Courts should consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it was offered.[

Counter-Affidavit
Inadmissible in Evidence

Appellant posits that the trial court erred in not admitting the counter-affidavit executed by Eufracio Almocera, who died before the trial. He argues that the counter-affidavit should have been admitted under the doctrine of independently relevant statement; that is, "not to prove the truth of the facts therein but only to prove that such writings were executed."^[35] He further argues that the counter-affidavit "will corroborate xxx a very material fact that indeed Cornelio Valencia [did] not know who the assailants really were as he did not see them."

We do not agree. Courts should consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it was offered.^[36] In this case, appellant argues that the said document should have been admitted for the sole purpose of proving that such counter-affidavit was executed. The counter-affidavit, therefore, should not have been used for the purpose specified by the defense counsel during the trial: to "disprove the testimony of Cornelio Valencia"^[37] or, as he subsequently declared in the Appellant’s Brief, to corroborate the testimony of Defense Witness Santillan.^[38] For the court to consider the substance of the counter-affidavit is to give probative value to the statements of an affiant who could no longer be subjected to cross-examination, in violation of the hearsay rule.^[39]

In any event, even if the counter-affidavit were admitted to disprove the eyewitness account of Valencia, the prosecution’s case would still prosper. The guilt of appellant rests not only on the testimony of Valencia, but also on the more detailed account of Barrun.

[ G.R. No. 123072, October 14, 1998 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CADIZ LAPAY, ANECITO LAPAY, MARIO LAPAY, PANCHITO VILLANUEVA, SEGUNDO OLBES, ROGELIO RETEZA, EMILIANO CRISOSTOMO, BASILIO GENEROSA, RUDY CONSTANTINO AND PAYLITO TORRECAMPO, ACCUSED, CADIZ LAPAY, APPELLANT. 

admissible as part of the res gestae they having been caused by and did result from the startling, if not gruesome, occurrence that she witnessed

The trial court was of the opinion that what Ms. Aguilar heard or saw does not merely constitute an independently relevant statement which it considered as an "exception to the hearsay rule, only as to the tenor rather than the intrinsic truth or falsity of its contents."^[18] We will clarify this.  Insofar as the statements of Rufina Alconyes are concerned, they are admissible as part of the res gestae they having been caused by and did result from the startling, if not gruesome, occurrence that she witnessed; and these were shortly thereafter uttered by her with spontaneity, without prior opportunity to contrive the same.  The report made thereof by Josephine Aguilar is not hearsay since she was actually there and personally heard the statements of Alconyes which she recounted in court.  Her account of said statements of Alconyes are admissible under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, with respect to the tenor and not the truth thereof, since independent of the truth or falsity of the same they are relevant to the issue on the cause of the death of the victim.

[ G.R. No. 119359, December 10, 1996 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROBERT CLOUD, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 

Well-settled is the rule that, unless the affiant is presented as a witness, an affidavit is considered hearsay.

Rule on Independently
Relevant Statement

That witnesses must be examined and presented during the trial,^[50] and that their testimonies must be confined to personal knowledge is required by the rules on evidence, from which we quote:

"Section 36.  Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded.  –A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules."^[51]

On this basis, the trial court correctly refused to admit Jesus Cortez's Affidavit, which respondent had offered as evidence.^[52]  Well-settled is the rule that, unless the affiant is presented as a witness, an affidavit is considered hearsay.^[53]

An exception to the foregoing rule is that on "independently relevant statements."  A report made by a person is admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the statements.^[54]  Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement given in the report, the fact that it has been made is relevant.  Here, the hearsay rule does not apply.^[55]

independently relevant statement

In this case, Evangelista's testimony may be considered as an independently relevant statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant.^[19] When Evangelista said that Rubia told her that it was petitioner who requested that the check be exchanged for cash, Evangelista was only testifying that Rubia told her of such request. It does not establish the truth or veracity of Rubia's statement since it is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not presented in court to attest to such utterance. On this score, evidence regarding the making of such independently relevant statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may (a) constitute a fact in issue or (2) be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.^[20] Indeed, independent of its truth or falsehood, Evangelista's statement is relevant to the issues of petitioner's falsehood, his authorship of the check in question and consequently, his culpability of the offense charged.

[ G.R. NO. 155619, August 14, 2007 ]

LEODEGARIO BAYANI, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Article 256. Intentional abortion. - Any person who shall intentionally cause an abortion shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any violence upon the person of the pregnant woman.

2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using violence, he shall act without the consent of the woman.

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the woman shall have consented.

 Article 257. Unintentional abortion. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion by violence, but unintentionally.

Article 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

impossible crime

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

xxx

Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation ⁴ of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:

. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. ⁵

This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. ⁶ The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, ⁷ and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. ⁹

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. ¹⁰

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. ¹¹ There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act ¹² in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. ¹³ Thus:

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. ¹⁴

The impossibility of killing a person already dead ¹⁵ falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. ¹⁶ One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. ¹⁷

The case at bar belongs to this category. 

xxx

 In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable

xxx

In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

xxxx

 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.  

Article 59.Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos.

Examples of an impossible crime, which formerly was not punishable but is now under article 59 of the Revised Penal Code, are the following: 

 (1) When one tries to kill another by putting in his soup a substance which he believes to be arsenic when in fact it is common salt; and 

(2) when one tries to murder a corpse. (Guevara, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th ed., page 15; decision, Supreme Court of Spain, November 26, 1879; 12 Jur. Crim., 343.

INTENTIONAL ABORTION ELEMENTS

Intentional Abortion

ART.256

ELEMENTS:
1. That there is a pregnant woman;
2. That violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages administered,
   or that the accused otherwise acts upon such pregnant woman;
3. That as a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages
   upon her, or any other act of the accused, the fetus dies,
   either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.
4. That the abortion is intended.


A fetus about six months old cannot subsist by itself, outside
the maternal womb. Abortion usually means expulsion before 6th
month or before term of its viability

Viada: Abortion, as long as fetus dies as a result of violence
used or drugs administered

Infanticide, if: (1) Fetus could sustain independent life after
                             its separation from maternal womb, and
                       (2) it is killed

Fetus survives in spite of attempt to kill it or use of violence:
a. Abortion intended, all acts of execution performed –
   frustrated intentional abortion
b. Abortion not intended, fetus does not die – physical injuries

No frustrated unintentional abortion

Ways of committing intentional abortion
1. Using any violence upon the person of the pregnant woman;
2. Acting, but without using violence, without the consent of
   the woman. (By administering drugs or beverages upon such
   pregnant woman without her consent.)
3. Acting (by administering drugs or beverages), with the consent
   of the pregnant woman.

If the mother as a consequence of abortion suffers death or physical
injuries, you have a complex crime of murder or physical injuries
and abortion.

In intentional abortion, the offender must know of the pregnancy
because the particular criminal intention is to cause an abortion.

If the woman turns out not to be pregnant and someone performs
an abortion upon her, he is liable for an impossible crime if the
woman suffers no physical injury. If she does, the crime will be
homicide, serious physical injuries, etc.

Frustrated abortion is committed if the fetus that is expelled is
viable and, therefore, not dead as abortion did not result despite
the employment of adequate and sufficient means to make the
pregnant woman abort.

when a person, either with the object of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking possession of the personal property belonging to another and using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure

that appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to is admitted.⁴⁷

Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.⁴⁸

While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and against the owner’s consent transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful one
 Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi was no longer with Cipriano’s consent as the latter was already demanding its return.
x x x

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.⁵¹ Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.⁵² The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed.⁵³ Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.⁵⁴

In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission⁵⁵ which was reiterated in Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co, Inc.,⁵⁶ Justice Claudio Teehankee (later Chief Justice), interpreting the theft clause of an insurance policy, explained that, when one takes the motor vehicle of another without the latter’s consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft, there being intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain:

Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was "temporary" and for a "joy ride", the Court sustains as the better view⁵⁷ that which holds that when a person, either with the object of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking possession of the personal property belonging to another and using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites in his work Groizard who holds that the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon who calls it "hurt de uso."⁵⁸ (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted) 

xxx

 

Thus, in People v. Panida⁶⁶ which involved the crime of carnapping and the penalty imposed was the indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum, this Court did not apply the provisions of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-carnapping law provides for its own penalties which are distinct and without reference to the said Code.

The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months. There can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under the Revised Penal Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on, or applicable only to, the rules for felonies under the Code. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation. For this reason, we hold that the proper penalty to be imposed on each of accused-appellants is an indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum.⁶⁷ (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the first clause of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months, not more than 17 years and 4 months,⁶⁸ for, as discussed above, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied suppletorily and, therefore, the alleged aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence cannot be appreciated.

Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,⁶⁹ as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same – the penalty imposed being a range.⁷⁰

 WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Crim Case No. Q-97-71956, finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another judgment entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539, as amended and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) Months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months, as maximum. 

G. R. No. 148233             June 8, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.

The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation.  The prosecutor’s ruling is reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final determinative authority on the matter, has the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutor’s determination.^⁠13 It is well-settled that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to interference by the courts, save only 

(1)when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;

(2) when he grossly misapprehends facts;

 (3)when he acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law;

(4) or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.^⁠14 

SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014,RAY SHU, PETITIONER, VS. JAIME DEE, ENRIQUETO MAGPANTAY, RAMON MIRANDA, LARRY MACILLAN, AND EDWIN SO, RESPONDENTS.

in arriving at these conclusions, the city prosecutor already delved into the merits of the respondents’ defense.  This is contrary to the well-settled rule that the validity and merits of a party’s defense and accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.^⁠7  The allegations adduced by the prosecution will be put to test in a full-blown trial in which evidence shall be analyzed, weighed, given credence or disproved.^⁠8  The preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence^⁠9.  Simply put, in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the rules of evidence that, as a rule, is outside his technical knowledge.^⁠10 

That the findings of the city prosecutor should be ventilated in a full-blown trial is highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its  similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature^⁠11.  The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.  Thus, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting “with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine.”^⁠12 

Read in this light, the respondents’ defense that there are striking similarities in the specimen signatures they submitted and those of the questioned deeds is  a matter of evidence whose consideration is proper only in a full-blown trial.  In that proper forum, the respondents can present evidence to prove their defense and controvert the questioned documents report; they can raise as issue the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the examination.

Probable cause pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to support a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.^⁠4 

It is well-settled that in order to arrive at a finding of probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present.  In determining these elements for purposes of preliminary investigation, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are required, not absolute certainty.  Thus, probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction.^⁠5  

The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process  exists when a party  is given a chance to be heard through his motion for reconsideration.^⁠1