G.R. No. L-47045 November 22, 1988
NOBIO SARDANE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO J. ACOJEDO, respondents.
Y.G. Villaruz & Associates for petitioner.
Pelagio R. Lachica for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The extensive discussion and exhaustive disquisition in the decision 1 of the respondent Court 2 should have written finis to
this case without further recourse to Us. The assignment of errors and
arguments raised in the respondent Court by herein private respondent,
as the petitioner therein, having been correctly and justifiedly
sustained by said court without any reversible error in its conclusions,
the present petition must fail.
The assailed decision details the facts and proceedings which spawned the present controversy as follows:
Petitioner
brought an action in the City Court of Dipolog for collection of a sum
of P5,217.25 based on promissory notes executed by the herein private
respondent Nobio Sardane in favor of the herein petitioner. Petitioner
bases his right to collect on Exhibits B, C, D, E, F, and G executed on
different dates and signed by private respondent Nobio Sardane. Exhibit B
is a printed promissory note involving Pl,117.25 and dated May 13,
1972. Exhibit C is likewise a printed promissory note and denotes on its
face that the sum loaned was Pl,400.00. Exhibit D is also a printed
promissory note dated May 31, 1977 involving an amount of P100.00.
Exhibit E is what is commonly known to the layman as 'vale' which reads:
'Good for: two hundred pesos (Sgd) Nobio Sardane'. Exhibit F is stated
in the following tenor: 'Received from Mr. Romeo Acojedo the sum Pesos:
Two Thousand Two Hundred (P2,200.00) ONLY, to be paid on or before
December 25, 1975. (Sgd) Nobio Sardane.' Exhibit G and H are both vales'
involving the same amount of one hundred pesos, and dated August 25,
1972 and September 12, 1972 respectively.
It has been established in the trial court that on
many occasions, the petitioner demanded the payment of the total amount
of P5,217.25. The failure of the private respondent to pay the said
amount prompted the petitioner to seek the services of lawyer who made a
letter (Exhibit 1) formally demanding the return of the sum loaned.
Because of the failure of the private respondent to heed the demands
extrajudicially made by the petitioner, the latter was constrained to
bring an action for collection of sum of money.
During the scheduled day for trial, private
respondent failed to appear and to file an answer. On motion by the
petitioner, the City Court of Dipolog issued an order dated May 18, 1976
declaring the private respondent in default and allowed the petitioner
to present his evidence ex-parte. Based on petitioner's evidence, the City Court of Dipolog rendered judgment by default in favor of the petitioner.
Private respondent filed a motion to lift the order
of default which was granted by the City Court in an order dated May 24,
1976, taking into consideration that the answer was filed within two
hours after the hearing of the evidence presented ex-parte by the petitioner.
After the trial on the merits, the City Court of
Dipolog rendered its decision on September 14, 1976, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
(a) Ordering the defendant to pay unto the plaintiff
the sum of Five Thousand Two Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Twenty-five
centavos (P5,217.25) plus legal interest to commence from April 23, 1976
when this case was filed in court; and
(b) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P200.00 as attorney's fee and to pay the cost of this proceeding. 3
Therein
defendant Sardane appealed to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Norte which reversed the decision of the lower court by dismissing
the complaint and ordered the plaintiff-appellee Acojedo to pay said
defendant-appellant P500.00 each for actual damages, moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit.
Plaintiff-appellee then sought the review of said decision by petition
to the respondent Court.
The assignment of errors in said petition for review
can be capsulized into two decisive issues, firstly, whether the oral
testimony for the therein private respondent Sardane that a partnership
existed between him and therein petitioner Acojedo are admissible to
vary the meaning of the abovementioned promissory notes; and, secondly,
whether because of the failure of therein petitioner to cross-examine
therein private respondent on his sur-rebuttal testimony, there was a
waiver of the presumption accorded in favor of said petitioner by
Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
On the first issue, the then Court of First Instance
held that "the pleadings of the parties herein put in issue the
imperfection or ambiguity of the documents in question", hence "the
appellant can avail of the parol evidence rule to prove his side of the
case, that is, the said amount taken by him from appellee is or was not
his personal debt to appellee, but expenses of the partnership between
him and appellee."
Consequently, said trial court concluded that the
promissory notes involved were merely receipts for the contributions to
said partnership and, therefore, upheld the claim that there was
ambiguity in the promissory notes, hence parol evidence was allowable to
vary or contradict the terms of the represented loan contract.
The parol evidence rule in Rule 130 provides:
Sec. 7. Evidence of written agreements.—When
the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the
terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing except in
the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing or
its failure to express the the true intent and agreement of the
parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the
pleadings;
(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.
As
correctly pointed out by the respondent Court the exceptions to the
rule do not apply in this case as there is no ambiguity in the writings
in question, thus:
In
the case at bar, Exhibits B, C, and D are printed promissory notes
containing a promise to pay a sum certain in money, payable on demand
and the promise to bear the costs of litigation in the event of the
private respondent's failure to pay the amount loaned when demanded
extrajudicially. Likewise, the vales denote that the private respondent
is obliged to return the sum loaned to him by the petitioner. On their
face, nothing appears to be vague or ambigous, for the terms of the
promissory notes clearly show that it was incumbent upon the private
respondent to pay the amount involved in the promissory notes if and
when the petitioner demands the same. It was clearly the intent of the
parties to enter into a contract of loan for how could an educated man
like the private respondent be deceived to sign a promissory note yet
intending to make such a writing to be mere receipts of the petitioner's
supposed contribution to the alleged partnership existing between the
parties?
It has been established in the trial court that, the
private respondent has been engaged in business for quite a long period
of time--as owner of the Sardane Trucking Service, entering into
contracts with the government for the construction of wharfs and
seawall; and a member of the City Council of Dapitan (TSN, July 20,
1976, pp. 57-58).<äre||anº•1àw> It indeed puzzles us
how the private respondent could have been misled into signing a
document containing terms which he did not mean them to be. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The
private respondent admitted during the cross-examination made by
petitioner's counsel that he was the one who was responsible for the
printing of Exhibits B, C, and D (TSN, July 28, 1976, p. 64). How could
he purportedly rely on such a flimsy pretext that the promissory notes
were receipts of the petitioner's contribution? 4
The Court of Appeals held, and We agree, that even if evidence aliunde
other than the promissory notes may be admitted to alter the meaning
conveyed thereby, still the evidence is insufficient to prove that a
partnership existed between the private parties hereto.
As manager of the basnig Sarcado
naturally some degree of control over the operations and maintenance
thereof had to be exercised by herein petitioner. The fact that he had
received 50% of the net profits does not conclusively establish that he
was a partner of the private respondent herein. Article 1769(4) of the
Civil Code is explicit that while the receipt by a person of a share of
the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a
partner in the business, no such inference shall be drawn if such
profits were received in payment as wages of an employee. Furthermore,
herein petitioner had no voice in the management of the affairs of the basnig. Under similar facts, this Court in the early case of Fortis vs. Gutierrez Hermanos, 5 in denying the claim of the plaintiff therein that he was a partner in the business of the defendant, declared:
This
contention cannot be sustained. It was a mere contract of employment.
The plaintiff had no voice nor vote in the management of the affairs of
the company. The fact that the compensation received by him was to be
determined with reference to the profits made by the defendant in their
business did not in any sense make him a partner therein. ...
The same rule was reiterated in Bastida vs. Menzi & Co., Inc., et al. 6 which involved the same factual and legal milieu.
There are other considerations noted by respondent
Court which negate herein petitioner's pretension that he was a partner
and not a mere employee indebted to the present private respondent.
Thus, in an action for damages filed by herein private respondent
against the North Zamboanga Timber Co., Inc. arising from the operations
of the business, herein petitioner did not ask to be joined as a party
plaintiff. Also, although he contends that herein private respondent is
the treasurer of the alleged partnership, yet it is the latter who is
demanding an accounting. The advertence of the Court of First Instance
to the fact that the casco bears the name of herein petitioner
disregards the finding of the respondent Court that it was just a
concession since it was he who obtained the engine used in the Sardaco
from the Department of Local Government and Community Development.
Further, the use by the parties of the pronoun "our" in referring to
"our basnig, our catch", "our deposit", or "our boseros" was
merely indicative of the camaraderie and not evidentiary of a
partnership, between them.
The foregoing factual findings, which belie the
further claim that the aforesaid promissory notes do not express the
true intent and agreement of the parties, are binding on Us since there
is no showing that they fall within the exceptions to the rule limiting
the scope of appellate review herein to questions of law.
On the second issue, the pertinent rule on actionable documents in Rule 8, for ready reference, reads:
Sec. 8. How to contest genuineness of such documents.—When
an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or
attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding
section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically
denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but this
provision does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a
party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for the
inspection of the original instrument is refused.
The
record shows that herein petitioner did not deny under oath in his
answer the authenticity and due execution of the promissory notes which
had been duly pleaded and attached to the complaint, thereby admitting
their genuineness and due execution. Even in the trial court, he did not
at all question the fact that he signed said promissory notes and that
the same were genuine. Instead, he presented parol evidence to vary the
import of the promissory notes by alleging that they were mere receipts
of his contribution to the alleged partnership.
His arguments on this score reflect a misapprehension
of the rule on parol evidence as distinguished from the rule on
actionable documents. As the respondent Court correctly explained to
herein petitioner, what he presented in the trial Court was testimonial
evidence that the promissory notes were receipts of his supposed
contributions to the alleged partnership which testimony, in the light
of Section 7, Rule 130, could not be admitted to vary or alter the
explicit meaning conveyed by said promissory notes. On the other hand,
the presumed genuineness and due execution of said promissory notes were
not affected, pursuant to the provisions of Section 8, Rule 8, since
such aspects were not at all questioned but, on the contrary, were
admitted by herein petitioner.
Petitioner's invocation of the doctrines in Yu Chuck, et al. vs. Kong Li Po, 7 which was reiterated in Central Surety & Insurance Co. vs. C. N. Hodges, et al. 8
does not sustain his thesis that the herein private respondent had
"waived the mantle of protection given him by Rule 8, Sec. 8". It is
true that such implied admission of genuineness and due execution may be
waived by a party but only if he acts in a manner indicative of either
an express or tacit waiver thereof. Petitioner, however, either
overlooked or ignored the fact that, as held in Yu Chuck, and the
same is true in other cases of Identical factual settings, such a
finding of waiver is proper where a case has been tried in complete
disregard of the rule and the plaintiff having pleaded a document by
copy, presents oral evidence to prove the due execution of the document
and no objections are made to the defendant's evidence in refutation.
This situation does not obtain in the present case hence said doctrine
is obviously inapplicable.
Neither did the failure of herein private respondent
to cross-examine herein petitioner on the latter's sur-rebuttal
testimony constitute a waiver of the aforesaid implied admission. As
found by the respondent Court, said sur-rebuttal testimony consisted
solely of the denial of the testimony of herein private respondent and
no new or additional matter was introduced in that sur-rebuttal
testimony to exonerate herein petitioner from his obligations under the
aforesaid promissory notes.
On the foregoing premises and considerations, the
respondent Court correctly reversed and set aside the appealed decision
of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte and affirmed in
full the decision of the City Court of Dipolog City in Civil Case No.
A-1838, dated September 14, 1976.
Belatedly, in his motion for reconsideration of said
decision of the respondent Court, herein petitioner, as the private
respondent therein, raised a third unresolved issue that the petition
for review therein should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
since the lower Court's decision did not affirm in full the judgment of
the City Court of Dipolog, and which he claimed was a sine qua non
for such a petition under the law then in force. He raises the same
point in his present appeal and We will waive the procedural
technicalities in order to put this issue at rest.
Parenthetically,
in that same motion for reconsideration he had sought affirmative
relief from the respondent Court praying that it sustain the decision of
the trial Court, thereby invoking and submitting to its jurisdiction
which he would now assail. Furthermore, the objection that he raises is
actually not one of jurisdiction but of procedure. 9
At
any rate, it will be noted that petitioner anchors his said objection
on the provisions of Section 29, Republic Act 296 as amended by Republic
Act 5433 effective September 9, 1968. Subsequently, the procedure for
appeal to the Court of Appeals from decisions of the then courts of
first instance in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over
cases originating from the municipal courts was provided for by Republic
Act 6031, amending Section 45 of the Judiciary Act effective August 4,
1969. The requirement for affirmance in full of the inferior court's
decision was not adopted or reproduced in Republic Act 6031. Also, since
Republic Act 6031 failed to provide for the procedure or mode of appeal
in the cases therein contemplated, the Court of Appeals en banc
provided thereof in its Resolution of August 12, 1971, by requiring a
petition for review but which also did not require for its availability
that the judgment of the court of first instance had affirmed in full
that of the lower court. Said mode of appeal and the procedural
requirements thereof governed the appeal taken in this case from the
aforesaid Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals in 1977. 10 Herein petitioner's plaint on this issue is, therefore, devoid of merit.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against herein petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
2 Special Fifth Division, CA-G.R. No. SP-06464-R, Romeo J. Acojedo, Petitioner, vs. Nobio Sardane and Hon. Dimalanes B. Buissan, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Respondents.
3 Rollo, 62-65.
4 Rollo, 71-74.
5 6 Phil. 100 (1906).
6 58 Phil. 188 (1933).
7 46 Phil. 608 (1924).
8 38 SCRA 159 (1971).
9 See Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523 (1911).
10 For the present procedure, see Sec. 22 B.P. 129; Pars. 20, 21, and 22 (b) of the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines.
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