"The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds justification in man's natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his person and rights from impending danger and peril; it is based on that impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human being." [People v. Boholst-Caballero, G.R. No. L-23249 November 25,1974,61 SCRA 180, 1 85.] In our jurisdiction it is found in Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
x x x
It is settled jurisprudence that he who invokes the exempting circumstance of self-defense must prove it during the trial [U.S. v. Coronel, 30 Phil. 112 (1915)]. He must prove the elements enumerated in Article 11 by clear and convincing evidence, the reason being that since he had admitted having killed or wounded another, which is an act punishable by law, he shall be liable thereof unless he establishes a lawful defense [People v. Boholst-Caballero, supra]. Thus, the determination of whether or not all the three elements are present in the case.
1. That there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased Leopoldo Potane is evident from the established facts. Leopoldo Potane, who had showed signs of mental illness and had threatened his immediate relatives with a bolo, suddenly and without provocation attacked with a bolo Masipequina, whom he (Leopoldo Potane) has asked to go inside the house.
2. That there was reasonable necessity of the means employed by Masipequina to prevent or repel Leopoldo Potane's attack is also supported by the evidence.
In the leading case of U.S. v. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784 (1922), where a policeman trying to quell a disturbance shot with his revolver and fatally wounded a man who attacked him with a knife, the Court laid down the following rule:
A police officer, in the performance of his duty, must stand his ground and cannot, like a private individual, take refuge in flight; his duty requires him to overcome his opponent. The force which he may exert therefore differs somewhat from that which may ordinarily be offered in self-defense. Bearing this in mind, we do not think that the appellant in using his revolver against the deceased can be said to have employed unnecessary force. The deceased attacked him with a deadly weapon; he might, perhaps, have saved himself by running away, but this his duty forbade. Was he to allow himself to be stabbed before using his arms? It may, perhaps, be argued that the appellant might have used his club, but a policeman's club is not a very effective weapon as against a drawn knife and a police officer is not required to afford a person attacking him the opportunity for a fair and equal struggle. (State vs. Phillips, 119 Iowa, 652; 67 L.R.A. 292; North Carolina vs. Gosnell, 74 Fed., 734; Boykin vs. People, 22 Colo., 496; 45 Pac., 419; Adams vs. State, 72 Ga., 85.) And if it was necessary for the appellant to use his revolver, he could hardly, under the circumstances, be expected to take deliberate and careful aim so as to strike a point less vulnerable than the body of his adversary. (U.S. vs. Mack 8 Phil., 701; U.S. v. Domen 37 Phil., 57.) [Id., p. 787].
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-51206 August 25, 1989
NORBERTO MASIPEQUINA and JOVENCIO ALAMPAYAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, responden
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, responden
