dishonesty. —

xxx xxx xxx

3) Directly or indirectly tampering with electric meters or metering installation of the Company or the installation of any device, with the purpose of defrauding the Company.

Such an offense is obviously of so serious a character as to merit the penalty of dismissal from employment. The Labor Code pronounces "fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative," or "serious misconduct" on the part of the employee to be lawful ground to terminate employment. And this Court has held that the "dismissal of a dishonest employee is as much in the interests of labor as it is of management. The labor force in any company is protected and the workers' security of tenure strengthened when pilferage of equipment, goods and products which endangers the viability of an employer and, therefore, the workers' continued employment is minimized or eliminated and consequently labor-management relations based on mutual trust and confidence are promoted." ¹⁷

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED, the decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission and of the Labor Arbiter subject thereof are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, and the petitioner's termination of the employment of private respondent is AUTHORIZED and APPROVED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1 Sec. 2, Rule 133 (Revised Rules on Evidence), Rules of Court; see, e.g., People v. Javier, 183 SCRA 702; People v. Torre, 184 SCRA 525; People v. Libag, 184 SCRA 707; People v. Flores, 186 SCRA 830.
2 Sec. 1, Rule 133; see, e.g., Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. v. C.A., 173 SCRA 619; Urbano v. IAC, 157 SCRA 1; Gandionco v. Penaranda, 155 SCRA 725; Noda v. Cruz-Arnaldo, 151 SCRA 227.
3 Sec. 5, Rule 133; see, e.g., Rubberworld Phils. Inc. v. NLRC, 175 SCRA 450; DBP v. NLRC, 175 SCRA 537; Rodriguez v. ECC, 178 SCRA 30.
4 See Tibulan v. Inciong, 176 SCRA 316; Associated Labor Union (ALU) v. Calleja, 179 SCRA 127; Asiaworld Publishing House v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219.
5 The Revised Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board provides that: "Unless adopted herein or by resolution of the board, the provisions of the Rules of Court do not apply, not even in a suppletory character" (Sec. 3 [c], Rule 1).
6 A "Found Connected Service Report" (No. 369847),was rendered by the Meralco Meter Reading Division on July 7, 1978.
7 Conducted on October 23, 1978.
8 The application is dated December 4, 1978.
9 The preventive suspension was made effective on December 6, 1978 pending approval of the application for clearance to dismiss.
10 The decision is dated April 30, 1980.
11 Rollo, p. 22.
12 The Commission's Decision was promulgated on December 12, 1982. Commissioner Cleto T Villatuya dissented and voted for "the reversal of the Labor Arbiter's decision and to grant the application for clearance to terminate the services of the complainant" (Rollo, pp. 2627). The Solicitor General also "found it cogent to assume a position contrary to that of (the majority of) respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), et al." (Rollo, pp. 73-74).
13 Rollo, p. 24.
14 SEE Cortes, Philippine Administrative Law, 1984 ed., 356-366, citing Perez v. CTA, 101 Phil. 630 (1957), Santos v. Nable, 111 Phil. 1045 (1960), Philippine Movie Pictures Workers Association v. Premier Productions, Inc., 92 Phil. 844 (1953), Halili v. Floro, 90 Phil. 245 (1951), Estate of Florencio P. Buan v. Pampanga Bus Company and La Mallorca, 99 Phil. 373 (1956).
15 Art. 221 of the present Labor Code, originally Art. 270, PD 442 issued July 1, 1974.
16 Commercial Motors Corporation v. Commissioners, Second Division, NLRC, et al. G.R. No. 74762, December 10, 1990; Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 757; Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. v. C.A., 11 7 SCRA 369; East Asiatic Co., Ltd. v. CIR, 40 SCRA 543544; Philippine Engineering Corp. v CIR, 41 SCRA 100; Tajonera v. Lamoroza, 110 SCRA 438.
17 International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Phil. v. Leogardo, 117 SCRA 967.

In administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 183678               March 15, 2010
RENE VENTENILLA PUSE, Petitioner,
vs.
LIGAYA DELOS SANTOS-PUSE, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order filed by petitioner Rene V. Puse assailing the Decision¹ dated 28 March 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100421.

Petitioner is a registered Professional Teacher stationed at S. Aguirre Elementary School, East District, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, while respondent is a Barangay Rural Health Midwife assigned at the Municipal Health Office of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.

It appears that on 10 January 1992, petitioner married respondent Ligaya Delos Santos-Puse at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Daet, Camarines Norte before the Hon. Judge Oscar T. Osorio.² He had two (2) children with her, and had a church wedding before respondent found out that petitioner was already married. Respondent discovered that petitioner had already gotten married to Cristina Pablo Puse at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Laoag City, Ilocos Norte on 27 December 1986. Respondent likewise learned that he has two (2) children with his first wife.³

Thus, on 2 August 2005, respondent filed a letter-complaint with the Director of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), National Capital Region, Manila, through the Director, PRC, Lucena City, seeking assistance regarding her husband against whom she had filed a criminal case for "Bigamy" and "Abandonment." She alleged that her husband has not been giving her and their children support.⁴

In a letter dated 16 August 2005, petitioner was directed by the PRC of Lucena City to answer the complaint for immorality and dishonorable conduct filed by respondent.⁵ Per directive, petitioner submitted his Compliance⁶ dated 31 August 2005 denying the charges against him. He adopted his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses, Jocelyn Puse Decena and Dominador I. Blanco, which were submitted in Criminal Case Nos. 7228 and 7229 before the MTC of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. He argued that if respondent’s allegations were true, she herself would be equally guilty of immorality and dishonorable conduct, as she was fully aware that petitioner was already married when she married him. He added he has not abandoned respondent or their children and continually gives support for their children.

In her Reply to Answer/Compliance⁷ dated 6 September 2005, respondent said she married petitioner in good faith, unaware that he was already married to Cristina N. Pablo. When she learned of petitioner’s deception regarding his marital status, she filed a case for Bigamy before the MTC of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, which found probable cause to hold petitioner for trial. She found petitioner’s explanation "Na ako ay wala ng balita o komunikasyon sa aking unang asawa at ang paniwala ko ay siya ay patay na at ang aking kasal ay nawala ng saysay" to be lame and insufficient to justify his contracting a subsequent bigamous marriage. She claimed that petitioner should have instituted in court a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of his first wife before contracting a subsequent marriage. In the absence of such declaration, her marriage to petitioner is bigamous and void ab initio. She added that the affidavits of his sister and close friend should not be given weight.

In his Rejoinder⁸ dated 11 October 2005, petitioner reiterated the arguments in his Answer and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it was not verified and for failure of the respondent to attach a valid certification against forum-shopping.

After due consideration of the complaint, affidavits, supporting documents and pleadings filed, the Board of Professional Teachers, PRC, Lucena City, found a prima facie case for Immorality and Dishonorable Conduct against petitioner, and directed respondent to pay docket and legal research fees.⁹ The case was docketed as Adm. Case No. LCN-0016.

On 16 February 2007, the Board of Professional Teachers (Board), PRC, Manila, found petitioner administratively liable of the charges and revoked his license as a Professional Teacher. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Board finds Rene Ventenilla Puse guilty as charged and accordingly revokes his license as a Professional Teacher. He is ordered to surrender his Certificate of Registration and his Professional Identification Card to the Professional Regulation Commission within ten (10) days from the time this decision becomes final and executory and to desist from the practice of the teaching profession under the pain of criminal prosecution.

SO ORDERED.¹⁰

The Board ruled that contrary to petitioner’s contentions, it had jurisdiction over petitioner and could validly order the revocation of his license, as petitioner was a professional teacher. Under Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7836, otherwise known as the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994, the Board has the power and authority to regulate the practice of teaching in the Philippines. The charge of Immorality and/or Dishonorable Conduct is also one (1) of the grounds for the revocation or suspension of a license of a professional teacher. For entering into a second marriage without first seeking a judicial declaration of the presumptive death of his first wife and thereafter cohabiting with his second wife and having children with her, petitioner is liable for Immorality and Dishonorable Conduct. The Board added that whether respondent had knowledge of the first marriage or not is irrelevant and further found petitioner’s claim that his cohabitation with respondent was under duress, force or intimidation untenable. Citing Section 3,¹¹ Article III and Section 3,¹² Article XI of the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers, and the Oath of Professionals,¹³ the Board also explained that petitioner’s official life cannot be detached from his personal life, contrary to his contention that the acts complained of were purely private. His immorality and dishonorable conduct demonstrate his unfitness to continue practicing his profession as he is no longer the embodiment of a role model for young elementary school pupils, the Board ruled.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision but his motion was denied by the Board per Resolution dated 9 July 2007.¹⁴

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 100421, before the Court of Appeals assailing the Resolutions dated 16 February 2007 and 9 July 2007 of the Board.

On 28 March 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal.¹⁵ The appellate court held that the applicable law was Rep. Act No. 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers because petitioner was occupying the position of Teacher I at the S. Aguirre Elementary School. Under Rep. Act No. 4670, the one (1) tasked to investigate the complaint was the Board of Professional Teachers. Thus, it was the Board of Professional Teachers that had jurisdiction over the administrative case and not the Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the Department of Education (DepEd) as contended by petitioner. As to the finding of immorality and/or dishonorable conduct, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Board in finding as untenable petitioner’s excuse that he believed his first wife to be dead and that his first marriage was no longer subsisting. It said that petitioner should have applied for a judicial order declaring his first wife presumptively dead before marrying respondent. It further found without merit petitioner’s defense that the complaint is of a private nature, explaining that his actions relate to the very nature of his career: to teach, mold and guide the youth to moral righteousness.

As to petitioner’s defense of pari delicto, the appellate court upheld the Board’s finding that respondent was in good faith when she married petitioner. The Board also afforded petitioner due process.

On 30 June 2008, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.¹⁶ Hence, the present recourse.

Petitioner argues that:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN VALIDATING THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS OF PRC-MANILA DESPITE THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE SAME AND ITS PATENT NULLITY FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED OUTSIDE OF ITS JURISDICTION AND IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF YOUR PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS;

II. THE HONORABLE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS OF THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC)-MANILA AND LUCENA CITY, GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, WHEN IT ASSUMED PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER THE UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THE RESPONDENT IN CONTRAVENTION WITH EXISTING RULES AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER;

III. THE HONORABLE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS OF THE PRC-MANILA GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF IMMORALITY AND DISHONORABLE CONDUCT AND SUBSEQUENTLY REVOKING HIS TEACHER’S LICENSE AS A PENALTY NOTWITHSTANDING THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUSTAINING THE COMPLAINT, WHICH IN EFFECT VIOLATED THE RIGHT OF YOUR PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.¹⁷

From the foregoing, the issues may be summed up as follows: (1) Did the Board of Professional Teachers have jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed by respondent against petitioner? (2) Was petitioner denied administrative due process? (3) Was there substantial evidence to sustain the complaint and to hold petitioner liable?

On the first issue, petitioner argues that the proper forum to hear and decide the complaint was either the CSC pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 991936 (Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service) or the DepEd pursuant to Rep. Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). Since the charge was for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the complaint should have been brought before the CSC.

We do not agree. An administrative case against a public school teacher may be filed before the Board of Professional Teachers-PRC, the DepEd or the CSC, which have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases such as for immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct.

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals.¹⁸ When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.¹⁹ The authority to hear and decide administrative cases by the Board of Professional Teachers-PRC, DepEd and the CSC comes from Rep. Act No. 7836, Rep. Act No. 4670 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807, respectively.

Under Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836, the Board is given the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes enumerated therein. Among the causes is immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. Section 23 reads:

SEC. 23. Revocation of the Certificate of Registration, Suspension from the Practice of the Teaching Profession, and Cancellation of Temporary or Special Permit. – The Board shall have the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of any registrant, to reprimand or to cancel the temporary/special permit of a holder thereof who is exempt from registration, for any of the following causes:

(a) Conviction for any criminal offense by a court of competent jurisdiction;

(b) Immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct;

(c) Declaration by a court of competent jurisdiction for being mentally unsound or insane;

(d) Malpractice, gross incompetence, gross negligence or serious ignorance of the practice of the teaching profession;

(e) The use of or perpetration of any fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of registration, professional license or special/temporary permit;

(f) Chronic inebriety or habitual use of drugs;

(g) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the rules and regulations and other policies of the Board and the Commission, and the code of ethical and professional standards for professional teachers; and

(h) Unjustified or willful failure to attend seminars, workshops, conferences and the like or the continuing education program prescribed by the Board and the Commission. x x x²⁰

Thus, if a complaint is filed under Rep. Act No. 7836, the jurisdiction to hear the same falls with the Board of Professional Teachers-PRC.

However, if the complaint against a public school teacher is filed with the DepEd, then under Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the investigating committee created pursuant to said section, now being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order No. 33, S. 1999, also known as the DECS Rules of Procedure. Section 9 of the Magna Carta provides:

SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. – Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

A complaint filed under Rep. Act No. 4670 shall be heard by the investigating committee which is under the DepEd.

As to the CSC, under P.D. No. 807, also known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, particularly Sections 9(j) and 37(a) thereof, the CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. These sections state:

SEC. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission.–The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:

x x x x

(j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;

x x x x

SEC. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.–(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.

As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise and discipline all government employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.²¹ Consequently, if civil service rules and regulations are violated, complaints for said violations may be filed with the CSC.

However, where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.²² Here, it was the Board of Professional Teachers, before which respondent filed the complaint, that acquired jurisdiction over the case and which had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the CSC.

Petitioner’s reliance on the cases of Emin v. De Leon²³ and Office of the Ombudsman v. Estandarte²⁴ to support his claim that it was the DepEd Investigating Committee created pursuant to Rep. Act No. 4670 which had jurisdiction to try him because he is a public school teacher, is without merit as these cases are not in point. In Emin, the issue was which between the DepEd Investigating Committee (under Rep. Act No. 4670) and the CSC (under P.D. No. 807) had jurisdiction to try the administrative case, while in Estandarte, the issue was which between the Office of the Ombudsman and the DepEd Investigating Committee had jurisdiction over the administrative case filed in said case. In contrast, the instant case involves the Board of Professional Teachers which, under Rep. Act No. 7836, had jurisdiction over administrative cases against professional teachers and has the power to suspend and revoke a licensed teacher’s certificate of registration after due proceedings.

As to the issue of due process, was petitioner denied administrative due process?

Petitioner questions the authority of the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, arguing that venue was improperly laid as he and respondent are residents of Parang, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte; they were married in Daet, Camarines Norte where the alleged immoral and dishonorable conduct was committed; his professional teacher’s license was issued in the Central Office of the PRC in Manila and renewed in the PRC Regional Office in Legaspi City, Albay; and he is a Teacher I of S. Aguirre Elementary School, East District, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.

Moreover, petitioner also faults the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City for acting on respondent’s unverified letter in violation of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521 which provides:

Section 4. Complaint in Writing and Under Oath. – No complaint against a civil servant shall be given due course, unless the same is in writing and under oath.

He also asserts that respondent purposely filed the complaint before the Board of Professional Teachers in Lucena City because the investigating officer was her colleague and belonged to the same religious denomination as her. This, according to petitioner, showed the partiality of the board. The Board of Professional Teachers also allegedly denied him due process because he was allegedly informed of the retraction of the testimony/affidavit of his witness (Dominador Blanco) only upon receipt of the Board’s decision.

Petitioner’s contentions are without merit.

Petitioner’s allegation of improper venue and the fact that the complaint was not under oath are not sufficient grounds for the dismissal of the complaint. Well to remember, the case was an administrative case and as such, technical rules of procedure are liberally applied. In administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.²⁵ The intention is to resolve disputes brought before such bodies in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner possible.²⁶

Petitioner was likewise amply afforded administrative due process the essence of which is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.²⁷ The records show that petitioner filed the following: (1) Compliance-Answer to the Complaint; (2) Rejoinder; (3) Position paper; (4) Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Board of Professional Teachers finding him guilty as charged; and (5) Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He attended the preliminary conference and hearing where he was able to adduce his evidence. With the opportunities he had, he cannot claim he was denied due process.

As regards his claim that the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City was partial because the investigating officer knew respondent personally, the same was not substantiated. Even assuming arguendo that the investigating officer knew respondent, convincing proof was still required to establish partiality or bias. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias.²⁸ For failure of petitioner to adduce such evidence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails.²⁹

That he was allegedly informed of Dominador Blanco’s retraction upon receipt of the Board’s resolution is also of no moment. Even if it were true that petitioner was only informed of the retraction when he received a copy of the Board’s resolution, there was still no denial of due process because he still had the opportunity to question the same in his Motion for Reconsideration. This, he did not do.

But was there substantial evidence to show that petitioner was guilty of immoral and dishonorable conduct? On this issue, we likewise find against petitioner.

Petitioner claims good faith and maintains that he married respondent with the erroneous belief that his first wife was already deceased. He insists that such act of entering into the second marriage did not qualify as an immoral act, and asserts that he committed the act even before he became a teacher. He said that for thirteen (13) years, he was a good husband and loving father to his children with respondent. He was even an inspiration to many as he built a second home thinking that he had lost his first. He wanted to make things right when he learned of the whereabouts of his first family and longed to make up for his lost years with them. He maintains that he never violated the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers but embraced it like a good citizen when he opted to stop his illicit marriage to go back to his first family. He adds that respondent knew fully well he was married and had children when they contracted marriage. Thus, she was also at fault. Lastly, he claims there was no substantial proof to show that his bigamous marriage contracted before he became a teacher has brought damage to the teaching profession.

However, the issues of whether petitioner knew his first wife to be dead and whether respondent knew that petitioner was already married have been ruled upon by both the Board of Professional Teachers and the Court of Appeals. The Board and the appellate court found untenable petitioner’s belief that his first wife was already dead and that his former marriage was no longer subsisting. For failing to get a court order declaring his first wife presumptively dead, his marriage to respondent was clearly unlawful and immoral.

It is not the Court’s function to evaluate factual questions all over again. A weighing of evidence necessarily involves the consideration of factual issues - an exercise that is not appropriate for the Rule 45 petition filed. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the parties may raise only questions of law in petitions filed under Rule 45, as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. As a rule, we are not duty-bound to again analyze and weigh the evidence introduced and considered in the tribunals below.³⁰ This is particularly true where the Board and the Court of Appeals agree on the facts. While there are recognized exceptions to this general rule and the Court may be prevailed upon to review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals when the same are manifestly mistaken, or when the appealed judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court overlooked certain undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion,³¹ no such circumstances exist in this case.

Indeed, there is no sufficient reason to overturn the findings of the Board as affirmed by the appellate court. It is clear from the evidence that petitioner’s claim that he believed his first wife Cristina Puse to be already dead was belied by the latter’s declaration. In the affidavit submitted before the CSC in A.C. No. CSC RO5 D-06-012 entitled Cristina Puse v. Ligaya de los Santos, Cristina Puse, petitioner’s first wife, declared that "Sometime in 1993, complainant decided to work in Hongkong x x x. Since then up to the present, she has regularly sent financial support to her children and husband. From time to time, complainant would visit her family in the Philippines at least once a year every year." From this statement, petitioner cannot claim that he had no knowledge of the whereabouts of his first wife or that she was already dead given that she regularly sent her family financial support and visited them in the Philippines at least once a year.

Petitioner’s contention that there was no substantial evidence to show his guilt because respondent did not even formally offer her exhibits also does not persuade. As we have already said, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. The fact that respondent did not formally offer her exhibits the way she would in the courts of justice does not prevent the Board of Professional Teachers or Court of Appeals from admitting said exhibits and considering them in the resolution of the case. Under Section 5 of PRC Resolution No. 06-342 (A), Series of 2006, also known as the New Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigations in the Professional Regulation Commission and the Professional Regulatory Boards, "technical errors in the admission of the evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of the parties shall not vitiate the proceedings." Here, we do not find any evidence that respondent’s failure to formally offer her exhibits substantially prejudiced petitioner.

Neither is there merit to petitioner’s contention that because he contracted the bigamous marriage before he even became a teacher, he is not required to observe the ethical standards set forth in the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers.³²

In the practice of his profession, he, as a licensed professional teacher, is required to strictly adhere to, observe and practice the set of ethical and moral principles, standards and values laid down in the aforesaid code. It is of no moment that he was not yet a teacher when he contracted his second marriage. His good moral character is a continuing requirement which he must possess if he wants to continue practicing his noble profession. In the instant case, he failed to abide by the tenets of morality. Petitioner kept his first marriage secret to his second wife. Unfortunately for him, his second wife discovered his true marital status which led to the filing of the administrative and criminal cases against him.

In Santos, Jr. v. NLRC, a case involving a teacher dismissed from work on account of immorality, we declared:

On the outset, it must be stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of conduct and applicable laws. American jurisprudence has defined immorality as a course of conduct which offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate, x x x Thus, in petitioner’s case, the gravity and seriousness of the charges against him stem from his being a married man and at the same time a teacher.

x x x x

As a teacher, petitioner serves as an example to his pupils, especially during their formative years and stands in loco parentis to them. To stress their importance in our society, teachers are given substitute and special parental authority under our laws.

Consequently, it is but stating the obvious to assert that teachers must adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency. There is no dichotomy of morality. A teacher, both in his official and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior. He must freely and willingly accept restrictions on his conduct that might be viewed irksome by ordinary citizens. In other words, the personal behavior of teachers, in and outside the classroom, must be beyond reproach.

Accordingly, teachers must abide by a standard of personal conduct which not only proscribes the commission of immoral acts, but also prohibits behavior creating a suspicion of immorality because of the harmful impression it might have on the students. Likewise, they must observe a high standard of integrity and honesty.

From the foregoing, it seems obvious that when a teacher engages in extra-marital relationship, especially when the parties are both married, such behaviour amounts to immorality, justifying his termination from employment.³³

The Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers contains, among others, the following:

PREAMBLE

Teachers are duly licensed professionals who possess dignity and reputation with high moral values as well as technical and professional competence. In the practice of their noble profession, they strictly adhere to, observe, and practice this set of ethical and moral principles, standards, and values.

x x x x

ARTICLE II

THE TEACHER AND THE STATE

Section 1. The schools are the nurseries of the citizens of the state. Each teacher is a trustee of the cultural and educational heritage of the nation and is under obligation to transmit to learners such heritage as well as to elevate national morality, x x x.

x x x x

Section 3. In the interest of the State of the Filipino people as much as of his own, every teacher shall be physically, mentally and morally fit.

x x x x

ARTICLE III

THE TEACHER AND THE COMMUNITY

x x x x

Section 3. Every teacher shall merit reasonable social recognition for which purpose he shall behave with honor and dignity at all times and refrain from such activities as gambling, smoking, drunkenness and other excesses, much less illicit relations.

x x x x

ARTICLE XI

THE TEACHER AS A PERSON

Section 1. A teacher shall live with dignity in all places at all times.

x x x x

Section 3. A teacher shall maintain at all times a dignified personality which could serve as model worthy of emulation by learners, peers, and others. [Emphasis supplied.]

The foregoing provisions show that a teacher must conform to the standards of the Code. Any deviation from the prescribed standards, principles and values renders a teacher unfit to continue practicing his profession. Thus, it is required that a teacher must at all times be moral, honorable and dignified.

The discovery of petitioner’s bigamous marriage has definitely caused damage to the teaching profession. How can he hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality?

The fact that he is now allegedly walking away from his second marriage in order to be with his first family to make up for lost time does not wipe away the immoral conduct he performed when he contracted his second marriage. If we are to condone immoral acts simply because the offender says he is turning his back on his immoral activities, such would be a convenient excuse for moral transgressors and which would only abet the commission of similar immoral acts.1awph!1

His assertion that he fulfilled his responsibilities as a father and a husband to his second family will, even if true, not cleanse his moral transgression. In a case involving a lawyer who raised this same defense, we held:

Before we write finis to this case, we find it necessary to stress certain points in view of respondent’s additional reason why he should be exonerated – that he loves all his children and has always provided for them. He may have indeed provided well for his children. But this accomplishment is not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law. It has always been the duties of parents – e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. But what respondent forgot is that he has also duties to his wife. As a husband, he is obliged to live with her; observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. And most important of all, he is obliged to remain faithful to her until death.³⁴

Petitioner’s claim that he is a good provider to his second family is belied by the complaint of respondent wherein it was alleged that he failed financially to support his second family. Moreover, he is already delinquent as to his duties to his second wife. How can he live with her, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, render help and support, and to remain faithful to her until death when he has another family to whom he is returning to?

All told, petitioner’s act of entering into said second marriage constitutes grossly immoral conduct. No doubt, such actuation demonstrates a lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the teaching profession. When he contracted his second marriage despite the subsistence of the first, he made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.

We now go to the penalty imposed on petitioner. The penalty imposed on petitioner was the revocation of his license which penalty was upheld by the Court of Appeals. He claims that such penalty was harsh and inappropriate. He cites Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations which states that disgraceful and immoral conduct is a grave offense punishable by suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. Considering that the charge was supposedly his first offense and taking into account his years of committed service, the commensurate penalty, according to petitioner, is only the suspension of his professional license. He refers to the case of Vitug v. Rongcal,³⁵ where this Court considered remorse and the brevity of the illicit relationship as mitigating circumstances taken in favor of the respondent lawyer.

It must be remembered, however, that petitioner was charged before the Board of Professional Teachers under Rep. Act No. 7836 and not under Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations. Under Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836, the Board has the power to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration³⁶ of any teacher for any causes mentioned in said section, one (1) of which is immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. The Board has the discretion, taking into account the circumstances obtaining, to impose the penalty of suspension or revocation. In the imposition of the penalty, the Board is not guided by Section 22 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations which provides for suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense for disgraceful and immoral conduct. Petitioner, therefore, cannot insist that Section 22 be applied to him in the imposition of his penalty, because the Board’s basis is Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836 which does not consider whether the offense was committed the first or second time.

As to the supposed mitigating circumstances of remorse and brevity of the illicit relationship, these cannot be appreciated in petitioner’s favor, as these circumstances are not present in the instant case. We do not find any expression of remorse in petitioner. What we note, instead, is obduracy on his part. Despite the clear evidence (first wife’s statement that she regularly sends financial support to her children and husband [referring to petitioner] and that she visits them in the Philippines at least once a year) showing that petitioner knew that his first wife was still alive, he remains unyielding on his stand that he thought that his wife was already deceased. We also cannot consider the illicit and immoral relationship to be brief because it lasted for more than twelve (12) years until respondent learned about petitioner’s deception.

Under the circumstances, we find the penalty imposed by the Board proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 28 March 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100421 is AFFIRMED.

With costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ CA rollo, pp. 134-138. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo concurring.

² Rollo, p. 144.
³ Id. at 140.
⁴ Id. at 86.
⁵ Id. at 85.
⁶ Id. at 87-90.
⁷ Id. at 99-100.
⁸ Id. at 102-105.
⁹ Id. at 106.
¹⁰ Id. at 82.
¹¹ ARTICLE III – THE TEACHER AND THE COMMUNITY
x x x x

Section 3. Every teacher shall merit reasonable social recognition for which purpose he shall behave with honor and dignity at all times and refrain from such activities as gambling, smoking, drunkenness and other excesses, much less illicit relations.

¹² ARTICLE XI – THE TEACHER AS A PERSON
x x x x

Section 3. A teacher shall maintain at all times a dignified personality which could serve as a model worthy of emulation by learners, peers, and others.

¹³ Oath of Professionals

I further solemnly swear that at all times and places I will adhere closely to the ethical standards and professional roles of teachers in the Philippines x x x.

¹⁴ Rollo, pp. 83-84.
¹⁵ CA rollo, pp. 134-138.
¹⁶ Id. at 162.
¹⁷ Rollo, pp. 22-23.
¹⁸ Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Vol. 1, Third Revision, p. 1761.

¹⁹ Civil Service Commission v. Sojor, G.R. No. 168766, May 22, 2008, 554 SCRA 160, 176.

²⁰ Sec. 23 (h) has been repealed by Sec. 20, Rep. Act No. 8981 (PRC Modernization Act of 2000).

²¹ Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009, pp. 7-8.

²² Department of Justice v. Liwag, G.R. No. 149311, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 83, 98.

²³ G.R. No. 139794, February 27, 2002, 378 SCRA 143.
²⁴ G.R. No. 168670, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 155.
²⁵ Emin v. De Leon, supra at 154.

²⁶ De la Cruz v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports-Cordillera Administrative Region, G.R. No. 146739, January 16, 2004, 420 SCRA 113, 124.

²⁷ Alcala v. Villar, G.R. No. 156063, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 147, 154.

²⁸ De la Cruz v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports-Cordillera Administrative Region, supra at 123.

²⁹ Id.
³⁰ Madrid v. Mapoy, G.R. No. 150887, August 14, 2009, p. 8.

³¹ Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-1," G.R. No. 157901, September 11, 2009, p. 15.

³² Professional Regulation Commission Resolution No. 435, Series of 1997.
³³ G.R. No. 115795, March 6, 1998, 287 SCRA 117, 123-125.

³⁴ Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 310, 322.

³⁵ A.C. No. 6313, September 7, 2006, 501 SCRA 166, 185.

³⁶ SEC. 17. Issuance of Certificate of Registration and Professional License. – The registration of a professional teacher commences from the date his name is enrolled in the roster of professional teachers.

Every registrant who has satisfactorily met all the requirements specified in this Act shall, upon payment of the registration fee, be issued a certificate of registration as a professional teacher x x x as evidence that the person named therein is entitled to practice the profession x x x. The certificate shall remain in full force and effect until withdrawn, suspended and/or revoked in accordance with law.

A professional license x x x shall likewise be issued to every registrant who has paid the annual registration fees for three (3) consecutive years. This license shall serve as evidence that the licensee can lawfully practice his profession until the expiration of its validity.

THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ARE NOT STRICTLY APPLIED TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 99047       April 16, 2001
OMAR O. SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
I.T. (INTERNATIONAL) CORP./SAMIR MADDAH & TRAVELLERS INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division), respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:

This old petition, denominated as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court I shall be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons which are hereinafter stated. The petition seeks to reverse the Resolutlon¹ dated March 26, 1991 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Second Division, which set aside the Decision² dated December 29, 1989 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Adjudication Office in POEA Case No. (L) 88-12-1048.

The facts are as follows:

Sometime in November 1987, petitioner Omar Sevillana was contracted to work as a driver by private respondent I.T. (International) Corporation (I.T., for brevity) for its foreign accredited principal, Samir Maddah (Samir, for brevity), in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The agreed monthly salary was US $370.00 for a period of two (2) years. Petitioner alleged, however, that when he received his salaries from his employer, he was only paid US $100.00 a month for twelve (12) months, instead of the agreed US $370.00 per month. 1âwphi1.nêt

On November 2, 1988, after working twelve (12) months with his employer, petitioner said that he was repatriated without any valid and justifiable reason. Petitioner shouldered the cost of his return airfare in the amount of US $630.00.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA, for brevity) for underpayment of salaries, illegal dismissal, reimbursement of return airfare, moral damages and attorney's fees against I.T, (International) Corporation, Samir Maddah and Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation (Travellers, for brevity).

In answer thereto, private respondent I.T denied the material allegations of the petitioner but admitted that the petitioner was one of several workers it deployed and employed abroad. I.T. argued that the petitioner continuously worked with Samir for more than one (1) year until his blood pressure was considered critical. Thus, Samir was forced to closely monitor the health condition of the petitioner. When petitioner's blood pressure did not stabilize and begun affecting his work as driver due to frequent headaches and dizziness, I.T. alleged that Samir decided to repatriate the petitioner to avoid further injury and complication to his health. I.T. claimed that after the petitioner had received all the benefits accorded to an employee consisting of full salaries and separation pay, the petitioner refused to be repatriated and instead decided to run away. Since then, the whereabouts of the petitioner were unknown and I.T. only heard about the petitioner when the latter reported to their office in the Philippines and later on filed the subject complaint before the POEA Adjudication Office.

After both parties have submitted their respective position papers and their evidence thereto, the POEA Adjudication Office, through Tomas Achacoso, rendered a decision on December 29, 1989 holding the private respondents herein jointly and severally liable to the petitioner. The dispositive portion of the POEA decision reads –

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents (International) Corporation, Madir and Travellers Insurance & Surety Co~oration jointly and severally liable to the complainants the following amounts or their peso equivalents at the time of payment:

1. THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY US DOLLARS (US $3,240.00) representing complainant's salary differential for his twelve months employment;

2. FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY US DOLLARS (US $4,440.00) representing complainant's salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract;

3. TWO THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIX1Y NINE SAUDI RIY AL (S.R. 2,369.00) representing the cost of complainant's return airfare;

4. 5% of the aforesaid amounts as attorney's fees.

All other claims of the complainant are dismissed.

SO ORDERED."³

Only private respondent I.T. appealed the aforesaid decision of the POEA Adjudication Office to the NLRC Second Division which in turn reversed and set aside the findings and ruling of the former in its Resolution dated March 26, 1991. The NLRC held that –

x x x x x x x x x

The conclusions that could be inferred on the PAL Ticket is that complainant at that particular time travelled from Saudi Arabia to the Philippines -as to who paid the fare is subject of conflicting allegations; and the Travel Exit Pass, the same being a document of POEA, are proof of the contents thereof- the relevant fact in so far as this case is concerned, is the agreed salary of complainant, $370.00- not as to whether or not the complainant was underpaid. Thus, the primary evidence from which the Administrator drew his conclusions in the assailed decision is the affidavit of complainant where the affiant was not subjected to cross examination to determine whether or not he is telling the truth and the application (mis-application) of the general principles of law.

Consequently, we find it disconcerning to stamp our imprimatur of approval in the assailed decision considering (the) quantum of evidence presented vis-il-vis (the) amount involved in the award.

Firstly, I.T. (Int'l) Corp. is a recruitment agency. It is not in the level of the employer itself. At the (sic) most it is an agent of the employer. The application, therefore, of the so called' common knowledge that in employer to employee relationship, the former is the one who keep records of payments, , and , in abetter position to present the same' in the present case is akin to stretching the said principle to ridiculous proportions. Both appellant and complainant-appellee stand an (sic) -equal footing. No presumption arises. They both do not have the employment records of the complainant. More serious inquiry should have been resorted to such as the instrument of cross examinating the witnesses presented by the parties, or even the use of clarificatory questions by the Office a quo the witnesses would have shed light as to who among the parties is telling the truth. But records show that there is none.

Secondly, the POEA Administrator heavily relied upon the principle of law that in illegal termination cases, the burden of proof lies on the employer, and the employer not having presented sufficient evidence to justify the dismissal ergo the dismissal is illegal. The POEA Administrator misread the law. It is only when the employer admits the dismissal, which is not so in this case, that the burden to present proof that the dismissal is for cause hangs on the shoulders of the employer.

Thirdly, considering that the payment of the PAL ticket is at issue and there being no other evidence presented, except their respective bare self-serving and conflicting allegations We find no sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that one party paid for the ticket.

Basic in this jurisdiction is that he who asserts a right must prove it. In labor disputes, the evidence mandated by law are these relevant evidence which a reasonable and unbiased mind would accept to support a conclusion. Failing to do this, We find no basis to the award.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is set aside and a new one entered dismissing this one.

SO ORDERED."⁴

Dissatisfied, petitioner now come to us and assigns the following as errors committed by the NLRC, to wit:

I

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE AFFIDAVIT OF COMIPLAINT CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF TRUTH BECAUSE THE AFFIANT w AS NOT CROSS- EXAMINED .

II

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINANT-PETITIONER WAS NOT ILLEGALLY DISMISSED. .

III

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NEITHER PARTY, THE COMPLAINANT AND RESPONDENT, COULD BE AWARDED REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE PAL TICKET.

The Solicitor General, in his Comment⁵ to the petition, joined the petitioner⁶ in arguing that although there was a failure to allege grave abuse of discretion against the NLRC, this element of grave abuse of discretion is present in the instant petition. The assailed resolution was issued in gross violation of the settled principle that affidavits suffice as evidence in proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies like the POEA.⁷

We find merit in the petition.

At the outset, we note that the instant petition was filed with this Court on May 22, 1991 before the ruling of this Court in the case of the St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC⁸ on September 16, 1998 which required that judicial review of labor cases should be filed in the Court of Appeals before the same can be elevated to this Court following the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. The prevailing jurisprudence then holds that judicial review of labor cases by the Supreme Court may only be through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.⁹ Moreover, in the interest of justice, this Court had treated, in a number of cases, as special civil actions for certiorari petitions erroneously captioned as petitions for review on certiorari.¹⁰ It is in this light that we so treat the present petition. Rules of procedure and evidence should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense in labor cases in order that technicalities would not stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.¹¹

Furthermore, while we consider this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it is likewise significant to note that petitioner failed to seasonably file a motion for reconsideration at the NLRC level before recourse to this Court was made. As a general rule, this petition should have been dismissed outright for failure to comply with a condition precedent in order that this petition for certiorari shall lie. The filing of a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.¹² However, this rule is subject to certain recognized exceptions.¹³ Upon careful consideration of the case at bar, we find that this case falls under one of those recognized exceptions, namely, that the assailed order is a patent nullity, as will be shown later.

Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it considered petitioner's complaint-affidavit as mere hearsay evidence since the petitioner was not cross-examined. Petitioner argues that private respondent I.T . waived its right to cross-examine him when both parties agreed to submit their case for decision before the POEA Adjudication Officer on the basis of each parties' respective position papers, affidavits and other evidence extant on the record below.

Petitioner's argument is well-taken. It must be stressed that labor laws mandate the speedy disposition of cases, with the least attention to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process. In this light, the NLRC, like the labor arbiter, (in the case at bar, the POEA Adjudication Officer) is authorized to decide cases based on the position papers and other documents submitted, without resorting to technical rules of evidence.¹⁴

We quote, with approval, the following observations of the Solicitor General:

"We are constrained to disagree with the ruling of the NLRC.

In the recently decided case of Rabago, et. al. vs. NLRC and Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc.. G.R. No.82868, August 5. 1991. pp. 8-9, this Honorable Court held:

'We have said often enough that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise on the specific matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only respect but finality if they are supported by substantial evidence (Omar K. Al-Esayi and Company, Ltd. Vs. Flores, 183 SCRA 458; Chua vs. NLRC, 182 SCRA 353; Pagkakaisa ng mga Manggagawa vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 181 SCRA 119).'

' x x x The argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC. where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only. It is also worth noting that ABC has not presented any evidence of its own to disprove the complainant's claim. As the Solicitor General correctly points out, it would have been so easy to submit the complainant's employment records which were in the custody of ABC, to show that they had served (for) less than one year.' (Underscoring for emphasis)

Thus, it is clear that petitioner's affidavit of complaint may be made the basis of truth even if affiant was not cross-examined.¹⁵

The fact alone that most of the documents submitted in evidence by an employee were prepared by him does not make them self-serving since they have been offered in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter (in this case before the POEA Adjudication Officer) and that ample opportunity was given to the employer to rebut their veracit and authenticity. ¹⁶ The seriousness of the allegations in the complaint-affidavit in the case at bar cannot just be perfunctorily rejected absent any showing that the petitioner-affiant was lying when he made the statements contained therein. There being none, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC to ignore or simply sweep under the rug the petitioner's complaint-affidavit and conclude that it is a mere hearsay evidence without finding that there was adequate reason not to believe the allegations contained therein. Accordingly, the NLRC ruling that the complaint-affidavit is hearsay because the affiant was not cross-examined has no legal basis because the rules of evidence are not supposed to be strictly observed in proceedings before the NLRC and the POEA Adjudication Office. The NLRC failed to observe this well-entrenched doctrine when this case was brought on appeal before it.

Neither can we warrant the ruling of the NLRC that herein private respondent I.T. may only be considered as an agent of Samir, its foreign principal, and that private respondent I.T. should not be expected to have access to the employment records of its said foreign principal, thereby justifying the latter's non-presentation of the needed documents before the POEA Adjudication Office, and the absolution of I.T. from any liability to petitioner.¹⁷ In so ruling, respondent NLRC disregarded the rule regarding the solidary liability of the local employment agency with its foreign principal in overseas employment contracts. Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.¹⁸ This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him.¹⁹ This is in line with the policy of the State to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class. The fact, however, that private respondent I.T. failed to fully air its position was mainly due to its own inaction and negligence when it chose not to present countervailing evidence on the records of salary payments and separation pay it claimed Samir has paid to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, cannot be expected to have the proper facility to produce the same before the POEA Adjudication Officer considering that their relations became sour due to the present charges.

The NLRC's doubts in the factual findings of the POEA Adjudication Officer should not have prompted it to reject outright the contention of the petitioner contained in his complaint-affidavits, position paper and evidence submitted to the POEA Adjudication Office. The NLRC is not precluded by the rules to allow both parties ill submit additional evidence to prove their respective claims even on appeal²⁰ or to order the remand of the case to the administrative agency concerned for further study and investigation upon such issues. Since NLRC relied on the available evidence obtaining in the records of this case, it should have followed the well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer (as represented by the local employment agency in this case) and the employee, the doubts must be resolved in favor of the employee.²¹

As regards the issue of petitioner's dismissal from employment, petitioner claims that he was illegally dismissed; that respondent I.T. failed to substantiate its claim that petitioner was repatriated because he (petitioner) was found to have hypertension; and that respondent I.T. has the burden of proving that petitioner was legally dismissed.

We rule for the petitioner."

When the NLRC declared that the burden of proof in dismissal cases shifts to the employer only when the latter admits such dismissal, the NLRC ruled erroneously in disregard of the law and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. As correctly articulated by the Solicitor General in his Comment to this petition, thus –

"Article 277(b) of the Labor Code puts the burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee was for a valid or authorized cause on the employer. It should be noted that the said provision of law does not distinguish whether the employer admits or does not admit the dismissal.

It is a well-known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish (Robles vs. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., 104 Phil. 688).

Moreover, Article 4 of the Labor Code provides:

'Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.'

In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA 166 SCRA 533, this Honorable Court held:

'When the conflicting interest of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counterbalanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity-and the right-to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner.'

Thus, it is clear that petitioner was illegally dismissed by private respondent Samir Maddah."²²

Time and again we have ruled that where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal. The burden is on the employer to prove that the termination of employment was for a valid and legal cause. For an employee's dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due process.²³

A review of the record shows that neither of the two (2) conditions precedent were shown to have been complied with by the private respondents. All that private respondent I.T. did was to rely on its claim that petitioner was repatriated by its foreign principal, respondent Samir Maddah, due to hypertension with nary an evidence to support it. In all termination cases, strict compliance by the employer with the demands of both procedural and substantive due process is a condition sine qua non for the same to be declared valid.²⁴ Under Section 8, Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, for a disease to be a valid ground for the dismissal of the employee, the continued employment of such employee is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or the health of his co-employees, there must be a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months, even with proper medical treatment. This rule was correctly applied by the POEA Adjudication Office in its Decision dated December 29, 1989, to wit:

"In so far as the issue of illegal dismissal is concerned, this Office also finds it in the affirmative.

This Office in arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, takes into consideration the express provision of the Labor Code [Art. 277, par. (b)] that expressly provides that the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer (respondents in the instant case).

The defense of complainant's medical problems (alleged hypertension of complainant) interposed by respondents to justify the dismissal of the former is totally bereft of merit. The said defense of respondents is not only uncorroborated by documentary evidence but is also not a just or valid cause for termination of one's employment. While an employer (respondents in this case) may validly terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease, it is authorized only if his continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees (Art. 284, Labor Code). This is not present in the instant case, for there is no finding from a medical practitioner certifying that complainant is really hypertensive."²⁵

Since the burden of proving the validity of the dismissal of the employee rests on the employer, the latter should likewise bear the burden of showing that the requisites for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In the absence of the required certification by a competent public health authority, this Court has ruled against the validity of the employee's dismissal.²⁶ It is therefore incumbent upon the private respondents to prove by the quantum of evidence required by law that petitioner was .,ot dismissed, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would be unjustified.²⁷ This Court will not sanction a dismissal premised on mere conjectures and suspicions, the evidence must be substantial and not arbitrary and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant his separation from work.²⁸ We find no cogent reason to depart from the conclusion reached by the POEA Adjudication Office in the case at bar.

We also find merit in the petitioner's claim of refund for his repatriation plane ticket. The record shows that private respondent I.T. failed to controvert this claim of petitioner during the arbitration level at the POEA Adjudication Office. If at all, this belated claim of private respondent I.T., in the absence of proof therefor, and contrary to its Memorandum dated October 16, 1992 that respondent Samir had paid for the repatriation plane ticket of the petitioner, is merely an afterthought that deserves scant consideration from this Court. The POEA thus held that –

"Noteworthy in the instant case is respondent's failure to deny complainant's allegation that he was the one who shouldered the cost ofhis return airfare in the amount of SR 2,369.00. Having failed to deny the same, herein respondents are deemed to have admitted the same. Considering that the complainant in this case was illegally dismissed as mentioned earlier, the herein respondents are therefore liable to the repatriation expenses (return airfare in this case) of the herein complainant in the amount of SR 2,369.00 (per Annex 'A')."²⁹

The solidary nature of the relationship of respondent I.T. as the local employment agency, and respondent Samir, its foreign principal, vis-a-vis the petitioner does not exempt respondent I.T. from presenting proof of its alleged payment of the repatriation plane ticket. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the evidence of petitioner in that regard, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, merits the favorable consideration of this Court, to wit:

"It should be noted, however, that the only piece of evidence on the issue of payment of return airfare presented by petitioner is a "CERTIFICATION" signed by a certain Allan L. Timbayan, Labor Attache' in Jeddah. Said Certification reads:

'This is to certify that Overseas Contract Worker OMAR SEVILLANA, holder of passport No. DC 0605633, issued on 20 Nov. 1986 at Davao City, sought the assistance of this Office in connection with his employment problem. He stayed as stranded OCW at the Extension Office of the Labor Attache', Consulate General of the Philippines.

'Subject stranded OCW purchased his own ticket No. 0742041113955 form Jeddah to Manila via Karachi. The subject OCW was repatriated on 2 November 1988.

'This certification is issued upon the request of the stranded (sic) OCW for whatever legal purpose it may serve.' (Annex "C", Petition. Underscoring for emphasis).

Against this Certification, private respondents failed to adduce any proof that the return ticket was purchased by the employer. Considering that petitioner was illegally dismissed as earlier discussed, private respondents are, therefore, liable for the repatriation expenses of petitioner."³⁰

The Court in Pacific Maritime Services, Inc. vs. Ranay³¹ reiterated the doctrine regarding a claim of payment in labor cases, viz:

"As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment."

In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the assailed resolution of public I espondent NLRC is a patent nullity; and that the same was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The said resolution of public respondent NLRC, being a patent nullity, immediate resort to this Court was justified even without a prior motion for reconsideration therefor.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution dated March 26, 1991 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the Decision dated December 29, 1989 of the POEA Adjudication Office is hereby REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ.,concur.

 Footnotes:

¹Rollo, pp. 23-30; penned by Domingo H. Zapanta, Commissioner and concurred in by Edna Bonto-perez, Presiding Commissioner, and Rustico L. Diokno, Commissioner.

²Rollo, pp. 32-40.

³ Rollo, p. 40.

⁴ NLRC Resolution 6-8; Rollo, pp. 28-30.

⁵ Rollo, pp. 57-69.

⁶ Memorandum for the Petitioner; Rollo, pp. 134-145.

⁷ Comment, Office of the Solicitor General, Rollo, p. 68 & Memorandwn, Petitioner, Rollo, pp. 140-141.

⁸ 295 SCRA 494,509 (1998).

⁹ Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Inc. v. NLRC, 182 SCRA 446,451 (1990), citing Purefoods Corp. v. NLRC, et al., 171 SCRA 415 (1989).

¹⁰ Empire Insurance Company v. NLRC, 294 SCRA 263, 270 (1998) citing Salazar v. NLRC, 256 SCRA 273 (1996); Cando v. NLRC, 189 SCRA 666 (1990); Leopard Security and Investigation Agency v. NLRC, 186 SCRA 756 (1990); Mansalay Catholic School v. NLRC, 172 SCRA 465 (1989); Philippine-Singapore Ports Corporation v. NLRC, 218 SCRA 77 (1993).

¹¹ Philippine Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, 299 SCRA 690,694 (1998).

¹² Purefoods Corp. v. NLRC, 171 SCRA 415,425-426 (1989).

¹³ The recognized exceptions where the special civil action for certiorari willlie even without filing a motion for reconsideration includes: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprive of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved [Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 292 SCRA 452,457-458 (1998)].

¹⁴ Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union v. Laguesma, 286 SCRA 401,432 (1998).

¹⁵ Ro11o, pp 63-64.

¹⁶ PMI Colleges v. NLRC, 277 SCRA 462, 474 (1997).

¹⁷ Rollo, pp. 28-29.

¹⁸ Empire Insurance Company v. NLRC, 294 SCRA 263,271-272 (1998).

¹⁹ P.I. Manpower Placements, Inc. v. NLRC (Second Division), 276 SCRA 451,461 (1997).

²⁰ Masagana Concrete Products v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 576,588 (1999); Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Sony v. NLRC (First Division), 272 SCRA 209,218-220 (1997).

²¹ Travelarie & Tours Corporation v. NLRC, 294 SCRA 505,511 (1998); Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 299 SCRA 608 (1998).

²² Rollo, pp. 65-66.

²³ Phi1mare Shipping & Equipment Supply Inc., v. NLRC, G.R. No.126764, December 23, 1999.

²⁴ Garcia v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 597, 608 (1999); Masagana Concrete Products v. NLRC, Supra., p. 595 ( 1999).

²⁵ Rollo, pp. 37-38.

²⁶ Viola Cruz v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.116384, February 7, 2000.

²⁷ Barros v. NLRC, 315 SCRA 23, 27 (1999).

²⁸ PLDT Co. v. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1,7 (1997).

²⁹ Rollo, pp. 38-39.

³⁰ Ro110, pp. 67-68.

³¹ 275 SCRA 717,725-726 (1997