It Should Be Stressed That The Right To Appeal Is Neither A Natural Right Nor A Part Of Due Process. It Is Merely A Procedural Remedy Of Statutory Origin And May Be Exercised Only In The Manner Prescribed By The Provisions Of Law Authorizing Its Exercise…

The Facts:

On November 25, 2008, Corazon was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of the crime of Estafa. According to her, she received the decision on January 13, 2009 and filed a timely motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied on May 20, 2009, copy of the order of which she received on July 31, 2009. She then filed her Notice of Appeal on August 3, 2009, which the RTC, by order dated June 29, 2010, denied for allegedly being belatedly filed. Because of this, Corazon thru counsel filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, assailing the denial of her Notice of Appeal, the Decision convicting her of Estafa, as well as the Motion For Reconsideration/New Trial filed by her.

The Court’s ruling:

We deny the petition.

At the outset, the Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities which this Court cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioner’s cause. It appears that petitioner assails not only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be discussed below, the petition is bound to fail, because of petitioner’s complete disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the Court.

First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit:

SEC. 2. Where to appeal. – The appeal may be taken as follows:

x x x x

(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and

x x x x

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. – (a)  The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x x x.

Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself[1]. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken[2]. The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal[3].

The Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the task of determining under which rule a petition should fall. It has likewise warned lawyers to follow the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to the client’s cause[4].

Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts[5]. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed[6]. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case[7].

Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the trial court’s decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration.  In utter disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her motion for reconsideration[8]. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment[9]. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition[10].

The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation of the petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders, resolutions, decisions, pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that are material and relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying on the case records of the lower court[11].

Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioner’s repeated disregard of the Rules and the Court’s lawful orders. In a Resolution[12] dated September 15, 2010, the Court required petitioner to fully comply with the Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:
x x x x

2. petitioner to FULLY COMPLY with the Rules by submitting: (a) an affidavit of service on the RTC and on the Office of the Solicitor General; (b) a proper verification in accordance with Section 1, Rule 45 in relation to Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules, and a valid certification of non-forum shopping in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7, with properly accomplished jurat showing that the affiant exhibited before the notary public at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the affiant as required under Sections 6 and 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended by Court En Banc Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; and (c) her counsel’s contact details pursuant to the En Banc Resolution dated 10 July 2007 in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC, all within five (5) days from notice.  x x x[13]

Despite the directive, no such compliance was made prompting the Court to require her counsel to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for non-compliance. Records likewise show that petitioner also failed to file a Reply to respondent’s Comment to the petition.

On August 2, 2011, petitioner’s counsel submitted his explanation for non-compliance and asked for more time within which to comply with the Court’s resolution, because of heavy workload and his failure to contact petitioner who apparently transferred residence. In a Resolution[14] dated August 31, 2011, the Court, while granting the motion for extension requested, admonished petitioner’s counsel for the unsatisfactory explanation. Yet again, petitioner failed to file the required Reply prompting the Court again to ask for the counsel’s explanation why he should not be disciplinary dealt with. Petitioner’s counsel claimed that he could not prepare the required reply because the documents needed had been destroyed by typhoon “Pedring.” He, likewise, pointed out that he exerted earnest efforts to locate petitioner but he could not do so at that point[15]. After the Court required him again to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for not complying with the Court’s resolutions, and since his efforts to communicate with his client proved futile, he asked the Court that he be relieved of all his duties and responsibilities as counsel on record[16]. In a Resolution[17] dated December 10, 2012, we required petitioner herself to comment thereon, but no such compliance was made to date.

Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections in order to serve better the ends of justice[18] It is the duty of the counsel to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, to determine which court has appellate jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for appeal[19]. Any error in compliance may be fatal to the client’s cause[20]. It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise[21]. The requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded at whim. In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, parties have to abide by these rules with greater fidelity in order to facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases[22].

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 193217, February 26, 2014, CORAZON MACAPAGAL, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.


[1] Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, 433 Phil. 844, 854 (2002).
[2] Id.
[3] Id. at 855.
[4] Id. at 856.
[5] Heirs of Teofilo Gaudiano v. Benemerito, 545 Phil. 311, 319 (2007).
[6] Id. at 319-320.
[7] Id. at 320.
[8] Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 4 reads:

SEC. 4. Contents of the petition. – The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by petitioner, and shall x x x (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the  court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition; x x x.
[9] Spouses Lanaria v. Planta, 563 Phil. 400, 414 (2007).
[10] Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 5.
[11] B.E. San Diego, Inc. v. Alzul, 551. Phil. 841, 860 (2007).
[12] Rollo, pp. 27-28.
[13] Id. at 27.  (Emphasis in the original)
[14] Id. at 54-55.
[15] Id. at 57-61.
[16] d. at 65-68.
[17] Id. at 70.
[18] Hilario v. People, G.R. No. 161070, April 14, 2008, 551 SCRA 191, 203.
[19] ] Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, supra note 10, at 855.
[20] Id. at 856.
[21] Heirs of Teofilo Gaudiano v. Benemerito, supra note 14, at 320; id. at 867.
[22] Basuel v. Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), 526 Phil. 608, 614 (2006).

Where A Party Has The Means In His Power Of Rebutting And Explaining The Evidence Adduced Against Him, If It Does Not Tend To The Truth, The Omission To Do So Furnishes A Strong Inference Against Him.

The Facts:

Adriano and Wenifreda (Tambuyat), married since 1965, owned several properties, among them a parcel of lot bought by Adriano.  The deed of sale was signed by Adriano as vendee, while Rosario (Baguis) signed as one of the witnesses.  When the title to the lot was issued (TCT No. T-145321(M), however, it was registered in the name of “ADRIANO TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BAGUIS”.  When Adriano died intestate in 1998, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of TCT T-145321, alleging that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano; TCT T-145321 was erroneously registered; that Rosario is married to one Eduardo Nolasco; and the registration was a result of the insidious machination of Rosario with the assistance of the broker.  She prayed that TCT T-145321 be cancelled and a new one issued indicating her as the spouse married to Adriano.  Opposing, Rosario denied that the property was acquired by the spouses Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage; that it was she who bought it using her personal funds; she and Adriano were married on September 2, 1988 and lived together as husband and wife, producing a son named Adrian; that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the proceeding as it is merely a summary proceeding and a thorough determination will have to be made if the property is conjugal or personal.

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favour of Wenifreda.  It ordered the cancellation of TCT T-145321 and issuance of a new one indicating Wenifreda as married to Adriano, as well as the payment of damages in her favour.  It ruled that Section 108^⁠1 of PD 1529 required court authorisation for any alteration or amendment if any mistake, error or omission was made in entering a certificate of title.  It was proved that Wenifreda is the surviving spouse of Adriano; that Rosario had a prior subsisting marriage to Nolasco, and TCT No. T-145321 was issued with her erroneously indicated as Adriano’s spouse.  Adrian’s filiation may not be proved in a land registration case.

On appeal to the CA, the later ruled that a separate and different proceeding is not necessary to resolve her opposition to the petition in the case as she in effect acquiesced and freely submitted her issues to the court to prove her allegations; the distinction between the trial court sitting as a land registration court and as a general court had been eliminated by PD 1529; Adriano and Rosario were not co-owners of the property as both of them had prior subsisting marriages at the time of their adulterous relations; Adriano alone was the vendee in the deed of sale and no evidence was proved that Rosario contributed to the purchase of the property.

Rosario elevated her case to the Supreme Court.  She argues that the case is essentially a partition of Adriano’s estate which deprives her and her son of their share; Section 108 cannot apply to the case as there were contentious issues which need to be resolved by a  court of general jurisdiction;  based on the evidence, she acquired the property using her own funds.

The Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in allowing the cancellation of TCT T-143521 to indicate Wenifreda as the surviving spouse of Adriano.

The Court’s ruling:

The Court denies the Petition.

The trial court in LRC Case No. P-443-99 was not precluded from resolving the objections raised by Banguis in her opposition to the petition for cancellation; a separate action need not be filed in a different court exercising general jurisdiction. Banguis should be considered to have acquiesced and freely submitted the case to the trial court for complete determination on her opposition, when she went to trial and adduced and submitted all her relevant evidence to the court. “The active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.”^⁠2 

Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances: (1) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2) when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (3) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (4) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (5) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (6) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (7) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.^⁠3  The present case falls under (3) and (7), where the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan committed an error in issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of “Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis” when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful spouse.

Proceedings under Section 108 are “summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues.”^⁠4  Banguis’s opposition to the petition for cancellation ostensibly raised controversial issues involving her claimed ownership and the hereditary rights of Adrian, which she claims to be her son by Adriano. However, apart from the fact that evidence of Banguis’s ownership is irrelevant in Wenifreda’s petition, the evidence apparently indicates that Banguis could not be the owner of the subject property, while a resolution of the issue of succession is irrelevant and unnecessary to the complete determination of Wenifreda’s petition. The Court is thus led to the conclusion that the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan simply erred in including Banguis in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse.

As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Documentary evidence – among others, the parties’ respective marriage contracts, which, together with marriage certificates, are considered the primary evidence of a marital union^⁠5 – indicates that Adriano was married to Wenifreda, while Banguis was married to Nolasco – and both marriages were subsisting at the time of the acquisition of the subject property and issuance of the certificate of title thereto. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a common-law relationship at all. Consequently, Banguis cannot be included or named in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse; the right and privilege belonged to Wenifreda alone.

x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: “Be it noted however that with respect to ‘spouse’, the same must be the legitimate ‘spouse’ (not common-law spouses).”

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term “spouse” embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.^⁠6 (Emphasis supplied)

The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. P-443-99 is – who should be included in the title to the subject property as Adriano’s spouse, Banguis or Wenifreda? Was there error in placing Banguis’s name in the title as Adriano’s spouse? If Banguis is Adriano’s spouse, then there would be no need to amend or even cancel the title. On the other hand, if Wenifreda is Adriano’s spouse, the inclusion of Banguis would then be erroneous, and TCT T-145321 would have to be cancelled. All that is required in resolving this issue is to determine who between them is Adriano’s spouse; it was unnecessary for Banguis to prove that she is the actual owner of the property. Title to the property is different from the certificate of title to it.

x x x. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, the Court made a clear distinction between title and the certificate of title:

The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. x x x.

Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.^⁠7 

Nonetheless, if Banguis felt that she had to go so far as to demonstrate that she is the true owner of the subject property in order to convince the trial court that there is no need to cancel TCT T-145321, then she was not precluded from presenting evidence to such effect. Understandably, with the quality of Wenifreda’s documentary and other evidence, Banguis may have felt obliged to prove that beyond the certificate of title, she actually owned the property. Unfortunately for her, this Court is not convinced of her claimed ownership; the view taken by the CA must be adopted that she and Adriano could not have been co-owners of the subject property as she failed to present sufficient proof that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property, while the deed of sale covering the subject property showed that Adriano alone was the vendee. This Court is not a trier of facts, so it must rely on the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals, which are thus considered conclusive and binding.^⁠8  Moreover, the Court notes that while Banguis claims that she alone paid for the property using her own funds and money borrowed from her sister, she nonetheless acknowledges that Adriano is a co-owner thereof, thus implying that he contributed to its acquisition. Such contradictory statements cast serious doubts on her claim; basically, if she were the sole purchaser of the property, it would only be logical and natural for her to require that her name be placed on the deed of sale as the vendee, and not as mere witness – which is what actually occurred in this case. On the other hand, if Adriano contributed to its purchase, Banguis would have required that her name be placed on the deed as a co-vendee just the same. Her failure to explain why – despite her claims that she is the purchaser of the property – she allowed Adriano to be denominated as the sole vendee, renders her claim of ownership doubtful. “Where a party has the means in his power of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him, if it does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong inference against him.”^⁠9 One cannot also ignore the principle that “the rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common sense.”^⁠10 

Neither can the Court believe Banguis’s assertion that Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation of TCT T-145321 is in reality a partition of Adriano’s estate which in effect transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus divests Banguis and her son Adrian of their rights and interests therein. LRC Case No. P-443-99 is simply a case for the correction of the wrongful entry in TCT T-145321; it simply aims to reflect the truth in the certificate of title – that Adriano is married to Wenifreda – and nothing else. It would have been a summary proceeding, but Banguis complicated matters by injecting her claims of ownership, which are irrelevant in the first place for, as earlier stated, registration is not the equivalent of title.

Finally, with the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the petitioner, particularly those relating to the trial court’s March 30, 2004 Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, as well as the April 14, 2004 Writ of Execution issued, as they have become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 14, 2012 Decision and July 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84954 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Brion, (Acting Chairperson),^* Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe,^** and Leonen, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015, ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT, PETITIONER, VS. WENIFREDA BALCOM-TAMBUYAT, RESPONDENT.

¹ Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not convened the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the owner’s duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.

All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other provision of this Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was entered.

² Maneja v. National Labor Relations Commission, 353 Phil. 45, 60 (1998), citing Marquez v. Secretary of Labor, 253 Phil. 329, 336 (1989).

³ See also Paz v. Republic, G.R. No. 157367, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 74, 81.

⁴ Bagayas v. Bagayas, G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517, September 18, 2013, 706 scra 73, 87 citing Philippine Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela, 660 Phil. 358 (2011).

⁵ Vda. De Chua v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 465, 483 (1998); Vda. de Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014, 714 SCRA 447, 455.

⁶ Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014, citing Eugenio, Sr. v. Judge Velez, 263 Phil. 1149, 1159-1160 (1990).

⁷ Torbela v. Rosario, G.R. No. 140528, December 7, 2011, 661 SCRA 633, 658-659.

⁸ Philamlife. v. Gramaje, 484 Phil. 880, 889 (2004).

⁹ Medija v. Patcho, 217 Phil. 509, 522 (1984).

¹⁰ People v. Toledo and Holgado, 51 Phil. 825, 833 (1928).

buy bust is a form of entrapment

In People v. Sembrano³⁴ citing People v. Agulay,³⁵ this Court held that a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation, as in this case, deserves judicial sanction.³⁶ Moreover, in a buy-bust operation, the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the same are not only authorized but also duty-bound to apprehend the violator and consequently search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.

frame-up and extortion

Denial or frame up is a standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. As such, it has been viewed by the court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted.³⁹ It should not accord a redoubtable sanctuary to a person accused of drug dealing unless the evidence of such frame up is clear and convincing.⁴⁰ Without proof of any intent on the part of the police officers to falsely impute appellant in the commission of a crime, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the principle that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect, deserve to prevail over the bare denials and self-serving claims of appellant that he had been framed up.⁴¹ Neither can appellant’s claim of alleged extortion by the police operatives be entertained. Absent any proof, appellant’s assertion of extortion allegedly committed by the police officers could not be successfully interposed. It remains one of those standard, worn-out, and impotent excuses of malefactors prosecuted for drug offenses. What appellant could have done was to prove his allegation and not just casually air it

G.R. No. 187047 June 15, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MANUEL CRUZ y CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.

This Court held that neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any of the money used in a buy-bust operation, much less is it required that the boodle money be marked. The only elements necessary to consummate the crime is proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.⁴⁵ Both elements were satisfactorily proven in the present case. There is also no rule that requires the police to use only marked money in buy-bust operations. This Court has in fact ruled that failure to use marked money or to present it in evidence is not material since the sale cannot be essentially disproved by the absence thereof. Its non-presentation does not create a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence for as long as the sale of the illegal drugs is adequately established and the substance itself is presented before the court