instances when the dead man's statute NOT APPLICABLE

1. WHEN the testimony does not refer to a matter which occurred before the death of the deceased but merely to documents (Bordalba v. CA);

2. When the executor is the plaintiff in the case, the defendant is free to testify against the plaintiff (Razon v. IAC)

3. Where the defendant (ESTATE of or person of unsound mind) files a counterclaim against the plaintiff (Sunga-Chan v. Chua)

4. When the person testifying against the defendant is an ORDINARY witness.

WAIVER: When a party cross-examines the witness on matters that occurred during the lifetime of the deceased he waives his right to invoke the dead-man's statute. (Santos v. Santos)

SURVIVORSHIP DISQUALIFICATION RULE

Section 23 of Rule 130

Requisites:

1. The WITNESS is a
(a) party to a case,
(b) or an assignor of a party to a case or
(c) a person in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.

2. The ACTION is against: (a) an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person (b) or a person of unsound mind

3. The SUBJECT-MATTER of the action is a claim or demand against:
(a) the estate of the deceased person, or
(b) a person of unsound mind

4. The TESTIMONY of the witness refers to any matter of fact which occurred BEFORE
(a) the death of such deceased person or
(b) such person became of unsound mind.

It is a settled doctrine that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be established beyond cavil that the judgment adverted to is unjust, contrary to law or unsupported by the evidence, and that the same was rendered with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.⁵ In other words, the quantum of proof required to hold respondent judge guilty for alleged violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code, is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty and does not suffice to convict.⁶ Here, the allegations of the complaint-affidavit are unsubstantiated. Respondent judge cannot, of course, be pronounced guilty on the basis of bare allegations. There has to be evidence on which conviction can be anchored. The evidence must truly be beyond reasonable doubt.

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1524 January 26, 2000
formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 97-420-RTJ

LUCIA F. LAYOLA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE BASILIO R. GABO, JR., respondent.

That would be in line with the well- settled principle first announced by Justice Malcolm in the leading case of In re Horrilleno, ¹ decided as far back as 1922, to the effect that the guilt of a judge against whom an administrative complaint is lodged "must be proved beyond reasonable doubt."

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1106-CFI January 24, 1977

ARMANDO B. CLEDERA, complainant,
vs.
DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, DISTRICT JUDGE, BRANCH I CFI, CAMARINES SUR, respondent.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient as basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action upon the employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer, as in this case the Court, has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position (Filoteo v. Calago, A.M. No. P-04-1815, October 18, 2007; Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court).

Anent the issue of falsification of public documents, there is substantial evidence to hold the respondent guilty of dishonesty for falsifying an official document.

EN BANC

A.M. No. P-10-2833^* December 14, 2010

RETIRED EMPLOYEE, Municipal Trial Court, Sibonga, Cebu, Complainant,
vs.
MERLYN G. MANUBAG, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial Court, Sibonga, Cebu, Respondent.

Administrative charges against judges have been viewed by this Court with utmost care, as the respondent stands to face the penalty of dismissal or disbarment. Thus, proceedings of this character are in their nature highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases. The charges in such case must, therefore, be proven beyond reasonable doubt.¹⁵

In light of the evidence submitted in this case, the Court is of the view that the charges against Judge Kapili were not sufficiently substantiated by Datoon who has the burden of proof in administrative proceedings.¹⁶ The evidence presented was not sufficient to compel the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers over the respondent judge as mandated under Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.¹⁷

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2247 March 2, 2011
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3143-RTJ)

JOCELYN DATOON, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE BETHANY G. KAPILI, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Respondent.

It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ April 23, 2010

FRANCISCO P. OCAMPO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-5-263- RTC Re: Initial Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, and COURT STENOGRAPHER VICTORIA C. JAMORA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093

SYLVIA SANTOS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, Respondent.

Significantly, this Court has, time and again, declared a conservative and cautious approach to disbarment proceedings like the instant case.

Thus, in Santos vs. Dichoso (Adm. Case No. 1825; 84 SCRA 622) and reiterated in Noriega vs. Sison (Adm. Case No. 2266; 125 SCRA 293) this Court ruled:

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.

Again, in Santos vs. Dichoso (Adm. Case No. 1825; 84 SCRA 622) this Court defined the degree of proof necessary to disbar a lawyer. This Court held:

The profession of an attorney is acquired after long and laborious study. It is a lifetime profession. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the attorney may be able to amass considerable means to support himself and his family, besides the honor and prestige that accompany his office and profession. To deprive him of such honored station in life which would result in irreparable injury must require proof of the highest degree, which We find nowhere here. While courts will not hesistate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties they will, on the other hand, protect them from the unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants. The success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his reputation. Anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored. Private persons, and particularly disgruntled opponents, may not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as vehicles through which to vent their rancor on members of the Bar.

Clearly, in these cases, 40th complainants have failed to produce such degree of proof as to warrant the disbarment of respondent attorney. Neither is there sufficient evidence to warrant his suspension.

WHEREFORE, the complaints in these two administrative cases are hereby DISMISSED.

A.M. No. 2760 June 30, 1988

ALFREDO A. MARTIN, petitioner,
vs.
ALFONSO FELIX, JR., respondent.

A.M. No. 2851 June 30, 1988

MARIA CONCEPCION AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
ALFONSO FELIX JR., respondent.

Preliminarily, let it be stressed that in administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of her complaint. Substantial evidence is such evidence which a reasonable mind will accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.¹⁴ If complainant fails to discharge said burden, respondent cannot be held liable for the charge.¹⁵

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1973 March 14, 2008
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2329-RTJ)

ASUNCION REYES, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RUSTICO D. PADERANGA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Mambajao, Camiguin, Respondent.

Thus, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores recommended:

This finding is made with full awareness of the recent Supreme Court ruling on quantum of evidence required in the cases at bench. In the 7 August 2007 case of Alquizar v. Carpio, et al., the Supreme Court pronounced that:

x x x. In administrative or disciplinary proceedings, the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint rests on the complainant. While substantial evidence would ordinarily suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different where the proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense. Administrative proceedings against judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges or to establish the ground/s for the removal of a judicial officer should thus be more than substantial; they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To borrow from Reyes v. Mangino:

Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.

It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The evidence adduced here overwhelmingly established moral certainty that respondent judge raped and sexually harassed complainant Mesdames Tan and Villafranca on separate and repeated occasions.

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982 December 14, 2007
(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)

SHERLITA O. TAN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1983 December 14, 2007
(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)

JOHANNA M. VILLAFRANCA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

ANONYMOUS LETTER-WRITERS, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, respondent.

The denial of respondent, which is unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is plainly a negative self-serving assertion which deserves no weight in law, and cannot prevail over the positive and forthright declarations of the prosecutors who from all indications were never actuated by improper motives. As found by Mme. Justice Griño-Aquino, "[n]either Zuño nor Formaran III had any motive to concoct falsehood against Justice Demetria."

Respondent argues that his culpability must be established beyond reasonable doubt. We agree. But, we have often said, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such absolute certainty as to exclude the possibility of error. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. In the instant case, we believe that that requisite degree of proof has been met.

A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA December 19, 2001

In Re: Derogatory News Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria with Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen: Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, respondent.

However, in this case, we are not convinced that complainant was able to prove, by substantial evidence, that respondent committed the acts complained of. Basic is the rule that in administrative proceedings, complainant bears the onus of establishing the averments of her complaint.⁴⁰ If complainant fails to discharge this burden, respondent cannot be held liable for the charge.⁴¹

Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a judge found guilty of immorality can be dismissed from the service, if still in the active service, or may forfeit all or part of his retirement benefits, if already retired, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.⁴² We have already ruled that if a judge is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge.⁴³ This quantum of evidence, complainant failed to satisfy.

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1650 September 29, 2009
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1195-RTJ)

MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS, Complainant,
vs.
MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS, Presiding Judge, Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, Respondent.

It is well settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.^[16] In the cases at bar, the complainants Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca were able to adequately substantiate their allegations.

A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2014 March 4, 2009

NILDA VERGINESA-SUAREZ, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RENATO J. DILAG AND COURT STENOGRAPHER III CONCEPCION A. PASCUA, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

A.M. NO. 06-07-415-RTC March 4, 2009

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RENATO J. DILAG, Respondent.

DEAD man's statute

G.R. No. 112443 January 25, 2002

TERESITA P. BORDALBA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME, namely, CANDIDA FLORES, EMANNUEL JAYME, DINA JAYME DEJORAS, EVELIA JAYME, and GESILA JAYME; AND HEIRS OF ASUNCION JAYME-BACLAY, namely, ANGELO JAYME-BACLAY, CARMEN JAYME-DACLAN and ELNORA JAYME BACLAY, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals¹ in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, which affirmed with modification the Decision² of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386.

The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853 square meters and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The subject lot is part of a parcel of land situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City, and originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an extra-judicial partition,³ written in the Spanish language was executed, describing said parcel of land as –

2. otra parcela de terreno urbano en el barrio de Look, Mandawe, Cebu, que linda al N. con la Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme; al E. linda con propiodades de Fernando Antigua; al S. linda con propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme, y al O. linda con la Calle Plaridel. La propiodad descrita esta avaluada, con todas sus mejoras, en la cantidad de MIL Y CINCUENTA PESOS ------------------------------------------------ P1,050.00.⁴

and disposing, inter alia, the same parcel of land as follows:

1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private respondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Agelio Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;

2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba; and

3) 1/3 to an unidentified party.

Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jayme’s house, which his family occupied since 1945.

Sometime in July 1964, Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, petitioner’s mother, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch IV, an amended application for the registration⁵ of the lot described with the following boundaries:

N - Fruelana Jayme & Road

S - Felicitas de Latonio

E - Agustin de Jayme

W - Porfirio Jayme, Lot No. 1 and Vivencio Abellana

Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of a land owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme; and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the lot for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission.

Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay filed their opposition⁶ contending that said application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extra-judicial partition. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of interest of the parties.

Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of Cebu City an application⁷ dated January 10, 1979, seeking the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of the aborted application of her mother, Elena Jayme, now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C), described as follows:

North: Froilan Jayme and Road

East: Agustin Jayme

South: Alfredo Alivio and Spouses Hilario Gandecila

West: Hilario Gandecila Porferio Jayme and Heirs of Vevencio Abellanosa⁸

On April 16, 1980, petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-571 (FP) over said lot.⁹ Thereafter, petitioner caused the subdivision and titling of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), into 6 lots,¹⁰ as well as the disposition of two parcels thereof, thus:

1) Lot No. 1242-A with an area of 581 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) in the name of spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, to whom petitioner sold said lot;

2) Lot No. 1242-B with an area of 420 square meters covered by TCT No. 22772 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba, and which the latter mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Mandaue;

3) Lot No. 1242-C with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22773 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba;

4) Lot No. 1242-D with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22774 in the name of Teresita Bordalba;

5) Lot No. 1242-E with an area of 216 square meters covered by TCT 22775 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba;

6) Lot No. 1242-F with an area of 216 square meters and covered by TCT No. 22776 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba.

Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title over Lot No. 1242, as well as the conveyances made by petitioner involving the lot subject of the controversy, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, the instant complaint against petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands.

In the said complaint, private respondents prayed that Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), as well as TCT Nos. 22771-22776 be declared void and ordered cancelled. Private respondents also prayed that they be adjudged owners of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), and that spouses Genaro V. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue be declared buyers and mortgagee in bad faith, respectively. In addition, they asked the court to award them actual, compensatory, and moral damages plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by her through purchase from her mother,¹¹ who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947. In her answer, petitioner traced her mother’s ownership of the lot partly from the 1947 deed of extra-judicial partition presented by private respondents,¹² and claimed that Nicanor Jayme, and Candida Flores occupied a portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) by mere tolerance of her mother. On cross-examination, petitioner admitted that the properties of the late Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme were partitioned by their heirs in 1947, but claimed that she was not aware of the existence of said Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures in the said Deed to be the signature of her mother.¹³

On May 28, 1990, the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation. However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and consequently upheld as valid the sale of Lot No. 1242-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) to spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, and the mortgage of Lot No. 1242-B covered by TCT No. 22772 in favor of the Rural Bank of Mandaue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs by:

1) declaring Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-57 (FP) and all subsequent certificates of title as a result of the subdivision of Lot No. 1242 except TCT NO. 22771 (FP) as null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel them;

2) declaring spouses defendants Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as buyers in good faith and are the legal and rightful owners of Lot No. 1242-A as described in TCT No. 22771 (FP);

3) declaring the Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. as mortgagee in good faith and the mortgage lien in its favor be carried over to and be annotated in the new certificate of title to be issued under the names of the plaintiffs;

4) declaring the plaintiffs as the legal and rightful owners of Lot 1242 and ordering the issuance of the certificate of title in their names;

5) dismissing the claims of the defendant spouses Cabahug and Capala and the defendant Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. for lack of merit;

6) ordering the defendant Teresita Bordalba to pay plaintiffs the following amounts:

(a) P5,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses;

(b) P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and,

7) ordering defendant Bordalba to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.¹⁴

Both petitioner Teresita Bordalba and private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that since private respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), petitioner should be ordered to reconvey 1/3 of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) to private respondents. The decretal portion of the respondent court's decision states:

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is MODIFIED to order the reconveyance of one-third of the subject land in favor of the plaintiff-appellees in lieu of the cancellation of the Certificates of Title issued and their declaration as the owners of Lot No. 1242 in its entirety. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.¹⁵

Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man’s statute. Likewise, petitioner questions the right of private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity between the disputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.

The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court are binding upon this Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls under one of them.¹⁶

The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that petitioner resorted to fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the lot under scrutiny. The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that misrepresentation tainted petitioner’s application, insofar as her declaration that the land applied for was not occupied or claimed by any other person. Her declaration is belied by the extra-judicial partition which she acknowledged, her mother’s aborted attempt to have the lot registered, private respondents’ predecessors-in-interest’s opposition thereto, and by the occupancy of a portion of the said lot by Nicanor Jayme and his family since 1945.

It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith, and does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a means to enrich oneself at the expense of others.¹⁷

As to the alleged violation of the dead man’s statute,¹⁸ suffice it to state that said rule finds no application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.¹⁹

Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.

Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.²⁰

Anent the issue of identity, the disparity in the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) vis-à-vis the boundaries of the lot referred to in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition can be explained by the fact that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is only a portion of the entire parcel of land described in the Deed, a 1/3 pro-indiviso portion of which was adjudicated each to, first, petitioner’s mother, second, to the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, and third, to an unidentified party. Logically therefore, their boundaries will not be similar. At any rate, the records show that the parcel of land adjudicated to the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein was the lot found on the corner of Plaridel and Mabini Streets in Looc, Mandaue City. As admitted further by both parties, Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the land allotted to their predecessors-in-interest in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. Moreover, petitioner’s mother acknowledged in her application for registration of Lot No. 1242 that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was the source of her claim over the lot sought to be registered. She further admitted that the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the parcel of land inherited by her and her co-heirs, to the extent of 1/3 share each. Under Section 31, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules on Evidence, where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.

Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which private respondents’ predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was disregarded by petitioner when she secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title in her name, to the exclusion of private respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, the trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in upholding the right of private respondents as co-owners, and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of the lot in question to them.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court is unable to determine what part of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is within the boundaries of the parcel of land inherited in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition by the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein. This is so because private respondents did not show the extent of the said land mentioned in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition in relation to Lot No. 1242 (799-C). While they presented the boundaries of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, to wit:

North: Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme

East: Propiodades de Fernando Antigua

South: Propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme

West: Calle Plaridel

they did not, however, show where these boundaries are found in relation to the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C). Absent a fixed boundary of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, which they claim Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is a part of, the Court cannot determine the extent to which the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included. Admittedly, the north boundary of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) (Property of Froilan Jaime and Mabini Street) is similar to the north boundary of the land mentioned in the Deed. With only one reference point, however, the south, east and west boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) cannot be established with certainty to be within the parcel of land described in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.

In Beo v. Court of Appeals,²¹ the Court held that in order that an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action must fully prove not only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. So that when the record does not show that the land subject matter of the action has been exactly determined, the action cannot prosper, inasmuch as the plaintiff's ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the trial.

In the present case, while it is true that private respondents were not able to show the extent of their 1/3 pro indiviso right over Lot No. 1242 (799-C), they have nevertheless established their claim over the said lot. Hence, in line with our ruling in the case of Laluan v. Malpaya,²² the prudent recourse would be to remand the case to the lower court for a new trial.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, and the May 28, 1990 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386, insofar as it relates to the recognition of the 1/3 share of private respondents over Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial court in order to determine what part of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included in the parcel of land adjudicated in the 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition to the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

¹ Ninth Division, composed of Associate Justices Nathaniel P. De Pano, Jr. (ponente and chairman), Jesus M. Elbinias (member) and Angelina S. Gutierrez (member).

² Penned by Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole.

³ "CONVENIO DE REPARTICION Y DISTRIBUCION EX-TRAJUDICIALES DE LOS BIENES DE LOS ESPOSOS DON CARMENO JAYME, Y DONA MARGARITA ESPINA DE JAYME CELEBRADO EL..DE...….DE 1947, POR SUS HIJOS, MARIANO JAYME, SEGUNDO JAYME, ANDRES JAYME, GENEROSA JAYME, TEOFILA JAYME DE OUANO, FELECITAS JAYME DE LATONIO Y ELENA JAYME, VIUDA DE PEREZ, CON LA CONCURRENCIA DE LOS DOS SOBRINOS ASUNCION JAYME DE BACLAY Y NICANOR JAYME, HIJOS DE LA FINADA ESPIRIDIONA JAYME…" (Exhibit "A", Records, p. 76).

⁴ Exhibit "A-2", Records, p. 77.

⁵ Exhibit "B", Records, pp. 81-83.

⁶ Exhibit "C", Records, pp. 84-85.

⁷ Exhibit "D", Records, p. 86.

⁸ Exhibit "3", Records, p. 117.

⁹ Exhibit "J", Records, p. 96.

¹⁰ Exhibit "K", Records, p. 100 and Exhibits "L" - "Q", Records, pp. 101-107.

¹¹ Exhibit "2", Records, p. 115.

¹² Records, p. 32.

¹³ TSN, November 14, 1989, p. 18.

¹⁴ Records, pp. 205-206.

¹⁵ Rollo, p. 33.

¹⁶ Pua, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 345 SCRA 233, 243 [2000]; citing Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 330 [1998].

¹⁷ Esquivias, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 272 SCRA 803, 816 [1997]; citing Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 444 [1938].

¹⁸ Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 23.

¹⁹ Volume V, Herrera, Remedial Law, p. 312 [1999].

²⁰ Heirs of Ignacio Conti, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 345, 353 [1998], citing Marabilles v. Quito, 110 Phil. 64 [1956] and Hernandez v. Padua, 14 Phil. 194 [1909].

²¹ 200 SCRA 575, 581-582 [1991]; citing Galace, et al. v. Balagtas, 11 SCRA 687 [1964].

²² 65 SCRA 494, 503 [1975].