Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179540 March 13, 2009
PERFECTA CAVILE, JOSE DE LA CRUZ and RURAL BANK OF BAYAWAN, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
JUSTINA LITANIA-HONG, accompanied and joined by her husband, LEOPOLDO HONG and GENOVEVA LITANIA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated 8 March 2007 and the Resolution3 dated 3 September 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66873. The assailed Decision of the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated 29 February 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 6111, dismissing the complaint of respondents Justina Litania-Hong, her husband Leopoldo Hong, and her sister Genoveva Litania; and declaring petitioner spouses Perfecta Cavile and Jose de la Cruz to be the absolute owners of the parcels of land subjects of this case. The assailed Resolution of the appellate court denied petitioner spouses’ Motion for Reconsideration of its decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case proceed as follows:
On 5 April 1937, a Deed of Partition5 was entered into by the heirs of the spouses Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon. Said heirs included the legitimate children of Bernardo and Tranquilina, namely, (1) Susana Cavile, (2) Castor Cavile, and (3) Benedicta Cavile; as well as the children of Bernardo by his previous marriages, specifically: (4) Simplicia Cavile, (5) Fortunato Cavile, and (6) Vevencia Cavile.6 Subject of the Deed of Partition were several parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Tolong, Negros Oriental, which were then covered by Tax Declarations No. 5615, No. 5729, No. 7143, No. 7421 and No. 7956, all under the name of Bernardo.
Of particular interest in this case are the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956. The lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 7421 was described in the Deed of Partition as "bounded on the North by Simplicio Cavile antes Roman Echaves, on the East by Rio Bayawan, on the South by Riachuelo Napasu-an, and on the West by Riachuelo Napasu-an y Julian Calibug antes Francisco Tacang." The lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 7956 was identified to be the one "bounded on the North by Hilario Navaro, on the East by Silverio Yunting, on the South by Fortunato Cavile, and on the West by Maximiano Balasabas."
In accordance with the Deed of Partition, the conjugal properties of Bernardo and Tranquilina were divided into two parts. The first part, corresponding to Bernardo’s share, was further divided into six equal shares and distributed among his six heirs. The second part, corresponding to Tranquilina’s share, was subdivided only into three shares and distributed among her children with Bernardo, i.e., Susana, Castor, and Benedicta.
Also stated in the Deed of Partition was the sale by the other aforementioned legal heirs to their co-heir Castor of their aliquot shares in the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7143, No. 7421, and No. 7956; thus, making Castor the sole owner of the said properties. Similarly, the Deed of Partition acknowledged the sale by all the legal heirs to Ulpiano Cavile of their respective shares in the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 5729, thus, transferring to the latter absolute ownership of said parcel of land.
Thereafter, on 5 August 1960, Castor and Susana executed a Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition,7 whereby Castor recognized and confirmed that the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 2039 and No. 2040 were the just and lawful shares of Susana in the properties left by their deceased parents Bernardo and Tranquilina, and that Susana was in actual possession of the said properties. According to the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 2039 was "bounded on the North by Simplicio Cavile, on the East by Rio Bayawan, on the South by Napasu-an, and on the West by Napasu-an Creek and Julian Calibog;" while the one covered by Tax Declaration No. 2040 was "bounded on the North by Hilario Navvaro (sic), on the South by Fortunato Cavile, on the East by Silverio Yunting, and on the West by Maximino (sic) Balasabas."
The descriptions of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 2039 and No. 2040 in the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition were strikingly close to those of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956, respectively, in the Deed of Partition.
Fourteen years after the execution of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition in 1960, respondents filed on 23 December 1974 a Complaint for Reconveyance and Recovery of Property with Damages before the RTC against Perfecta Cavile, the daughter of Castor, Jose de la Cruz, the husband of Perfecta (hereinafter petitioner spouses), and the Rural Bank of Bayawan, Inc. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 6111.8
Respondents averred in the Complaint that respondents Justina and Genoveva inherited two parcels of land, covered by Tax Declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409 (subject lots),9 from their mother Susana, who, in turn, inherited the same from her parents Bernardo and Tranquilina. Respondents invoked the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition dated 5 August 1960 wherein Castor purportedly recognized Susana’s ownership of the subject lots. Susana had enjoyed undisputed ownership and possession of the subject lots, paying the realty taxes due and introducing improvements thereon. Susana was even able to obtain a loan from the Rural Bank of Dumaguete City sometime in 1960, mortgaging the subject lots as security for the same.
After Susana’s death in 1965, the subject lots were inherited by her daughters, respondents Justina and Genoveva, who then assumed the mortgage thereon. However, respondents alleged that Castor and petitioner spouses eventually intruded upon and excluded respondents from the subject lots. When Castor died in 1968, petitioner spouses continued their unlawful occupancy of the subject lots, planting on the same and harvesting the products. Respondents claimed that they exerted efforts to settle the matter, but petitioner spouses stubbornly refused to accede. In 1974, prior to the filing of the Complaint, respondents again sought an audience with petitioner spouses, yet the latter only presented to them the Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) No. FV-4976,10 No. FV-4977,11 and No. FV-497812 covering the subject lots, issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Negros Oriental, on 9 October 1962, in the name of petitioner Perfecta. Respondents were, thus, constrained to institute Civil Case No. 6111 against petitioner spouses and the Rural Bank of Bayawan, Inc., seeking the cancellation of the OCTs in the name of petitioner Perfecta or, alternatively, the reconveyance by petitioner spouses of the subject lots to respondents, plus award for damages. The Rural Bank of Bayawan, Inc. was impleaded as a defendant in the Complaint since petitioner spouses mortgaged the subject lots in its favor as security for a loan in the amount of P42,227.50. However, the bank was later dropped as a party after the aforesaid loan was settled.
Petitioner spouses countered in their Answer to the Complaint that, by virtue of the Deed of Partition dated 5 April 1937, the heirs of both Bernardo and Tranquilina took exclusive possession of their respective shares in the inheritance. Castor fully possessed the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7143, No. 7421 and No. 7956, after his co-heirs sold to him their shares therein. In 1962, Castor sold to petitioner Perfecta the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956, which corresponded to the subject lots in the Complaint. Following the sale, petitioner Perfecta took possession of the subject lots and filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for the issuance of title over the same. The Bureau issued free patent titles over the subject lots in favor of petitioner Perfecta and, by virtue thereof, she was able to secure on 9 October 1962, OCTs No. FV-4976, No. FV-4977, and No. FV-4978 in her name.
Petitioner spouses asserted that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition dated 5 August 1960 involving the subject lots was a nullity since said properties were never owned nor adjudicated in favor of Susana, respondents’ predecessor-in-interest. Castor and Susana executed the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition merely to accommodate the latter who then needed security for the loan she was trying to obtain from the Rural Bank of Dumaguete City. Respondents would not be able to deny the said accommodation arrangement, given that neither Susana nor respondents actually possessed the subject lots or applied for titles thereto. Respondents did not even know that the subject lots were divided into three lots after a Government survey. If Susana and respondents paid realty taxes for the subject lots, it was only to convince the Rural Bank of Dumaguete to renew their loan from year to year, secured as it was by the mortgage on the subject lots. Thus, petitioner spouses posited that no ownership could then be transferred to respondents after Susana’s death.
Trial in Civil Case No. 6111 thereafter ensued before the RTC.13
On 29 February 2000, the RTC promulgated its Decision, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring [herein petitioner spouses] as the absolute owners over the parcels of land in litigation. Consequently, [herein respondents’] complaint is ordered dismissed. [Respondents’] counterclaim is likewise entered dismissed for lack of merit.14
The RTC ruled that the petitioner spouses’ evidence was more worthy of credence in establishing their ownership of the subject lots. As petitioner Perfecta testified before the RTC, Castor immediately took possession of the subject lots after the Deed of Partition was executed in 1937. This fact was supported by the unrebutted testimony of Luciana Navarra, petitioner Perfecta’s cousin, who declared that her husband was petitioner Perfecta’s tenant on the subject lots since 1947 and that respondents never actually occupied the said properties. The RTC observed that it was highly questionable and contrary to human experience that respondents waited nine long years after their ejection from the subject lots in 1965 before taking any legal step to assert their rights over the same.
The RTC further subscribed to the testimony of Perfecta that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was executed by Castor solely to accommodate Susana, enabling her to obtain a bank loan using the subject lots as collateral. It noted that Susana did not bother to apply for the issuance of title to the subject lots in her name. Contrarily, it was Perfecta who applied for and obtained title to the subject lots, which, surprisingly, respondents were not even aware of. The RTC found that the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties after the execution of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition evidently demonstrated their intention to merely accommodate Susana in her loan application. Hence, the RTC concluded that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was a simulated contract which was void and without any legal effect.
Without seeking a reconsideration of the above RTC Decision, respondents challenged the same by way of appeal before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66873.
On 8 March 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision in favor of respondents, the decretal portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one entered ORDERING [herein petitioner spouses] and/or their heirs, assigns and representatives as follows:
1. To reconvey to [herein respondents] the possession and title to the litigated parcels of land.
2. Upon reconveyance of the litigated properties, the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City is ordered to cancel Certificate of Title No. 4877 (sic), 4976 and 4978 and to issue a new certificate to [respondents] or their successors in interest.
3. With costs against [petitioner spouses].15
The Court of Appeals agreed in the respondents’ contention that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was not a simulated document. The said document should be entitled to utmost respect, credence, and weight as it was executed by and between parties who had firsthand knowledge of the Deed of Partition of 1937. Moreover, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition constituted evidence that was of the highest probative value against the declarant, Castor, because it was a declaration against his proprietary interest. Other than petitioner Perfecta’s testimony, the appellate court found no other proof extant in the records to establish that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was a simulated document or that it did not express the true intent of the parties. The Court of Appeals likewise highlighted the fact that Castor did not attempt to have the subject lots declared in his name during his lifetime and that petitioner Perfecta herself admitted that she only started paying real estate taxes for the subject lots in 1993. It was Susana and, later, her children, respondents Justina and Genoveva, who had been paying for the realty taxes on the subject lots since 1937.
Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the foregoing Decision, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution17 dated 3 September 2007.
Petitioner spouses filed the instant Petition, raising the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
I.
WHETHER [OR NOT] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW IN RULING THAT EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF AN AFFIDAVIT, THE "CONFIRMATION OF EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION," MAY BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE TO VARY THE TERMS OF A JUDICIALLY DECLARED VALID AGREEMENT ENTITLED "DEED OF PARTITION"?
II.
WHETHER [OR NOT] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL ERROR IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA?
III.
WHETHER [OR NOT] THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM-SHOPPING?
IV.
WHETHER [OR NOT] THE FREE PATENT TITLES ISSUED TO THE PETITIONERS MAY BE RECONVEYED TO THE RESPONDENTS?18
Essentially, the Court finds that the fundamental issue that must be settled in this case is who, among the parties herein, have the better right to the subject lots.
The Court notes prefatorily that in resolving the present case, an examination of the respective evidence of the parties must necessarily be undertaken. Although the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, we find that an exception19 to this rule is present in the instant case in that the Court of Appeals made findings of fact which were contrary to those of the RTC.
Before proceeding, the Court further establishes as a foregone fact, there being no issue raised on the matter, that the subject lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409 described in the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6111 are the very same lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7956 and No. 7421 included in the Deed of Partition, and by Tax Declarations No. 2040 and No. 2039 subject of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition.
Respondents, as plaintiffs before the RTC in Civil Case No. 6111, sought the reconveyance and recovery of the subject lots purportedly illegally usurped by petitioner spouses who succeeded in having the same titled in the name of petitioner Perfecta. Respondent Justina testified in open court that the subject lots were inherited by her and co-respondent Genoveva’s mother, Susana, from their grandparents, Bernardo and Tranquilina.20 As proof of Susana’s ownership of the subject lots, respondents presented the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition executed on 5 August 1960 by Castor and Susana. In said document, Castor ostensibly recognized and confirmed Susana’s ownership and possession of the subject lots.21 Tax declarations22 covering the subject lots in the names of Susana and respondents were also offered to the court a quo to lend support to respondents’ claims of ownership.
On the other hand, to prove their entitlement to the subject lots, petitioner spouses presented before the RTC the Deed of Partition23 entered into by the heirs of spouses Bernardo and Tranquilina on 5 April 1937. By virtue thereof, Castor acquired through sale the shares of his co-heirs in the subject lots. Petitioner Perfecta testified before the trial court that right after the execution of said Deed, she and her father, Castor, assumed possession of the subject lots, planting coconuts, rice, and corn thereon.24 She additionally testified that realty taxes on the subject lots had since been paid by Castor and, subsequently, by her.25 Possession of the subject lots by Castor and petitioner spouses was corroborated by the testimony of Luciana Navarra, who insisted that respondents never occupied the said lots.26 Finally, petitioner spouses presented OCTs No. FV-4976, No. FV-4977, and No. FV-4978, covering the subject lots, issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Negros Oriental on 9 October 1962 in the name of petitioner Perfecta.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties in the instant case, the Court rules in favor of petitioner spouses.
At this point, let it be stated that the validity and due execution of the Deed of Partition executed in 1937 is not directly assailed in this case, thus, the Court need not pass upon the same. Under the said Deed of Partition, the other heirs of Bernardo and Tranquilina clearly and unequivocally sold their shares in the subject lots to Castor, petitioner Perfecta’s father. What appeared to be the clear right of ownership of Castor over the subject lots was put in doubt by the execution of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition by Castor and his sister Susana in 1960. Respondents, children and heirs of Susana, base their claim of ownership of the subject lots on the said document, while petitioner spouses denounce the same to be simulated, executed for purposes other than to transfer ownership of the subject lots, and cannot legally alter the terms of the previously duly executed Deed of Partition.
As held by the Court of Appeals, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition partakes of the nature of an admission against a person’s proprietary interest.27 As such, the same may be admitted as evidence against Castor and petitioner spouses, his successors-in-interest. The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence, notwithstanding that they are hearsay, is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further, that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.28
Nevertheless, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition is just one piece of evidence against petitioner spouses. It must still be considered and weighed together with respondents’ other evidence vis-à-vis petitioner spouses’ evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." "Preponderance of evidence" is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.29 Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence, thus:
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
Herein, despite the admission made by Castor in the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition against his own interest, the Court is still convinced that the evidence adduced by the petitioner spouses preponderated over that of the respondents.
In analyzing the two vital documents in this case, the Court discerns that while the Deed of Partition clearly explained how Castor came to fully own the subject lots, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, even though confirming Susana’s ownership of the subject lots, failed to shed light on why or how the said properties wholly pertained to her when her parents Bernardo and Tranquilina clearly had other heirs who also had shares in the inheritance.
Other than the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, respondents were only able to present as evidence of their title to the subject lots tax declarations covering the same, previously, in the name of Susana and, subsequently, in their own names. We find such tax declarations insufficient to establish respondents’ ownership of the subject lots. That the disputed property has been declared for taxation purposes in the name of any party does not necessarily prove ownership. Jurisprudence is consistent that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership of the properties stated therein. A disclaimer is even printed on the face of such tax declarations that they are "issued only in connection with real property taxation [and] should not be considered as title to the property." At best, tax declarations are indicia of possession in the concept of an owner.30 Conversely, non-declaration of a property for tax purposes does not necessarily negate ownership.31
On the other hand, the Court is at a loss as to how the Court of Appeals failed to give due consideration to the Torrens titles issued in the name of petitioner Perfecta when it rendered its assailed Decision.
Sometime in 1962, petitioner Perfecta applied for and was granted by the Bureau of Lands free patents over the subject lots. Pursuant thereto, Original Certificates of Title No. FV-4976, No. FV-4977, and No. FV-4978, covering the subject lots, were issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Negros Oriental, on 9 October 1962, in the name of petitioner Perfecta. Given this crucial fact, the Court pronounces that respondents’ Complaint for reconveyance of the subject lots and damages filed only on 23 December 1974 is already barred.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of the free patents become as indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from date of issuance of the patent.32 However, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether or not fraud has been committed in securing the title. Indeed, one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to public land should not be allowed to benefit from it.33
On this matter, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 14134 provides that all actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth [now Republic] of the Philippines. Such is the rule because whether the grant of a free patent is in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is so raised by the government and set aside, another claiming party may not question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government.35 Thus, private parties, like respondents in the instant case, cannot challenge the validity of the patent and the corresponding title, as they had no personality to file the suit.
Although jurisprudence recognizes an exception to this case, the respondents may not avail themselves of the same.
Verily, an aggrieved party may still file an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, which prescribes in 10 years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate of Title over the property, provided that the property has not been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully or fraudulently registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.36 If the registered owner, be he the patentee or his successor-in-interest to whom the free patent was transferred, knew that the parcel of land described in the patent and in the Torrens title belonged to another, who together with his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession thereof, and if the patentee and his successor-in-interest were never in possession thereof, the true owner may bring an action to have the ownership of or title to the land judicially settled. The court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens titled issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner thereof.37
In the instant case, respondents brought the action for reconveyance of the subject lots before the RTC only on 23 December 2004, or more than 12 years after the Torrens titles were issued in favor of petitioner Perfecta on 9 October 1962. The remedy is, therefore, already time-barred.
And even if respondents’ Complaint was filed on time, the Court would still rule that respondents failed to satisfactorily prove that they were in possession of the subject lots prior to the grant of free patents and issuance of Torrens titles over the same in favor petitioner Perfecta. The bare testimony of respondent Justina that Susana had been in the peaceful and undisturbed possession of the subject lots since 1937 up to the time of her death in 1965 was entirely bereft of substantiation and details. No information was provided as to how said possession of the subject lots was actually exercised or demonstrated by Susana. In contrast, the possession of the subject lots by Castor, and later on by petitioner spouses, was established not just by the testimony of petitioner Perfecta, but was corroborated by the testimony of Luciana Navarra, whose husband was a tenant working on the subject lots. Petitioner spouses possessed the subject lots by planting thereon coconuts, rice, and corn - a claim which respondents were unable to refute.
Furthermore, respondents’ allegation that petitioner Perfecta committed fraud and breach of trust in her free patent application is specious. The fact that the document evidencing the sale of the subject lots by Castor to petitioner Perfecta was not presented does not automatically mean that said contract was never in existence. Also undeserving of much consideration without sufficient proof is respondents’ averment that the subject lots were private lands which could no longer be granted to any person via free patent. Respondents ought to remember that mere allegation of fraud is not enough. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive another party of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved.38 Also, the issuance by Bureau of Lands of free patents over the subject property to petitioner Perfecta enjoys the presumption of regularity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 8 March 2007 and Resolution dated 3 September 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66873 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 29 February 2000 of the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 6111 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
| MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice | ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 8-36.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon with the concurrence of Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Francisco P. Acosta; rollo, pp. 38-44.
3 Rollo, pp. 46-47.
4 Penned by Judge Victor C. Patrimonio; rollo, pp. 116-127.
5 Folder 2, Index of Exhibits, Exhibit 1.
6 Having died before the execution of the Deed of Partition, Fortunato and Vevencia were merely represented therein by their eldest children, Lucio Cavile and Vicente Navarra, respectively.
7 Folder 2, Index of Exhibits, Exhibit A.
8 In 1985, the complaint was amended in view of the death of petitioner Jose de la Cruz. His children Solon de la Cruz and Don de la Cruz were impleaded as defendants. Felicitas L. Reston was also impleaded as a plaintiff, as she was likewise a daughter of Susana Cavile.
9 The descriptions of the boundaries of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409 in the Complaint correspond to those of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7956 and No. 7421, respectively, in the Deed of Partition, as well as to the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 2040 and No. 2039 in the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition.
10 Folder 2, Index of Exhibits, Exhibits B to B-2.
11 Id. at Exhibits C to C-2.
12 Id. at Exhibits D to D-2.
13 In the RTC, respondent Justina Litania-Hong was presented as a lone witness for the plaintiffs in 1975. In 1987, the Perdices Coliseum, upon which the trial court was situated, was burned. The original records of the case were, thus, lost and were only duly reconstituted on 16 September 1987. Afterwards, petitioner Perfecta Cavile testified for the defendants, followed by another witness, Leticia Navarra.
14 Rollo, p. 127.
15 Id. at 43.
16 Id. at 48-57.
17 Id. at 46-47.
18 Id. at 19.
19 In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, questions of fact may be determined by the Court when: (1) the conclusion of the Court of Appeals is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. (See Rosario v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 139233, 11 November 2005, 474 SCRA 500, 506, citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 834, 846 [1998]).
20 TSN, 11 December 1975, pp. 8-9.
21 The pertinent portions of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition provide:
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, CASTOR CAVILE, xxx, hereinafter called and referred to as the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART; and SUSANA CAVILE, xxx, hereinafter called and referred to as the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART,
WITNESSETH:
That the parties herein are the only legitimate children of the deceased spouses Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Alvier Galon, who both died intestate, in the Municipality of Bayawan, Negros Oriental, sometime on the year 1917, and February 19, 1945, respectively.
That the said deceased spouses left several parcels of agricultural land in the Municipality of Bayawan, province of Negros Oriental, and among said parcels of land are the following property described and bounded as follows:
x x x x
That the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART hereby recognizes, agree, bind and confirm that the above-described parcels of land are (sic) the just and lawful share of the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, and which property is actually in the possession of the latter.
x x x x
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto signed this instrument on this 5th day of August, 1960, at the Municipality of Bayawan, Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines.
SGD CASTOR CAVILE
(Party of the First Part)SGD SUSANA CAVILE
(Party of the Second Part)
22 Folder 2, Index of Exhibits, Exhibits E to L-2.
23 The pertinent portions of the Deed of Partition read:
DEED OF PARTITION
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
THAT Susana Cavile, Castor Cavile, Benedicta Cavile, Simplicia Cavile, Lucio Cavile and Vicenta Navarra both (sic) of legal age and residents in the Municipality of Tolong, Province of Oriental Negros, Philippine Islands, after being duly sworn to in legal form, WITNESSETH:
That Susana Cavile, Castor Cavile and Benedicta Cavile are the only children of Bernardo Cavile with his wife Tranquilina Galon, and that Simplicia Cavile and Fortunato Cavile and Vevencia Cavile are the children of Bernardo Cavile outside from the conjugal home of Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon.
That Fortunato Cavile and Vevencia Cavile having already been dead are survived by their corresponding children and represented in this document by their oldest child, Lucio Cavile and Vicenta Navarra, respectively.
That during the union of Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon several properties have been acquired by them and declared under the name of Bernardo Cavile all situated in the Municipality of Tolong, Province of Oriental Negros, which properties are described as follows:
x x x x
That by this document it is hereby agreed by the legal heirs of Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon to divide and by these presents it is hereby divided the above mentioned properties in the following manner:
1 - That the conjugal properties of said Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon which are already described are hereby divided into two parts ONE (1) part which corresponds to the share of Bernardo Cavile is also divided into SIX (6) equal parts, that is among Susana Cavile, Castor Cavile, Benedicta Cavile, Simplicia Cavile, Fortunato Cavile represented by his oldest son, Lucio Cavile, and Vevencia Cavile represented by her oldest child Vicenta Navarra.
2 - That the other ONE (1) part which corresponds to the share of Tranquilina Galon is also hereby equally divided into THREE (3) parts, that is among Susana Cavile, Castor Cavile and Benedicta Cavile.
SHARE OF BERNARDO CAVILE
x x x x
That the share of Bernardo Cavile in parcels Tax Declaration Nos. 7421, 7143 and 7956 are sold by the legal heirs to Castor Cavile in consideration of the sum of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY(-) SIX PESOS (
P166.00), Philippine currency, which amount has been received and divided equally among them.x x x x
SHARE OF TRANQUILINA GALON
x x x x
That the share of Tranquilina Galon in parcels Tax Declaration Nos. 7421, 7143 and 7956 are hereby sold by the heirs of said Tranquilina Galon to Castor Cavile in consideration of the sum of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY(-)SIX PESOS (
P166.00), Philippine currency(,) which sum has been received and divided equally among them.That the said heirs of Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon above mentioned hereby agree and accept as it is hereby agreed and accepted all the items and conditions in this DEED OF PARTITION.
IN WITNESS HEREOF we have this 5th day of April, 1937, A.D., sign our names below in the Municipality of Tolong, Province of Oriental Negros, Philippine Islands. (Folder 2, Index of Exhibits, Exhibits 1 to 1-c.)
24 TSN, 20 July 1994, pp. 9-10.
25 Folder 2, Index of Exhibits, Exhibits 2 to 2-e.
26 TSN, 24 April 1995, pp. 10-12.
27 Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. – The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.
28 Parel v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556, 19 April 2006, 487 SCRA 405, 416.
29 Go v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 883, 890-891 (2001).
30 Azana v. Lumbo, G.R. No. 157593, 22 March 2007, 518 SCRA 707, 718-719.
31 Id. at 719.
32 Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 397 Phil. 799, 810 (2000); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 636, 642-643 (1996).
33 Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Angeles, 439 Phil. 349, 357 (2002).
34 Public Land Act.
35 See Maninang v. Consolacion, 12 Phil. 342, 349 (1908).
36 See Heirs of Sanjorjo v. Heirs of Quijano, G.R. No. 140457, 19 January 2005, 449 SCRA 15, 27.
37 Vital v. Anore, 90 Phil. 855, 858-859 (1952).
38 Crisologo v. Court of Appeals, 160-A Phil. 1085, 1093-1094 (1975).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172671 April 16, 2009
MARISSA R. UNCHUAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J.P. LOZADA, ANITA LOZADA and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review are the Decision1 dated February 23, 2006 and Resolution2 dated April 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 73829. The appellate court had affirmed with modification the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 10 reinstating its Decision4 dated June 9, 1997.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Sisters Anita Lozada Slaughter and Peregrina Lozada Saribay were the registered co-owners of Lot Nos. 898-A-3 and 898-A-4 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 532585 and 532576 in Cebu City.
The sisters, who were based in the United States, sold the lots to their nephew Antonio J.P. Lozada (Antonio) under a Deed of Sale7 dated March 11, 1994. Armed with a Special Power of Attorney8 from Anita, Peregrina went to the house of their brother, Dr. Antonio Lozada (Dr. Lozada), located at 4356 Faculty Avenue, Long Beach California.9 Dr. Lozada agreed to advance the purchase price of US$367,000 or P10,000,000 for Antonio, his nephew. The Deed of Sale was later notarized and authenticated at the Philippine Consul’s Office. Dr. Lozada then forwarded the deed, special power of attorney, and owners’ copies of the titles to Antonio in the Philippines. Upon receipt of said documents, the latter recorded the sale with the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Accordingly, TCT Nos. 12832210 and 12832311 were issued in the name of Antonio Lozada.
Pending registration of the deed, petitioner Marissa R. Unchuan caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the lots. Marissa claimed that Anita donated an undivided share in the lots to her under an unregistered Deed of Donation12 dated February 4, 1987.
Antonio and Anita brought a case against Marissa for quieting of title with application for preliminary injunction and restraining order. Marissa for her part, filed an action to declare the Deed of Sale void and to cancel TCT Nos. 128322 and 128323. On motion, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
At the trial, respondents presented a notarized and duly authenticated sworn statement, and a videotape where Anita denied having donated land in favor of Marissa. Dr. Lozada testified that he agreed to advance payment for Antonio in preparation for their plan to form a corporation. The lots are to be eventually infused in the capitalization of Damasa Corporation, where he and Antonio are to have 40% and 60% stake, respectively. Meanwhile, Lourdes G. Vicencio, a witness for respondents confirmed that she had been renting the ground floor of Anita’s house since 1983, and tendering rentals to Antonio.
For her part, Marissa testified that she accompanied Anita to the office of Atty. Cresencio Tomakin for the signing of the Deed of Donation. She allegedly kept it in a safety deposit box but continued to funnel monthly rentals to Peregrina’s account.
A witness for petitioner, one Dr. Cecilia Fuentes, testified on Peregrina’s medical records. According to her interpretation of said records, it was physically impossible for Peregrina to have signed the Deed of Sale on March 11, 1994, when she was reported to be suffering from edema. Peregrina died on April 4, 1994.
In a Decision dated June 9, 1997, RTC Judge Leonardo B. Cañares disposed of the consolidated cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. CEB-16145, to wit:
1. Plaintiff Antonio J.P. Lozada is declared the absolute owner of the properties in question;
2. The Deed of Donation (Exh. "9") is declared null and void, and Defendant Marissa R. Unchuan is directed to surrender the original thereof to the Court for cancellation;
3. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is ordered to cancel the annotations of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim of defendant Marissa R. Unchuan on TCT Nos. 53257 and 53258 and on such all other certificates of title issued in lieu of the aforementioned certificates of title;
4. Defendant Marissa R. Unchuan is ordered to pay Antonio J.P. Lozada and Anita Lozada Slaughter the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages; exemplary damages of P50,000.00; P50,000.00 for litigation expenses and attorney’s fees of P50,000.00; and
5. The counterclaims of defendant Marissa R. Unchuan [are] DISMISSED.
In Civil Case No. CEB-16159, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
In both cases, Marissa R. Unchuan is ordered to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
On motion for reconsideration by petitioner, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 10, with Hon. Jesus S. dela Peña as Acting Judge, issued an Order14 dated April 5, 1999. Said order declared the Deed of Sale void, ordered the cancellation of the new TCTs in Antonio’s name, and directed Antonio to pay Marissa P200,000 as moral damages, P100,000 as exemplary damages, P100,000 attorney’s fees and P50,000 for expenses of litigation. The trial court also declared the Deed of Donation in favor of Marissa valid. The RTC gave credence to the medical records of Peregrina.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. On July 6, 2000, now with Hon. Soliver C. Peras, as Presiding Judge, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 10, reinstated the Decision dated June 9, 1997, but with the modification that the award of damages, litigation expenses and attorney’s fees were disallowed.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 23, 2006 the appellate court affirmed with modification the July 6, 2000 Order of the RTC. It, however, restored the award of P50,000 attorney’s fees and P50,000 litigation expenses to respondents.
Thus, the instant petition which raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND VIOLATED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT FAILED TO RESOLVE PETITIONER’S THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR.
II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY AND SHOULD REVIEW THE CONFLICTING FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN ITS OWN DECISION AND RESOLUTIONS ON THE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION, AND THAT OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.
III.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S CASE IS BARRED BY LACHES.
IV.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER IS VOID.
V.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT ANITA LOZADA’S VIDEOTAPED STATEMENT IS HEARSAY.15
Simply stated, the issues in this appeal are: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the Decision of the RTC which declared Antonio J.P. Lozada the absolute owner of the questioned properties; (2) Whether the Court of Appeals violated petitioner’s right to due process; and (3) Whether petitioner’s case is barred by laches.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court violated her right to due process when it did not rule on the validity of the sale between the sisters Lozada and their nephew, Antonio. Marissa finds it anomalous that Dr. Lozada, an American citizen, had paid the lots for Antonio. Thus, she accuses the latter of being a mere dummy of the former. Petitioner begs the Court to review the conflicting factual findings of the trial and appellate courts on Peregrina’s medical condition on March 11, 1994 and Dr. Lozada’s financial capacity to advance payment for Antonio. Likewise, petitioner assails the ruling of the Court of Appeals which nullified the donation in her favor and declared her case barred by laches. Petitioner finally challenges the admissibility of the videotaped statement of Anita who was not presented as a witness.
On their part, respondents pray for the dismissal of the petition for petitioner’s failure to furnish the Register of Deeds of Cebu City with a copy thereof in violation of Sections 316 and 4,17 Rule 45 of the Rules. In addition, they aver that Peregrina’s unauthenticated medical records were merely falsified to make it appear that she was confined in the hospital on the day of the sale. Further, respondents question the credibility of Dr. Fuentes who was neither presented in court as an expert witness18 nor professionally involved in Peregrina’s medical care.
Further, respondents impugn the validity of the Deed of Donation in favor of Marissa. They assert that the Court of Appeals did not violate petitioner’s right to due process inasmuch as it resolved collectively all the factual and legal issues on the validity of the sale.
Faithful adherence to Section 14,19 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.20
In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterates the rule that a notarized and authenticated deed of sale enjoys the presumption of regularity, and is admissible without further proof of due execution. On the basis thereof, it declared Antonio a buyer in good faith and for value, despite petitioner’s contention that the sale violates public policy. While it is a part of the right of appellant to urge that the decision should directly meet the issues presented for resolution,21 mere failure by the appellate court to specify in its decision all contentious issues raised by the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe appellant’s contentions is not sufficient to hold the appellate court’s decision contrary to the requirements of the law22 and the Constitution.23 So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary findings of facts to warrant its conclusions, we cannot declare said court in error if it withheld "any specific findings of fact with respect to the evidence for the defense."24 We will abide by the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed,25 and all matters within an issue in a case were laid down before the court and were passed upon by it.26
In this case, we find nothing to show that the sale between the sisters Lozada and their nephew Antonio violated the public policy prohibiting aliens from owning lands in the Philippines. Even as Dr. Lozada advanced the money for the payment of Antonio’s share, at no point were the lots registered in Dr. Lozada’s name. Nor was it contemplated that the lots be under his control for they are actually to be included as capital of Damasa Corporation. According to their agreement, Antonio and Dr. Lozada are to hold 60% and 40% of the shares in said corporation, respectively. Under Republic Act No. 7042,27 particularly Section 3,28 a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least 60% of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines, is considered a Philippine National. As such, the corporation may acquire disposable lands in the Philippines. Neither did petitioner present proof to belie Antonio’s capacity to pay for the lots subjects of this case.
Petitioner, likewise, calls on the Court to ascertain Peregrina’s physical ability to execute the Deed of Sale on March 11, 1994. This essentially necessitates a calibration of facts, which is not the function of this Court.29 Nevertheless, we have sifted through the Decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals but found no reason to overturn their factual findings. Both the trial court and appellate court noted the lack of substantial evidence to establish total impossibility for Peregrina to execute the Deed of Sale.
In support of its contentions, petitioner submits a copy of Peregrina’s medical records to show that she was confined at the Martin Luther Hospital from February 27, 1994 until she died on April 4, 1994. However, a Certification30 from Randy E. Rice, Manager for the Health Information Management of the hospital undermines the authenticity of said medical records. In the certification, Rice denied having certified or having mailed copies of Peregrina’s medical records to the Philippines. As a rule, a document to be admissible in evidence, should be previously authenticated, that is, its due execution or genuineness should be first shown.31 Accordingly, the unauthenticated medical records were excluded from the evidence. Even assuming that Peregrina was confined in the cited hospital, the Deed of Sale was executed on March 11, 1994, a month before Peregrina reportedly succumbed to Hepato Renal Failure caused by Septicemia due to Myflodysplastic Syndrome.32 Nothing in the records appears to show that Peregrina was so incapacitated as to prevent her from executing the Deed of Sale. Quite the contrary, the records reveal that close to the date of the sale, specifically on March 9, 1994, Peregrina was even able to issue checks33 to pay for her attorney’s professional fees and her own hospital bills. At no point in the course of the trial did petitioner dispute this revelation.
Now, as to the validity of the donation, the provision of Article 749 of the Civil Code is in point:
art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
When the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute and indispensable.34 Here, the Deed of Donation does not appear to be duly notarized. In page three of the deed, the stamped name of Cresencio Tomakin appears above the words Notary Public until December 31, 1983 but below it were the typewritten words Notary Public until December 31, 1987. A closer examination of the document further reveals that the number 7 in 1987 and Series of 1987 were merely superimposed.35 This was confirmed by petitioner’s nephew Richard Unchuan who testified that he saw petitioner’s husband write 7 over 1983 to make it appear that the deed was notarized in 1987. Moreover, a Certification36 from Clerk of Court Jeoffrey S. Joaquino of the Notarial Records Division disclosed that the Deed of Donation purportedly identified in Book No. 4, Document No. 48, and Page No. 35 Series of 1987 was not reported and filed with said office. Pertinent to this, the Rules require a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, to account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall, as in this case, not be admissible in evidence.371avvphi1
Remarkably, the lands described in the Deed of Donation are covered by TCT Nos. 7364538 and 73646,39 both of which had been previously cancelled by an Order40 dated April 8, 1981 in LRC Record No. 5988. We find it equally puzzling that on August 10, 1987, or six months after Anita supposedly donated her undivided share in the lots to petitioner, the Unchuan Development Corporation, which was represented by petitioner’s husband, filed suit to compel the Lozada sisters to surrender their titles by virtue of a sale. The sum of all the circumstances in this case calls for no other conclusion than that the Deed of Donation allegedly in favor of petitioner is void. Having said that, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the issue of laches as the execution of the deed created no right from which to reckon delay in making any claim of rights under the instrument.
Finally, we note that petitioner faults the appellate court for not excluding the videotaped statement of Anita as hearsay evidence. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath.41 It is a hornbook doctrine that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its maker did not take the witness stand.42 Verily, the sworn statement of Anita was of this kind because she did not appear in court to affirm her averments therein. Yet, a more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party;43 the videotaped statement of Anita appears to belong to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay.44 Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declaration against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declaration against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.45 Thus, a man’s acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not.46 However, as a further qualification, object evidence, such as the videotape in this case, must be authenticated by a special testimony showing that it was a faithful reproduction.47 Lacking this, we are constrained to exclude as evidence the videotaped statement of Anita. Even so, this does not detract from our conclusion concerning petitioner’s failure to prove, by preponderant evidence, any right to the lands subject of this case.
Anent the award of moral damages in favor of respondents, we find no factual and legal basis therefor. Moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of a wrongful act or omission or fraud or bad faith. When the action is filed in good faith there should be no penalty on the right to litigate. One may have erred, but error alone is not a ground for moral damages.48 The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondents actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof.49 As exemplary damages can be awarded only after the claimant has shown entitlement to moral damages,50 neither can it be granted in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 23, 2006, and Resolution dated April 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 73829 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The awards of moral damages and exemplary damages in favor of respondents are deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
| DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice | PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 35-51. Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, with Associate Justices Enrico A. Lanzanas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. concurring.
2 Id. at 62-63.
3 Id. at 173-176. Dated July 6, 2000. Penned by Judge Soliver C. Peras.
4 Id. at 95-155. Penned by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares.
5 Records, Vol. I, pp. 355-358.
6 Id. at 351-354.
7 Id. at 347-350.
8 Records, Vol. II, pp. 187-188.
9 TSN, August 19, 1996, p. 8.
10 Records, Vol. I, p. 278.
11 Id. at 279.
12 Id. at 344-346.
13 Rollo, pp. 154-155.
14 Id. at 156-172.
15 Id. at 235-236.
16 SEC. 3. Docket and other lawful fees; proof of service of petition.— Unless he has theretofore done so, the petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court of the Supreme Court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition. Proof of service of a copy thereof on the lower court concerned and on the adverse party shall be submitted together with the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
17 SEC. 4. Contents of petition.— The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42.
18 TSN, April 25, 1996, p. 6.
19 Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
20 Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 202, 219.
21 Id. at 218.
22 Rules of Court, Rule 36, Sec. 1
SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders.—A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
23 J. G. Bernas, Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government Notes and Cases Part I 632 (3rd ed., 2005).
24 Id.
25 Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec.3, par. (m).
26 Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec.3, par. (o).
27 An Act to Promote Foreign Investments, Prescribe the Procedures for Registering Enterprises Doing Business in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes, approved on June 13, 1991.
28 sec. 3. Definitions.—As used in this Act:
(a) the term "Philippine National" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a domestic partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines….
29 Twin Towers Condominium Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123552, February 27, 2003, 398 SCRA 203, 222.
30 Records, Vol. II, pp. 375-376.
31 S. A.F. Apostol, Essentials of Evidence 438 (1991).
32 Records, Vol. II, p. 320.
33 Id. at 238-241.
34 Civil Code, Art. 1356.
35 Records, Vol. II, p. 357.
36 Id. at 248.
37 Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sec. 31.
38 Records, Vol. I, p. 295.
39 Id. at 296.
40 Id. at 408-418.
41 Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & 146738, April 3, 2001, 356 SCRA 108, 128.
42 People v. Quidato, Jr., G.R. No. 117401, October 1, 1998, 297 SCRA 1, 8.
43 Estrada v. Desierto, supra at 131.
44 Id.
45 II F. D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 491 (6th Revised ed. 1989).
46 United States v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583 (1912).
47 S. A.F. Apostol, Essentials of Evidence 63 (1991).
48 Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Mendez, No. L-66419, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 593, 601.
49 Quezon City Government v. Dacara, G.R. No. 150304, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 243, 256.
50 Id. at 257.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. NO. 146556 April 19, 2006
DANILO L. PAREL, Petitioner,
vs.
SIMEON B. PRUDENCIO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Danilo Parel (petitioner) which seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated March 31, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Baguio, in Civil Case No. 2493-R, a case for recovery of possession and damages. Also assailed is CA Resolution2 dated November 28, 2000.
On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio (respondent) filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner with the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of a two-storey residential house located at No. 61 Forbes Park National Reservation near Department of Public Service (DPS) compound, Baguio City; such property was constructed solely from his own funds and declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 47048; he commenced the construction of said house in 1972 until its completion three years later; when the second floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he allowed petitioner’s parents, Florentino (now deceased) and Susan Parel, to move therein and occupy the second floor while the construction of the ground floor was on-going to supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials; when the construction of the second floor was finished in 1975, respondent allowed petitioner’s parents and children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat; it was done out of sheer magnanimity as petitioner’s parents have no house of their own and since respondent’s wife is the older sister of Florentino, petitioner’s father; in November 1985, respondent wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as the former was due for retirement and he needed the place to which petitioner’s parents heeded when they migrated to U.S. in 1986; however, without respondent’s knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor of respondent’s house; petitioner’s refusal to vacate the house despite repeated demands prompted respondent to file the instant action for recovery of possession. Respondent also asked petitioner for a monthly rental of P3,000.00 from April 1988 and every month thereafter until the latter vacates the said premises and surrender possession thereof; and for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging that: his parents are the co-owners of the said residential house, i.e., the upper story belongs to respondent while the ground floor pertains to petitioner’s parents; he is occupying the ground floor upon the instruction of his father, Florentino, with respondent’s full knowledge; his parents spent their own resources in improving and constructing the said two-storey house as co-owners thereof; the late Florentino was an awardee of the land on which the house stands and as a co-owner of the house, he occupied the ground floor thereof; the demand to vacate was respondent’s attempt to deprive petitioner’s parents of their rights as co-owner of the said house; that respondent had filed ejectment case as well as criminal cases against them involving the subject house which were all dismissed. Petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and prayed for damages and attorney’s fees.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision3 dated December 15, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby declares that the house erected at No. 61 DPS Compound, Baguio City is owned in common by the late Florentino Parel and herein plaintiff Simeon Prudencio and as such the plaintiff cannot evict the defendant as heirs of the deceased Florentino Parel from said property, nor to recover said premises from herein defendant.
Likewise, the plaintiff is ordered to:
(a) pay the defendant in the total sum of P20,000.00 for moral and actual damages;
(b) pay the defendant P20,000.00 in Attorney’s fees and P3,300.00 in appearance fees;
(c) pay the costs of this suit.4
The RTC found the following matters as conclusive: that petitioner’s father was an allocatee of the land on which the subject house was erected, as one of the lowly-paid government employees at that time when then Mayor Luis Lardizabal gave them the chance to construct their own house on said reservation; that respondent failed to show proof of any contract, written or oral, express or implied, that the late Florentino and his family stayed on the house not as co-owners but as mere lessees, nor any other proof that would clearly establish his sole ownership of the house; and, that the late Florentino was the one who gathered the laborers for the construction of the house and paid their salaries. Thus, the RTC ruled that co-ownership existed between respondent and petitioner’s father, Florentino.
The RTC concluded that respondent and petitioner’s father agreed to contribute their money to complete the house; that since the land on which said house was erected has been allocated to petitioner’s father, the parties had the understanding that once the house is completed, petitioner’s father could keep the ground floor while respondent the second floor; the trial court questioned the fact that it was only after 15 years that respondent asserted his claim of sole ownership of the subject house; respondent failed to disprove that petitioner’s father contributed his own funds to finance the construction of the house; that respondent did not question (1) the fact that it was the deceased Florentino who administered the construction of the house as well as the one who supplied the materials; and (2) the fact that the land was in Florentino’s possession created the impression that the house indeed is jointly owned by respondent and Florentino.
The RTC did not give credence to the tax declaration as well as the several documents showing the City Assessor’s assessment of the property all in respondent’s name since tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership. It rejected the affidavit executed by Florentino declaring the house as owned by respondent saying that the affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine the purpose of its execution; that it was executed because of an advisement addressed to the late Florentino by the City Treasurer concerning the property’s tax assessment and Florentino, thought then that it should be the respondent who should pay the taxes; and that the affidavit cannot be accepted for being hearsay.
Aggrieved by such decision, respondent appealed to the CA. In a Decision dated March 31, 2000, the CA reversed the trial court and declared respondent as the sole owner of the subject house and ordered petitioner to surrender possession of the ground floor thereof to respondent immediately. It also ordered petitioner to pay respondent a monthly rental of P2,000.00 for use or occupancy thereof from April 1988 until the former actually vacates the same and the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
The CA found as meritorious respondent’s contention that since petitioner failed to formally offer in evidence any documentary evidence, there is nothing to refute the evidence offered by respondent. It ruled that the trial court’s statement that "defendants’ occupancy of the house is due to a special power of attorney executed by his parents most specially the deceased Florentino Parel who is in fact a co-owner of said building" is wanting of any concrete evidence on record; that said power of attorney was never offered, hence, could not be referred to as petitioner’s evidence to support his claim; that except for the bare testimonies of Candelario Regua, the carpenter-foreman, that it was Florentino who constructed the house and Corazon Garcia, the former barangay captain, who testified that the lot was allocated to petitioner’s father, there was no supporting document which would sufficiently establish factual bases for the trial court’s conclusion; and that the rule on offer of evidence is mandatory.
The CA found the affidavit dated September 24, 1973 of Florentino, petitioner’s father, stating that he is not the owner of the subject house but respondent, as conclusive proof of respondent’s sole ownership of the subject house as it is a declaration made by Florentino against his interest. It also found the tax declarations and official receipts representing payments of real estate taxes of the questioned property covering the period 1974 to 1992 sufficient to establish respondent’s case which constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 28, 2000.1avvphil.net
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari with the following Assignment of Errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING RESPONDENT AS THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AT 61 FORBES PARK NATIONAL RESERVATION, NEAR DPS COMPOUND, BAGUIO CITY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CO-OWNERSHIP BETWEEN THE LATE FLORENTINO PAREL AND RESPONDENT;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO SURRENDER POSSESSION OF THE GROUND FLOOR OF THE SUBJECT BUILDING TO RESPONDENT;
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY RESPONDENT
P2,000.00/MONTH FOR USE OR OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT PREMISES FROM APRIL 1988 UNTIL PETITIONER ACTUALLY VACATES THE SAME;4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY TO RESPONDENT
P50,000.00 ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT;5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 5
Petitioner concedes that while his former counsel failed to make a formal offer of his documentary evidence before the trial court and that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, he maintains that the said rule is not absolute, citing the case of Bravo, Jr. v. Borja; 6 that his documentary evidence which were not formally offered in evidence were marked during the presentation of the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses and were part of their testimonies; that these evidence were part of the memorandum filed by him before the trial court on July 12, 1993.
Petitioner insists that even in the absence of the documentary evidence, his testimony as well as that of his witnesses substantiated his claim of co-ownership of the subject house between his late father and respondent as found by the trial court.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in finding the affidavit of petitioner’s father declaring respondent as owner of the subject house as conclusive proof that respondent is the true and only owner of the house since the affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine the purpose for which it was executed.
Petitioner further contends that since he had established his father’s co-ownership of the subject house, respondent has no legal right to eject him from the property; that he could not be compelled to pay rentals for residing in the ground floor of the subject house; that respondent should bear his own expenses and be adjudged liable for damages which petitioner sustained for being constrained to litigate.
The principal issue for resolution is whether petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his father was a co-owner of the subject two-storey residential house.
The issue raised by petitioner is mainly factual in nature. In general, only questions of law are appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However, considering that the findings of the RTC and CA are contradictory, the review of the case is in order.7
We agree with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint for recovery of possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof. Respondent presented the affidavit dated September 24, 1973 executed by Florentino and sworn to before the Assistant City Assessor of Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca, which reads:
I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age, employee, and residing at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, after having been sworn to according to law depose and say:
That he is the occupant of a residential building located at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, Baguio City which is the subject of an advicement addressed to him emanating from the Office of the City Assessor, Baguio City, for assessment and declaration for taxation purposes;
That I am not the owner of the building in question;
That the building in question is owned by Mr. Simeon B. Prudencio who is presently residing at 55 Hyacinth, Roxas District, Quezon City.
Further, affiant say not.8 (Underscoring supplied)
Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. – The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.
The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.9
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner’s father and had adequate knowledge with respect to the subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s interests as his heirs.10 A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.11 Notably, during Florentino’s lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said affidavit until 1989, the year of his death, there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by respondent against him (Florentino) and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing that petitioner entered the house against the latter’s will and held that the remedy of respondent was to file an action for ejectment;12 and even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that respondent’s action should be an accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.13
Moreover, the building plan of the residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in the name of respondent and his wife. It was established during petitioner’s cross-examination that the existing structure of the two-storey house was in accordance with said building plan.14
Notably, respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house declared under his name since 1974.15 In fact, petitioner during his cross-examination admitted that there was no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared any portion of the house in their name.16
We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.17 The house which petitioner claims to be co-owned by his late father had been consistently declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent, and this fact, taken with the other circumstances above-mentioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that respondent is the sole owner of the house subject matter of the litigation.
Respondent having established his claim of exclusive ownership of the subject property, it was incumbent upon petitioner to contravene respondent’s claim. The burden of evidence shifted to petitioner to prove that his father was a co-owner of the subject house.
We held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, to wit:18
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.19
In this case, the records show that although petitioner’s counsel asked that he be allowed to offer his documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the same.20 Thus, the CA did not consider the documentary evidence presented by petitioner. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit.21 It is a settled rule that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.22
Petitioner insists that although his documentary evidence were not formally offered, the same were marked during the presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus it can properly be taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja.23
Such reliance is misplaced. In Bravo Jr., we allowed evidence on minority by admitting the certified true copy of the birth certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was not formally offered in evidence. This was due to the fact that the birth certificate was properly filed in support of a motion for bail to prove petitioner’s minority which was never challenged by the prosecution and it already formed part of the records of the case. The rule referred to in the Bravo case was Section 7 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 7. Evidence on motion.- When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.
and not Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which is the one applicable to the present case.
Even assuming arguendo that the documentary evidence of petitioner should be considered in his favor, the evidence showing that respondent had filed civil and criminal cases against petitioner which were dismissed as well as the alleged Special Power of Attorney of petitioner’s parents whereby they authorized petitioner to stay in the ground floor of the house, did not establish co-ownership of Florentino and respondent of the subject house.
The testimonies of petitioner and his witnesses failed to show that the subject house is co-owned by petitioner’s father and respondent.
Candelario Regua merely testified that he was hired by petitioner’s father, Florentino, to construct the residential building in 1972;24 that he listed the materials to be used for the construction which was purchased by Florentino;25 that he and his men received their salaries every Saturday and Wednesday from Florentino or his wife, respectively;26 that he had not met nor seen respondent during the whole time the construction was on-going.27 On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he cannot tell where the money to buy the materials used in the construction came from.28
Corazon Garcia merely testified that Florentino started building the house when he was allocated a lot at DPS compound, that she knew Florentino constructed the subject house29 and never knew respondent. 30 The bare allegation that Florentino was allocated a lot is not sufficient to overcome Florentino’s own affidavit naming respondent as the owner of the subject house.
Petitioner himself testified that it was his father who saw the progress of the construction and purchased the materials to be used; 31 and as a young boy he would follow-up some deliveries upon order of his father 32 and never saw respondent in the construction site. The fact that not one of the witnesses saw respondent during the construction of the said house does not establish that petitioner’s father and respondent co-owned the house.
We also find that the CA did not err in ordering petitioner to pay respondent being the sole owner of the subject house a monthly rental of P2,000.00 from April 1988, the date of the extra-judicial demand, until petitioner actually vacates the subject house. Although the CA made no ratiocination as to how it arrived at the amount of P2,000.00 for the monthly rental, we find the same to be a reasonable compensation for the use of the ground floor of the subject house which consists of a living room, a dining room, a kitchen and three bedrooms. The rental value refers to the value as ascertained by proof of what the property would rent or by evidence of other facts from which the fair rental value may be determined. 33
We likewise affirm the CA’s award of attorney’s fees in favor of respondent. Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows the recovery of attorney’s fees in cases when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest 34 and in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered 35 which are both shown in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2000 and its Resolution dated November 28, 2000 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
| CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice | ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Asscociate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Elvi John S. Asuncion; rollo, pp. 32-41.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Elvi John S. Asuncion; Id. at 60-61.
3 Penned by Judge Pastor V. de Guzman, Jr.; Id. at 81-84.
4 Id. at 84.
5 Id. at 15-16.
6 G.R. No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 466.
7 Heirs of Miguel Franco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123924, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 60, 67. Among the exceptional circumstances that would compel the Supreme Court to review the findings of fact of the lower courts is when the findings of fact are conflicting. See e.g., Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 226 Phil. Rep. 496, 510 (1986).
8 Records, p. 154.
9 Evidence, Ricardo J. Francisco, Vol. VII, Part I, 1997 edition, p. 554, citing 20 Am. Jur. 468.
10 Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. L-25788, April 30, 1980, 97 SCRA 373, 380.
11 Supra note 7, citing Noda v. Cruz-Arnaldo, G.R. No. L-57322, June 22, 1987, 151 SCRA 227.
12 Records, p. 199.
13 Id. at pp. 346-347.
14 TSN, March 10, 1993, pp.30-34.
15 Records, p. 167 to 181; Exhibits " N," "N-1" to " N-18".
16 TSN, April 21, 1993, pp. 12-13.
17 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68946, May 22, 1992, 209 SCRA 214, 227.
18 350 Phil. 138 (1998).
19 Id. at 173.
20 Records, p. 318.
21 Francisco, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. VI, 1980 edition, p. 123, citing U.S . v. Solana, 33 Phil. 582 (1916) and Dayrit v. Gonzalez, 7 Phil. 182 (1906).
22 People v. Gecomo, 324 Phil. 297, 318 (1996); Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 51, 55 (1991).
23 Supra note 6.
24 TSN, February 24, 1993, pp. 9-11.
25 Id. at 11
26 Id. at 12.
27 Id. at 12-14.
28 Id. at 23.
29 TSN, March 10, 1993, pp. 10-11.
30 Id. at 13.
31 Id. at 29.
32 Id.
33 Asian Transmission Corporation v. Canlubang Sugar Estates, G.R. No. 142383, August 29, 2003, 410 SCRA 202, 223 citing Herpolsheimer v. Christopher, 111 N.W. 359 (1907).
34 Art. 2208 (2).
35 Art. 2208 (11).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 137944 April 6, 2000FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUEÑA and RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the property for which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they may become the basis of a claim for ownership. By acquisitive prescription, possession in the concept of owner — public, adverse, peaceful and uninterrupted — may be converted to ownership. On the other hand, mere possession and occupation of land cannot ripen into ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the March 19, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 43423. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: 3
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial court appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered declaring . . . Honorata Mendoza Bolante the rightful owner and possessor of the parcel of land which is the subject of this appeal.
The Facts
The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in Barangay Bangad, Binangonan, Province of Rizal, having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 26-0027. The undisputed antecedents of this case are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows: 4
The facts not disputed revealed that prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930. [Petitioners] were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is the present occupant of the land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975, [respondent] and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of [petitioners], during the cadastral survey had a dispute on [the] ownership of the land.1âwphi1.nêt
During the pre-trial conference, parties stipulated the following facts:
1) The land subject of the case was formerly declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza prior to 1954 but is now declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza.
2) The parties agree[d] as to the identity of the land subject of instant case.
3) [Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza while the [respondent] is the only daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza.
4) Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza [were] brothers, now deceased.
5) During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15, 1979 there was already a dispute between Honorata M. Bolante and Miguel Mendoza, brother of [petitioners].
6) [Respondent was] occupying the property in question.
The only issue involved [was] who [was] the lawful owner and possessor of the land subject of the case.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of [petitioners], the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered for the [petitioners] and against the [respondent]:
1. Declaring that the parcel of land situated in Bangad, Binangonan, Rizal covered by tax declaration no. 26-0027 in the name of Margarito Mendoza belong to his heirs, the [petitioners] herein;
2. Ordering [respondent] to vacate the property subject of the case and deliver possession thereof to the heirs of Margarito Mendoza.
3. Ordering the [respondent] to indemnify the [petitioners] in the sum of P10,000.00, as actual damages.
4. Ordering the [respondent] to pay the costs.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit allegedly signed by the respondent and her mother had not been sufficiently established. The notary public or anyone else who had witnessed the execution of the affidavit was not presented. No expert testimony or competent witness ever attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures.
The CA further ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to overcome the denial of respondent and her mother. The former testified that the latter, never having attended school, could neither read nor write. Respondent also said that she had never been called "Leonor," which was how she was referred to in the affidavit.
Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioners' tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison with respondent's proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code.
Hence, this Petition. 5
Issues
Insisting that they are the rightful owners of the disputed land, the petitioners allege that the CA committed these reversible errors: 6
1. . . . [I]n not considering the affidavit as an exception to the general rule that an affidavit is classified as hearsay evidence, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand;
2. . . . [I]n holding that respondent has been in actual and physical possession, coupled with . . . exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985, which are evidence of the best kind of circumstance proving the claim of the title of ownership and enjoys the presumption of preferred possessor.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Admissibility of the Affidavit
Petitioners dispute the CA's ruling that the affidavit was not the best evidence of their father's ownership of the disputed land, because the "affiant was not placed on the witness stand." They contend that it was unnecessary to present a witness to establish the authenticity of the affidavit because it was a declaration against respondent's interest and was an ancient document. As a declaration against interest, it was an exception to the hearsay rule. As a necessary and trustworthy document, it was admissible in evidence. And because it was executed on March 24, 1953, it was a self-authenticating ancient document.
We quote below the pertinent portion of the appellate court's ruling: 7
While it is true that the affidavit was signed and subscribed before a notary public, the general rule is that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence, unless affiants are placed on the witness stand (People's Bank and Trust Company vs. Leonidas, 207 SCRA 164). Affidavits are not considered the best evidence, if affiants are available as witnesses (Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 587). The due execution of the affidavit was not sufficiently established. The notary public or others who saw that the document was signed or at least [could] confirm its recitals [were] not presented. There was no expert testimony or competent witness who attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures. Worse, [respondent] denied the genuineness of her signature and that of her mother . . . [Respondent] testified that her mother was an illiterate and as far as she knew her mother could not write because she had not attended school (p. 7, ibid). Her testimony was corroborated by Ma. Sales Bolante Basa, who said the [respondent's] mother was illiterate.
The petitioners’ allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered as authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved first. 8 And before a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead, insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable the existence of any motive to falsify. 9
In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is not admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness. 10 Such declarant should be confronted with the statement against interest as a prior inconsistent statement.
The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An ancient document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. 11 It must on its face appear to be genuine. The petitioners herein failed, however, to explain how the purported signature of Eduarda Apiado could have been affixed to the subject affidavit if, according to the witness, she was an illiterate woman who never had any formal schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity.
Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Second Issue:
Preference of Possession
The CA ruled that the respondent was the preferred possessor under Article 538 of the Civil Code because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985. Petitioners dispute this ruling. They contend that she came into possession through force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code.
We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not lose legal possession because possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. 12 To all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal possessor.13 Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover such possession. 14
However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the respondent. Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners' father and brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse possession of the land.
Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the respondent's father (Sinforoso), who was the brother of petitioners' father (Margarito), as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 26425. 15 When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time, respondent and her mother continued residing on the lot.
When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948. 16 Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 17 and paid its realty taxes beginning 1952. 18 When he died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found by the CA, the respondent and her mother were living on the land, which was being tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was physically ousted by the respondent. 19
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
Third Issue:
Possession of Better Right
Finally, the petitioners challenge the CA ruling that "actual and physical coupled with the exclusive and continuous possession [by respondent] of the land since 1985" proved her ownership of the disputed land. The respondent argues that she was legally presumed to possess the subject land with a just title since she possessed it in the concept of owner. Under Article 541 of the Code, she could not be obliged to show or prove such title.
The respondent's contention is untenable. The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven. 20 That is, one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision, be restored thereto by the means established by law. 21 Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case should be established in one of the ways provided by law.
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the claimants has proven acquisitive prescription. 22
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years.23 Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood. 24
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner — public, peaceful, and uninterrupted 25 — had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription. 26
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. 27 Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true owner, 28 occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985), 29 this supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.
We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the disputed land was established before the trial court through the series of tax declarations and receipts issued in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder's adverse claim against the state and other interested parties. 30
However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. 31 At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. 32 In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.33 In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 30-39.
2 Seventh Division composed of JJ Mariano M. Umali (ponente); Fermin A. Martin Jr. (Division chairman) and Romeo J. Callejo Sr. (member), both concurring.
3 CA Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 38.
4 CA Decision, pp. 2-5; rollo, pp. 31-34.
5 This case was deemed submitted for decision on November 29, 1999, upon simultaneous receipt by this Court of the parties' Memoranda. Petitioners' Memorandum was signed by Atty. Romeo M. Flores while that of respondent was signed by Attys. Arceli A. Rubin and Rogel F. Quijano.
6 Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 85-86.
7 CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 34.
8 Rule 132, Sec. 20, Rules of Court.
9 Rule 130, Sec. 38, Rules of Court; Fuentes Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 430, 435, February 9, 1996; People v. Bernal, 274 SCRA 197, 203, June 19, 1997.
10 Lichauco v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 84 Phil. 330, 342, August 23, 1949.
11 Rule 132, Sec. 21, Rules of Court; Heirs of Salud Dizon Salamat v. Tamayo, 298 SCRA 313, 318, October 30, 1998; and Heirs of Demetria Lacsa v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 234, 242, May 20, 1991.
12 Art. 536, Civil Code; Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of San Jose, 27 Phil. 571, 575, August 29, 1914.
13 Ayala de Roxas v. Maglonso, 8 Phil. 745, 749, April 27, 1906.
14 Heirs of Placido Miranda v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 368, 379, March 29, 1996.
15 Exhibit "1," RTC Records, p. 94.
16 Exhibit "2," RTC Records, p. 95.
17 Exh. "D," RTC Records, p. 77. Petitioners also submitted Tax Declaration Nos. 10410 for 1965, 13481 for 1974, and 26-0027 for 1985. RTC Records, pp. 78-79 & 57.
18 Exh. "B-17," RTC Records, p. 75. Real Property Tax receipts submitted by the petitioners covered the years 1953-1979. RTC Records, pp. 58-75.
19 CA Decision, p. 8; rollo, p. 37. TSN, November 13, 1992, p. 11.
20 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1992 ed., p. 284; City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227, 231, November 10, 1905; Chan v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737, 745, June 30, 1970; and Perez v. Mendoza, 65 SCRA 480, 490, July 25, 1975.
21 Art. 539, Civil Code.
22 Art. 540 of the Civil Code provides: "Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for acquiring dominion.
23 Art. 1134, Civil Code.
24 Comment, p. 8; rollo, p. 53; TSN, January 4, 1993, p. 3.
25 Art. 1118, Civil Code.
26 Heirs of Miranda v. CA, supra, p. 375.
27 Art. 714, Civil Code.
28 Corporation de PP. Dominicos v. Lazaro, 42 Phil. 119, 122 & 126-127, September 10, 1921.
29 Heirs of Miranda v. CA, supra, p. 368; and Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601, 605, July 31, 1997.
30 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 712, 720, July 12, 1996.
31 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 38, 44, March 11, 1991.
32 Heirs of Vencilao Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 574, 581-582, April 1, 1998; Deiparine v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 668, 675, December 4, 1998; Titong v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 102, 115, March 6, 1998.
33 De Luna v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 276, 280, August 6, 1992.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 111692 February 9, 1996
ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Still professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of mistaken identity, petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder.1
At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair."2 Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.3
Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who autopsied the cadaver of Julieto Malaspina on 24 July 1989, reported that death was due to "stab wound at left lumbar region 1-1/2 in. in length with extracavitation of the small and large intestines."4
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that when the victim was killed he was conversing with him; that he was compelled to run away when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill all those from San Isidro" because "Jonie," the killer, was from that place; that since he was also from San Isidro he sought refuge in his brother's house where he met "Jonie;" that "Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped out and escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay.5
The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner guilty of murder qualified by treachery and imposed on him an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Julieto Malaspina the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as actual damages plus costs.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court; hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred when it held that petitioner was positively and categorically identified as the killer of Malaspina, in affirming the judgment of conviction and in holding petitioner liable for damages to the heirs of the victim.
Petitioner points to an alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok to the effect that they saw petitioner stab Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the testimony of the attending physician that the victim was stabbed on the left lumbar region.
This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material is that Malaspina was stabbed to death and that three (3) prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the knife wielder. It must be stressed that these witnesses had known petitioner for quite some time and never had any personal misunderstanding nor altercation with the latter as to create any suspicion that they were impelled by ill motives to falsely implicate him.
That it was another person who committed the offense is too incredible. No less than petitioner's own witness, Nerio Biscocho who claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner, and "Jonie" Fuentes are one and the same person. Thus -
COURT:
Q Who is this Joni Fuentes and Alejandro Fuentes?
A That Joni Fuentes is the same of that or the accused Alejandro Fuentes. I do not know his real name but he is called as Joni, sir, . . .7
On cross-examination witness Biscocho further admitted that he himself would call petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., as "Joni" or "Jonie" Fuentes, as some of his friends did, but victim Malaspina occasionally called petitioner "Junior".8
Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo testified that on 24 June 1989 while he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed Malaspina in "retaliation;" that he even showed him the knife he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives of the deceased. The following day however he learned that the self-confessed killer was gone and that petitioner had been arrested for a crime he did not commit.9
For his part, Station Commander P/Sgt. Conde, Jr., testified that after the criminal information for murder was filed on 26 July 1989, petitioner met Felicisimo who informed him of the disclosure by Zoilo. Conde then advised Felicisimo that if it was true that it was Zoilo who fatally stabbed Malaspina Felicisimo must persuade Zoilo to surrender. Conde then personally went to Barangay San Isidro to investigate. There he was told by the townsfolk that Zoilo had already fled.10
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.11
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. We are not unaware of People v. Toledo, 12 a 1928 case, where Justice Malcolm writing for the Court endeavored to reexamine the declaration of third parties made contrary to their penal interest. In that case, the protagonists Holgado and Morales engaged in a bolo duel. Morales was killed almost instantly. Holgado who was seriously wounded gave a sworn statement (Exh. 1) before the municipal president declaring that when he and Morales fought there was nobody else present. One (1) month later Holgado died from his wounds. While the Court was agreed that Toledo, who reportedly intervened in the fight and dealt the mortal blow, should be exonerated on reasonable doubt, the members did not reach an accord on the admissibility of Exh. 1. One group would totally disregard Exh. 1 since there was ample testimonial evidence to support an acquittal. The second group considered Exh. 1 as part of the res gestae as it was made on the same morning when the fight occurred. A third group, to which Justice Malcolm belonged, opined that the court below erred in not admitting Exh. 1 as the statement of a fact against penal interest.
For all its attempt to demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the rejection in certain cases of declarations against penal interest, the Toledo case cannot be applied in the instant case which is remarkably different. Consider this factual scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accused-appellant, verbally admitted to the latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate. The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo. Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the admission of such a statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore, "shocking to the sense of justice." 13 Let us assume that the trial court did admit the statement of Zoilo and on that basis acquitted accused-appellant. Let us assume further that Zoilo was subsequently captured and upon being confronted with his admission of guilt readily repudiated the same. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that can bind Zoilo legally to that statement.
But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. 14 For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify. Thus, for this case at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse as explained in Toledo -
The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence.15
The Court of Appeals as well as the trial court correctly determined the crime to be murder qualified by treachery. The suddenness of the attack, without any provocation from the unsuspecting victim, made the stabbing of Malaspina treacherous.16 However, the court a quo erred in imposing an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Since aside from treachery qualifying the crime to murder there is no other modifying circumstance proved, the medium period of the penalty, i.e. reclusion perpetua, should have been imposed on petitioner.17
Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed the crime it is error to hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as actual damages on the basis of the mere testimony of the victim's sister, Angelina Serrano, without any tangible document to support such claim. This is a valid point. in crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.18 To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential that the injured party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. 19 Courts cannot simply, rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.20
The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence on record. We have only the testimony of the victim's elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of Malaspina. 21 However, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be granted.22
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding petitioner ALEJANDRO FUENTES JR. guilty of MURDER and directing him to indemnify the heirs of Julieto Malaspina in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs is AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty imposed should be as it is corrected to reclusion perpetua, and the award of actual damages is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Decision penned by Justice Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., with Justices Oscar M. Herrera and Alfredo J. Lagamon concurring, prom. 28 July 1993; Rollo, pp. 34-39.
2 TSN, 11 July 1991, pp. 9-10.
3 TSN, 18 June 1991, pp. 2-6; 11 July 1991, pp. 8-11; 8 August 1991, pp. 3-5.
4 Exhs. "A" and "B," Records, pp. 69-71; see TSN, 11 July 1991, pp. 2-4.
5 TSN, 3 September 1991, pp. 3-7.
6 Judge Evangeline S. Yuipco presiding; Records, pp. 107-108.
7 TSN, 29 August 1991, pp. 7-8.
8 Id., pp. 13-14.
9 TSN, 29 August 1991, pp. 3-5.
10 Id., 4 September 1991, pp. 2-3.
11 Jones on Evidence, 2nd Ed., Sec. 1164, cited in Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. III, 1990 Ed., p. 554.
12 51 Phil. 825 (1928).
13 Id., p. 836.
14 See Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P. RY. Co., 151 N.W. 852, 862, cited in 20 Am. Jur. 468; People v. Catalino, No. L-25403, 15 March 1968, 22 SCRA 1091, 1107.
15 Id., p. 838.
16 People v. Ronquillo., G.R. No. 96125, 31 August 1995; People v. Loto, G.R. Nos. 114523-24, 5 September 1995.
17 People v. Laspona, G.R. No. 108084, 14 August 1995; People v. Mirabite, G.R. Nos. 111294-95, 7 September 1995.
18 Art. 2202, New Civil Code.
19 Art. 2199, id.
20 People v. Degoma, G.R. Nos. 89404-05, 22 May 1992, 209 SCRA 266; People v. Arguelles, G.R. No. 102539, 17 May 1993, 222 SCRA 166; Dichoso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55613, 10 December 1990, 192 SCRA 169.
21 TSN, 19 June 1991, p. 4.
22 In People v. Wenceslao, G.R. No. 95583, 12 August 1992, 212 SCRA 560, the Court disallowed claim for actual damages, the same being merely based on a typewritten list of expenses submitted by the father of the deceased without any competent proof presented in court.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39528 November 19, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JIMMY MONAGA, JESUS BARRIDO, and BENHUR BANABAN, accused, BENHUR BANABAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
J.T. Barrera & Associates for accused Jimmy Monaga.
Gualberto C. Opong for accused Jesus Barrido.
Clarito Fantillanan for accused-appellant Benhur Banaban.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
The accused Jimmy Monaga, Jesus Barrido, and Benhur Banaban were charged before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo with the crime of Murder committed, as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1972, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the abovenamed accused conspiring, confederating, and working together, taking advantage of their superior strength and number and the right time to better realize their purpose. armed with long barrelled locally made shotguns (pugakhangs), with treachery and evident premeditation and a decided purpose to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one HERMINIO BALDERAS thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds on the different parts of the body which cause his death thereafter. "
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the case, Judge Valerio V. Rovira found the said accused guilty of the offense charged and sentenced "each of them to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify, jointly and severally, Marina Balderas, Enrique Balderas, Erlando Balderas, Wilfredo Balderas, and Herminio Balderas, Jr., the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of Herminio Balderas; the sum of P19,200.00 for loss of income; P10,000.00 for moral damages, and to reimburse them the amount of P2,200.00 for hospitalization, etc., and P500.00 for the coffin, and to pay the costs." Since one Danilo Banaban, who testified for the defense, admitted that he and his late cousin Jessie Demillo, alone, were responsible for the death of Herminio Balderas on the occasion complained of. the Court also ordered the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo to immediately institute a criminal action against the said Danilo Banaban.
From the sentence, the accused appealed to this Court. However, sometime later, the accused Jimmy Monaga and Jesus Barrido withdrew their respective appeals. 1
Under consideration is the appeal of the accused Benhur Banaban.
The inculpatory facts are as follows:
... The spouses Herminio Balderas and Marina Balderas were tenants of Juanita Barrido in her riceland located in Piliwan, Ajuy, Iloilo. As such tenants, the spouses occupied the house of Juanita on her land under tenancy. In 1971, Juanita Barrido-Ledesma, elder sister of Jesus Barrido, and her husband went to Ajuy. Finding the portion of her land occupied by Herminio Balderas neglected, Juanita told the spouses that she would give them P800.00 if they vacate the land and her house. Herminio Balderas refused to vacate unless she would pay sum P3,000.00 or settle the matter in the Court of Agrarian Relations. Jesus Barrido, younger brother of Juanita, on several instances tried to persuade the spouses to vacate the house and land of his elder sister. Herminio refused to vacate the house and land. By use of force or intimidation Jesus Barrido succeeded in driving away the spouses Herminio Balderas and Marina Balderas from the house of his sister, but they continued to occupy the land. Benhur Banaban, also a tenant of Juanita Barrido, lost his female carabao. Benhur and his son Danilo Banaban suspected Herminio Balderas to have stolen it. When they confronted Herminio, he told them that they would get the carabao if they pay him P50.00. The matter was brought to the Barrio Captain and then to the Mayor of Ajuy before whom Herminio Balderas, Benhur Banaban, Barrio Captain Celso Yap appeared. Herminio admitted having asked Benhur P50.00 but he did it in a jest for he was drunk at that time. On January 25. 1972 the carabao was found dead, tied to a tree in the mountain of the barrio of Pedaga. Ajuy. The following morning, January 26, Celso Yap, Benhur Banaban and his son Danilo Banaban went to Mayor Jose Rojas, Jr. of Ajuy and reported what they found. The Mayor sent Pat. Ben Sason to call for Herminio Balderas who came with the policeman. Herminio promised before the mayor that he would pay Benhur Banaban ?400.00 for the carabao on February 1, 1972. Herminio tried to borrow this amount from Jesus Barrido but the latter refused to lend him the amount. Herminio did not pay the P400.00 as promised before the mayor. So the mayor sent his policemen Pat. Ben Sason, Pat. Subanas and Pat. Wilson Paragona accompanied by Jesus Barrido to call for Herminio Balderas, They found him in the store of Norman Alejan in Punta Equi, Culasi, Ajuy, drinking beer with T/Sgt. Nicolas Belicano of the Constabulary. Herminio refused to go with them although they told him that he was under arrest for theft of large cattle, coconut, and for refusing to vacate the house and land of Juanita Batrido. He told T/Sgt. Belicano that if he would go with Jesus Barrido and his companions, fee would be killed by them. T/Sgt. Belicano asked Jesus Barrido for a warrant of arrest. They had none. The sergeant told Jesus Barrido and' his companions not to arrest Hermino for they had no authority to make arrest without any warrant of arrest. That night, Herminio Balderas slept in the house of T/Sgt. Nicolas Belicano in Culasi, Ajuy, Iloilo. At about 8:45 in the evening of February 8, 1972, while Herminio Balderas was walking along the road with his child on his right shoulder, followed by his wife Marina Balderas, he was ambushed, shot and wounded by Jesus Barrido, Benhur Banaban, Danilo Banaban, Jimmy Monaga, and two other unidentified men, near the bodega of Mr. Blancaflor in Piliwan, Ajuy, Iloilo. He was immediately brought to the Iloilo Mission Hospital in the City of Iloilo where Dr. Salvador Aguirre examined him and operated on him for the following injuries; Gunshot wounds -- 8.5 cms. x 9.5 cms. at the left lumbar region (entrance), pellets spread at his side, entering the abdominal cavity, left, passing thru several loops of small and large intestines; the greater curvature of the stomach is severed. (Exh. 'A'). On February 13, 1972, at 11:15 p.m. Herminio Balderas died in the Iloilo Mission Hospital (Exh, 'B), He was survived by his wife, Marina Balderas, and four minor children, namely: Enrique, age 9 years, Erlando, age 8 years, Wilfredo, age 5, and Herminio, Jr., age 2 years old. 2
The defense of the appellant Benhur Banaban is alibi and anchored on the testimony of his son Danilo Banaban that he (Danilo) was the one who shot Herminio Balderas on the night of February 8, 1972, resulting in the latter's death, and that the accused Jimmy Monaga, Jesus Barrido, and Benhur Banaban had nothing to do with the death of the said Herminio Balderas. The appellant, in this appeal, vigorously assails the trial court for not giving weight and credence to the testimony of the said Danilo Banaban although the written admission of Danilo Banaban (Exh. 2-Monaga and Banaban) is a declaration against interest within the purview of Section 32, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court and, hence, more reliable and trustworthy.
The contention is untenable. The rejection by the trial court of the I testimony of Danilo Banaban that he alone is responsible for the death of Herminio Balderas is in accord with the physical facts. Thus, the trial court said:
The Court cannot believe the testimony of Danilo Banaban that now he is the only person who actually shot, wounded and killed Herminio Balderas. According to him, immediately after the incident he surrendered to the Chief of Police of Ajuy in his office. He was right away lodged in jail. There is no competent evidence to prove this claim. He should have produced the book in the office of the Chief of Police showing the record of arrests, the police blotter showing the record of events of February 8 or 9, 1972, where the alleged surrender of Danilo Banaban to the Chief of Police was entered, and the police blotter for "all the days that Danilo Banaban was allegedly confined in the Municipal Jail of Ajuy. Pat. Ben Sason of Ajuy, testifying for the accused Jesus Barrido, said that the death of Herminio Balderas was investigated by the police department of Ajuy, but the person who shot him is not yet known. The Court finds and so holds that Danilo Banaban did not surrender to the police of Ajuy and he was never under detention in the Municipal Jail of Ajuy for the death of Herminio Balderas. 3
Indeed, the assumption of penal responsibility by Danilo Banaban appears to be an afterthought. As pointed out by the Solicitor General:
... Danilo Banaban is the eldest of ten children of appellant Benhur Banaban. The youngest was nine months old at the time he took the stand (pp. 115, 121, Id). He was living with his parents and was under their custody (p. 78, tsn., Oct. 16, 1973). In the ordinary course of events, appellant Benhur Banaban was the breadwinner of his brood and had to eke out an additional income for whatever little education his children could get. It would not be strange, indeed, that Danilo's mother prevailed upon him to take full responsibility of the crime. In clearing his father, Danilo had to include appellant Jimmy Monaga and Jesus Barrido because they were indicted with his father as co-conspirators. Otherwise, things might not augur well for appellant Benhur Banaban. 4
The provisions of Section 32, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court finds no application in the instant case. The said section reads:
Sec. 32. Declaration against interest.—The declaration made by a person deceased, or outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, pecuniary or moral, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.
As the rule provides, the declaration to be submitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, must be that of a person, either deceased, outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify. In the instant case, however, Danilo Banaban was available as a witness and was, in fact, presented in court and testified for the appellant.
The appellant further contends that the trial court erred in convicting him as co-principal in the commission of the offense charged despite the absence of evidence of conspiracy.
The contention is without merit. While there may be no evidence of agreement of direct conspiracy, the unity of purpose and community of design among the appellant and his co-accused in the killing of Herminio Balderas is clearly inferred from the acts of the accused proven by evidence. Thus, Marina Balderas declared that she saw the appellant together with co-accused Jimmy Monaga and Jesus Barrido, and three other persons sitting by the roadside as she and her deceased husband were on their way to the house of Salvador Ballener, where they were staying, after coming from the house of Florenia Aspero. She was able to recognize them because the lights of the tractor inside the bodega of Porfirio Blancaflor were turned on and directed towards the road where the appellant and his companions were seated. Then, when her husband was about 11 brazas from them, the accused Jimmy Monaga shot her husband with a home-made shotgun, commonly known in the locality as a "pugakhang", hitting him in the right side. Then, the accused Jesus Barrido shot her husband in the forearm, also with a "pugakhang", followed by the appellant Benhur Banaban who missed because her husband had run away. 5 Florenia Aspero also declared that five minutes after the deceased Herminio Balderas and Marina Balderas had left her house, she heard three successive gunshots. She went towards the road and saw the appellant Benhur Banaban, Jimmy Monaga, and Jesus Barrido running along the road, coming from the bodega of Porfirio Blancaflor. They were all carrying home-made shotguns. The accused Jimmy Monaga was ahead and when he was abreast of her, Jimmy Monaga asked to buy some cigarettes, but she refused, telling him to go on his way as she heard shouts. She went to the place where the shouts were coming from and saw Herminio Balderas lying on the roadside bleeding. She asked Herminio Balderas what happened and the deceased told her that he was shot by Jimmy Monaga and his companions. 6 She was able to recognize the appellant and his companions when they passed by her because the light of their Petromax lamp reached the roadside. 7 Finally, Dr. Gregorio Parra stated that the deceased suffered injuries caused by shotgun pellets. 8
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether they act through the physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. It is also a settled law that "conspiracies need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished. The very existence of a conspiracy is generally a matter of inference deduced from certain acts of the persons accused, done in pursuance of an apparent criminal or unlawful purpose in common between them. The existence of the agreement, or joint assent of the minds need not be proved directly. 9 Upon the premises, conspiracy had been established in the killing of Herminio Balderas.
The appellant also claims that he and his co-accused were convicted, not on the strength of the prosecution evidence, but on the weakness of their defense.
This contention is, likewise, without merit. The appellant and his co-accused have been positively Identified as the assailants of the deceased Herminio Balderas and there is no convincing proof that the prosecution witnesses had a reason to testify falsely against the appellant. On the other hand, the appellant had a motive to kill the deceased Herminio Balderas. It appears that the carabao of the appellant was taken away by the deceased for ransom and when the carabao died, the deceased promised to pay the appellant the value thereof. However, he failed to fulfill his promise when it came due.
The appellant points out some contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, but they are so inconsequential and miniscule as to impress the Court seriously.
With respect to the alibi of the appellant that he was in Sitio Dulang, Barrio Sto. Rosario, Ajuv, about 4 kilometers away from the scene of the crime, watching the palay of Isaac Cacho and that he learned of the victim's death only the following morning when his wife came and told him that their son Danilo had killed a person, suffice it to state that the appellant was positively Identified as one of the perpetrators of the crime and there is no convincing proof that it was impossible for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
On the whole, the issues raised by the appellant in his appeal involves the credibility of witnesses and the settled longstanding rule, where the issues raised hinge on the credibility of witnesses, is for the appellate tribunal to give due respect to the assessment of the facts made by the lower court, said court having had the opportunity not only of receiving the evidence, but also of observing the witnesses while testifying. This rule should not be overturned unless there is a showing that in making the disputed factual finding, the trial court had overlooked or failed to consider certain facts of weight and importance that could have materially affected the conclusion cached in the case. 10 In the instant case, there is no positive reason that would justify a reversal of the judgment appealed from.
It results that the trial court did not err in finding the appellant Benhur Banaban guilty of the crime of Murder. The appellant, however, is entitled to the mitigating circumstance analogous to, if not the same as, vindication of a grave offense committed by the deceased when the latter took away the carabao of the appellant and held it for ransom, and thereafter, failed to fulfill his promise to pay its value after the carabao had died.
The offense being attended by a mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty is the minimum of that provided for by law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant should be, as he is hereby, sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, with the modification of the penalty imposed upon the appellant as above indicated, the judgment appealed from should be. as it is hereby, AFFIRMED in all other respects. The appellant should pay proportionate part of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I vote to hold the appellant guilty as an accomplice. He should be sentenced to 6 years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eleven years of prision mayor as maximum.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I vote to hold the appellant guilty as an accomplice. He should be sentenced to 6 years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eleven years of prision mayor as maximum.
Footnotes
1 Rollo. p. 223
2 Decision. pp. 13-16.
3 Id, p. 13.
4 pp. 9-10, Brief for the Solicitor General.
5 pp. 23-26, t.s.n. of Feb. 16, 1973.
6 pp. 62-64, t.s.n. of March 16, 1973, pp.
7 69-70, Id.
8 p. t.s.n. of January 25, 1972.
9 People vs. Belen, 118 Phil. 880.
10 People vs. Sales, G.R. No. L-29340, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 489.
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