On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this element was not clearly established by the People's evidence and he, therefore, draws the conclusion that respondent court seriously erred in presuming the existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores the fact that intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person (Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil. 368 [1951]; 1 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977, p. 45; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197). And what was the external demeanor which petitioner showed from which the trial court and respondent court inferred animus furandi? These circumstances were vividly spelled in the body of the judgment which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over which he remains indifferent even at this crucial stage. Withal, the sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act in bringing out the tires from his bodega which were loaded on his pick–up (People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 [1929]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 46; Section 3(b), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence). At any rate, dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special statute like the Anti–FencingLaw of 1979 (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58) because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577 (1915); 1 Reyes, supra, at p. 59; 1 Aquino, supra, at p. 52). Verily, when it was proved that petitioner committed the unlawful acts alleged in the information, it was properly presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and with criminal intent, and it was incumbent upon him to rebut such a presumption -- a burden which petitioner regrettably failed to discharge (United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303 (1910); 1 Aquino, supra, at p. 45). Moreover, the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1612 that:
Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
must be upheld in the light of petitioner's shallow demurrer premised on a denial and alibi, since a disputable presumption on this score is sufficient until overcome by contrary evidence (Sibal and Salazar, Compendium on Evidence, Second Ed., 1988, p. 290).
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Presidential Decree No. 1612, because Section 3(a) thereof includes the accessory penalty pertaining thereto vis-a-vis Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code:
a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.
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