As for the administratrix’s invocation of the Dead Man’s Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each other’s claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man’s Statute;[28] besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them.
The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on review, the pertinent portion of which reads:
In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony.[29] Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence—the checks.x x x
The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein.
x x x[27] (Underscoring supplied)
As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each other’s claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man’s Statute;[28] besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them.
The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on review, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in each other’s favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.But Sanson’s and Celedonia’s claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonia’s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sanson’s claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other’s transaction.
Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law speaks of “parties or assignors of parties to a case.” Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each other’s behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis supplied)
In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony.[29] Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
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