1. On May 21, 1982, petitioner
Dumez Company, a French company, through petitioner Trans-Orient Engineers,
Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
engaged the services of private respondent Veronico Ebilane as carpenter for
one of its projects in the Middle East, with Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as his place
of actual employment. The parties executed and signed a one-year overseas
employment agreement embodying the terms and conditions of private respondent's
employment.
Private respondent commenced
performance of said contract on July 3, 1982. On August 31, 1982, while
at the job site, private respondent was suddenly seized by abdominal pain and
rushed to the Riyadh
Central Hospital
were appendectomy was performed on him. During his confinement, he
developed right-sided weakness and numbness and difficulty of speaking which
was found to have been caused by Atrial Fibrillation and CVA embolism.
In a letter dated September 22,
1982, petitioners formally terminated private respondent's employment effective
September 29, 1982, up to which time petitioners paid private respondent his
salaries under his employment contract. Thereafter, on October 13, 1982,
private respondent was repatriated to Manila.
On November 23, 1982, private
respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners.
Such complaint was filed with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office
of the POEA.
In deciding the case in favor of respondent, the
POEA took judicial notice of Social Insurance Law of Saudi Arabia.
Question:
is the POEA correct in taking judicial notice of the Social Insurance Law of
Saudi Arabia, which was not duly proved during the hearing? Explain.
2. Private
respondents are brothers who were engaged in the business of forwarding and
transporting "balikbayan" boxes from California,
U.S.A.
to Metro Manila, Philippines. Manuel J. Salazar (hereinafter
"Manuel") managed the Philippine side via MANSAL Forwarders, a
business registered in his name with principal office at No. 48 Scout Tobias
Street, Quezon City. On the other hand, Mario J. Salazar (hereinafter
"Mario") handled the U.S. side of the forwarding business as General
Manager of M.J.S. International, Inc., a corporation with principal office at
No. 3400 Fletcher Drive, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
According
to the petitioner, sometime in February of 1989, while he was in Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., Mario
tried to convince him to invest some money in the said business. Mario had
allegedly represented that petitioner's money will be held in trust and
administered by both him and his brother for the exclusive use of their
forwarding and transporting business. Petitioner further alleged that Mario
promised him a return on his investment equivalent to ten per centum (10%) for
one month, at the end of which, his money plus interest earned shall be
returned to him.
When
petitioner returned to the Philippines,
it was Manuel's turn to persuade him to part with his money under the said
investment scheme. Eventually convinced by the private respondents’
representations and assurances, petitioner agreed to invest the total amount of
US $34,000.00 which he entrusted to his aunt, Liwayway Dee Tanzo, who was
residing in the U.S.A.
Thus, petitioner issued several personal checks made out to Liwayway Dee Tanzo,. or to
"Calfed", or payable to cash.
Except for California Federal Check No. 322 which was encashed by Mario
himself, private respondents received the proceeds of the above checks through
Liwayway Dee Tanzo on several occasions in August 1989.
Meanwhile,
Mario encountered serious liquidity problems that prompted him to
petition the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for a release from his debts on September
27, 1990. He was ordered "released from all dischargeable debts" by
the said court on January 25, 1991.
Upon
the expiration of the thirty (30) day investment period, petitioner demanded
from Mario in the States and Manuel in Quezon
City proper accounting of his financial investment
and/or the return of his capital plus interest earned. At the outset, private
respondents avoided their obligation to petitioner by making various excuses
but after persistent demands by the latter, Manuel finally admitted that their
shipments had encountered some problems with the Bureau of Customs. Thus, on
January 29, 1990, Manuel executed a letter authorizing the petitioner to
withdraw documents to assist in the release of their shipments from the Bureau
of Customs. However, when petitioner attempted to secure the release of the
"balikbayan" boxes from the Bureau of Customs, he discovered that the
same had actually contained smuggled goods and were accordingly seized and
forfeited in favor of the government.
To
prove that the money was not in trust, but a loan, the respondents offered as
evidence its previous transactions of loan with other friends in the U.S. .
Manuel offered in evidence copies of the contracts of loan entered into between
M.J.S. International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo, which are contracts of loan and
not trust agreements.
Petitioner
object to the admissibility of said evidence, as they are irrelevant to the
contract of trust agreements that was entered between him and Mario.
Rule
on his contention.
3. In a land dispute, the parties
appeared before the barangay council,which rendered a decision of the
conflicting claims which they presented before said council.Said barangay
decision was contained in a document termed as Administrative Case No. 4,
During
trial said documentary exhibit was offered, which the court admitted and
appreciated in deciding in favor of the appellants.In their first assignment,
appellants assail the admission in evidence over the objection of the appellant
of Exhibit "3." This exhibit is a decision in favor of the
defendant-appellee against herein plaintiff-appellant Grace Ventura, by the council
of Barrio of San Pascual, Tuba, Benguet, in its Administrative Case No. 4, for
the settlement of ownership and possession of the land. Question: Is Exh. 3
admissible as evidence in court?
4. (A) what is a judicial admission? (B)When is
judicial admission mandatory? (C) What is a confession? (D) what is an
evidentiary rule? (E)
(What is an adoptive admission?
5. A) In a land dispute, the defendants offered to
compromise the case by offering P20,000 cash for the dismissal of the case. The
plaintiffs did not agree, and so the case for recovery of possession pushed
through. During trial, the plaintiff testified about the offer of compromise.
The defendant objected to its admissibility. As judge would you admit said
testimony?
B) In a criminal case for malicious mischief, the
accused offered to pay 5,000 pesos to pay for the broken bottles of beer, and
asks for the dismissal of the criminal case. During the trial, the offer was
used as evidence to prove the criminal liability of the accused. Is said evidence
admissible as an implied admission of guilt? Would your answer be the same is
the crime charged is reckless imprudence resulting to homicide?
C) In a physical injuries case, the accused offered
to pay the medical and hospital expenses. Can this be considered as proof of
civil or criminal liability of the accused?
6. Explain
the Best Evidence Rule and state at least two exceptions thereto.
7.
What do you understand by “opinion
evidence”? Is it admissible? State the rule and the exceptions thereto.
8. [G.R. No.
107372. January 23,
1997] On September 30, 1982, private
respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a
consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. The
first deed of absolute sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
258628 provides in part:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of
THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND (P35,000.00) PESOS, receipt of which in full is
hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and conveyed, as we hereby
sell, transfer and convey, that subdivided portion of the property covered
by TCT No. 258628 known as Lot No. 684-G-1-B-2 in favor of RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ,
of legal age, Filipino. whose marriage is under a regime of complete separation
of property, and a resident of 942
Aurora Blvd., Quezon City,
his heirs or assigns."
while the second deed of absolute sale covering TCT
No. 243273 provides:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS receipt of which in full is hereby
acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and conveyed, as we hereby sell,
transfer and convey, that consolidated-subdivided portion of the property
covered by TCT No. 243273 known as Lot No. 5 in favor of RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, of
legal age, Filipino, whose marriage is under a regime of complete separation of
property, and a resident of 942 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City his heirs or
assigns.
Private respondents received
the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles to
petitioner. On April 9, 1990
the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles. Private respondents,
however, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the
possession of another person, and petitioner's
acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued
private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer
with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the
following oral conditions which were never
reflected in the deeds of sale:
"3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No.
243273) remains with the defendants (private respondents) until plaintiff
(petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements have been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right
of way amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the
approved plan for the segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his
property and that of defendants' lot to segregate his right of way;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all
other expenses that may be incurred by reason of sale. x x x."
During trial,
private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the
sale was subject to the above conditions, although such
conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's
timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions
was barred by the parol evidence rule, the
lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint
as well as the counterclaim.
Questions: (1) Is the ruling of
the Court correct?
(2) What do you understand by parol
evidence rule?
(3) In order that parol evidence may be
admitted, what are the requirements that must be complied with ?
(4) What are the exceptions to the parol
evidence rule?
(5) Does the case above
contain the exception to the parol evidence rule?
9. How would you object to the following?
a. Witnesses
sometimes preface their testimonies with expression like “I believe” or “ I
think” such that the witness speaks from
conjecture or from hearsay.
b. When evidence is presented which do not tend
to prove a fact alleged in the information.
c. When a
witness is cross-examined about what another witness has said and which he has
not repeated in his testimony.
d. When a
question is asked which suggests to the witness the answer the examining party
wants.
e. When a tricky
question is asked, one that is calculated to make the witness give a false or
inconsistent answer.
10.
What are collateral matters? As a general rule would you allow collateral
matters as evidence? Explain.
End of the examination
(please pay xerox fee of 4 pesos)
No comments:
Post a Comment