Significantly, this Court has, time and again, declared a conservative and cautious approach to disbarment proceedings like the instant case.

Thus, in Santos vs. Dichoso (Adm. Case No. 1825; 84 SCRA 622) and reiterated in Noriega vs. Sison (Adm. Case No. 2266; 125 SCRA 293) this Court ruled:

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.

Again, in Santos vs. Dichoso (Adm. Case No. 1825; 84 SCRA 622) this Court defined the degree of proof necessary to disbar a lawyer. This Court held:

The profession of an attorney is acquired after long and laborious study. It is a lifetime profession. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the attorney may be able to amass considerable means to support himself and his family, besides the honor and prestige that accompany his office and profession. To deprive him of such honored station in life which would result in irreparable injury must require proof of the highest degree, which We find nowhere here. While courts will not hesistate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties they will, on the other hand, protect them from the unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants. The success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his reputation. Anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored. Private persons, and particularly disgruntled opponents, may not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as vehicles through which to vent their rancor on members of the Bar.

Clearly, in these cases, 40th complainants have failed to produce such degree of proof as to warrant the disbarment of respondent attorney. Neither is there sufficient evidence to warrant his suspension.

WHEREFORE, the complaints in these two administrative cases are hereby DISMISSED.

A.M. No. 2760 June 30, 1988

ALFREDO A. MARTIN, petitioner,
vs.
ALFONSO FELIX, JR., respondent.

A.M. No. 2851 June 30, 1988

MARIA CONCEPCION AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
ALFONSO FELIX JR., respondent.