A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.[55] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thursday, January 12, 2017
Wednesday, January 11, 2017
amendment of information after arraignment
Delicate and sensitive is the issue in this case, which is, whether or
not the upgrading of the crime charged from homicide to the more serious
offense of murder is such a substantial amendment
that it is proscribed if made after the accused had pleaded "not
guilty" to the crime of homicide, displaying as alleged by the defense,
inordinate prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
x x x x
Such amendment to insert in the information real name of the accused involves merely a matter of form as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the accused of a fair opportunity to present a defense; neither is the nature of the offense charged affected or altered since the revelation of accused's real name does not change the theory of the prosecution nor does it introduce any new and material fact.[19] In fact, it is to be expected that the information has to be amended as the unknown participants in the crime became known to the public prosecutor.[20]
"Abuse of superior strength" having already been alleged in the original information charging homicide, the amendment of the name of the crime to murder, constitutes a mere formal amendment permissible even after arraignment
x x x
To amend the information so as to change the crime charged for homicide to the more serious offense of murder after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the former is indubitably proscribed by the first paragraph of the above-quoted provision. For certainly a change from homicide to murder is not a matter of form; it is one of substance with very serious consequences."[24]Indeed, petitioner forcefully and strongly submits that, in the light of this ruling, we are allegedly obliged to grant his prayer for the reversal of the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals and the affirmance of the trial court’s ruling that the post-arraignment amendment sought by the People is prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same being a substantial amendment prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
The cited ruling, however, differs from the case at bench because the facts herein sustain a contrary holding. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
Applying our aforegoing disquisition in the 1946 case of Regala, we likewise ruled in the 1983 case of People v. Court of Appeals[17] that a post-arraignment amendment to further allege conspiracy, is only a formal amendment not prejudicial to the rights of the accused and proper even after the accused has pleaded "not guilty" to the charge under the original information. We held in said case of People v. Court of Appeals:
"x x x The trial Judge should have allowed the amendment x x x considering that the amendments sought were only formal. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his memorandum, ‘there was no change in the prosecution’s theory that respondent Ruiz willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and shot with a gun Ernesto and Rogelio Bello x x x. The amendments would not have been prejudicial to him because his participation as principal in the crime charged with respondent Ruiz in the original informations, could not be prejudiced by the proposed amendments.’
x x x x
Such amendment to insert in the information real name of the accused involves merely a matter of form as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the accused of a fair opportunity to present a defense; neither is the nature of the offense charged affected or altered since the revelation of accused's real name does not change the theory of the prosecution nor does it introduce any new and material fact.[19] In fact, it is to be expected that the information has to be amended as the unknown participants in the crime became known to the public prosecutor.[20]
"Abuse of superior strength" having already been alleged in the original information charging homicide, the amendment of the name of the crime to murder, constitutes a mere formal amendment permissible even after arraignment
x x x
To amend the information so as to change the crime charged for homicide to the more serious offense of murder after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the former is indubitably proscribed by the first paragraph of the above-quoted provision. For certainly a change from homicide to murder is not a matter of form; it is one of substance with very serious consequences."[24]Indeed, petitioner forcefully and strongly submits that, in the light of this ruling, we are allegedly obliged to grant his prayer for the reversal of the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals and the affirmance of the trial court’s ruling that the post-arraignment amendment sought by the People is prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same being a substantial amendment prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
The cited ruling, however, differs from the case at bench because the facts herein sustain a contrary holding. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
"x x x the original Information, while only mentioning homicide, alleged:x x x x
Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe as the accused; [sic] of Danny Buhat stabbing the deceased Ramon while his two other companions were holding the arms of Ramon, thus, ‘the information already alleged superior strength’; and inflicting mortal wounds which led to the death of Ramon.
Superior strength qualifies the offense to murder (Article 248).
xxx xxx xxx
Before us, the Information already alleged superior strength, and the additional allegation that the deceased was stabbed by Buhat while the arms of the former were being held by the two other accused, referring to John Doe and Richard Doe. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
If the killing is characterized as having been committed by superior strength, then to repeat, there is murder x x x
Also the case of Dacuycuy was mentioned, as a justification for not allowing change of designation from homicide to murder, but then the body of the Information in the Dacuycuy ruling did not allege averments which qualifies [sic] the offense of murder. The case before us instead is different in that the Information already alleges that Buhat attacked the deceased while his two other companions held him by the arms, ‘using superior strength.’ x x x We would even express the possibility that if supported by evidence, Buhat and the Altavases could still be penalized for murder even without changing the designation from homicide to murder, precisely because of aforementioned allegations. The proposed change of the word form homicide to murder, to us, is not a substantial change that should be prohibited."[25]
Applying our aforegoing disquisition in the 1946 case of Regala, we likewise ruled in the 1983 case of People v. Court of Appeals[17] that a post-arraignment amendment to further allege conspiracy, is only a formal amendment not prejudicial to the rights of the accused and proper even after the accused has pleaded "not guilty" to the charge under the original information. We held in said case of People v. Court of Appeals:
"x x x The trial Judge should have allowed the amendment x x x considering that the amendments sought were only formal. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his memorandum, ‘there was no change in the prosecution’s theory that respondent Ruiz willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and shot with a gun Ernesto and Rogelio Bello x x x. The amendments would not have been prejudicial to him because his participation as principal in the crime charged with respondent Ruiz in the original informations, could not be prejudiced by the proposed amendments.’
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 119601, December 17, 1996 ]
DANILO BUHAT, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
It is well settled that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution. To overcome this presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld. In addition, one who denies the due execution of a deed where one's signature appears has the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before the notary public arid acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act. We have alsokheld ithat a notarized instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and is Conclusive as to the truthfulness of Its contents, and has in its favor the presumption of regularity.
It is fundamental that every element constituting The offense must be alleged in the information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. The allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are substantial matters and an accused's right to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the information cannot be waived. No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein. To convict him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.
x x x x
x x x x
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 211977, October 12, 2016 ]
MARIANO LIM, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
Verily, when it was proved that petitioner committed the unlawful acts alleged in the information, it was properly presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and with criminal intent, and it was incumbent upon him to rebut such a presumption
On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this element was not clearly established by the People's evidence and he, therefore, draws the conclusion that respondent court seriously erred in presuming the existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores the fact that intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person (Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil. 368 [1951]; 1 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977, p. 45; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197). And what was the external demeanor which petitioner showed from which the trial court and respondent court inferred animus furandi? These circumstances were vividly spelled in the body of the judgment which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over which he remains indifferent even at this crucial stage. Withal, the sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act in bringing out the tires from his bodega which were loaded on his pick–up (People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 [1929]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 46; Section 3(b), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence). At any rate, dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special statute like the Anti–FencingLaw of 1979 (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58) because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577 (1915); 1 Reyes, supra, at p. 59; 1 Aquino, supra, at p. 52). Verily, when it was proved that petitioner committed the unlawful acts alleged in the information, it was properly presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and with criminal intent, and it was incumbent upon him to rebut such a presumption -- a burden which petitioner regrettably failed to discharge (United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303 (1910); 1 Aquino, supra, at p. 45). Moreover, the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1612 that:
Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
must be upheld in the light of petitioner's shallow demurrer premised on a denial and alibi, since a disputable presumption on this score is sufficient until overcome by contrary evidence (Sibal and Salazar, Compendium on Evidence, Second Ed., 1988, p. 290).
xxxx
Presidential Decree No. 1612, because Section 3(a) thereof includes the accessory penalty pertaining thereto vis-a-vis Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code:
a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 100311, May 18, 1993 ]
JUANITO LIM, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
"x x x the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1612 x x x must be upheld in the light of petitioner’s shallow demurrer premised on a denial and alibi, since a disputable presumption on this score is sufficient until overcome by contrary evidence."
First of all, contrary to petitioner’s contention, intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a special law such as P.D. 1612.
The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called "acts mala in se," and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called "acts mala prohibita."[6] This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?[7] When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.[8]
In the case of Lim v. Court of Appeals[9] involving violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, we said:
It was incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow this presumption by sufficient and convincing evidence but he failed to do so. All petitioner could offer, by way of rebuttal, was a mere denial and his incredible testimony that a person aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of his establishment and left them there.
The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called "acts mala in se," and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called "acts mala prohibita."[6] This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?[7] When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.[8]
In the case of Lim v. Court of Appeals[9] involving violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, we said:
"On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this element was not clearly established by the People’s evidence and he, therefore, draws the conclusion that respondent court seriously erred in presuming the existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores the fact that intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person (Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil. 368 [1951]; 1 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977, p. 45; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197). And what was the external demeanor which petitioner showed from which the trial court and respondent court inferred animus furandi? These circumstances were vividly spelled in the body of the judgment which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over which he remains indifferent even at this crucial stage. Withal, the sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act in bringing out the tires from his bodega which were loaded on his pick-up (People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 [1929]; 1 Reyes, supra at P. 46; Section 3(b), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence). At any rate, dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special stature like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58) because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577 [1915]; 1 Reyes, supra, at p. 59; 1 Aquino, supra, at p. 52)."Secondly, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by petitioner, as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing.[10]
It was incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow this presumption by sufficient and convincing evidence but he failed to do so. All petitioner could offer, by way of rebuttal, was a mere denial and his incredible testimony that a person aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of his establishment and left them there.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 111343, August 22, 1996 ]
ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO, SR., PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, AND LOURDES DU, RESPONDENTS.
Sunday, January 8, 2017
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the Court has reiterated the essential elements in People v. Eling[34] to wit: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crime. The existence of the subject firearms and the ammunition were established through the testimony of Acierto. Their existence was likewise admitted by petitioner when he entered into stipulation and through his subsequent judicial admission. Concerning petitioner's lack of authority to possess the firearms, SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. testified that upon verification, it was ascertained that the name of petitioner does not appear in the list of registered firearm holders or a registered owner thereof. As proof, he submitted a certification to that effect and identified the same in court. The testimony of SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. or the certification from the FEO would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element.[35]
A final point. Republic Act (RA) No. 8294[36] took effect on June 6, 1997 or after the commission of the crime on January 30, 1996. However, since it is advantageous to the petitioner, it should be given retrospective application insofar as the penalty is concerned.
Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294 provides:
Prision mayor in its minimum period ranges from six years and one day to eight years. Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC as affirmed by the CA is proper.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crime. The existence of the subject firearms and the ammunition were established through the testimony of Acierto. Their existence was likewise admitted by petitioner when he entered into stipulation and through his subsequent judicial admission. Concerning petitioner's lack of authority to possess the firearms, SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. testified that upon verification, it was ascertained that the name of petitioner does not appear in the list of registered firearm holders or a registered owner thereof. As proof, he submitted a certification to that effect and identified the same in court. The testimony of SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. or the certification from the FEO would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element.[35]
A final point. Republic Act (RA) No. 8294[36] took effect on June 6, 1997 or after the commission of the crime on January 30, 1996. However, since it is advantageous to the petitioner, it should be given retrospective application insofar as the penalty is concerned.
Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294 provides:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. x x x
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
Prision mayor in its minimum period ranges from six years and one day to eight years. Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC as affirmed by the CA is proper.
Hence, if the “other crime” is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 136149-51, September 19, 2000 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. WALPAN LADJAALAM Y MIHAJIL ALIAS “WARPAN,” APPELLANT.
Saturday, January 7, 2017
The authority of punong barangays to possess the necessary firearm within their territorial jurisdiction is necessary to enforce their duty to maintain peace and order within the barangays. Owing to the similar functions, that is, to keep peace and order, this Court deems that, like police officers, punong barangays have a duty as a peace officer that must be discharged 24 hours a day. As a peace officer, a barangay captain may be called by his constituents, at any time, to assist in maintaining the peace and security of his barangay.50 As long as Aguillon is within his barangay, he cannot be separated from his duty as a punong barangay—to maintain peace and order.
G.R. No. 190569 April 25, 2012
P/INSP. ARIEL S. ARTILLERO, Petitioner,
vs.
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman; BERNABE D. DUSABAN, Provincial Prosecutor, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo; EDITO AGUILLON, Brgy. Capt., Brgy. Lanjagan, Ajuy, Iloilo, Respondents.
vs.
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman; BERNABE D. DUSABAN, Provincial Prosecutor, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo; EDITO AGUILLON, Brgy. Capt., Brgy. Lanjagan, Ajuy, Iloilo, Respondents.
does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence,
While the prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the possession of the petitioner, without the latter being able to present any license or permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a certification from the government agency concerned.24
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was carrying a firearm without prior authority, license or permit, the latter must be exculpated from criminal liability under P.D. No. 1866, as amended.
G.R. No. 156320 February 14, 2007
RODOLFO ABENES y GACUTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
HE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
vs.
HE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Friday, January 6, 2017
EN BANC A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011 RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the
solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession
of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the
Philippine College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral
conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the
Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity
and credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines the
foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly the
decision of cases and the establishment of legal precedents through
dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya
case does violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as
the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left
without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and
far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity
of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente
of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position, without
prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider
appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to
review the manner by which it conducts research, prepares drafts,
reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of
similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and
Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in
pleadings, practice, and adjudication.
x x x
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely,
Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin,
Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia
R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T.
Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera,
Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R.
Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P.
Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,
Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza,
Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye
B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva
and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law
professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and
13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to
the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending
to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and
the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found
UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty,
as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and
professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings
with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the
Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings. However, he is
reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law
school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional
conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this
Court.
(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and
for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of
merit.
EN BANC A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC February 24, 2009 IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO V. NOGRALES AND LIMKAICHONG, G.R. No. 179120.
Before this Court is the Report of the Investigating Committee created
under the Resolution dated December 10, 2008, to investigate the
unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Ruben T.
Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Villando v.
COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33,
respectively, to determine who are responsible for the leakage of a
confidential internal document of the En Banc.
x xx
The New Code of Judicial Conduct253 provides that confidential information acquired by justices and judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose not related to their judicial duties.254 The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel likewise devotes one whole canon on confidentiality, to wit:
x xx
The New Code of Judicial Conduct253 provides that confidential information acquired by justices and judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose not related to their judicial duties.254 The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel likewise devotes one whole canon on confidentiality, to wit:
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any
unauthorized person any confidential information acquired by them while
employed in the judiciary, whether such information came from authorized
or unauthorized sources.
Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public record relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases, including notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar papers.
The notes, drafts, research papers, internal
discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and
similar papers that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision,
resolution or order shall remain confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is made public.
x x x
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS the findings and APPROVES WITH MODIFICATION the Recommendations of the Investigating Committee as follows:
(1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) is held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court and he is FINED P500,000.00, to
be charged against his retirement benefits, and disqualified to hold
any office or employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations;
furthermore, Justice Ruben T. Reyes is directed to SHOW CAUSE within ten
(10) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision why he should not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar in light of the aforementioned
findings.
(2) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario are held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and are ordered to pay the FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively.
With
respect to the motion for contempt filed by Margarita Cojuangco against
Rina Jimenez-David, we believe that the article written by the latter
is not such as to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice. The allegedly contemptuous article merely restates the history
of the case and reiterates the arguments which Rina Jimenez-David,
together with some other journalists have raised before this Court in
their Brief for Petitioner Vitug. We do not find in this case the
contemptuous conduct exhibited by the respondent in In re Torres 13 where
the respondent, being a newspaper editor, published an article which
anticipated the outcome of a case in the Supreme Court, named the author
of the decision, and pointed out the probable vote of the members of
the Court although in fact, no such action had been taken by the court;
and in In re Kelly 14 where
respondent, having been convicted of contempt of court, published a
letter during the pendency of his motion for a re-hearing of the
contempt charge. In said letter, he severely criticized the court and
its action in the proceeding for contempt against him. In contrast to
the aforementioned publications, Rina Jimenez-David's article cannot be
said to have cast doubt on the integrity of the court or of the
administration of justice. If at all, it was a mere criticism of the
existing libel law in the country. In view of the above considerations,
we are constrained to deny the motion for contempt.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. Likewise, the motion for contempt filed by
respondent against Rina Jimenez-David is DENIED on the same ground.
MARITES DANGUILAN-VITUG, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RAMON MABUTAS, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XLII, Manila, and MARGARITA R. COJUANGCO, respondents.
the press will end up printing "praise" releases and that is no way for the people to know the truth
Macasaet writes a daily column, "Business Circuit," in Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation. In the 18-21 September 2007 issues of Malaya, Macasaet
ran a story, based on information obtained from confidential sources,
of an alleged bribery in the Court committed as follows: on separate
occasions in the second week of September 2007,2 five3 boxes containing cash worth P10
million were delivered to the Court and received by a certain
"Cecilia," a staff of an unnamed lady Justice, who opened one of the
boxes and saw its contents. Forthwith, the Justice terminated
"Cecilia’s" employment. The payoff was made allegedly in connection with
a decision rendered by the Justice "acquitting" a Filipino-Chinese
businessman. Macasaet’s story, which carried commentaries on the state
of the judiciary and reputation of judges,4 exhorted "Cecilia" to divulge everything she knows about the alleged bribery and the Court to investigate the matter.
xxx
[T]he Constitution did not conceive the press to act as the cheer leader of government, including the judiciary. Rather, the press is the agent of the people when it gathers news, especially news derogatory to those who hold the reins of government. The agency is necessary because the people must have all available information before they exercise their sovereign judgment. As well observed: "The newspapers, magazines, and other journals of the country, it is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any other instrument of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern." As agent of the people, the most important function of the press in a free society is to inform and it cannot inform if it is uninformed. We should be wary when the independent sources of information of the press dry up, for then the press will end up printing "praise" releases and that is no way for the people to know the truth
xxx
EN BANC
A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC August 8, 2008RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE COLUMNS OF MR. AMADO A.P. MACASAET PUBLISHED IN MALAYA DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 2007
originality in the law is viewed with skepticism. It is only the arrogant fool or the truly gifted who will depart entirely from the established template and reformulate an existing idea in the belief that in doing so they will improve it. While over time incremental changes occur, the wholesale abandonment of established expression is generally considered foolhardy.9
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is
exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases
from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a legal
periodical or language from a party’s brief are used without giving
attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sources they deem
appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal.
This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases
for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more
importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a
result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal
plagiarism.8
EN BANC
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC February 8, 2011IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.
In labor cases, as in other administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required.[50] To note, considering that substantial evidence is an evidentiary threshold, the Court, on exceptional cases, may assess the factual determinations made by the NLRC in a particular case. In Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna,[51] the Court expressed the following view:
The evident conflict between the NLRC’s and CA’s factual findings as shown in the records of this case prompts the Court to sift through their respective factual determinations if only to determine if the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reaching its disposition, keeping in mind that the latter’s assessment should only meet the threshold of substantial evidence.
Accordingly, we do not re-examine conflicting evidence, re- evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise in its specialized field. Nor do we substitute our “own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible.” The factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.
Nevertheless, there are exceptional cases where we, in the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction may be urged to look into factual issues raised in a Rule 45 petition. For instance, when the petitioner persuasively alleges that there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support the factual findings of the tribunal or court a quo, as Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states in express terms that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established only if supported by substantialevidence.[52] (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
The evident conflict between the NLRC’s and CA’s factual findings as shown in the records of this case prompts the Court to sift through their respective factual determinations if only to determine if the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reaching its disposition, keeping in mind that the latter’s assessment should only meet the threshold of substantial evidence.
With the aforecited GSIS policies and procedures as guidelines and the basic rule that, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable is substantial evidence,[43] the Court assesses the liability of Mallari in this administrative case.
Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is a reasonable ground to believe, based on the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal cases, but the evidence must be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.[44]
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the Court finds substantial evidence to prove Mallari’s administrative liability.
Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is a reasonable ground to believe, based on the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal cases, but the evidence must be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.[44]
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the Court finds substantial evidence to prove Mallari’s administrative liability.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, this sworn statement by respondent is an admission against her interest.
Section 26, Rule 130, Rules of Court (which is of suppletory application) expressly states:
The rationale for the rule was explained by the Supreme Court in Manila Electric Company v. Heirs of Spouses Dionisio Deloy:
Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself UNLESS SUCH DECLARATION WAS TRUE. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds to the truth, and it is his fault if it does not.
Respondent's representation in her COC for Senator that she had been a resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months by May 2013 is an admission that is binding on her. After all, she should not have declared it under oath if such declaration was not true.
Respondent's convenient defense that she committed an honest mistake on a difficult question of law, when she stated in her COC for Senator that her period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013 was 6 years and 6 months, is at best self-serving. It cannot overturn the weight given to the admission against interest voluntarily made by respondent.
Assuming arguendo that as now belatedly claimed the same was due to an honest mistake, no evidence has been shown that there was an attempt to rectify the so-called honest mistake. The attempt to correct it in her present COC filed only on October 15, 2015 cannot serve to outweigh the probative weight that has to be accorded to the admission against interest in her 2013 COC for Senator.
Certainly, it is beyond question that her declaration in her 2013 COC for Senator, under oath at that, that she has been a resident of the Philippines since November 2006 still stands in the record of this Commission as an official document, which may be given in evidence against her, and the probative weight and binding effect of which is neither obliterated by the passing of time nor by the belated attempt to correct it in her present COC for President of the Philippines. Respondent cannot now declare an earlier period of residence. Respondent is already stopped from doing so. If allowed to repudiate at this late stage her prior sworn declaration, We will be opening the floodgates for candidates to commit material misrepresentations in their COCs and escape responsibility for the same through the mere expedient of conveniently changing their story in a subsequent COC. Worse, We will be allowing a candidate to run for President when the COC for Senator earlier submitted to the Commission contains a material fact or data barring her from running for the position she now seeks to be elected to. Surely, to rule otherwise would be to tolerate a cavalier attitude to the requirement of putting in the correct data in a COC. In fact, the COC filer, in that same COC, certifies under oath that the data given are indeed "true and correct".
Public respondent's conclusions are unjustified. In the first place, the COMELEC misapplied the concepts of admissions and honest mistake in weighing the evidence presented by petitioner. As will be discussed below, declarations against interest are not conclusiveevidence and must still be evaluated to determine their probative value. Neither does the declaration in her 2013 CoC foreclose the presentation of evidence of petitioner's good faith and honest belief that she has complied with the 10-year residency requirement for presidential candidates.
Admissions against Interest
Admissions against interest are governed by Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
It is well to emphasize that admissions against interest fall under the rules of admissibility.[85] Admissions against interest pass the test of relevance and competence. They, however, do not guarantee their own probative value and conclusiveness. Like all evidence, they must be weighed and calibrated by the court against all other pieces at hand. Also, a party against whom an admission against interest is offered may properly refute such declaration by adducing contrary evidence.[86]
To be admissible, an admission must (1) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (2) be categorical and definite; (3) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (4) be adverse to the admitter' s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.[87] An admission against interest must consist of a categorical statement or document pertaining to a matter of fact. If the statement or document pertains to a conclusion of law or necessitates prior settlement of questions of law, it cannot be regarded as an admission against interest.[88]
Even a judicial admission, which does not require proof, for judicial admissions under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court[89] But even then, contrary evidence may be admitted to show that the admission was made through palpable mistake. In Bitong v. CA,[90] the Court ruled that although acts or facts admitted in a pleading do not require proof and can no longer be contradicted, evidence aliunde can be presented to show that the admission was made through palpable mistake. Said the Court:
A party whose pleading is admitted as an admission against interest is entitled to overcome by evidence the apparent inconsistency, and it is competent for the party against whom the pleading is offered to show that the statements were inadvertently made or were made under a mistake of fact. In addition, a party against whom a single clause or paragraph of a pleading is offered may have the right to introduce other paragraphs which tend to destroy the admission in the paragraph offered by the adversary.Every alleged admission is taken as an entirety of the fact which makes for the one side with the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its effect on the other side. The reason for this is, where part of a statement of a party is used against him as an admission, the court should weigh any other portion connected with the statement, which tends to neutralize or explain the portion which is against interest.In other words, while the admission is admissible in evidence, its probative value is to be determined from the whole statement and others intimately related or connected therewith as an integrated unit.[91]
Obedience to the rule of law is the bedrock of the Philippine justice system.[251] In order to expound and define the true meaning and operation of these laws, they must first be ascertained by judicial determination, and in order "to produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in the last resort, to one supreme tribunal xxx authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice."[252]
The rules of evidence, authorized by the Constitution, is a means by which uniformity is instituted in the judicial system whether in courts of law or administrative agencies granted quasi-adjudicatory power. These rules govern the means of ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact.[253]
It must be emphasized that ascertaining evidence does not entail absolute certainty. Under Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence must only induce belief in the existence of a fact in issue, thus:
Section 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, judges are not precluded from drawing conclusions from inferences based on established facts. In the case of Joaquin v. Navarro,[254] the Court proceeded to discuss this process:[255]
In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."
In Montemayor v. Bundalian,[21] this Court laid down the guidelines for the judicial review of decisions rendered by administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers, as follows:
First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.
Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned. [emphases ours]
Settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that a notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise the document should be upheld. Clearly, the positive presumption of the due execution of the subject real estate mortgage outweighs [petitioners'] bare and unsubstantiated denial that the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-225132 and T-225131 were among those intended to secure the loan of One Million Pesos. Their imputation of fraud among the officials of [the bank] is weak and unpersuasive. x x x
The burden of proof shifts to the person invoking self-defense, who, with clear andconvincing evidence, must establish all the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. Upon failure to establish these requisites, conviction is inevitable because the accused, by setting up self-defense, admits being the author of the killing.
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service."[25] These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts' and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse.[26] On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers.[27] For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons.[28] To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest representation conflicts."[29] The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer's largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients
Moreover, this "inconsistency" refers only to a collateral matter and does not deviate from the fact that accused-appellant was positively and categorically identified as the perpetrator of the crime. The "inconsistency" only bolsters the credibility of Lejano as it shows that his testimony was not rehearsed nor perjured. Thus -
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declarations nor the veracity or weight of their testimony. In fact, these minor inconsistencies enhance the credibility of the witnesses for they remove any suspicion that their testimonies were contrived or rehearsed. In People v. Maglente [306 SCRA 546 (1999)], this Court ruled that inconsistencies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal.[5]The defense maintains that Lejano is a perjured witness as he could not even state the exact date when his cousin died. Again, this Court is not convinced. Whatever seeming discrepancy there was in Lejano's testimony was not as irreconcilable nor material or relevant as to merit its complete disregard by the court. The date when the victim died refers only to a collateral matter. The established fact remains that accused-appellant stabbed the victim to death.
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