under the Rules of Court, a witness may be impeached by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad. However, a witness cannot be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts, unless there is a showing of previous conviction by final judgment such that not even the existence of pending information maybe shown to impeach him.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 209137               July 1, 2015

EDUARDO CELEDONIO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Eduardo Celedonio (Celedonio) assails the April 8, 2013 Decision1 and the September 17, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 34472, affirming the August 18, 2011 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 35668-MN.

The Information,4 dated April 25, 2007, charged Celedonio with the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 22nd day of April 2007, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and by means of force upon things, and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the herein complainant by destroying the backdoor of said house, and once inside, take, rob and carry away the following:

(1) one gold bracelet 24K Php8,000.00
(3) necklace (1) one 24K and (2) two 18K Php42,000.00
(2) two digicam Sony player Php22,000.00
(1) one DVD portable Php5,000.00
(1) one wrist watch Tagheur Php30,000.00
(1) one sun glass Guess Php5,000.00
(1) one camera Canon Php2,500.00
(1) one Gameboy advance Php5,000.00
(1) one calculator Php1,500.00
(1) one discman Sony Php3,000.00
(2) two pcs. 100.00 US dollar bills
(22) twenty two pcs. Php500.00 bills
(2) two necklace 18K worth Php30,000.00
(2) two bracelet worth Php11,500.00
(2) two gold ring worth Php8,000.00
(1) one wedding ring worth 14K worth Php1,500.00
(1) one wrist watch swiss military worth Php10,000.00
(1) one cellphone NOKIA 8250 worth Php3,000.00
(3) three pairs of earrings worth Php15,000.00
(3) three pcs. of 100.00 US dollars worth Php15,000.00
(60) sixty pcs. of Php50.00 bills worth Php3,000.00
(100) one hundred pcs. of Php20.00 bills worth Php2,000.00

(15) fifteen pcs. of Php100.00 bills worth Php1,500.00 owned and belonging to CARMENCITA DE GUZMAN y SERRANO, to the damage and prejudice of the herein complainant, in the aforementioned amount of Php223,000.00.

Contrary to law.5

Version of the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution shows that on the evening of April 21, 2007, a certain Adriano Marquez (Marquez)witnessed the robbery perpetrated in the house of Carmencita De Guzman (De Guzman)while she was away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband. No one was left in the house. Marquez, whose house was opposite the house of De Guzman and Celedonio, which were adjacent to each other, identified Celedonio as the culprit. Upon learning of the incident, De Guzman reported it to the police and requested that Celedonio be investigated for possibly having committed the crime, based on the account of Marquez.

Later, a follow-up operation was conducted by PO1 Rommel Roque (PO1 Roque)and SPO2 Adrian Sugui (SPO2 Sugui), accompanied by Marquez. They proceeded to Raja Humabon St., Navotas, to survey the area for the possible identification and apprehension of the suspect. On their way, Marquez pointed to a man on a motorcycle and said, "Sir, siya po si Eduardo Celedonio." The police immediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1 Roque asked him if he was Eduardo Celedonio, but he did not reply and just bowed his head.

SPO2 Sugui informed Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him. Celedonio still remained silent and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked him, "Where [were] the stolen items?" Celedonio then alighted from his motorcycle and opened its compartment where PO1 Roque saw some of the stolen items, as per report of the incident, such as the portable DVD player and a wristwatch, among others.6

PO1 Roque asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter answered, "Iyan po."7 Thus, Celedonio was arrested and was informed of his constitutional rights. More itemswere seized from Celedonio at the police station.

Version of the Accused

After the prosecution rested its case, Celedonio filed his Demurrer to Evidence (with leave of court) citing as his ground the alleged illegality of his arrest and the illegal search on his motorcycle. The RTC denied the demurrer, stating that the question of the legality of Celedonio’s arrest had been mooted by his arraignment and his active participation in the trial of the case. It considered the seizure of the stolen items as legal not only because of Celedonio’s apparent consent to it, but also because the subject items were in a moving vehicle.8

In his defense, Celedonio claimed that he was at home with his wife, sleeping, at the time of the incident. His wife corroborated his statement.

In its Decision, dated August 18,2011, the RTC found Celedonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision9 reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDUARDO CELEDONIO y MONIS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the offense of Robbery with Force Upon Things as defined and penalized under Article 299 (a)2 of the Revised Penal Code, he is therefore sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. He is also ordered to pay private complainant the amount of Php105,000.00 which is the worth of what has not been recovered from the loss she suffered by reason of the robbery.

SO ORDERED.10

The trial court was convinced that the prosecution clearly established that: 1) a robbery had been committed; 2) it was committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash were found in Celedonio’s possession; and 4) Celedonio had no valid explanation for his possession of the stolen goods.11

Insisting on his innocence, Celedonio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the RTC erred: 1) in convicting him of the crime despite the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence; 2) in not finding that the search was illegal, rendering the articles recovered inadmissible; and 3) in not finding that the prosecution witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against him.12

The CA, however, affirmed the RTC in toto. It found that the totality of circumstances warranted the finding that Celedonio was solely and directly responsible for the crime.13

In addition, the CA brushed aside Celedonio’s argument that he was illegally arrested and that the items seized should be excluded as evidence. It stressed that Celedonio was not arrested when he voluntarily opened the compartment of his motorcycle. He was only brought to the police for investigation after some of the stolen items were found in his motorcycle compartment.14 Further, Celedonio’s failure to raise the issue before his arraignment constituted a waiver on his part to question the legality of his arrest.15

Celedonio moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES

I

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING THAT THE PETITIONER’S GUILT WAS PROVEN BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED ON THE PETITIONER WAS ILLEGAL, RENDERING THE ARTICLES RECOVERED INADMISSIBLE.

III

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESS ADRIANO MARQUEZ WAS ILL-MOTIVATED IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

The petition lacks merit.

Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the prosecution establishes the accused-appellant’s participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that he committed the imputed crime, the latter should be convicted.16

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.17

In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when taken together, constituted an unbroken chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio was the perpetrator. The CA opined that:

xxx As correctly pointed out by the trial court, these circumstances are: accused was a next door neighbor of private complainant; he was seen by another neighbor going over the concrete fence separating their houses and ransacking a room in complainant’s house; during the time, no one was inside complainant’s house as all of them were at the wake of private complainant’s recently demised husband; two (2) days after, most of the items discovered to have been stolen that night were found in the compartment of the accused’s motorcycle which he was riding on when accosted by the police; the items recovered from him were identified by the complainant as her stolen property; during the trial accused denied that the stolen items were found in his possession and claimed that they were "planted" by the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery. In short, the accused could not explain his possession of the recently stolen items found in his sole possession.

x x x x

We find the conviction of accused-appellant based on circumstantial evidence factually and legally tenable, as the facts from which the aforementioned circumstances arose have been proved through the positive testimony of Adriano Marquez, PO1 Rommel Roque and Carmencita de Guzman.18

The defense does not refute the existence of the commission of robbery. In fact, Celedionio himself acknowledged that the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence, although weak, ambiguous and inconclusive, established that 1) a robbery had been committed; 2) it was committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash were found in his possession; and 4) he had no valid explanation for his possession of the stolen goods.19 Celedonio, however, still insisted that he cannot be convicted of the crime of robbery because 1) he was not caught in exclusive possession of the stolen items; 2) the search conducted on him was illegal thereby rendering the seized articles inadmissible; and 3) the witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against him.

These arguments, however, do not hold water.

First, Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of some of the stolen items when the police officers flagged down his motorcycle during their follow-up operation. He failed to give a reasonable explanation as to his possession of the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is owned by him.

Celedonio never claimed ownership of the subject items. When the alleged stolen items were found in his motorcycle compartment which he had control over, the disputable presumption of being the taker of the stolen items arose. He could have overcome the presumption, but he failed to give a justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only plausible scenario that could be inferred therefrom was that he took the items.

Second, no illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police officers asked where the stolen items were, they merely made a general inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-up operation. Records did not show that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the stolen items were in Celedonio’s motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any showing that the police officers frisked Celedonio or rummaged over his motorcycle. There was no showing either of any force or intimidation on the part of the police officers when they made the inquiry. Celedonio himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he was asked if the items were the stolen ones, he actually confirmed it.20 The police officers, therefore, were left without any recourse but to take him into custody for further investigation. At that instance, the police officers had probable cause that he could be the culprit of the robbery. He did not have any explanation as to how he got hold of the items. Moreover, taking into consideration that the stolen items were in a moving vehicle, the police had to immediately act on it.

Third, contrary to Celedonio’s argument, Marquez was a credible witness. Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.21

In this case, if only to discredit Marquez, Celedonio claimed that they once had a fight over a water meter. As correctly observed by the CA, however, such allegation was too insignificant that it could not destroy whatever credibility Marquez possessed as a witness. The CA, thus, posited:

xxx It is true that under the Rules of Court, a witness may be impeached by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad. However, a witness cannot be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts, unless there is a showing of previous conviction by final judgment such that not even the existence of pending information maybe shown to impeach him.

More so, in this case, wherein no information was filed against the witness, but only the mere say so of the accused on Marquez' alleged involvement in a quarrel with him over a water meter. Furthermore, no testimony was presented to show that the reputation of Marquez for truth, honesty or integrity is bad; no evil motive has been established against prosecution witness Marquez that might prompt him to testify falsely against accused-appellant Celedonio.22

Alibi and denial were the only defenses of Celedonio. Unless he can strongly support his claims that the items were "planted" and that it was physically impossible for him to be in De Guzman's house other than the mere averment that he was asleep at the time, his defenses cannot prevail over the strong circumstantial evidence.23

Having established the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, the CA did not commit any reversible error in upholding the RTC. In the absence of any indication that the R TC and the CA overlooked facts or circumstances that would result in a different ruling in this case, the Court will not disturb their factual findings.24

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order No. 2079, dated June 29, 2015.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba, with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring. Rollo, pp. 36-53.

2 Id. at 55-56.
3 Id. at 74-79. Penned by Judge Carlos M. Flores.
4 Records, pp. 1-2.
5 Id. at 37-38.
6 Id. at 41-42.
7 Id. at 42.
8 RTC Decision, id. at 76-77.
9 Id. at 74-79.
10 Id. at 79.
11 Id.
12 CA Decision, id. at 39.
13 Id. at 45.
14 Id. at 50.
15 Id.
16 People v. Consorte, G.R. No. 194068, July 9, 2014.
17 Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
18 Id. at 45-46.
19 Id. at 20.
20 Id. at 42.
21 People v. Dadao, G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014, 714 SCRA 524, 535.
22 Rollo, pp. 49-50.
23 People v. Piosang, G.R. No. 200329, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 587, 596.
24 Sabay v. People, G.R. No. 192150, October 1, 2014.

The prosecution was not given the opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the representations of the accused. The prosecution is as much entitled to due process as the accused in a criminal case.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-80778 June 20, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and SEGUNDINA ROSARIO y SEMBRANO, respondents.

U.P. Office of Legal Services for petitioner University of the Philippines.

Candido G. Del Rosario & Associates for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this special civil action for certiorari seeking to declare null and void the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City dated October 27, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 051672 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Segundina Rosario y Sembrano," the issues raised are (1) whether or not double jeopardy attaches in the event of a judgment of acquittal of the accused without a trial on the merits; and (2) whether or not the complainant or private offended party in a criminal case can file a special civil action for certiorari questioning the validity of said judgment of acquittal without the intervention of the Solicitor General.

On June 2, 1987 an information for violation of P.D. No. 772 was filed by the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City, with the approval of the city fiscal, in the RTC of the same city against Segundina Rosario y Sembrano, which reads, among others, as follows:

That on or about 16th day of December, 1986, and for sometime prior thereto and persisting up to the present, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the University of the Philippines, the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in occupying and/or possessing a portion of the said property, by then and there construct his/her house therein for residential purposes, without the consent and against the will of the said offended party. 1

Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty and a pre-trial conference was held on August 14, 1987 wherein the accused informed the court that she has a title, a building permit and survey plan covering the subject land. The trial court then issued an order on the same day that reads as follows:

Considering that the accused has a title, building permit and a survey plan on the subject land, the Court instructs both parties to submit their respective proffer of documentary exhibits together with their positions as to whether this case will be heard or dismissed. 2

The private prosecutor presented a position paper showing that the said property belongs to the University of the Philippines (U.P.) as shown by TCT No. 9462 covering about 493 hectares at Diliman, Quezon City which includes the area in question; that a plan was submitted of the entire area; 3 that the ownership of the so-called U.P. campus under TCT No. 9462 has been sustained by several decisions of the Supreme Court; that the supposed title of the accused, TCT No. 5762 has been cancelled by TCT No. 126671 in the name of Bughay Construction and Development Corporation; that granting the accused had a title thereto, the issue is whether or not the property described in the title is at Pook Amorsolo, U.P. Campus which is adjacent to Bo. Kruz-na-Ligas, Diliman, Quezon City; that the alleged title of the accused shows that the property is situated in Bo. Gulod, Municipality of Marikina, Province of Rizal; that this is also shown in the tax declaration presented by her; 4 that in fact the accused paid the corresponding real estate tax at Marikina; 5 and that the criminal case should proceed as it has been shown that the area on which the accused made the construction belongs to the U.P. without the knowledge and consent of the latter and in violation of P.D. No. 772.

On the other hand, the accused submitted a proffer of exhibits with a manifestation tending to show that the accused applied for a building permit to construct on the lot; that the lot is covered by a title in the name of the accused; that a copy of the building permit was also submitted for which the accused paid for the fee; that the relocation plan of the land and the field notes were also submitted; and that she informed U.P. of her claim and asked them not to intrude into her property.

An opposition thereto was filed by U.P. stating that the proffer of exhibits is irregular and without basis as in fact the evidence was not marked in the pre-trial; that the proffer of exhibits is not covered by Rule 118, Sections 1 and 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; that what is allowed only in Section 2 thereof is the marking of the exhibits for Identification purposes of documentary evidence; that the manifestation submitting the case for resolution has no legal basis; and thus it is prayed that the proffer of exhibits and manifestation be denied for being irregular or not pursuant to the rules.

On October 27, 1978, the questioned decision was rendered by the respondent judge acquitting the accused of the offense charged with costs de oficio. Hence, the herein petition for certiorari filed by the counsel for the private offended party, U.P., in behalf of the People of the Philippines. The petition seeks to render null and void the aforesaid decision for want of due process as the acquittal of the accused was rendered without a trial on the merits.

The petition is impressed with merit. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Rule 118 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide as follows:

SECTION 1. Pre-trial: when proper.-To expedite the trial, where the accused and counsel agree, the court shall conduct a pretrial conference on the matters enumerated in Section 2 hereof, without impairing the rights of the accused.

SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects.-The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;

(c) Marking for Identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)

SEC. 3. Pre-trial order.-After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that in criminal cases a pre-trial may be held by the trial court only where the accused and his counsel agree. Such pre-trial shall cover plea bargaining, stipulation of facts, marking for Identification of evidence of the parties, waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence and such other matters as may promote a fair and expeditious trial. After the pre-trial, the trial court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked, and thereafter the trial on the merits shall proceed which shall be limited to matters not disposed of during the pre-trial.

In this case, a pre-trial was held wherein the accused alleged that she has a title covering the property in question. The respondent judge thus required the parties to submit their proffer of documentary exhibits and their position paper as to whether or not the case would be heard or dismissed. Under the aforestated provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particulary Section 2 thereof, what is specified is the marking for identification of evidence for the parties and the waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence. A proffer of exhibits or evidence is not among those enumerated. Such proffer of evidence or more specifically in offer of evidence is generally made at the time a party closes the presentation of his evidence in which case the adverse party is given the opportunity to object thereto and the court rules on the same. When evidence proposed to be presented is rejected by the court a proffer of evidence is usually made stating its nature and purpose had it been admitted.

Assuming that such proffer of evidence, as directed by the respondent judge, may be made at the pre-trial in a criminal case, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to object to the admissibility. In this case, the prosecution filed its opposition to the proffer of its exhibits stating that it is not authorized under section 1 and 2 of Rule 118 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; that the documentary evidence were not presented for marking at the pre-trial; and that the manifestation submitting the case for the resolution with the proffer of exhibits has no legal basis. In it position paper, U.P. also pointed out that the alleged title of the accused covers property in Marikina and not in U.P. Campus, Quezon City wherein the accused built her structure. The trial court did not even rule on the admissibility of the exhibits of the accused.

The respondent judge despite the conflicting positions of the parties and the objection of the U.P. to the resolution of the case without a trial on the merits, nevertheless rendered a decision acquitting the accused by making the following disquisition:

With all the documents of the prosecution and the defense on record, it may now be asked: MAY THE ACCUSED BE CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBER 772?

Prosecution of the accused is anchored on the postulate that accused built a structure over land belonging to the University of the Philippines and titled in the name of the latter. Documents presented by the defense established that accused has a title over the land on which she built the structure; that she has a building permit for the structure; that she paid the corresponding fees for the building permit; that she has a relocation plan with supporting data of field notes and lot data computation (Exhs. "1", "2", "2-A", "3", "4", "5", "5-A," "6-B", "5-B-1", "5-B-2", and "5-B-3").

Actually, there is now a collision between the claim of the prosecution and the defense on rights of ownership to the land in question. It may be noted that both land titles are torrens titles.

Under these well established facts, it cannot be stated with certainty that the accused built her structure illegally. If somehow it is discernible that it is more the inadequacy of details in the states evidence that makes it difficult for us to arrive at definite conclusions rather than, perhaps, the actual facts themselves, still we cannot pin responsibility on appellant (sic). That moral conviction that may serve as basis of a finding of guilt in criminal cases is only that and which is the logical and inevitable result of the evidence on record, exclusive of any other consideration. Short of this, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it is, even more, our constitutional duty to acquit him." So, said the Supreme Court in People vs. Maisug, 27 SCRA 753. The same holds true to the instant case. The scanty and/or inadequate evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to sustain conviction.

It may be added that the torrens title of accused over the property on which she built her structure cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of her title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose (Magay vs. Estiandan, 69 SCRA 456). The same doctrine has been reiterated in Director of Lands vs. CFI of Misamis Oriental, Br. 1, No. L-58823, March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 392). 6

This Court finds that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the aforestated decision without affording the prosecution the opportunity to have its day in court. The issue before the Court is whether or not the accused built the structure on the land belonging to U.P. At the pre-trial, U.P. presented its title and plan showing that the accused built a structure within its property. The accused by her proffer of exhibits and manifestation pretended to have a title to the questioned land. However, as stressed by U.P., the titled property of accused is located in Marikina and not in Quezon City and said title could not cover the very lot in question which is at Pook Amorsolo, U.P. Campus where the structure of accused was built. This issue cannot be determined by a mere examination of the titles and documents submitted by the parties. A trial on the merits should be undertaken to determine once and for all whether the place where the structure was built by the accused belongs to U.P. or to the accused. The conclusion of the trial court that the accused did not build her structure illegally as she has a title to the property in question is without any factual or legal basis. Indeed, the observation of respondent judge in the questioned decision as to "the inadequacy in details of the state's evidence" simply demonstrates that a trial on the merits should have been held to enable the prosecution to establish its case. No doubt, the acquittal of the accused is a nullity for want of due process. The prosecution was not given the opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the representations of the accused. The prosecution is as much entitled to due process as the accused in a criminal case.

Double jeopardy cannot be invoked as a bar to another prosecution in this case. 7 There is double jeopardy only when: 1) there is a valid complaint or information; 2) filed before a competent court; 3) to which defendant had pleaded; and 4) of which he has previously been convicted or acquitted or which was dismissed or terminated without his express consent. 8

In this case, the prosecution was deprived of an opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. The decision that was rendered in disregard of such imperative is void for lack of jurisdiction. 9 It was not a court of competent jurisdiction when it precipitately rendered a decision of acquittal after a pre-trial. A trial should follow a pre-trial. That is the mandate of the rules. 10 Obviously, double jeopardy has not set in this case.

The question as to whether or not U.P., as the private offended party, can file this special civil action for certiorari questioning the validity of said decision of the trial court should be answered in the affirmative.

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. 11 The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. 12

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant. 13

In this case, the Solicitor General upheld the right of U.P. to file the petition as an aggrieved party. Inasmuch as the prosecution was deprived of due process, the questioned decision of the respondent judge acquitting the accused is null and void as it was rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the respondent judge dated October 27, 1987 is set aside and declared null and void. The respondent judge is hereby directed to proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, and thereafter, to decide the same on the basis of the evidence adduced, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Page 9, Rollo.

2 Page 11, Rollo.

3 Annex D to the Position Paper, xerox copy of the title.

4 Annex E, Position Paper.

5 Annex F, Position Paper.

6 Pages 27 and 28, Rollo.

7 People vs. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 1119 (1966).

8 People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851 (1933); Section 7, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

9 People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166,170 (1985); People vs. Ruiz, 81

SCRA 453 (1978); and People vs. Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA 607 (1979).

10 Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 118, supra.

11 People vs. Ruiz, supra; People vs. Court of Appeals, supra; The City Fiscal of Tacloban vs. Hon. Pedro M. Espina, et al., G.R. No. 83996, October 21, 1988; and Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 370 (1982).

12 Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 (1984); People vs.

Jalandoni, 131 SCRA 454 (1984); and Rule 122, Section 11(b), 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

13 Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3, supra.

PROFFER OF EVIDENCE

A proffer is an offer made prior to any formal negotiations.

In a trial, to proffer (sometimes profer) is to offer evidence in support of an argument, or elements of an affirmative defense or offense. A party with the burden of proof must proffer sufficient evidence to carry that burden. For example, in support of a particular argument, a party may proffer documentary evidence or witnesses.

Where a party is denied the right to introduce evidence because that evidence would be inflammatory, hearsay, or would lack sufficient authentication, that party must make a proffer of what the evidence would have shown in order to preserve the issue for appeal.

x x x

Just because you know what your excluded evidence would have shown does not mean that the trial court knows and, as importantly for appellate purposes, that the appellate court can glean from the record the substance of the evidence or the basis for the denial of its admission. For example, in Triesch v. Triesch, No. 03-15-00102-CV, 2016 WL 1039035 (Tex. App. Mar. 8, 2016), the wife attempted to set aside a mediated settlement agreement by introducing evidence of the husband’s allegedly false statements made during the mediation. The trial court excluded the evidence as confidential mediation communications protected by statute.

The Texas appellate court affirmed. The court agreed that the communications were inadmissible and also held that the wife had waived any error by failing to make an offer of proof as to the substance of the excluded evidence. In so holding, the court cited to Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2), which is virtually identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2), and provides that to “preserve error concerning the exclusion of evidence, the complaining party must demonstrate the substance of the excluded evidence through an offer of proof or a bill of exception unless the substance of the evidence is apparent from the context.” 2016 WL 1039035, at *6. Because the husband objected and the court sustained the objection before any questions about the communications were asked and because the wife had failed to make a proffer, the appellate court could “only surmise” what the evidence “generally concerned.” Id. As a result, the wife failed to preserve the error. Id.  

Preservation Issue:

To preserve an issue concerning the erroneous exclusion of evidence, a formal offer of proof is not required. The proponent must ensure, however, that the trial court is aware of what the proponent expects the evidence to show and the grounds for which the proponent believes the evidence to be admissible.  

A proffer will accomplish this goal and also is needed to create a clear record that an appellate court can review for error. Such a proffer may be made in numerous ways depending on the court’s evidentiary rules and the particular circumstances, including the filing of affidavits and briefs, presenting deposition testimony, reading from an excluded document and explaining its relevance, or calling witnesses to the stand. But merely telling the court the general nature of the proposed evidence or stating that the evidence is “to prove my case” is insufficient.  

Truly, "direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of guilt."27 The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established."28 Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the offender "if i)there is more than one circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt."29 All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.30 In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person are the following: 1. In the morning of December 15,1996, petitioner was heard telling his co-accused Sotero Paredes (Sotero) "ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" before boarding a red car. Sotero was holding an armalite rifle while petitioner was armed with a .45 caliber pistol; 2. The said red car was identified or recognized by prosecution witness Rodolfo to be the same car he had sold to Sotero for ₱10,000.00 in September 1996; 3. The victim Alberto was fatally shot later in the day (December 15, 1996) by unidentified gunmen who thereafter immediately fled riding a red car; and 4. Post-mortem examination of the victim’s body showed that he sustained multiple gunshot wounds, the nature, severity and characteristics of which indicate that they were inflicted using high-powered guns, possibly anarmalite rifle and .22 caliber pistol.31

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No.179535               June 9, 2014

JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO ESPINELI, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Jurisprudence teaches us that "for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent x x x."1 Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.2

Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari3 is the July 6, 2007 Decision4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02252 which modified the August 31, 1999 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, by finding petitioner Jose Espineli a.k.a. Danilo "Danny" Espineli (petitioner) guilty of the crime of homicide instead of murder.

Also questioned is the CA’s September 14, 2007 Resolution6 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.7

Factual Antecedents

On June 24, 1997, an Information8 charging petitioner with the crime of murder was filed before the RTC,9 the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996 in the Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with one (1) Sotero Paredes and three (3) other unidentified persons, whose real names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown, said Sotero Paredes having been earlier charged with the same offense, and is now undergoing trial before Branch 90, of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, then armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shoot one Alberto Berbon y Downie with the use of said firearms, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds on his head and different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Alberto Berbon y Downie. CONTRARY TO LAW.10

Petitioner was arrested on July 1, 1997 and when arraigned on July 7, 1997 with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.11

The facts show that in the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto Berbon y Downie (Alberto), a 49-year old Senior Desk Coordinator of the radio station DZMM, was shot in the head and different parts of the body in front of his house in Imus, Cavite by unidentified malefactors who immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting car.

Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon) of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested and took into custody one Romeo Reyes (Reyes) for the crime of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes confided to the group of Atty. Dizon that he was willing to give vital information regarding the Berbon case. In due course, NBI Agent Dave Segunial(NBI Agent Segunial) interviewed Reyes on February 10, 1997 and reduced his statement into writing whereby Reyes claimed that on December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner and Sotero Paredes (Paredes) board a red car while armed with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite, respectively; and that petitioner told Paredes that "ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon."12 Subsequently, Reyes posted bail and was released on February 14, 1997. Thenceforth, he jumped bail and was never again heard of. NBI Agent Segunial testified on these facts during the trial.

The victim’s widow, Sabina Berbon (Sabina) likewise testified. According to her, sometime in the third week of February 1997 Reyes sought financial help so he could transfer his family to the province and protect them from any untoward consequence that may result from his giving information to the NBI regarding the death of Sabina’s husband. Sabina gave him the total amount of ₱1,500.00 and promised to help him in applying for the witness protection program. This was affirmed on the witness stand by Sabina’s brother, Bartolome Pakingan. After that, however, Reyes never came back.

Another prosecution witness, Rodolfo Dayao (Rodolfo), testified that he sold his red Ford Escort car to three persons who came to his residence in the afternoon of September 1, 1996. He later identified the said car from the photographs presented to him by the police officers.

Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat (Dr. Lagat), the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who conducted a post-mortem examination on Alberto, declared in his Autopsy Report that the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the head and body. He also stated that based on the size of the gunshot wounds or entrance, high-powered guns were used in the killing.

Petitioner, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence for his defense. Instead, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence13 without leave of court. As no action whatsoever was taken thereon by the trial court, petitioner just moved that the case be deemed submitted for decision.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision14 dated August 31, 1999, the trial court adjudged petitioner guilty of murder, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO "Danny" ESPINELI, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of "Murder" as charged. He is, therefore, sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Alberto Berbon y Downie, the civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00, and actual and compensatory damages in the total amount of ₱135,000.00 as funeral expenses (Exhibit "H"), interment fee of ₱8,360.00 (Exhibit "C"), medical expenses in the total amount of ₱1,519.45 (Exhibit[s] "D", "D-1" and "D-2") and for the contract fees of Memorial Park Care the amount of ₱15,700.00 (Exhibit "E").

Furthermore, considering that he is a high risk prisoner, his transfer to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, is immediately ordered.

SO ORDERED.15

Petitioner seasonably appealed his conviction before this Court. Pursuant, however, to the Court’s pronouncement in People v. Mateo,16 the case was ordered transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition through a Resolution17 dated March 22, 2006.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision18 promulgated on July 6, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the findings of the trial court. It ratiocinated that since none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing of the victim was perpetrated, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated. Neither can nighttime serve as an aggravating circumstance as the time of the commission of the crime was not even alleged in the Information. In view thereof, the CA found petitioner guilty only of homicide instead of murder. The decretal portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated August 31, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

In all other respects, the said decision STANDS.

In the service of his sentence, accused-appellant shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.19

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 which the CA denied in its Resolution21 dated September 14, 2007.

Hence, this Petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner posits that the CA should not have affirmed the Decision of RTC as the latter erred:

1. x x x [in admitting, considering and giving] probative value to Exhibit "A", the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of [Reyes] because [he] was not presented in court to confirm, affirm and authenticate the contents of his sworn statement. It resulted in the denial of petitioner’s constitutional right to confront and cross-examine his accusers.22

2. x x x [in convicting] the [petitioner] based on unproven, inadmissible circumstantial evidence.23

3. x x x in not acquitting the petitioner for failure of the prosecution to prove [his guilt] beyond reasonable doubt x x x.24

In sum, petitioner anchors his quest for the reversal of his conviction on the alleged erroneous admission in evidence of the Sinumpaang Salaysay25 of Reyes for being hearsay and inadmissible. He avers that the said sworn statement should not have been given probative value because its contents were neither confirmed nor authenticated by the affiant. Thus, all circumstances emanating from or included in the sworn statement must be totally brushed aside as lacking any evidentiary and probative value. Petitioner emphasizes that as found by the courts below, there was no direct evidence linking him to the crime; therefore, he wants this Court to review the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence upon which his conviction was based as he believes that the same failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent People of the Philippines, concurs with the petitioner and recommends his acquittal.26 It is also of the view that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Truly, "direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of guilt."27 The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established."28 Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the offender "if i)there is more than one circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt."29 All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.30

In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person are the following:

1. In the morning of December 15,1996, petitioner was heard telling his co-accused Sotero Paredes (Sotero) "ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" before boarding a red car. Sotero was holding an armalite rifle while petitioner was armed with a .45 caliber pistol;

2. The said red car was identified or recognized by prosecution witness Rodolfo to be the same car he had sold to Sotero for ₱10,000.00 in September 1996;

3. The victim Alberto was fatally shot later in the day (December 15, 1996) by unidentified gunmen who thereafter immediately fled riding a red car; and

4. Post-mortem examination of the victim’s body showed that he sustained multiple gunshot wounds, the nature, severity and characteristics of which indicate that they were inflicted using high-powered guns, possibly anarmalite rifle and .22 caliber pistol.31

The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced to render their verdict of conviction on circumstantial evidence as sanctioned under Section 4, Rule 13332 of the Rules of Court. The central issue now confronting this Court is whether the prosecution has amply proved by circumstantial evidence petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals sufficiently support petitioner’s conviction.

The Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence presented in this case in the light of the standards discussed above and finds the foregoing circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a judgment of conviction. Several reasons deserve our acceptance of the circumstances upon which petitioner’s conviction was based, to wit:

First, NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated Reyes and reduced the latter’s statement into writing declaring, among others, that in the morning of December 15, 1996, he (Reyes) overheard petitioner telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" and saw them armed with .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car. The CA gave weight to Reyes’ sworn statement in this wise:

The probative value of Romeo Reyes’s worn statement as to the words spoken by appellant to his co-accused Sotero Paredes in the morning of December 15, 1996 cannot be disputed. x x x33

Petitioner takes vigorous exception to the said findings, insisting that the said sworn statement belongs to the category of hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible. He asserts that its contents were never confirmed or authenticated by Reyes, thus, it lacks probative value.

The Court is unconvinced.

The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.34 This is known as the doctrine of independently relevant statements.35

In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him that he (Reyes) heard petitioner telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" and that he saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boardinga red car, cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunial’s testimony was not presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for the purpose of establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement containing such narration of facts. This is clear from the offer of the witness’ oral testimony.36 Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes’ statement.37 Verily then, what the prosecution sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts in his sworn statement and not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.38 Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a notarized document having been duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI. As such, it may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the due execution of this instrument or document involved pursuant to Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As held in Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza,39 a notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Here, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to overcome such presumption. Clearly, therefore, the CA did not err in its appreciation of Reyes’ sworn statement as testified to by NBI Agent Segunial.

Second, the identification and recognition through photograph by Rodolfo of the 1971 Ford Escort red colored car as the same car he had sold to Sotero in September 1996 clearly and convincingly prove that it was the very same red car used in the killing of Alberto on December 15, 1996.

Third, Alberto was shot and killed on December 15, 1996 and the gunmen immediately fled the scene riding a red car which was identified as the same car previously sold by Rodolfo to Sotero.

Fourth, though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited to the post-mortem examination of the cadaver of Alberto, his findings that the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds and that the same were caused by high-powered guns, served as corroborative evidence and contributed in a significant way in establishing the level of proof that the law requires in convicting petitioner.

Lastly, petitioner’s escape from detention on August 26, 1998 while the case was pending can also be considered as another circumstance since it is a strong indication of his guilt.

All told, this Court finds the concordant combination and cumulative effect of the alleged established circumstances, which essentially were the same circumstances found by the trial court and the appellate court, to have satisfied the requirement of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, the incriminating circumstances, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain of events enough to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner was responsible for the killing of the victim.

Besides, it is "[a]n established rule in appellate review x x x that the trial court’s factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. These factual findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA,"40 as in this case.

The Crime Committed and the Proper Penalty.

The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner is guilty only of the crime of homicide in view of the prosecution’s failure to prove any of the alleged attendant circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nighttime. As aptly observed by the appellate court:

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission of the crime. However, as none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing was perpetrated, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case. Neither can nighttime serve as an aggravating circumstance, the time of the commission of the crime was not even alleged in the Information.41 (Citations omitted)

The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal.42 In view of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence should be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium term which has a duration of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum should be within the range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Thus, the imposition by the CA of an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is in order.

Petitioner’s Civil liability

While the CA correctly imposed the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, it failed, however, to award moral damages. These awards are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide.43 Thus, for moral damages, the award of ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim is only proper.

Anent the award of actual damages, this Court sees no reason to disturb the amount awarded by the trial court as upheld by the CA since the itemized medical and burial expenses were duly supported by receipts and other documentary evidence.

The CA did not grant any award of damages for loss of earning capacity and rightly so. Though Sabina testified as to the monthly salary of the deceased, the same remains unsubstantiated. "Such indemnity cannot be awarded in the absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was either self-employed or a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.''44 The exceptions find no application in this case.

In addition and in conformity with current policy, an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all the monetary awards for damages from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 6, 2007 and Resolution dated September 14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02252 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that petitioner JOSE ESPINEL! a.k.a. DANILO "DANNY'' ESPINEL! is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ALBERTO BERBON y DOWNIE PS0,000.00 as moral damages as well as interest on all the damages assessed at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 860 (1999).
2 People v. Abdulah, 596 Phil. 870, 876 (2009).
3 Rollo, pp. 10-39.

4 CA rollo, 119-142; penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Sesinando S. Villon.

5 Records, pp.183-196; penned by Executive Judge Dolores L. Espanol.
6 CA rollo, p. 164
7 Id. at 147-152.
8 Records, pp. 1-2.
9 Later docketed as Criminal Case No. 4898-97.
10 Records, p. 1.
11 Id. at 30, 32.
12 Id. at 36.
13 Id. at 133-136.
14 Id. at 183-196.
15 Id. at 196.
16 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
17 CA rollo, pp. 39-40.
18 Id. at 119-142.
19 Id. at 141.
20 Id. at 147-152.
21 Id. at 164.
22 Rollo, p. 29.
23 Id. at 32.
24 Id. at 35.
25 Records, pp. 36-37.
26 See the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, rollo, pp. 142-157.
27 People v. Manchu, 593 Phil. 398, 406 (2008).
28 People v. Osianas, 588 Phil. 615, 627 (2008).
29 People v. Gaffud, Jr., 587 Phil. 521,530 (2008).
30 People v. Abdulah, supra note 2.
31 CA rollo, pp. 138-139.

32 Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.33 CA rollo, p. 139.
34 Republic v. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr., 441 Phil. 656, 672 (2002).
35 Id.
36 TSN, August 1, 1993, p. 3.
37 Id. at 25.
38 People v. Gumimba, 545 Phil. 627, 652 (2007).
39 G.R. No. 185477, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 807,817.
40 People v. Villasan, 618 Phil. 240, 251 (2009).
41 CA rollo, p. 140.
42 REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 249.

Art. 249. Homicide. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

43 People v. Orias, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 20!0, 622 SCRA 417,437-438.
44 People v. Mamaruncas, G.R. No. 179497 January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 182, 202.