In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two situations: (1) as evidence of the deceased’s aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the accused.54 The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor.55 When the evidence tends to prove self-defense, the known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to show that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.56

In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victim’s bad character he could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation.

Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed with treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman,⁵⁷ a murder case, the defense tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome or provocative character of the deceased. Upon objection of the prosecution, the trial court disallowed the same. The Supreme Court held:

"x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123),⁵⁸ such is not necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases of murder."⁵⁹

In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through treachery and evident premeditation. The evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph was sitting in his living room watching television when accused-appellant peeped through the window and, without any warning, shot him twice in the head. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to defend himself or retaliate against his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured his death without risk to the assailant. Following the ruling in People v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was attended by treachery, proof of the victim’s bad character is not necessary. The presence of this aggravating circumstance negates the necessity of proving the victim’s bad character to establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged and, at the same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph Marquez to murder.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 139070      May 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NOEL LEE, accused-appellant.