Delicate and sensitive is the issue in this case, which is, whether or
not the upgrading of the crime charged from homicide to the more serious
offense of murder is such a substantial amendment
that it is proscribed if made after the accused had pleaded "not
guilty" to the crime of homicide, displaying as alleged by the defense,
inordinate prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
x x x x
Such amendment to insert in the information real name of the accused involves merely a matter of form as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the accused of a fair opportunity to present a defense; neither is the nature of the offense charged affected or altered since the revelation of accused's real name does not change the theory of the prosecution nor does it introduce any new and material fact.[19] In fact, it is to be expected that the information has to be amended as the unknown participants in the crime became known to the public prosecutor.[20]
"Abuse of superior strength" having already been alleged in the original information charging homicide, the amendment of the name of the crime to murder, constitutes a mere formal amendment permissible even after arraignment
x x x
To amend the information so as to change the crime charged for homicide to the more serious offense of murder after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the former is indubitably proscribed by the first paragraph of the above-quoted provision. For certainly a change from homicide to murder is not a matter of form; it is one of substance with very serious consequences."[24]Indeed, petitioner forcefully and strongly submits that, in the light of this ruling, we are allegedly obliged to grant his prayer for the reversal of the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals and the affirmance of the trial court’s ruling that the post-arraignment amendment sought by the People is prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same being a substantial amendment prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
The cited ruling, however, differs from the case at bench because the facts herein sustain a contrary holding. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
Applying our aforegoing disquisition in the 1946 case of Regala, we likewise ruled in the 1983 case of People v. Court of Appeals[17] that a post-arraignment amendment to further allege conspiracy, is only a formal amendment not prejudicial to the rights of the accused and proper even after the accused has pleaded "not guilty" to the charge under the original information. We held in said case of People v. Court of Appeals:
"x x x The trial Judge should have allowed the amendment x x x considering that the amendments sought were only formal. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his memorandum, ‘there was no change in the prosecution’s theory that respondent Ruiz willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and shot with a gun Ernesto and Rogelio Bello x x x. The amendments would not have been prejudicial to him because his participation as principal in the crime charged with respondent Ruiz in the original informations, could not be prejudiced by the proposed amendments.’
x x x x
Such amendment to insert in the information real name of the accused involves merely a matter of form as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the accused of a fair opportunity to present a defense; neither is the nature of the offense charged affected or altered since the revelation of accused's real name does not change the theory of the prosecution nor does it introduce any new and material fact.[19] In fact, it is to be expected that the information has to be amended as the unknown participants in the crime became known to the public prosecutor.[20]
"Abuse of superior strength" having already been alleged in the original information charging homicide, the amendment of the name of the crime to murder, constitutes a mere formal amendment permissible even after arraignment
x x x
To amend the information so as to change the crime charged for homicide to the more serious offense of murder after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the former is indubitably proscribed by the first paragraph of the above-quoted provision. For certainly a change from homicide to murder is not a matter of form; it is one of substance with very serious consequences."[24]Indeed, petitioner forcefully and strongly submits that, in the light of this ruling, we are allegedly obliged to grant his prayer for the reversal of the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals and the affirmance of the trial court’s ruling that the post-arraignment amendment sought by the People is prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same being a substantial amendment prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
The cited ruling, however, differs from the case at bench because the facts herein sustain a contrary holding. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
"x x x the original Information, while only mentioning homicide, alleged:x x x x
Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe as the accused; [sic] of Danny Buhat stabbing the deceased Ramon while his two other companions were holding the arms of Ramon, thus, ‘the information already alleged superior strength’; and inflicting mortal wounds which led to the death of Ramon.
Superior strength qualifies the offense to murder (Article 248).
xxx xxx xxx
Before us, the Information already alleged superior strength, and the additional allegation that the deceased was stabbed by Buhat while the arms of the former were being held by the two other accused, referring to John Doe and Richard Doe. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
If the killing is characterized as having been committed by superior strength, then to repeat, there is murder x x x
Also the case of Dacuycuy was mentioned, as a justification for not allowing change of designation from homicide to murder, but then the body of the Information in the Dacuycuy ruling did not allege averments which qualifies [sic] the offense of murder. The case before us instead is different in that the Information already alleges that Buhat attacked the deceased while his two other companions held him by the arms, ‘using superior strength.’ x x x We would even express the possibility that if supported by evidence, Buhat and the Altavases could still be penalized for murder even without changing the designation from homicide to murder, precisely because of aforementioned allegations. The proposed change of the word form homicide to murder, to us, is not a substantial change that should be prohibited."[25]
Applying our aforegoing disquisition in the 1946 case of Regala, we likewise ruled in the 1983 case of People v. Court of Appeals[17] that a post-arraignment amendment to further allege conspiracy, is only a formal amendment not prejudicial to the rights of the accused and proper even after the accused has pleaded "not guilty" to the charge under the original information. We held in said case of People v. Court of Appeals:
"x x x The trial Judge should have allowed the amendment x x x considering that the amendments sought were only formal. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his memorandum, ‘there was no change in the prosecution’s theory that respondent Ruiz willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and shot with a gun Ernesto and Rogelio Bello x x x. The amendments would not have been prejudicial to him because his participation as principal in the crime charged with respondent Ruiz in the original informations, could not be prejudiced by the proposed amendments.’
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