Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the child's competency as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 195244               June 22, 2015

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA, Accused-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the child's competency as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge.

Under review is the decision promulgated on July 23, 2010,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the conviction of the appellant for the composite crime of robbery with homicide handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 211, in Mandaluyong City through its judgment rendered on January 27, 2006.2

Antecedents

The information charged the appellant with robbery with homicide, alleging as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of force and violence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to ₱13,000.00 belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter; that by reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon said JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries which directly caused her death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The CA adopted the RTC’s summation of the evidence of the Prosecution, to wit:

Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her to the hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he related that the assailant took money from his father’s pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetra tor because there was no light (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp. 3, 11-23, 28, 30-32).

Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his mother was stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor, which illumined the ground floor through the stairway (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp. 33-34).

Insp. Marquez, who autopsied the body, related that the cause of the victim’s death was hemorrhagic shock due to stab wound. The wound was located at the epigastric region, measuring 2.8 x 0.5 cm, 4 cm from left of the anterior midline, 13 cm deep, directed posterior and upward, piercing the right ventricle of the hear t, thoracic aorta and lower lobe of the left lung (TSN, April 21, 2004, pp. 1, 6; Exh. "I," Records, p. 103).

Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the victim. He narrated that he and the victim were married for nine years before the incident and that they have four children: Monica, 11 years old; Mary Joy, 9 years old; Carl, 5 years old; and Cherry Ann, 7 months old. At about 9 p.m. on October 21, 2003, he and his wife were sleeping downstairs in their sala, with their baby, while their other children slept upstairs. Their sala measures 3 by 3 meters. At around 2 a.m., his son Carl woke up crying and went downstairs to sleep with them. Fifteen to thirty minutes later, he heard someone shout "magnanakaw!" [H]e turned on the light and saw that their door was open. He got their bolo and ran outside. When he did not see anybody, he returned and heard his wife moaning. He embraced and carried her and saw blood on her back. He shouted for help and his brother-in law helped him bring the victim to the hospital where she eventually died. He spent ₱23,000.00 for the funeral and ₱44,500.00 for the wake and burial. On cross-examination, he admitted that he has no personal knowledge as to who stabbed his wife since he did not actually see the perpetrator and that it was his son who saw the appellant (TSN, August 25, 2004, pp. 3 12; October 6, 2004, pp. 5-6; November 17, 2004, pp. 3-4).

Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that she and her husband were sleeping upstairs when they were roused from their sleep at around 2 a.m. of October 22, 2003 by Dennis’ cry for help. She saw that there was blood on the victim’s chest. After the victim was brought to the hospital, she noticed that the victim’s children were trembling in fear and were crying. They got outside and went to the billiard hall in front of their house. She took Carl and had him sit on her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone but she did not see who it was since there were many people passing by. Later, the police asked Carl whether he saw somebody enter their house and he answered yes and demonstrated how his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that the person who stabbed his mother was present in the vicinity. He then pointed to appellant and said " siya po yung pumaso k sa bahay namin." As a resident there, appellant often goes to the billiard hall and sometimes watches the television at the house of the victim (TSN, February 9, 2005, pp. 3-14).

PO1 Fabela also testified that after it was reported to him that there was a stabbing incident, he went to the hospital then to the crime scene and interviewed the persons thereat. Later, Carl pinpointed and positively identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his mother and robbed them of their money. Appellant was arrested and brought to the police station (TSN, March 16, 2005, pp. 2, 5-6).

PO2 Sazon meanwhile testified that while he was questioning people in the area, Carl pointed to them the suspect who was one of the bystanders. They were asking Carl questions when he suddenly blurted out that it was appellant who entered their house and stabbed his mother. They invited the appellant to the police station but the latter denied having committed the crime. On cross-examination, the witness admitted that their basis in arresting appellant was the information relayed by Carl (TSN, April 27, 2005, pp. 2, 12-17; June 15, 2005, p. 5).4

In turn, the appellant denied the accusation. According to him, he had frequented the victim’s billiard hall, which was situated only four houses away from where he lived, and, on the evening in question, he had been the last to leave the billiard hall at 11 o’ clock p.m. and had then gone home. He recalled that he had been roused from slumber by screams for help around two o’clock a.m., prompting him to ask his mother for the key to the door; that he had then gone outside where he learned of the killing of the victim; that police officers had later on approached him to inquire what he knew about the killing because they told him that Carl, the young son of the victim, had pointed to him as the perpetrator, making him the primary suspect; that he had replied that he had had nothing to do with the crime; and that he had assured the police officers that he had never been involved in any wrongdoing in his years of living in the neighborhood.

The appellant’s mother corroborated his version.5

Judgment of the RTC

As mentioned, the RTC pronounced the appellant guilty of the crime charged under its judgment rendered on January 27, 2006,6 disposing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA @ "NONOY" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE under Article 293 and punished under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the court hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA as follows:

1) ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity;
2) ₱57,500.00 as actual damages;
3) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.7

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony of Carl, a 5-year old witness whose recollections could only be the product of his imagination.8

On July 23, 2010, however, the CA, giving credence to the child witness, and opining that his inconsistencies did not discredit his testimony, affirmed the conviction of the appellant,9 ruling thusly:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 27, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 211 of Mandaluyong City in Crim. Case No. MC03-7597, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that the award of ₱57,500.00 as actual damages should be DELETED and in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 should be AWARDED the heirs of Josephine Castro y Barrera.

SO ORDERED.10

Issues

In this appeal, the appellant posits that the adverse testimony of the 5-year old Carl, being filled with inconsistencies, was not credible, but doubtful; that unlike him, his sisters, who were then at the second floor of the house, were not roused from sleep; that contrary to Carl’s recollection, the place was not even dark when the stabbing attack on the victim occurred because his father said that he had turned the light on upon hearing somebody shouting " Magnanakaw!;" and that his father had then gotten his bolo, and gone outside the house.11

Moreover, the appellant maintains that the Prosecution did not prove that violence or intimidation was employed in the course of the robbery. He argues that he could not be held liable for robbery by using force upon things considering that the culprit had neither broken any wall, roof, floor, door or window to gain entry in the house nor entered the house through an opening not intended for entrance. If at all, he could be liable only for the separate crimes of theft and homicide, not of the composite crime of robbery with homicide.12

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the evidence showed that the appellant’s principal intent had been to rob the victim’s house, with the homicide being perpetrated as a mere incident of the robbery; and that Carl positively identified the appellant as the person who had stabbed the victim, his identification bearing "all the earmarks of credibility especially when he has no motive for lying about the identity of the accused."13

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is bereft of merit.

The most important task of the St ate in the successful prosecution of the accused is his credible and competent identification as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, this appeal turns on whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide was credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-year old lad, whose sole testimony positively pointed to and incriminated the appellant as the person who had entered their home, robbed the family, and killed his mother.

The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:

Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwis e provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (l8 a)

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons cannot be witnesses:

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a)

As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social stat us are not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for disqualification.14

That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.15

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court.16 All questions bearing on the credibility of witnesses are best addressed by the trial court by virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial and often incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment while testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court because of the nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique advantage of actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, the trial judge’s assessment of the witnesses’ testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings. The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred with the trial court.17

The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of perceiving events and of communicating his perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a competent witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct examination of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-examination. All that the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to communicate his perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.

The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That is apparently not disputed. However, it seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his testimony did not concern the principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime charged but related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did not negate the positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Also, that Carl did not shout to seek help upon witnessing how the appellant had stabbed his mother to death did not destroy his credibility. For sure, he could not be expected to act and to react to what happened like an adult. Although children have different levels of intelligence and different degrees of perception, the determination of their capacity to perceive and of their ability to communicate their perception to the courts still pertained to the trial court, because it concerned a factual issue and should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong showing of mistake or misappreciation on the part of the trial court.18

It is true that an appeal in a criminal case like this one opens the record of the trial bare and open. Even so, the finding of facts by the trial court are still entitled to great respect especially when affirmed on appeal by the CA.19This great respect for such findings rests mainly on the trial court’s direct and personal access to the witnesses while they testify in its presence, giving them the unique opportunity to observe their manner and decorum during intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused, and to see if the witnesses were fidgeting and prevaricating, or sincere and trustworthy. With both the RTC and the CA sharing the conviction on Carl’s credibility, his capacity to perceive and his ability to communicate his perception, we cannot depart from their common conclusion. Moreover, according credence to Carl’s testimony despite his tender age would not be unprecedented. In People v. Mendiola,20 the Court considered a 6-y ear-old victim competent, and regarded her testimony against the accused credible. In Dulla v. Court of Appeals,21 the testimony of the three-year-old victim was deemed acceptable. As such, Carl’s testimony was entitled to full probative weight.

Carl positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the investigation and during the trial. Worthy to note is that the child could not have been mistaken about his identification of him in view of his obvious familiarity with the appellant as a daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the child’s family. Verily, the evidence on record overwhelmingly showed that the appellant, and no other, had robbed and stabbed the victim.

The appellant contends that robbery was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the robbery itself must be proven as conclusively as the other essential element of the crime; and that it was not established that the taking of personal property was achieved by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force upon things.

The contention lacks persuasion.

To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the Prosecution must prove the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.22 A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.23

The CA has indicated that the appellant carried a long-bladed weapon. The fact that the appellant was armed with the long-bladed weapon, which was undoubtedly a deadly weapon, competently proved the presence of violence or intimidation against persons that qualified the offense as robbery instead of theft. For sure, too, the patent intent of the appellant was originally to commit robbery, with the homicide being committed only in the course or on the occasion of the perpetration of the robbery. As the records show, Dennis was awakened by someone shouting " Magnanakaw!" The shout was most probably made by the victim, whom the appellant then stabbed in order to facilitate his escape. Considering that the original criminal design to rob had been consummated with the taking of the money amounting to ₱13,000.00, the killing of the victim under the circumstances rendered the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.

Robbery with homicide is a composite crime, also known as a special complex crime. It is composed of two or more crimes but is treated by law as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of one criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and is to be distinguished from a compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.24 A composite crime is truly distinct and different from a complex or compound crime. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law, but in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other. In a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific, but in a complex or compound crime the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be made the subject of a separate information, but a light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed.

The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime are not appreciated to raise the penalty to be imposed because the information did not specifically allege them. But they should be appreciated in order to justify the grant of exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim in the amount of ₱30,000.00 in accordance with relevant jurisprudence.25 Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be granted if at least one aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstance for this purpose need not be specifically alleged in the information, and can be either a qualifying or attendant circumstance. As expounded in People v. Catubig:26

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense.1âwphi1 The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.27

In line with current jurisprudence,28 we increase the civil indemnity to

₱75,000.00, and the moral damages to ₱75,000.00.

In addition to the damages awarded by the CA, the appellant should be liable to pay the heirs of the victim interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the monetary awards for damages from the date of the finality of this decision until the awards are fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 23, 2010 subject to the MODIFICATIONS that then accused-appellant ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA shall pay to the heirs of the late Josephine Castro y Barrera civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00; moral damages of ₱75,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00; temperate damages of ₱25,000.00; and interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all monetary awards for damages reckoned from the date of the finality of this decision until the awards are fully paid, plus the costs of suit.

The accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 2-20: penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamar (retired), and Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson (retired).

2 CA rollo, pp. 23-39.
3 Id. at 9.
4 Rollo, pp. 3-6.
5 Id. at 6-7.
6 Supra note 2.
7 CA rollo, p. 39.
8 Rollo, p. 8.
9 Supra note 1.
10 Id. at 20.
11 Id. at 7-8.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 9.
14 Cavili v. Judge Florendo , No. L-68680, October 9, 1987, 154 SCRA 610, 615.
15 People v. Hermosa, G.R. No. 131805, September 07, 2001, 364 SCRA 648, 660.
16 People v. Abaigar, G.R. No. 199442, April 7, 2014; People v. Bisda, G.R. No. 140895, July 17, 2003, 406 SCRA 454.
17 People v. Barcela, G.R. No. 208760, April 23, 2014.
18 Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101680, December 7, 1992, 216 SCRA 224, 232.
19 Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106472, August 7, 1996, 260 SCRA 374, 381.
20 G.R. No. 134846, August 8, 2000, 337 SCRA 418.
21 G.R. No. 123164, February 18, 2000, 326 SCRA 32.
22 People v. Algarme, G.R. No. 175978, February 12, 2009, 578 SCRA 602, 621.
23 People v. Daniela, G.R. No. 139230, April 24, 2003, 401 SCRA 519, 534.

24 Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes . – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

25 People v. Barra, G.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013, 701 SCRA 99.
26 G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621.
27 Id. at 635.
28 People v. Arbalate, G.R. No. 183457, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 239, 255.

Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be present. Otherwise, their participation with respect to the document cannot be acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the absence of the parties is a breach of duty.

JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON vs. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA, A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015 

“x x x. 

The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. As this court previously explained: 

Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.45 (Citation omitted) 

X x x. 

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the affiant to appear in person before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1 states: 

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—"Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: 

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally complete instrument or document; 

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and 

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied) 

Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further: 

SEC. 2. Prohibitions.—. . . 

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document— 

(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and 

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. 

The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the document voluntarily affixes his or her signature. Without physical presence, the notary public will not be able to properly execute his or her duty under the law. In Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons Officials,47 we stated that "[i]t is obvious that the party acknowledging must . . . appear before the notary public[.]"48 Furthermore, this court pronounced that: 

[a] document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public. The affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature. Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document presented to them for notarization be signed in their presence. Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal deeds.49 (Citations omitted) 

Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express the true agreement between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents. It is the notary public who assures that the parties appearing in the document are the same parties who executed it. This cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the notary public acknowledging the document. 

Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land. Even if this is true, Jimmy and Juanita, as vendors, were not able to review the document given for notarization. The Deed of Absolute Sale was brought to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s representatives, who merely informed Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the document. Atty. Cefra should have exercised vigilance and not just relied on the representations of the vendee. 

It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be in the document submitted by the vendee for notarization. In addition, the possibility of forgery became real. 

In Isenhardt v. Atty. Real,50 Linco v. Atty. Lacebal,51 Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,52 and Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe,53 the respondent notaries were all guilty of notarizing documents without the presence of the parties. In Linco, Lanuzo, and Bautista, the respondents notarized documents even if the persons executing those documents were already dead at the time of notarization. In Bautista, the respondent, like Atty. Cefra, also allowed another individual to sign on behalf of another despite lack of authorization.54 In these cases, this court imposed the penalty of disqualification as notaries for two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. 

In the recent case of De Jesus v. Atty. Sanchez-Malit,55 the respondent lawyer notarized 22 public documents even without the signatures of the parties on those documents.56 This court suspended the respondent-lawyer from the practice of law for one (1) year and perpetually disqualified her from being a notary public.57

Aside from Atty. Cefra’s violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon requires "[a] lawyer [to] uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." He contumaciously delayed compliance with this court’s order to file a Comment. As early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty. Cefra to comment on the Complaint lodged against him. Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order until he was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on January 15, 2008, more than seven years after this court’s order. Atty. Cefra’s actions show utter disrespect for legal processes. 

The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon 1158 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts[.]" 

Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 159 of the Rules of Court, "wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court" constitutes a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cefra’s disobedience to this court’s directive issued in 2001 was not explained even as he eventually filed his Comment in2008. Clearly, his disobedience was willful and inexcusable. Atty. Cefra should be penalized for this infraction. 

In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,60 this court suspended a lawyer who refused to comply with this court’s directives to submit a Rejoinder and to comment on complainant’s Manifestation.61 The lawyer complied with the order to file a Rejoinder only after being detained by the National Bureau of Investigation for five (5) days.62 Likewise, she complied with the order to comment through a Manifestation filed after four (4) months without explaining her delay.63 This court found that the lawyer’s "conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. . . . [Her] obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders ‘not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.’"64

We thus find that the penalty recommended against Atty. Cefra should be modified to take into account all his acts of misconduct. 

WHEREFORE, this court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra GUILTY of notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 12, 1998 in the absence of the affiants, as well as failure to comply with an order from this court. Accordingly, this court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public. Respondent is also STERNLY WARNED that more severe penalties will be imposed for any further breach of the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 

X x x .” 

JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON vs. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA, A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015 

burden of proof v. burden of evidence

MILAGROS MANONGSONG, etc., et. al. vs. FELOMENA JUMAQUIO ESTIMO, et. al., G. R. No. 136773, June 25, 2003

“x x x.

We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of evidence and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals :^[23]

xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima faciecase, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.

X x x.”

Being the complainant, petitioner had the burden of establishing probable cause. Burden of proof is defined in Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court as "the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." In order to engender the well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, the elements of the crime charged should be present. This rule is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be – at the most – no criminal offense.52

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 184130               June 29, 2015

SANDRA M. CAM, Petitioner,
vs.
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, in his Capacity as Acting Ombudsman, MOTHALIB C. ONOS, in his Capacity as Chairman of the Prosecution and Monitoring Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman, ROSANO A. OLIVA and LOURDES S. PADRE SAN JUAN, in their capacities as Graft Investigation and Prosecution

Officers, IGNACIO "IGGY" ARROYO, JUAN MIGUEL "MIKEY" ARROYO and RESTITUTO MOSQUEDA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, CJ:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the Resolution1 dated 9 October 2006 and Order2 dated 13 February 2008 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-05-0380-H dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence and denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, respectively.

PREFATORY STATEMENT

In 2005, herein petitioner Sandra Cam went to the Senate to link members of the First Family to jueteng operations in the Bicol region. She confessed to being a "depository" of jueteng payola for General Restituto Mosqueda. She positively declared that she had personally handed bundles of money to Ignacio "Iggy" Arroyo (now deceased) and Juan Miguel "Mikey" Arroyo – brother-in-law, and son, respectively, of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

THE CASE

On 28 June 2005, petitioner executed her Complaint-Affidavit3 charging private respondents Iggy Arroyo, Mikey Arroyo and Mosqueda with protecting or coddling jueteng operation under Section 2(k) of Republic Act No. 9287 (R.A. 9287),4 entitled An Act Increasing the Penalties for Illegal Numbers Games Amending Certain Provisions of P.D. 1602 and for Other Purposes. She accused them of benefitting from jueteng.

Private respondent Mosqueda executed his Counter-Affidavit6 on 24 October 2005. In turn, respondent Mosqueda filed a Rejoinder-Affidavit7 on 25 November 2005.

Private respondent Mikey Arroyo did not file a Counter-Affidavit.

FACTS

The conflicting versions of facts as narrated by petitioner and respondent Mosqueda are juxtaposed hereunder. Respondents Iggy Arroyo and Mikey Arroyo proffer a blanket denial of any knowledge or involvement in the controversy. They assert that they have never even met petitioner, seeing her only for the first time in television when she first identified them to be recipients of jueteng payola.10

Petitioner claims that she met respondent Mosqueda sometime in 1998 in the course of her job as liaison officer of the then governor of Masbate, Antonio Kho. She claims that from 1998 to 1999, after having had frequent transactions with Police Security and Protection Office (PSPO) in Camp Crame, she became close to PSPO officials.11 Respondent Mosqueda admits that he met petitioner in 1998, but only in passing.12

A disputed phone call on 1 August 2004 allegedly precipitated the engagement of petitioner as depository of jueteng money. According to her, respondent Mosqueda called her that day to ask her to arrange a meeting with the governors of Bicol at the Makati Shangri-la Hotel. That same day, respondent Mosqueda allegedly met with Governors Jesus Typoco, Raul Lee and Luis Villafuerte (represented by his brother, Bong) in Makati. Two days later, in Camp Ola, Legazpi, respondent Mosqueda allegedly asked her if she could do him a favor of collecting "the thing," which later became clear to her as referring to ueteng money.[13]] Records show that Typoco, Lee and Luis Villafuerte executed a Joint Affidavit;14 and that Bong Villafuerte likewise executed an Affidavit15 categorically denying that he was present in the Shangri-la meeting.

On the other hand, respondent Mosqueda denies making the call and gives a different account of events on 1 and 2 August 2004. He claims that he was in Bicol from 29 July 2004 to 2 August 2004 to assume command as the new Regional Director of the PNP. He denies arranging and attending a luncheon with the governors in Makati on 1 August 2004, as he was the guest of honor at the inauguration of a new police station in Cabusao, Camarines Sur. He presents a Certificate of Appearance to support his alibi. Respondent claims that on August 2, he was informed by his staff that petitioner wanted to give him a courtesy call, and that he obliged because he "wanted to be acquainted with more people as fast as possible."16

Petitioner alleges that on 4 August 2004, a certain "Tita Fanny" went to her room I Alicia Hotel to deliver 250,000 from Albay.17 Within 30 minutes, another person delivered 100,000 from Sorsogon. Petitioner avers that respondent Mosqueda called her that same night to inquire about the money. He allegedly called her up again to inform her that Colonel Gumban would pick it up the next day. Allegedly upon instruction of respondent Mosqueda, petitioner kept 10,000 for herself and gave 340,000 to Col. Gumban. "Tita Fanny" was supposed to have witnessed the delivery. The following day, 5 August 2004, petitioner gave her Metrobank-Batangas and Calapan account details to Col. Gumban upon his request. He was said to have told her that the gambling lords would make deposits to these accounts.18

Respondent Mosqueda presented an Affidavit19 executed by Col. Gumaban, in which the latter denied petitioner’s allegations; and a Certification20 from the General Manager of Alicia Hotel to the effect that based on hotel records, no room was registered on August 3 and 4, 2005 under the name of Sandra Cam.

Petitioner discloses that beginning 6 August 2004 until March 2005, weekly deposits were made to her Metrobank accounts; and that within 24 hours, she would turn over the money to respondent Mosqueda either in Bicol or McDonald’s Tagaytay.21 Respondent dismisses this allegation as unbelievable and unsubstantiated.22

On two separate occasions, petitioner attests that upon respondent Mosqueda’s instructions, she withdrew money from her bank accounts and gave it to him. The first instance was on 30 August 2004 when she prepared 500,000 allegedly for the "hari." The second instance was on 21 September 2004 when she prepared 1,000,00 allegedly for the "bata" and "tiyo."23

Petitioner recounts that on 20 October 2004, 21 November 2004, and 20 February 2005, respondent Mosqueda instructed her to withdraw 1,000,000 for each occasion from her Metrobank account, to divide the amount equally, and to place the money in separate envelopes.24 Respondent Mosqueda calls the attention of the Court to petitioner’s lack of documentary proof to back up the allegations and her failure to properly explain what happened to the 3,000,000.25

Petitioner claims that another phone call from respondent Mosqueda paved the way for her personal delivery of bundles of money totaling 900,000 to then Congressmen Iggy and Mikey Arroyo in the second or third week of December 2004.26

The circumstances surrounding the deliveries were narrated by petitioner. She reveals that around 3 or 4p.m., she proceeded to respondent Iggy Arroyo’s office located at Room 209 at the North Wing of Congress. Once alone with him, petitioner gave him a brown envelope containing 400,000 in cash. After peeking into the envelope, respondent Iggy Arroyo allegedly asked, "Bakit kulang to ng isa?" Petitioner answered, "Pinapasabi po ni RD na nagbagyo at natigil ang Camarines Norte." Respondent Iggy Arroyo supposedly replied, "Sabihin mo sa boss mo walang bagyo bagyo sa akin, ang pinag usapan ay pinag usapan."27 Respondent Iggy Arroyo denies these allegations, and records reflect that he presented Affidavits executed by four of his political assistants attesting that they had never seen or encountered anyone by the name of Sandra Cam inside is office.28

According to petitioner, after delivering the brown envelope to respond Iggy Arroyo, she proceeded to the office of respondent Mikey Arroyo located at Room 202 at the South Wing of Congress. Not finding respondent Mikey Arroyo, she was allegedly directed by his staff to the session hall. There she approached him and introduced herself. Respondent Mikey Arroyo allegedly excused himself from the group he was conversing with and brought her near the gallery, where she gave him a gift-wrapped package containing 500,000.29 Respondent Mikey Arroyo denies that this event occurred. He informs the Court that a criminal case for libel has been filed against petitioner in connection with her statements that he received benefits from jueteng operations.30

After the alleged delivery, petitioner claims that she called respondent Mosqueda to report that she had already delivered the "fruits". He allegedly told her in a happy voice, "Maasahan ka talaga."31

Aside from cash deliveries, petitioner alleges that the respondent Mosqueda also received an Isuzu D Max and a Toyota Revo from the jueteng payola.32

As regards the Isuzu D Max vehicle, petitioner claims that sometime in August 2004, respondent Mosqueda told her that he heard gambling lords were giving vehicles to regional directors. Allegedly, he then told her that he also wanted an Isuzu D Max. Petitioner narrates that on 20 August 2004, she bought an Isuzu D Max and paid for it through a Manager’s check for 870,000 and cash amounting 400,000 given by "Tita Fanny" and a Mr. Tony Ong.33 Respondent Mosqueda counters that this was another unrealistic story, because if petitioner were to be believed that he was receiving one million pesos per week as jueteng payout, and that he was connected with gambling lords, then he could have bought an Isuzu D Max for himself or asked the gambling lords to deliver one directly to him.34

Petitioner discloses that jueteng payola was again used to buy another vehicle for respondent Mosqueda.35 He admits ownership of the Toyota Revo and petitioner’s role in facilitating the transaction, but asserts that he used his personal savings, as well as those of his wife, to buy the vehicle; and that he only accepted the offer of petitioner to negotiate the sale because she knew someone who could give the spouses a big discount on the purchase price.36

Petitioner also relates that respondent Mosqueda boasted of his connection to the Presidential Family and his involvement with the Jose Pidal controversy. Petitioner narrates how on 30 October 2004, respondent Mosqueda, while in a meeting with the President, texted her, "Makikita mo kamandag ko sa mga Arroyo;" and "Titingnan ko galling ni Espinosa." He was referring to Mario Espinosa, who was then the Presidential Assistant for Bicol Affairs. As events turned out later, Mario Espinosa was removed from that position. Respondent Mosqueda also allegedly told petitioner, "Di mo baa lam na kung hindi dahil sa akin bagsak na ang Arroyo Administration?" When asked why, he allegedly answered that it took them weeks to practice Iggy Arroyo to sign as Jose Pidal. Respondent Mosqueda allegedly said, "Ang totoo si FG" and "Ako lang ang may authority mag certify na ang signature ni Iggy ay si Jose Pidal."37

Respondent Mosqueda maintains that he never made these representations; and that petitioner was hurling malicious accusations to get back at him for his relentless campaign against jueteng, thereby displacing her financially.38 He adds that he could not have certified or authenticated the signature of "Jose Pidal", because that was the job of the handwriting expert of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Mely Sorra, who testified before the Senate that respondent Mosqueda did not interfere in her work.39

THE RULING OF THE OMBUDSMAN

On 9 October 2006, public respondents dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

First, public respondents evaluated the evidence presented by petitioners. They noted that the official receipts covering the purchase of a Toyota Revo in the name of Marilyn Mosqueda, wife of respondent Mosqueda, merely established the actual transaction of the subject vehicle, and nothing more. They ruled that the evidence could not be appreciated to determine the source of funds used to pay for the vehicle, i.e. whether or not the alleged jueteng payola was used as payment. Public respondents held that for an imputation a crime or felony to stand, it must be adequately substantiated by the required quantum of evidence; otherwise, the evidence presented cannot be used as basis for prosecution.40

Second, public respondents determined whether the burden of proof had been discharged by petitioner. On the one hand, they observed that the respondents were able to adduce sworn statements of persons allegedly involved in the transaction – Col. Gumbon Adam Claverio, Jesus Typoco, Jr., Raul Lee, Luis Raymond Villafuerte, and Bong Villafuerte – who explicitly denied having participated in the illegal activities. On the other hand, aside from her own declarations, petitioner miserably failed to controvert the statements by relevant proof.41

Third, applying People v. Ymana,42 public respondents held that the uncorroborated and unsubstantiated allegations of complainant would not suffice to determine the existence of probable cause against respondents, more so in the presence of contrary declarations of the allegedly involved personalities in the contested transactions.

In closing, public respondents recalled Gil v. People,43 in which the Court ruled that "the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense." Public respondents did not give due course to the Complaint in view of petitioner’s failure to present sufficient proof to support the accusation against private respondents.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied for being a mere rehash of the allegations in the Complaint.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue that confronts the Court is whether public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s Complaint for insufficiency of evidence and denying her motion for reconsideration.

After consideration of all the issues and arguments raised by the parties, this Court finds no clear showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman.

There was no grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish probable cause.

We note that the only documents presented to public respondents, aside from petitioner’s pleadings, are the following:

1. Vehicle Sales Invoice for a Revo issued by Toyota Makati Inc. ("Toyota") on 21 January 2005 in the name of Marilyn Mosqueda;44

2. Official Receipt No. 32008 issued by Toyota to Marilyn Mosqueda on 12 January 2005 for the cash payment of the reservation fee for a Revo;45

3. Official Receipt No. 32367 issued by Toyota to Marilyn Mosqueda on 17 January 2005 for the partial cash payment for a Revo;46 nad

4. Official Receipt No. 32669 issued by Toyota to Marilyn Mosqueda on 21 January 2005 for a full check payment for a Revo.47

For the purpose of filing a criminal information, probable cause has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that respondent is probably guilty thereof.48 The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after they have conducted a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended party.49

A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case; sufficient proof of the guilt of the criminal respondent must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal.50 While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play.51 The need for a careful examination of the evidence is also intended to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting and trying cases arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.

Being the complainant, petitioner had the burden of establishing probable cause. Burden of proof is defined in Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court as "the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law."

In order to engender the well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, the elements of the crime charged should be present. This rule is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be – at the most – no criminal offense.52

Petitioner accuses private respondents of receiving benefits in the form of cash and vehicles in the operation of the illegal numbers game of jueteng. However, aside from her testimony, petitioner presented only four documents concerning the sale of a Toyota Revo. Public respondents correctly ruled that the official receipts covering the purchase of a Toyota Revo in the name of Marlyn Mosqueda, wife of respondent Mosqueda, cannot be appreacited to prove that the funds used to pay for the vehicle came from jueteng operations.

There was no grave abuse of discretion in not filing an Information on the basis of petitioner’s uncorroborated testimony.

The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. The complaint may be dismissed should the Ombudsman find it insufficient in form or substance, or the Ombudsman may proceed with the investigation if the complaint appears to be in due form and substance.53 Hence, the filing or non-filing of the information is primarily lodged within the full discretion of the Ombudsman.54

Petitioner argues that since she is more credible than any of the private respondents, public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course to her Complaint. What she loses sight of is that mere allegation and speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof.55 We are not saying that uncorroborated testimony cannot stand alone. On the contrary, the Court does uphold a finding of guilt based on uncorroborated testimony if the testimony is intrinsically credible, and there is no showing that it was improperly or maliciously motivated.56

It must be emphasized that the issue before the Court is whether public respondents, in finding that the evidence is insufficient to declare the existence of probable cause, committed grave abuse of discretion. We find that they did not.

Public respondents gave petitioner many opportunities to substantiate her bare allegations. In fact, public respondents Onos, Padre-Juan and Oliva alerted her of the need for more evidence. In their Evaluation Report57 dated 8 July 2005, they recommended that the Complaint be referred to the Field Investigation Office for appropriate case build-up.58

We note that in her Reply-Affidavit (Re: Respondent Mosqueda’s Counter-Affidavit),59 petitioner alluded to several pieces of documentary evidence she submitted to the Senate in support of her allegations.60 She assumed that the Office of the Ombudsman already had a copy of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes as well as all of the documentary evidence submitted to the Senate, and made it part of the records of the case.61 However, the records forwarded to this Court do not contain any other document aside from the sales invoice and official receipts.

In any case, petitioner could have easily reproduced or obtained relevant documents, like bank statements or affidavits, and attached these to her Motion for Reconsideration or subsequent pleadings. In the same Reply-Affidavit, petitioner stated that"[n]o less than the officials of the PSPO will attest to the fact that I was close to them,"62 However, she never did submit any such affidavit. For reasons known only to petitioner and her counsel, they chose not to submit additional evidence.

Petitioner misquoted the Resolution.

The argument that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner was not able to prove respondents’ guild beyond reasonable doubt is untenable, because it stems from a misreading of the assailed Resolution. This was the exact wording of the Resolution: "[T]he instant complaint cannot be given due course in view of complainant’s failure to present sufficient proofs to support the accusation against the herein respondent."63 Nowhere in the Resolution do we find any statement that the Complaint was dismissed because complainant failed to prove the guilt of respondents.

Further, petitioner misquotes public respondents when she alleges that "according to public respondent, petitioner’s statements in her Complaint-Affidavit cannot be given credence because it is uncorroborated."64 Below is the explanation of public respondents quoted verbatim:

Applying [the ruling in People v. Ymana] in the instant case, therefore the uncorroborated and unsubstantiated allegations of the complainant will not suffice to determine the existence of probable cause against respondents, more so in the presence of contrary declarations of the alleged involved personalities in the contested transactions."65

Again, nowhere in the Resolution do we find any statement that petitioner’s uncorroborated allegations cannot be given credence.1âwphi1 Rather, the Resolution impressed that public respondents had been unable to determine the existence of probable cause because petitioner presented only uncorroborated allegations, which were met with contrary declarations of the alleged involved personalities in the contested transactions.

The Court will not interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion.

The extraordinariness of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for certiorari must not be diluted by invocations of grave abuse of discretion as some sort of magic phrase to counter almost every unfavorable decision, every adverse interlocutory order issued by judicial and quasi-judicial authorities.

As officers of the Court, litigators are enjoined to be circumspect about filing petitions for certiorari. This Court deems it necessary to remind its officers that to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari on the ground of abuse of discretion, the abuse must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.66 Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.67

Courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in determining probable cause, unless there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.

In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,68 the Court explained that the rule of non-interference is rooted in the recognition that the Ombudsman’s exercise of investigatory and prosecutor powers is mandated by the Constitution. The rule is also adopted for practicality. Otherwise, courts would be swamped if they have to review the exercise of discretion of public prosecutors each time they decide to file an information or dismiss a complaint.

Nevertheless, the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not absolute.69 It remains incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused in a manner that would warrant the Court’s reversal of the Ombudsman’s findings.

In the absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the present case, this Court cannot reverse the ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED, and the assailed Resolution and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-05-0380-H are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 30-62.
2 Id. at 63-68.
3 Id. at 69-76.
4 The Section reads:
Sec. 2 Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
k) Protector or Coddler, - Any person who lends or provides protection, or receives benefits in any manner in the operation of any illegal numbers game.
5 Rollo, pp. 85-108.
6 Id. at 109-117.
7 Id. at 591-610.
8 Id. at 611-615.
9 Id. at 653-658.
10 Id. at 191.
11 Id. at 6.
12 Id. at 86.
13 Id. at 7-8.
14 Records, pp. 90-92.
15 Id. at 171-173.
16 Rollo, p. 89.
17 Id. at 8.
18 Id at 8-9.
19 Id. at 439-442.
20 Id. at 480.
21 Id. at 9-10.
22 Id. at 826.
23 Id. at 10-11.
24 Id. at 11-16.
25 Id. at 827.
26 Id. at 12-13.
27 Id. at 14.
28 Id. at 82-84.
29 Id. at 14-15.
30 Id. at 192.
31 Id. at 15.
32 Id. at 10, 16.
33 Id. at 10.
34 Id. at 99-100.
35 Id. at 16.
36 Id. at 597-598.
37 Id. at 73.
38 Id. at 402-403.
39 Id. at 405.
40 Id. at 58.
41 Id. at 59.
42 253 Phil. 167 (1989).
43 258 Phil. 23 (1989).
44 Id. at 118.
45 Id. at 121.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 120.
48 Kalalo v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 158189, 23 April 2010, 619 SCRA 141.
49 Ang-Abaya v. Ang, 593 Phil. 530, 541 (2008).
50 Perez v. Ombudsman, 473 Phil. 372 (2004).
51 Tan, Jr. v. Matsura, G.R. No. 179003, 9 January 2013, 688 SCRA 263.
52 Ang-Abaya v. Ang, supra note 49 at 542.

53 Vergara v. Ombudsman, 600 Phil. 26, 41 (2009) citing Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, 563 Phil. 517, 525 (2007).

54 Id. citing Republic v. Desierto, 541 Phil. 57, 63.
55 Miro v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 172532 and 172544-45, 20 November 2013, 710 SCRA 371.
56 People v. Lamsing, 318 Phil. 561 (1995) citing People v. Lorioda, G.R. No. 93240, 22 January 1993, 217 SCRA 425.
57 Rollo, pp. 346-349.
58 Id. at 348.
59 Id. at 576-585.
60 Id. at 583.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 578.
63 Id. at 60-61.
64 Id. at 18.
65 Id. at 60.
66 Vergara v. Ombudsman, supra note 53.

67 Ombudsman v. Heirs of Margarita Vda. De Ventura, G.R. No. 151800, 5 November 2009, 605 SCRA 1,10 citing Velasco v. Commission on Elections, 595 Phil. 1172 (2008).

68 553 Phil. 733 (2007).
69 Ombudsman v. Heirs of de Ventura, supra note 67.