The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand ofcounsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the right against selfincrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence,it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced todetermine its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950])28(Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion.1âwphi1 The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In Gutang v. People,29 the petitioner therein and his companions were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu materials and paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that case were also asked to give urine samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine sample was inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession.

In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material." The situation in Gutangwas categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought tobe examined came from the body of the accused. The Court said:

This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosedfacts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 200748               July 23, 2014

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the common report of the people who are acquainted with him; his reputation.32 "Good moral character" includes all the elements essential to make up such a character; among these are common honesty and veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a character that measures up as good among people of the community in which the person lives, or that is up to the standard of the average citizen; that status which attaches to a man of good behavior and upright conduct.33

The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the business of the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a very bad man may have a righteous cause.³⁴ There are exceptions to this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both criminal and civil cases.

In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. When the accused presents proof of his good moral character, this strengthens the presumption of innocence, and where good character and reputation are established, an inference arises that the accused did not commit the crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory that a person of good character and high reputation is not likely to have committed the act charged against him.³⁵ Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a person of bad character.³⁶ The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the defendant to produce such evidence.³⁷ Once the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the defendant’s bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from refutation, would have a license to unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal.³⁸

In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two situations: (1) as evidence of the deceased’s aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the accused.54 The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor.55 When the evidence tends to prove self-defense, the known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to show that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.56

In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victim’s bad character he could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation.

Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed with treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman,⁵⁷ a murder case, the defense tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome or provocative character of the deceased. Upon objection of the prosecution, the trial court disallowed the same. The Supreme Court held:

"x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123),⁵⁸ such is not necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases of murder."⁵⁹

In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through treachery and evident premeditation. The evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph was sitting in his living room watching television when accused-appellant peeped through the window and, without any warning, shot him twice in the head. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to defend himself or retaliate against his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured his death without risk to the assailant. Following the ruling in People v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was attended by treachery, proof of the victim’s bad character is not necessary. The presence of this aggravating circumstance negates the necessity of proving the victim’s bad character to establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged and, at the same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph Marquez to murder.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 139070      May 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NOEL LEE, accused-appellant.

The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party." (Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., 622 [1955])

In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such testimony.

Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence) States:

Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated.

(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact accruing before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind." (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

The purpose of the rule has been explained by this Court in this wise:

The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party." (Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., 622 [1955])

The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. (See Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927])

In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.

It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.

G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992
ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC., respondents.

Relationship to a party has never been recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the credibility of the witness or—subject only to well recognized exceptions none of which is here present—the admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of relationship to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution in the assessment of a witness’ testimony but is not necessarily a negative element which should be taken as diminishing the credit otherwise accorded to it.25

As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each other’s claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man’s Statute;²⁸ besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them.

The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on review, the pertinent portion of which reads:

The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in each other’s favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.

Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law speaks of "parties or assignors of parties to a case." Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each other’s behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis supplied)

But Sanson’s and Celedonia’s claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonia’s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sanson’s claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other’s transaction.

In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony.²⁹ Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 127745            April 22, 2003
FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A. MONTINOLA, EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the Late Juan Bon Fing Sy, respondents-appellees.

nder the Dead Man's Statute Rule, "if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction."¹ Thus, the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro Caparas (Pedro) that he entered into a sharing of leasehold rights with the petitioners cannot be used as evidence against the herein respondent as the latter would be unable to contradict or disprove the same.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 180843               April 17, 2013

APOLONIO GARCIA, in substitution of his deceased mother, Modesta Garcia, and CRISTINA SALAMAT, Petitioners,
vs.
DOMINGA ROBLES VDA. DE CAPARAS, Respondent.

Petitioners' reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat respondent's claim cannot prevail over the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of partnership, albeit an informal one.

Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the absence of any written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:

"SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."

Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.

We are not persuaded.

A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property of real rights are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall necessary.⁶ Hence, based on the intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts and ascertained from their language and conduct, a verbal contract of partnership may arise.⁷ The essential profits that must be proven to that a partnership was agreed upon are (1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest in the profits.⁸ Understandably so, in view of the absence of the written contract of partnership between respondent and Jacinto, respondent resorted to the introduction of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership. The crucial issue to settle then is to whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render inadmissible respondent's testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.

The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.⁹ But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:

"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted.

2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind;

3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind;

4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."¹⁰

Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.

First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim¹¹ against respondents in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute".¹² Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.¹³ Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.¹⁴

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen."¹⁵ Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 143340       August 15, 2001
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners,
vs.
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: