LOZADA

Case Digest - PAROL EVIDENCE – (JOHANNA W. LOZADA)

1.                   G.R. No. L-62741 May 29, 1987

FILIPINAS MANUFACTURERS BANK, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EASTERN RIZAL FABRICATORS, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

Filipinas Manufacturers Bank filed in the Court of First Instance (now RTC), a complaint against Eastern Rizal Fabricators. It alleged inter alia that defendant Eastern Rizal Fabricators had executed on July 30, 1976, a promissory note for P370,000.00 which has matured for two years and four months already. And that despite repeated demands, defendant refused to pay without any valid and legal grounds.

 

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOAN OF Php. 370,000 which IS the subject matter of the present dispute, was still outstanding and if no full payment has been made, to submit memoranda substantiating their respective allegations concerning their respective allegation concerning the defense of forbearance.

 

RULING:

            Yes. The loan was still outstanding but only up to the extent of balance in the amount of Php. 230,000.00.

            When the appellant submitted a memorandum, stating it still has an outstanding balance of Php. 230,000.00 on its aforesaid account ‘ with the appellee bank.  It reiterated its prayer that the judgment complained of be reversed. The appellee bank did not file its memorandum despite notices sent to its counsel of record.

            Appellee bank’s unexplained inaction has left the court with no recourse but to order the appellant to discharge its debt to the admitted amount of Php. 230,000.00.  By its silence, we can assume that the appellee bank has no objections to the amount owing as acknowledge by the appellant.

            Parol evidence provides that the terms of an agreement has been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms and therefore can be, as between the parties and their successors in interest, as evidence of the terms of the agreement to written other than the contents of the writing itself, except when there are subsequent agreement to written contracts may be made orally and evidence in reference thereto does not violate the parol evidence rule.

            The reason for the rule is fundamental. The parties cannot be presumed to have intended the written instrument to cover all their possible subsequent agreements. Moreover, parol evidence does not in any way deny that the original agreement was that which the writing purports to express, but merely shows that the parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate their original understanding or to make a new and independent one. It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written contract the parol one was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable, it may be proved and enforced.

    

 

 

 

 

2.                    G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300 August 6, 1986

VICTORIA LECHUGAS, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA LOZA, SALVADOR LOZADA, ISIDRO LOZADA, CARMELITA LOZADA, DAVID LOZADA, AMPARO LOZADA, ERLINDA LOZADA and ALEJANDRA LOZADA, respondents.

FACTS:

            The petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against the private respondents, alleging that the latter by means of force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered lots A and B, corresponding to the middle and northern portion of the property owned by the petitioner known as Lot No. 5456. She alleged that they appropriated the produce thereof for themselves, and refused to surrender the possession of the same despite demands made by the petitioner. The petitioner appealed to the CA after the cases rendered in the other court rendered unfavorable judgment.

ISSUES:

I.        THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING PAROL EVIDENCE OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE PETITIONER IN ORDER TO VARY THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE DEED OF DEFINITE SALE (EXHIBIT A) ALTHOUGH THE LAND THEREIN IS DESCRIBED AND DELIMITED BY METES AND BOUNDS AND IdENTIFIED AS LOT NO. 5456 OF LAMBUNAO CADASTRE.

II. THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE THEORY OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THAT THE LAND DESCRIBED IN THE DEED OF SALE (EXHIBIT A) IS LOT NO. 5522 INSTEAD OF LOT NO. 5456 OF THE LAMBUNAO CADASTRE, THEIR ORIGINAL THEORY BEING THAT THE DEED OF SALE (EXHIBIT A) IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO BECAUSE LEONCIA LASANGUE CAN NOT SELL THE LAND IN QUESTION IN 1950 SINCE IT WAS ALLEGEDLY SOLD IN 1941 BY HER FATHER EMETERIO LASANGUE.

III.    THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT CANNOT REFORM THE DEED OF DEFINITE SALE BY CHANGING ITS SUBJECT MATTER IN THE ABSENCE OF STRONG, CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND ON THE STRENGTH OF LONG TESTIMONY OF THE VENDOR AND ALTHOUGH NO DIRECT ACTION FOR REFORMATION WAS FILED IN THE COURT OF ORIGIN.

 

RULING:

1.       The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial court's action in admitting the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue. The petitioner claims that Leoncia Lasangue was the vendor of the disputed land.

 

      As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court, the parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.

2.       There is likewise no merit in the contention of the petitioner that the respondents changed their theory on appeal.

Respondents, from the very start, had questioned and denied Leoncia Lasangue's capacity to sell the disputed lot to petitioner. It was their contention that the lot was sold by Leoncia's father Emeterio Lasangue to their father, Hugo Loza wayback in 1941 while the alleged sale by Leoncia to the petitioner took place only in 1950.

3.       The third issue raised by the petitioner has no merit. There is strong, clear, and convincing evidence as to which lot was actually sold to her. We see no reason to reverse the factual findings of both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals on this point. The "reformation" which the petitioner questions was, in fact, intended to favor her. Instead of declaring the deed of sale null and void for all purposes, the Court upheld its having passed ownership of Lot No. 5522 to the petitioner.

 

3.) G.R. No. 96405 June 26, 1996

BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR., petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.

FACTS:

            Petitioner Baldomero Inchiong, Jr. is one of the signatory of apromissory note in the amount of Php. 50,000.00 that resulted to his present liability with Rene C. Naybe and Gregorio D. Pantanosas which hold themselves jointly and severally liable to private respondent Philipine Bank of Communocations. Said promissory note was due on May 5, 1983 without the promissory having paid their obligation.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY THE OBLIGATION PROVIDED IN THE PROMISSORY NOTE AS JOINTLY AND SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH NAYBE AND PONTANOSAS TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATION.

RULING:

            Yes.

            Petitioner is liable up to the extent of the provision under the promissory note and for being one of the three signatories therein as “jointly and solidarilly liable.” Any one, some or all of them may be proceeded against for the entire obligation. The choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection.

            Pontanosas consequent dismissal of the said case does not deemed him as having discharged petitioner from liability. And with regards to Naybe, the court have never obtained jurisdiction over him.  Thus, petitioner may only have recourse against his co-makers, as provided by law.

N.B.

The promissory note "is not a public deed with the formalities prescribed by law but . . . a mere commercial paper which does not bear the signature of . . . attesting witnesses," parol evidence may "overcome" the contents of the promissory note. ⁹ The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule ¹⁰ states:

When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document.

What is required is that the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the
parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them." ¹¹ Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties. ¹² As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.

Case Digest – Dead Man Statute - (JOHANNA W. LOZADA)

1.       G.R. NO. l-27434 September  23, 1986

Genaro Guñi, et al  vs. CA

 

FACTS:

            The three haciendas owned by TABACALERA were negotiated by the late Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessor-in – interest of petitioners ( Genaro Guñi, et al.) sometime in 1949. However, having insufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell one of the hacienda to Santiago Villegas. As alleged the TABACALERA will only agree to the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas only upon having a guaranty by which Gaspar Vicente stood as a guarantor, for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. The guarantee was embodied in a document.

ISSUE:

1.       May respondent Gaspar Vicente testify on the matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva which contributes a claim of demand upon his estate in violation of Rule 123, Section 26 Par C, now Rule 130, Section 20 Paragraph (A)?

2.       May not a written promise to sell dated October 24, 1949 be novated into a verbal agreement of lease during the lifetime of the promissorr, whose death occurred on November 12, 1951, by facts and circumstances substantiated by competent oral evidence in this case?

3.       Should the promise in a promise to sell, who paid Php. 12,460.24 which was to be accounted and to be credited as rental after five (5) years of lease, who in his original complaint did not allege nor prove damages, except the sum of Php. 2,000 as attorney’s fees, receive a judgment for damages in the amount of Php. 74, 056.35 which consists of Php. 37, 121.26 plus legal interest for the crop years 1950-51 to 1958-59 and for Php. 3, 624.18 to Php. 4, 374.78 for every crop year subsequent to 1958 – 59 plus interes?

 

RULING:

 

1.       Yes. Gaspar Vicente can testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva which contribute a claim of demand upon his estate in violation of Rule 130, Section 20, Paragraph (A).

 

When Vicente took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting & surrender of fields nos. 4 & 13.  Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate / deceased person.  

 

2.        The novation of the written contract / promise to sell into a verbal agreement lease was clearly and conveniently proven not only by the testimony of petitioner Goñi, but likewise by the acts and conduct of the parties subsequent to the execution of the contract/ promise to sell.

 

3.       The third issue no longer necessary for discussion in said case for the petitioner have clearly and sufficiently shown that the contract / promise to sell was a subsequently novated in a verbal lease agreement which follows that they are entitled to a favorable decision on their counterclaim.

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.       EN BANC

G.R. No. 27498 September 20, 1927

Intestate of Marcelino Tongco, represented by Josefa Tongco, administratrix vs. Anastacia Vianzon

 

FACTS:

            Shortly before the the death of Marcelino Tongco, he had presented claims in a cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to certain properties in the name of the conjugal partnership consisting of himself and his wife, and that corresponding decrees for these lots were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership not long after his death.

ISSUE:

            Whether the property in dispute should be assigned to the estate of Marcelino Tongco or Whether it should be set aside as belonging exclusively to the widow.

 

RULING:

By reason of the provisions of Article 1407 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that all the property of the spouses is partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife.  But even proceeding on this assumption, we still think that the widow has proved in a decision & conclusive manner that the property in question belonged exclusively of her, that is, it would unless we are forced to disregard her testimony. And we are of the opinion that the witness (widow) is competent.

 

 

3.       EN BANC

G.R. No. L -27498 & 27499 October 10, 1927

Intestate of Marcelino Tongco, represented by Josefa Tongco, administratrix vs. Anastacia Vianzon

 And Government of the Philippine Islands,applicant vs. Marcelino Tongco, et al; Anastacia Vianzon, petitioner-appellee; Josefa Tongco, administratrix of the estate of  Marcelino Tongco, oppositor-appellant.

 

 

FACTS:

            In motion of reconsideration appellant asked of a modification of the part of the affirmed judgment which orders issuances of new decrees & certificates of titles for lots nos. 1062, 1263, & 491 in the name of Anastacia Vianzon or in the case no. 27499.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issuances of new decrees & certificates of titles for lots nos. 1062, 1263, & 491491 in the name of Anastacia Vianzon is proper.

 

RULING:

No.

 

Where a person alleges that he has been deprived of land by a decress of registration obtained by fraud in cadastral proceedings and file in court a petition for review within 1 year after the entry of the decree, and where after trial fraud is established, the court may order cancellation of the decree and the issuances of new decree and certificate of title in the name of the petitioner. 

 

The said motin of reconsideration is denied.