We quote below the pertinent portion of the appellate court's ruling: ⁷

While it is true that the affidavit was signed and subscribed before a notary public, the general rule is that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence, unless affiants are placed on the witness stand (People's Bank and Trust Company vs. Leonidas, 207 SCRA 164). Affidavits are not considered the best evidence, if affiants are available as witnesses (Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 587). The due execution of the affidavit was not sufficiently established. The notary public or others who saw that the document was signed or at least [could] confirm its recitals [were] not presented. There was no expert testimony or competent witness who attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures. Worse, [respondent] denied the genuineness of her signature and that of her mother . . . [Respondent] testified that her mother was an illiterate and as far as she knew her mother could not write because she had not attended school (p. 7, ibid). Her testimony was corroborated by Ma. Sales Bolante Basa, who said the [respondent's] mother was illiterate.

The petitioners’ allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered as authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved first. ⁸ And before a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead, insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable the existence of any motive to falsify. ⁹

In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is not admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness. ¹⁰ Such declarant should be confronted with the statement against interest as a prior inconsistent statement.

The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An ancient document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. ¹¹ It must on its face appear to be genuine. The petitioners herein failed, however, to explain how the purported signature of Eduarda Apiado could have been affixed to the subject affidavit if, according to the witness, she was an illiterate woman who never had any formal schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity.

Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy.¹⁵ One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote here:

"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. –

(a) In Criminal Cases:

x x x           x x x

(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged."

It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be applied here, still, we cannot sustain respondent’s posture.

Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this provision. Only those which would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.¹⁶ Thus, on a charge of rape - character for chastity, on a charge of assault - character for peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of embezzlement - character for honesty.¹⁷ In one rape case, where it was established that the alleged victim was morally loose and apparently uncaring about her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused doubtful.¹⁸

In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that has a bearing on Magdalena’s chastity. What he presented are charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the above provision because they do not establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged.

Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to establish is Magdalena’s lack of credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the charge. In this regard, a different provision applies.

Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a person’s integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief.¹⁹ A witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for truth,²⁰ honesty²¹ or integrity.²² Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads:

"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness. –A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense."

Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to character or reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a party who becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself in the same position as any other witness, and may be impeached by an attack on his character or reputation.²³

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the character or reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question – is Magdalena’s derogatory record sufficient to discredit her credibility?

Accused-appellant makes capital of Joseph’s bad reputation in their community. He alleges that the victim’s drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have been shot by any of the persons from whom he had stolen.³⁰As proof of Joseph’s bad character, appellant presented Herminia’s letter to Mayor Malonzo seeking his assistance for Joseph’s rehabilitation from drugs. On rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter to Mayor Malonzo but denied anything about her son’s thievery.³¹

Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz:

"Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:--

(a) In Criminal Cases:

(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.

(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.

(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.

x x x      x x x      x x x."

Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the common report of the people who are acquainted with him; his reputation.³² "Good moral character" includes all the elements essential to make up such a character; among these are common honesty and veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a character that measures up as good among people of the community in which the person lives, or that is up to the standard of the average citizen; that status which attaches to a man of good behavior and upright conduct.³³

The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the business of the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a very bad man may have a righteous cause.³⁴ There are exceptions to this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both criminal and civil cases.

In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. When the accused presents proof of his good moral character, this strengthens the presumption of innocence, and where good character and reputation are established, an inference arises that the accused did not commit the crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory that a person of good character and high reputation is not likely to have committed the act charged against him.³⁵ Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a person of bad character.³⁶ The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the defendant to produce such evidence.³⁷ Once the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the defendant’s bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from refutation, would have a license to unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal.³⁸

Not too long ago, we were called to pass upon the issue of the probative value of a marriage contract issued by the church to prove the fact of marriage.1 Once again, it behooves upon us to determine whether the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial, as it is denominated in this case, is sufficient to prove the fact of marriage.
X X X X

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in the case of U.S. v. Evangelista,22 it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 6823 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.24

Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court,25 before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof.26 As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during its execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.

Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a duplicate original, hence, the original need not be produced. We do not agree. We had previously ruled in Vallarta v. Court of Appeals27 that " a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non- production of the original. But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy."28

Next, while petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue that it is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration.

The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.

Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for.29

Gibson v. Poor30 cited the reason why it is required that an ancient document shall be produced from the proper depository:

x x x that thereby credit is given to its genuineness. Were it not for its antiquity, and the presumption that consequently arises that evidence of its execution cannot be obtained, it would have to be proved. It is not that any one particular place of deposit can have more virtue in it than another, or make that true which is false; but the fact of its coming from the natural and proper place, tends to remove presumptions of fraud, and strengthens the belief in its genuineness. It may be false, and so shown, notwithstanding the presumptions in its favor. If found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for; but that being done and all suspicions against its genuineness removed, we can discover no reason why it may not be read in evidence. The real question which is to affect its consideration is, whether the instrument offered is genuine, and contains a true statement of what it purports to. In the Bishop of Meath v. Marquis of Winchester, 2 Bing. 183, Tindal, C. J., speaking of ancient documents, holds this language. "It is not necessary that they should be found in the best and most proper place of deposit. If documents continued in such custody, there never would be any question as to their authenticity; but it is when documents are found in other than their proper place of deposit, that the investigation commences whether it was reasonable and natural under the circumstances in the particular case, to expect that they should have been in the place where they are actually found; for it is obvious, that while there can be only one place of deposit strictly and absolutely proper, there may be many and various that are reasonable and probable, though differing in degree; some being more so, some less; and in those cases the proposition to be determined is, whether the actual custody is so reasonably and probably accounted for, that it impresses the mind with the conviction, that the instrument found in such custody must be genuine." Some authorities hold, that the antiquity of the document is alone sufficient to entitle it to be read, and that the other circumstances only go to its effect in evidence.

Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the property for which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they may become the basis of a claim for ownership. By acquisitive prescription, possession in the concept of owner — public, adverse, peaceful and uninterrupted — may be converted to ownership. On the other hand, mere possession and occupation of land cannot ripen into ownership.

x x x x

We quote below the pertinent portion of the appellate court's ruling: ⁷

While it is true that the affidavit was signed and subscribed before a notary public, the general rule is that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence, unless affiants are placed on the witness stand (People's Bank and Trust Company vs. Leonidas, 207 SCRA 164). Affidavits are not considered the best evidence, if affiants are available as witnesses (Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 587). The due execution of the affidavit was not sufficiently established. The notary public or others who saw that the document was signed or at least [could] confirm its recitals [were] not presented. There was no expert testimony or competent witness who attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures. Worse, [respondent] denied the genuineness of her signature and that of her mother . . . [Respondent] testified that her mother was an illiterate and as far as she knew her mother could not write because she had not attended school (p. 7, ibid). Her testimony was corroborated by Ma. Sales Bolante Basa, who said the [respondent's] mother was illiterate.

The petitioners’ allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered as authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved first. ⁸ And before a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead, insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable the existence of any motive to falsify. ⁹

In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is not admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness. ¹⁰ Such declarant should be confronted with the statement against interest as a prior inconsistent statement.

The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An ancient document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. ¹¹ It must on its face appear to be genuine. The petitioners herein failed, however, to explain how the purported signature of Eduarda Apiado could have been affixed to the subject affidavit if, according to the witness, she was an illiterate woman who never had any formal schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity.

Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

Thus, all the elements of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, are present, such as: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. In addition, Article 1477 of the same Code provides that "the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon actual or constructive delivery thereof." The plaintiff-appellee Julio Tapec himself, testified during cross-examination that Ireneo Raguirag (father of defendants-appellants) was already in possession of the parcel of land when the subject land was offered to him by the vendor, Rosario Gonzales. (Original Records, TSN, June 26, 1986, p. 8) Moreover, Constancia Gonzales, a sister of the vendor of the plaintiffs-appellees, and a witness for the defendants-appellants, testified that the subject pastureland was sold to the grandfather of the defendants-appellants as told to her by her parents; and that the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants-appellants have been in possession of the property since they bought it. (Original Records, TSN, November 23, 1988, pp. 2-3).

The validity of the sale of the subject pastureland to the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants-appellants cannot be disputed. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. (Article 1356, New Civil Code) We do not agree with the ruling of the trial judge that under Article 1358 of the New Civil Code, a contract which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public document to be valid and enforceable.

Article 1358 of the New Civil Code enumerates certain contracts that must appear in public or private documents. This provision does not require such form in order to validate the act or contract but to insure its efficacy. Contracts enumerated by this article are, therefore, valid as between the contracting parties, even when they have not been reduced to public or private writings. (Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume Four, 1985 ed., pp. 549-550) Therefore, the Deed of Sale in favor of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants-appellants is considered valid and enforceable, even if it was only embodied in a private writing.

In upholding the validity of the 1931 sale of the subject pastureland, we can only conclude that when the land was sold to the plaintiffs-appellees in 1950, the vendor had no right to sell the subject property since at that time her family no longer owned the land and thus no legal right was transferred by the vendor to the plaintiffs-appellees. Article 1459 of the New Civil Code requires that the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered, otherwise the contract of sale is void.

Article 1544 of the New Civil Code on double sales does not apply in this case. The article provides that if an immovable property should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry Property. In order that the abovementioned provision may be invoked, it is necessary that the conveyance must have been made by a party who has an existing right in the thing, and the power to dispose of it. It cannot, therefore, be invoked in a case where the two different contracts of sale are made by two different persons, one of them not being the owner of the property sold. (Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume Five, 1959, pp. 83-84). ²¹

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals wrongfully applied the "ancient document rule" provided in Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 14 The rule states that:

Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary.— Were a private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given.

It is submitted by petitioners that under this rule, for a document to be classified as an "ancient document", it must not only be at least thirty (30) years old but it must also be found in the proper custody and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from suspicion. 15 Thus, according to petitioners, exhibits "3" and "7", entitled "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" and "Escritura de Venta Absoluta", respectively, can not qualify under the foregoing rule, for the reason that since the "first pages" of said documents do not bear the signatures of the alleged parties thereto, this constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget unlimited alterations. 16

We are not persuaded by the contention. Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. 17

In light of the foregoing considerations, it is but just and proper to allow, with becoming dispatch, withdrawal of the revised compensation amount, albeit protested. The concept of just compensation contemplates of just and timely payment; it embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner, but also the payment ofthe land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot, as Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals instructs, be considered "just," for the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for years before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.⁹⁰

Using the foregoing pronouncement as precedent, this Court opts to grant, in the interest of justice, Galle’s heirs the right to withdraw the amount of P7,534,063.91, which LBP iswilling to compensate the respondents for their mother’s estate, in the meantime that the case is pending determination anew in the CA.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 171836               August 11, 2014

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by HON. NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN, in his capacity as DAR-OIC Secretary, Petitioner, 

vs.

SUSIE IRENE GALLE, Respondent.

upholding commissioner's fees against LBP

The charging of P 25,000.00 as commissioners’ fees against LBP is likewise upheld. Section 16, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, expressly recognizes such fees, to wit:

Section 16. Fees of commissioners in eminent domain proceedings. – The commissioners appointed to appraise land sought to be condemned for public uses in accordance with the rules shall each receive a compensation to be fixed by the court of not less than (P 300.00) Pesos per day for the time actually and necessarily employed in the performance of their duties and in making their report to the court which fees shall be taxed as a part of costs of the proceedings.

Applying the rule, the Court finds the amount of P 25,000.00 as fair and commensurate to the work performed by the commissioners, which the CA summed up as follows:

We observe that in the Commissioners’ Report, the three (3) appointed Commissioners actually inspected 127 hectares of the subject property. It took them five (5) days to complete the ocular inspection and individually counted 12,153 coconut trees, 28,024 bananas, 4,928 Tundan, 821 Falcata, 1,126 Temani, 298 Bamboos, Jackfruit, 90 Santol, 51 Rombuon, 260 Ipil-Ipil, 5,222 Abaca plant, 68 Star Apple, 1,670 Antipolo, 67 Narra trees, 23 Durian trees, 139 Mango trees, 83 Avocado trees, 23 Lanzones trees, 84 Cacao, 18 Marang, and 13 trees of Lawaan.

Hence, for the actual time spent and thoroughness of its Report, it is proper for the said commissioners to be compensated in the amount of P 25,000.00, which is only P 1,666.66 per day.⁴⁰

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.VERONICA ATEGA NABLE, Respondent.FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 176692               June 27, 2012

commissioner's fees: who shall pay? and how much?

SEC. 58. Appointment of Commissioners. — The Special Agrarian Courts, upon their own initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, may appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof with the court.

Here, both parties did not object to the appointment of commissioners. Our ruling in Apo Fruits⁴⁸ is instructive:

The relevant law is found in Rule 67, Section 12 of the Rules of Court:

"SEC. 12. Costs, by whom paid. — The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the appeal shall be paid by the owner."

Rule 141, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, provides that:

"SEC. 16. Fees of commissioners in eminent domain proceedings. — The commissioners appointed to appraise land sought to be condemned for public uses in accordance with these rules shall each receive a compensation to be fixed by the court of NOT LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED (P300.00) PESOS per day for the time actually and necessarily employed in the performance of their duties and in making their report to the court, which fees shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings."

From the afore-quoted provision, the award made by the RTC is way beyond that allowed under Rule 141, Section 16; thus, the award is excessive and without justification. Records show that the commissioners were constituted on 26 May 2000 and they submitted their appraisal report on 21 May 2001, when the old schedule of legal fees was in effect. The amendment in Rule 141 introduced by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which took effect on 16 August 2004, increased the commissioner’s fees from P100.00 to P300.00 per day. Assuming they devoted all the 360 days from the time they were constituted until the time they submitted the appraisal report in the performance of their duties, and applying the old rate for commissioner’s fees, they would only receive P38,000.00. Moreover, even if the new rate is applied, each commissioner would receive only P108,000.00. The rule above-quoted is very clear on the amount of commissioner’s fees. The award made by the RTC in the amount of 2½% of the total amount of just compensation, i.e., 2 1/2% of P1,383,179,000.00, which translates to P34,579,475.00, is certainly unjustified and excessive. x x x⁴⁹

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.ATTY. RICARDO D. GONZALEZ, Respondent.FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 185821               June 13, 2013