Tuesday, March 29, 2016

case digest



Menchu Q. Cimafranca
Annulment Case (psychological incapacity)
Republic v CA and Quintos (G.R. No. 159594)
Facts:
Eduardo and Catalina were married. The couple were not blessed with a child because Catalina had a hysterectomy following her second marriage.
Eduardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing psychological incapacity as a ground. He alleged that Catalina always left the house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that Catalina constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of caring for their adopted daughter; that she gambled away all his remittances as an overseas worker; and that she abandoned the conjugal home with her paramour.
To support his claim, he presented the results of a neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle Reyes stating that Catalina exhibited traits of a borderline personality disorder that was no longer treatable.
Catalina did not appear during trial but admitted her psychological incapacity. However, she denied flirting with different men and abandoning the conjugal home.
Issue:   Whether or not Catalina was psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
No. Marriage remains valid.
Psychological incapacity is an incapacity/inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations.
In Republic v CA(Molina), the Supreme Court has established guidelines involving the nullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity. These were not met in the instant case since the gravity; root cause and incurability of Catalina's purported psychological incapacity were not sufficiently established.
Catalina's behavior of frequent gossiping, leaving the house without Eduardo's consent, refusal to do household chores, and take care of their adopted daughter were not established. Eduardo presented no other witness to corroborate these allegations.
Also, the RTC and CA heavily relied on Dr. Reyes' evaluation despite any factual foundation to support this claim. The report was vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of the incapacity.Even the testimony of Dr. Reyes stated a general description of borderline personality disorder which did not explain the root cause as to why Catalina was diagnosed as such. They did not specify the acts or omissions or the gravity which constituted the disorder. What was established was that Catalina was childish and immature. Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina. This lacks the depth and objectivity of an expert assessment.
Catalina's immaturity and apparent refusal to perform her marital obligations do not constitute psychological incapacity alone. It must be shown that such immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Writ of Habeas Data
Castillo vs. Cruz - GR No. 182165
Facts:
Respondent Spouses Cruz, leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos, refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan which intended to utilize it for local projects. Cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the property. The pertinent case among the filed cases was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents filed a motion for TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the demolition was already implemented before the TRO issuance.
Petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to “protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,” entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Issue: 1. Whether or not Writ Amparo and Habeas Data is proper toproperty rights; and,
 2. Whether or notAmparo and Habeas Data is proper whenthere is a criminal case already filed.
Ruling:
1. Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions. Secretary of National Defense v. Manaloteaches: “As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegalkillings” and “enforced disappearances.” Tapuzv. Del Rosario also teaches: “What it is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.”
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.
2.  Respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparoand habeas data.

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