Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 131523 August 20, 1998

TRAVELAIRE & TOURS CORP. and/or CHRISTINE B. OJEDA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NENITA I. MEDELYN, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 009593-95 entitled "Nenita I. Medelyn v. Travelaire and Tours Corporation and/or Christine Ojeda" involving an award of separation pay in favor of Nenita Medelyn. ¹

Private respondent, Nenita Medelyn, was employed as chief accountant of petitioner, Travelaire and Corporation. In a letter dated April 25, 1994, ² private respondent irrevocably resigned from her position in petitioner's corporation. On January 18, 1995, she filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission praying for separation pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay.

In a decision dated June 22, 1995, Labor Arbiter Potenciano S. Canizares, Jr., ³ awarded private respondent's 13th month pay but dismissing, however, the other claims. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant her proportionate 13th month pay for the year 1994 in the amount it of P2,866.67 as computed by MR. BENJAMIN MARTIN of the Commission's NLRC NCR Branch.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

Not satisfied with the decision, private respondent filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission, alleging that she is entitled to separation pay since other employees of the company who had also resigned were granted the same benefit. The NLRC thus modified the labor arbiter's decision and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent separation pay in the amount of P55,400.00.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration from the decision of the NLRC was denied, hence this petition.

We affirm the ruling of the public respondent NLRC.

The general rule is that an employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is not entitled to separation pay unless, however, there is a stipulation for payment of such in the employment contract or Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), or payment of the amount is sanctioned by established employer practice or policy. ⁴ Private respondent claims that she is entitled to separation pay inasmuch as, for the period 1991 to 1996, three former employees of the company who had resigned ahead of private respondent and on separate dates, namely Rogelio Abendan, Anastacio Cabate, and Raul C. Loya ⁵ were given separation pay. It is, therefore, the contention of private respondent that payment of separation pay to resigning employees already constitutes company practice and an established policy of her employer, hence she should also be entitled to this benefit. Petitioner, on the other hand, admits giving certain sums of money to Anastacio Cabate and Raul C. Loya out of the company's generosity and which are not equivalent to separation pay. ⁶

In ordering petitioner to give private respondent separation pay, public respondent NLRC ruled that there exists a company policy/practice, to wit:

. . . . However, we agree with the complainant that the Labor Arbiter erred in not awarding separation pay and service incentive leave pay.

The record shows that the respondent had paid separation pay to at least three (3) employees, namely, Rogelio Abenden (page 9, Record), Anastacio Cabate (page 16, Record); Raul C. Loya (pages 16 and 33). Athough in the case of Cabate and Loya the amount given was called ex gratia payment, it was nevertheless given upon separation of the employees from the company. The respondent said it was not separation pay but an amount given by the company out of generosity. If the respondent could be generous to some of its employees, why did it deny the complainant the same consideration. There is no reason why the company should discriminate against the complainant who had also served the company for a long time. ⁷

Well-established is the principle that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, are accorded with respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. ⁸

In the case at bar, the public respondent NLRC's finding that there is a company policy/practice of paying separation pay to its resigning employees, is supported by substantial evidence. This is shown by the fact that before private respondent resigned and for the period 1991 to 1996, on separate dates, three (3) resigning employees were given separation pay, even though the payments given to two of these employees (namely Rogelio Abendan, Anastacio Cabate) were termed "ex-gratia payments". Regardless of terminology and amount, the fact exists that upon resignation from petitioner corporation, the concerned employees were given certain sums of money occasioned by their separation from the company. While petitioner has denied that such company policy/practice exists, it nevertheless failed to present countervailing evidence, such as presenting the records of other resigned employees who were not given separation pay.

In certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, judicial review does not go as far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and NLRC based their determinations, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not said public respondents had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. ⁹ The said rule directs us to merely determine whether there is basis established on record to support the findings of a tribunal and such findings meet the required quantum of proof, which in this case, is substantial evidence. Our deference to the expertise acquired by quasi-judicial agencies and the limited scope granted to us in the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction restrain us from going so far as to probe into the correctness of a tribunal's evaluation of evidence, unless there is palpable mistake and complete disregard thereof in which case certiorari would be
proper. ¹⁰

Upon evaluation of the records of this case, as discussed previously, we finds substantial evidence to support the finding of public respondent NLRC that it is a company policy/practice of petitioner to give separation pay to its resigning employees. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by public respondent in awarding separation pay to private respondent.

Lastly, it is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the employee. Since it is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or in the interpretation of agreements and writings should be resolved in the former's favor. ¹¹ The policy is to extend the applicability to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. ¹² This gives us wider latitude to affirm the finding of the public respondent NLRC.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 009593-95 dated September 18, 1997 is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 9-14.

2 Ibid., p. 39.

3 Id., p. 30.

4 CJC Trading, Inc. v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 724, (1995).

5 Rollo, pp. 11-12.

6 Ibid., p. 12.

7 Id., pp. 11-12.

8 Eduardo B. Prangan v. NLRC, G.R. 126529, April 15, 1998.

9 Ilocus Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36; 50 (1995).

10 PMI Colleges v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121466, August 15, 1997.

11 Prangan v. NLRC, supra.

12 Sarmiento v. Employees Compensation Commission, 144 SCRA 422 (1986).

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. P-10-2788 January 18, 2011

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
CLAUDIO M. LOPEZ, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court, Sudipen, La Union, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

In an administrative case, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. The dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case.

An Information dated 12 January 2004 was filed against respondent Claudio M. Lopez (respondent), Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court of Sudipen, La Union, for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165), otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of October 2003, in the Municipality of Sudipen, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep and possess in his custody and control Seven Hundred Ninety Point Six (790.6) grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, without first securing the necessary permit or authority from the government agency.¹

Consonant with the En Banc Resolution dated 12 March 1981 authorizing the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to initiate motu proprio the filing of administrative complaint against judges and/or employees of the inferior courts who have been convicted and/or charged before the Sandiganbayan or the courts, the OCA, in its Report dated 17 February 2009,² recommended the filing of an administrative complaint against respondent for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a Government Employee. The Court, in its Resolution of 18 March 2009,³ approved the OCA’s recommendation and required respondent to comment on the complaint.

On 29 April 2009, respondent submitted a one-page answer/comment⁴ alleging that a criminal case docketed as Criminal Case No. 3064 for violation of RA 9165 was pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Balaoan, La Union (RTC-Br. 34) and that from the evidence presented, it was clear that the prosecution failed to prove its case and that the case "might" be dismissed. Respondent prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed.

On 17 June 2009, this Court issued a Resolution⁵ noting respondent’s answer/comment and referred the administrative matter to the OCA for designation of an investigating judge to conduct an investigation.

Judge Ferdinand A. Fe (Investigating Judge), Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC-Br. 34, was designated investigating judge to conduct the investigation and thereafter submit a report and recommendation on the administrative matter.⁶

During the investigation, respondent informed the Investigating Judge that he was adopting the demurrer to evidence he earlier filed in Criminal Case No. 3064 and offered the same as evidence in this administrative case. He claimed the prosecution failed to prove its case. But since this is an administrative case, the Investigating Judge was of the view that only substantial evidence is required and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

From the evidence adduced by the prosecution in the criminal case, the Investigating Judge found that by virtue of a search warrant issued by the presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bannayoyo-Lidlidda-San Emilio, Ilocos Sur, police officers searched the boarding house which respondent rented. Respondent was not in his boarding house when the search team and the barangay officials arrived. The police officers presented the search warrant to respondent’s live-in partner, Babes Cañedo (Cañedo). One block of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 790.6 grams wrapped in a newspaper and plastic bag was recovered inside the room and under respondent’s bed. When respondent arrived, the police officers confronted him but respondent denied ownership of the dried marijuana fruiting tops. Respondent likewise refused to sign the Certification of Orderly Search but Cañedo and Barangay Captain Ronnie A. Guzman and Barangay Kagawad Charito Bayan signed the certification.

The confiscated items were brought to the Sudipen Police Station. After preliminary investigation, respondent was charged with violation of RA 9165.

In his demurrer to evidence which he adopted as evidence in this administrative case, respondent maintained that the presiding judge who issued the search warrant had no territorial jurisdiction over Sudipen, La Union, the place where it was enforced and hence, the items seized by virtue thereof were inadmissible in evidence. He likewise argued that the police officers who enforced the search warrant violated Rule 126 concerning the presence of witnesses and the accused during the search.

The Investigating Judge believed that the issues on the legality of the issuance of the search warrant and violation of Rule 126 should be threshed out in the criminal case and not in the instant administrative case. The Investigating Judge observed that since the place that was searched was the room rented by respondent, the lawful occupant is the respondent and not Erlinda Estrada, the owner of the house. Moreover, the presence of the lawful occupant may be dispensed with if there is any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

From the evidence adduced and the admission of respondent in his demurrer to evidence which he adopted in this administrative case, the Investigating Judge concluded that respondent kept in his custody and control 790.6 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without first securing the necessary permit or authority from the appropriate government agency. Respondent’s acts constituted flagrant violation of the law and undermined the people’s faith in the judiciary.

The Investigating Judge found respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a Government Employee and recommended that respondent be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations.

The OCA agreed with the findings and conclusions of the Investigating Judge and that the act of respondent fell short of the standards of high moral conduct which court employees are bound to maintain. The OCA likewise found respondent guilty of grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a court employee and thus recommended that respondent be dismissed from the service.

As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Judge, to sustain a finding of administrative culpability, only substantial evidence is required. The present case is an administrative case, not a criminal case, against respondent. Therefore, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case. We emphasize the well-settled rule that a criminal case is different from an administrative case and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case.⁷1avvphil

The evidence showed that respondent is the occupant of the place where the 790.6 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops were recovered. Respondent did not have the necessary permit or authority from the appropriate government agency to possess the same. This is a flagrant violation of the law and is considered a grave misconduct.lawph!l

The Court defines misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer."⁸ The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.⁹ As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. An act need not be tantamount to a crime for it to be considered as grave misconduct as in fact, crimes involving moral turpitude are treated as a separate ground for dismissal under the Administrative Code.¹⁰ We agree with the findings and recommendation of both the Investigating Judge and the OCA that respondent committed grave misconduct which, under Section 52 (A)(3), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.

Once again, we stress that court employees, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public servants in an office dispensing justice, should always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with the law and court regulations. No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder than an office in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the people’s respect and faith in the judiciary. They should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish public trust and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those connected with dispensing justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility.¹¹

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS respondent Claudio M. Lopez, Process Server of the Muncipal Trial Court of Sudipen, La Union, from the service with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice	CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice	ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice	ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice	LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice	ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice	JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA Associate Justice	MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice

Footnotes

¹Rollo, p. 12.

²Id. at 1-2.

³Id. at 17.

⁴Id. at 19.

⁵Id. at 21.

⁶Id. at 23.

⁷Velasco v. Judge Angeles, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1908, 15 August 2007, 530 SCRA 204, 224-225.

⁸Arcenio v. Pagorogon, A.M. Nos. MTJ-89-270 and MTJ-92-637, 5 July 1993, 224 SCRA 246, 254.

⁹Roque v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 179245, 23 July 2008, 559 SCRA 660; Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, 508 Phil. 569 (2005).

¹⁰Vertudes v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 153166, 16 December 2005, 478 SCRA 210, 233-234.

¹¹Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan, 478 Phil. 823 (2004).